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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Die vorliegende wissenschaftliche Arbeit untersucht kritische Faktoren zur Abschätzung der 
Effektivität der existierenden Instrumente Zugang und Vorteilsausgleich (im Folgenden ABS, 
Access and Benefit Sharing nach Art. 15 der Convention on Biodiversity) auf nationaler und 
internationaler Ebene hinsichtlich der effektiven Umsetzung der damit verbundenen Ziele.  
Mit Hilfe der New Institutional Economics (NIE) wurden eine Reihe geeigneter Indikatoren für 
die o. a. Faktoren identifiziert. Eine globale schriftliche Befragung bei den Beteiligten am 
internationalen ABS-Prozess zu den Umsetzungsbedingungen der ABS- Instrumente 
bestätigte die Wichtigkeit and Gültigkeit der theoretisch abgeleiteten Faktoren und Indikatoren. 
Es wurde zudem bestätigt, dass die nationale Position zur ABS Politik sowie deren Umsetzung 
reagiert auf dynamische interne und externe Faktoren, z.B. politischen Druck, sich ändernde 
Nachfragesituation, neue Konkurrenten, neue Forschungsergebnisse, technologische 
Innovationen, Kritik von NGOs, dem Privatsektor, von Medien und Regierungen sowie 
Änderungen der gesetzlichen Rahmenbedingungen. 
 
Die Arbeit geht auch auf die Frage ein, inwieweit institutionelles Lernen während der 
Verhandlungen zum Nagoya Protokoll über ABS beobachtet werden konnten. Es konnte 
gezeigt werden, dass verschiedene innovative Prozesse genutzt wurden, um Blockaden im 
Verhand-lungsprozess zu überwinden, so dass man in der Tat von einem signifikanten 
Lernprozess während der Verhandlungen zum Nagoya Protokoll sprechen kann. Eine 
Herausforderung wird sein, dieses Lernen zu institutionalisieren, damit es die Implementierung 
von ABS informieren kann. Aus den Ergebnissen der Arbeit wird die Empfehlung abgeleitet, 
einen polyzentrischen Ansatz für die ABS-Implementierung zu wählen, der sich auf die 
Erfahrungen des institutionellen Lernens gründet. Dieser Ansatz betont, dass die 
Implementierung des Protokolls nur dann erfolgreich sein kann, wenn die Privatwirtschaft 
sowie indigene und lokale Gemeinschaften in den Prozess eingebunden werden.  
Die Namibische Fallstudie zeigt die Nützlichkeit der identifizierten kritischen Faktoren und 
Indikatoren für die Beurteilung von ABS Implementierung. Für Namibia wurde diese 
Entwicklung als klar positiv eingeschätzt. Die Ergebnisse der Fallstudie können zur Gestaltung 
einer angemessenen ABS-Politik sowie zur Optimierung ihrer Durchführung beitragen. 
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ABSTRACT 
The research presented in this thesis firstly investigates critical factors for assessing the 
effectiveness of existing Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS) instruments at the national and 
international levels with respect to the effective implementation of the associated goals in line 
with Article 15 of the CBD. The analysis and identification of indicators for the critical factors 
took place within the theoretical framework of New Institutional Economics (NIE). 
 
A global stakeholder survey on the necessary conditions for effective ABS instruments 
implementation confirmed the importance and validity of the theoretically derived critical factors 
and their indicators. Besides, it was confirmed that national ABS policy and implementation 
respond to dynamic internal and external factors like political pressure, changing market 
demand, new competitors, new scientific findings, technology innovations, criticism from 
NGOs, industry, media, governments as well as legal changes.  
 
The study also looked at the question as to whether institutional learning was observed during 
the negotiation of the Nagoya Protocol. This was confirmed given that different innovative 
processes were used to transcend some of the blockages that blocked fluidity in negotiations 
and one can thus indeed speak of a significant learning process during the negotiations of the 
Nagoya Protocol. Based on the insights from the findings, a polycentric approach to ABS 
implementation is suggested, importantly involving both the private sector and indigenous and 
local communities if success is to be achieved. 
 
A case study in Namibia showed that the identified critical factors and their indicators are 
indeed useful tools for assessing ABS implementation. It showed a clear progression over time 
in how the Namibian government had been dealing with ABS. This assessment of the 
effectiveness of Namibia’s approach to ABS implementation provides useful insights and 
lessons that could lead to improvements in ABS policy and implementation. 
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Do your utmost in trivial things 
From that you can attain sincerity 
This sincerity becomes apparent 
From being manifest, it becomes brilliant 
Being brilliant it affects others 
Affecting others, 
It changes them 
Changing people, it transforms everything 
It is only those with utmost sincereity 
Who can transform everything 
It will change  
If you do your utmost, one by one, 
The world will change. 
The Classics: Asian Verse 
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CHAPTER 1 
BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 
In academia there are disciplines, but in real life we have problems 
~Anon  
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
We live in a world of human-imposed borders. These can be disciplinary, political, social, 
economic or institutional. While it can be argued that these borders serve various important 
needs, they can also serve as a serious deterrent to effective environmental management, 
conservation and ultimately global sustainable development (Farley et al, 2009 cited by Farley 
2009). Political borders are perhaps the most visible dimension of the imposed borders. They 
are, however, rarely established to respect ecosystem boundaries, and even if an effort were 
made to do so, ecosystems are interconnected and their boundaries vague and fluid, while 
political boundaries are rigidly delineated. 
 
Real world problems do not respect disciplinary or political border. Effective conservation, 
management and sustainable use of natural resources, therefore, require insights from social 
sciences, natural sciences and the humanities (Berkes and Folke, 1998). This is even more so 
as international environmental conventions which, essentially, are created to designs modern 
institutions to govern resources use, allocation and management. These are developed by 
diplomats, assisted by people from different academic and occupational backgrounds with a 
divergence of interests, in the quest for sustainable development.  
 
Many developing countries today face various challenges, including the need for better, 
predictable and sustainable, new and additional financial resources to ensure effective 
implementation of environmental measures of sustainability. At the same time politicians from 
the so-called industrialised part of our world claim other pressing needs which prevent them 
from reacting positively to calls by their partners from non-industrialised countries. This 
dichotomy has created yet another border - that of a world divided by international discourse 
in which divisions are no longer clear cut. The real-world challenges of achieving sustainable 
development persist, regardless of which border you reside behind. 
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Today however, it has become clear that most challenges that we face in the environment 
sectors are driven by economic forces. We, therefore, need to recognise the need for economic 
analysis to help us make sense of them, and also to apply economic tools in our quest to 
address them (Farley, 2009).  
 
While economic growth provides a fair measure, the effectiveness of such tools further needs 
to be assessed according to how well they achieve ecological sustainability, just distribution of 
benefits and contribute to a high quality of life for those involved in these environmental 
sectors, as well as those who benefit from their utilisation.  
 
This study will, therefore, take a trans-disciplinary approach to assessing the effectiveness of 
Access to genetic resources and Benefit-Sharing1 (ABS) regimes based upon critical factors 
derived from New Institutional Economics (NIE). Indeed, by its very nature, ABS regulations 
and legislative frameworks exist at the juncture of many interlacing bodies of law that ‘criss-
cross’ the same biological material, bringing together a complex mix of scientific, conservation, 
trade, economic, human and legal elements that fit uneasily into a regulatory whole (Wynberg 
and Taylor, 2009). While no single law is ever likely to address these collectively, bringing 
traditional knowledge, innovation, science, biodiversity conservation, economic development, 
technology and equity, into an overall coherent and effective strategy, this remains the greatest 
challenge of all in this endeavour of regulating ABS (Ibid).  
 
The above is what has led to the long process of negotiating what is now known as the Nagoya 
Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing (the Nagoya Protocol) which is a key instrument 
towards such an overall coherent strategy to regulate ABS, because it is a key element that 
can facilitate the design of a global framework for sustainable development (ABS CDI, 2012). 
It represents a pivotal step forward in assisting countries to deal with ABS as providers and 
users of genetic resources. It not only aims at creating fair exchange conditions, but also 
provides enhanced legal certainty for valuing nature in a market economic approach and may 
be regarded as a building block for a global green economy (ABS CDI, 2012). 
                                               
1 Article 15.1 and 15.7 of the Convention on Biological Diversity provides for the sovereign rights of 
states over their resources and the need thus to regulate access to genetic resources as well as their 
right to stipulate the sharing of benefits from the utilization of genetic resources (CBD, 1992; Kamau et 
al, 2011). States have, therefore, been obliged to put in place the necessary administrative, police and 
legislative measures to regulate access to genetic resources and to ensure the equitable sharing of 
benefits. 
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The effective implementation of the Nagoya Protocol and domestic ABS instruments at the 
national level, however, remains a challenge given the complexities surrounding ABS and the 
need for a multi-dimensional, cross-sectoral and interdisciplinary approach. This study, 
therefore, attempts to focus on the effective implementation of ABS at the national and 
international levels through the use of a multi-lensed approach which combines new 
institutional economics, biology, psychology, ecology and environmental law. 
 
1.2 ABS & THE STATE OF THE CRITICAL FACTORS 
1.2.1 Snapshot of ABS and the Issues Around it 
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) objective of benefit-sharing has taken centre 
stage in a number of international arenas, as well as within the Convention itself. This 
Convention sets important new rules about the ways in which biological resources should be 
conserved, used and its benefits shared. It has provided renewed vigour to efforts to increase 
the share of benefits that poor communities receive from commercial use of their knowledge 
about biodiversity and biological resources (Wynberg, 2006). It is important to first explore the 
history of ABS and the activities that lead to the negotiations of the Nagoya Protocol on ABS. 
The “critical factors” one of the key objectives of this study will then make sense within this 
broader exploration of the history and issues surrounding ABS. 
 
The access and benefit-sharing provisions of the CBD have caused controversial debates 
between developing and developed countries and among advocacy groups from indigenous 
and local communities to business and industry (Siebenhüner and Suplie, 2005). The positions 
on ‘ABS’ were and remain highly polarized. Policy makers from provider countries and many 
NGOs for instance view companies and researchers as ‘bio-pirates’ while members of the 
business community regard the CBD as an ill-structured and uninformed UN-process, 
governed by politicians who vastly over-estimate the value of genetic resources (ten Kate and 
Laird, 1999, Blais 2002; ten Kate, 2002). Siebenhüner and Suplie (2005) argue that despite 
this polarisation, the fair and equitable sharing of benefits from genetic resources is a global 
trans-national problem that requires an international response. The complexity of this 
international response is further confounded by the fact that the players in this policy field are 
from various countries with highly divergent interests ranging from development aid, 
commercial interests in the pharmaceutical and agro-industry, to pure research.  
 
To understand the above situation and controversy one needs to go back to when the CBD 
was being negotiated. In a sense the power and interest constellation characterizing the 
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negotiation phase of the CBD (1989-1992) is better understood by reflecting and taking into 
consideration five factors as put forward by Rosendal (2006). These factors influenced the 
debate during the CBD negotiations and one can even go further, by saying that, it continued 
to influence the implementation of the CBD both at the national and international level. It can 
also be argued that these factors have an influence on the current negotiations for an 
international ABS regime under the CBD. 
 
The factors2 are: 
1. The bulk of terrestrial species diversity is found in tropical areas around the world and 
these areas constitute largely the poor parts of the world (United Nations Environment 
Programme [UNEP], 1995 cited in Rosendal, 2006). 
2. Genetic resources constitute important input factors for biotechnology and are of critical 
importance to agriculture, pharmaceutical, and chemical industries.  
3. Several biotechnological inventions build on food and medicinal plants that originate in 
the South as well as on traditional knowledge about valuable properties of plants or 
animal products. 
4. The development of modern biotechnology coincided with increased privatization of 
agricultural and pharmaceutical research in the 1970s. 
5. The difficulty of providing similar legal protection to traditional knowledge. 
The combination of these five factors contributed to the awareness of an existing imbalance 
between users and providers of genetic resources. They further provide the background for 
the developing countries’ claim for national sovereignty over access to genetic resources. The 
argument goes, from their point of view that, for all practical purposes their genetic capital was 
still considered a Common Heritage of Mankind, freely accessed by all (Raustiala & Victor, 
2004; Rosendal, 1991). Despite these and other opposing views and concerns, the CBD was 
adopted in 1992. The implications and underlying assumptions contained in the above factors, 
however, continued to permeate the debate within the CBD from both the perspective of 
providers and users of genetic resources, and thus shaped the future effectiveness of what is 
now known as the debate on Access and Benefits-sharing.  
 
Over the years, however there has been an evolution of the debate within the CBD which led 
to a growing mutual understanding within the international community, governmental and non-
governmental sector, that a new way of treating trade in genetic resources and for regulating 
                                               
2 Note that these are not yet the critical factors that this study is focusing but rather factors influencing 
the negotiation of an ABS regime as determined by Rosendal (2006)  
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bio-prospecting is needed (Siebenhüner and Suplie, 2005, Richerzhagen and Holm-Müller, 
2005). The underlying foundation is that: in order for users to gain access to resources they 
must provide benefits to the provider country, including technology transfer, and, in order to 
receive such benefits, a provider country must facilitate access to genetic resources (ten Kate 
& Laird, 1999, Svarstad & Dillion, 2000; CBD, 2002, Rosendal, 2006, Kamau et al, 2011).  
 
The Parties to the CBD spent 10 years negotiating and debating access and equity, 
culminating in the development of the Bonn Guidelines, that aim to provide Parties to the 
Convention with a set of voluntary guidelines to help them deal with this very complex issue, 
especially in terms of implementation. The guidelines propose a range of measures that user 
and provider countries should consider when implementing the CBD’s ABS specifications 
(Bonn Guidelines, 2001).  
 
Some of the concrete measures proposed in the guidelines are as follows: 
 How to include the principles of prior informed consent (PIC) and mutually agreed terms 
(MAT) in bioprospecting agreements, 
 How to deal with traditional knowledge (TK) on an equitable basis, 
 Disclosure of holders of traditional knowledge and countries of origin in patent 
applications, and, 
 A certification system for trade in genetic resources. 
The effective implementation of the ABS provisions can be characterized as a pragmatic step-
by-step approach that takes account of the existing different rationales and interests. It was, 
however, the view of some Parties to the Convention, especially from the developing parts of 
the world, that the voluntary nature of the guidelines did not foster widespread use and 
implementation of the guidelines. It seems that the status quo was being preferred somehow 
by some players. The industrialised countries, with their now well established and growing 
biotechnology sector, were concerned about maintaining free access to genetic resources 
(Rosental, 2006) and the developing countries were viewed as wanting to restrict access to 
genetic resources and reap significant benefits. The voluntary nature of the Bonn Guidelines 
did not facilitate a move forward, as not many governments were putting in place the necessary 
measures to implement the Bonn Guidelines and, thereby ensure effective access to genetic 
resources and the sharing of benefits.  
 
A call was made for an international regime on ABS to be developed. This call became one of 
the political successes out of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in 
Johannesburg, South-Africa. This prominence given to ABS in international processes has 
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sparked a significant interest in the concept of ABS especially in terms of its effective 
implementation at the national and international levels. The argument goes: without access it 
is presumed that there will be fewer benefits to share. Without benefit sharing, there will be 
fewer resources conserved for future use. This places ABS right at the centre stage of 
sustainable development, not only for the developing countries, but also for developed 
countries. This is because it is seen as having the potential, if appropriately and effectively 
implemented, to provide both economic and other incentives for sustainable use, management 
and conservation of biodiversity. It would also, therefore, address the imbalances that have 
fuelled the need for the CBD itself. 
 
The topic of ABS in terms of research is not new (Richerzhagen, 2007; Richerzhagen and 
Holm-Müller, 2005). A number of scholars have analyzed it from different angles. Wynberg 
(2006) for instance maintained that the commercialisation of Non Timber Forest Products 
within the frame of ABS is not a silver bullet and that different approaches to commercialisation, 
combined with the varied characteristics of different species, products and trade chains, yield 
very different environmental, social and economic outcomes. Her central thesis was that 
commercialisation approaches that involve partnerships between the private sector, NGOs, 
and producer organisation, with strong state oversight, are most likely to result in practices that 
are ecologically sustainable, economically efficient, socially just and pro-poor, as well as 
institutionally robust.  
 
In an interesting study Siebenhüner and Suplie (2005) considered the ABS debate from an 
institutional learning perspective. According to them, for a process to qualify as an institutional 
learning process, it has to refer to a collective level that exceeds the realm of individual 
decision-making and renders them social. They further define institutions3 as collectively 
shared norms, values and belief systems that govern the behaviour or collective actors. From 
this perspective the CBD, within which ABS is imbedded, makes for an interesting case of 
institutional learning given the fact that the Convention process is a highly dynamic one with 
different phases and periodic advances (Siebenhüner and Suplie, 2005). They further maintain 
that in addition, research and development in the field of biotechnology is developing 
dynamically and quite rapidly putting up new challenges for political responses. Any 
international agreement on ABS will, therefore, need to take account of these processes and 
divergent interests in its institutional design and be able to respond accordingly.  
                                               
3 They adopted the definition of institutions as used by the Science Plan of the Institutional Dimensions 
Project of the International Human Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental Change (IHDP, 
1999) 
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Sampath (2005) looked at the issue of regulating bioprospecting by examining optimal property 
rights structures and institutional mechanisms for regulating bioprospecting for drug research. 
She essentially focused on contract theory, one of the central tenets of NIE. It showed that the 
rights exchanged are complementary at each stage of drug discovery and development of 
genetic resources. From this perspective the bioprospecting collaborations in several countries 
were examined and the work provided a critique on institutional and contractual factors that 
led to their failure or success. It thus provides significant insight and guidance as well as 
information on the issue of establishing bioprospecting programmes, agreements to regulate 
access and equitable benefit-sharing. 
 
Täuber (2011) carried out an in-depth governance analysis of transactions involving genetic 
resources, with the aim of developing an instrument for contract standardisation for ABS under 
the CBD. Her work provides the starting point for developing a contract standardisation 
instrument in the form of menus for model contract clauses for ABS agreements. As it is 
common practice in empirical studies on governance decisions to take the perspective of 
the entity acquiring a good, service or right and to survey data only from this transaction 
party, her empirical work did not survey the provider perspective explicitly, which of course 
means that her work provides a good perspective on the state of play only from the user 
perspective, with regard to the implementation of ABS contracts. 
1.2.2 Overview of the Critical Factors for Assessing the Effectiveness of 
ABS 
Richerzhagen (2007) argued that despite the fact that many scholars analysed the ABS issue 
from various perspectives as evident from the examples above, there was still a lack of an 
adequate theoretical framework for the analysis of the effectiveness of the concept. 
 
It is, therefore, she maintains, necessary to develop a new analytical framework based on 
insights of new institutional economic theory, but also based on findings from the case studies 
that she carried out during her research process. She used an approach that combined 
deductive and inductive reasoning processes to establish a new analytic framework for 
assessing the effectiveness of the implementation of ABS at national and international levels.  
 
The new institutional economic theory was chosen because it appears the most appropriate 
theory. It provides suitable approaches to analyze the problems that occur during the 
implementation of ABS and offers adequate solutions to these problems. 
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According to (Richerzshagen, 2007) the effectiveness of the implementation of ABS, therefore, 
can be measured against the three objectives of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
which are: 
i) Conservation of biodiversity 
ii) Facilitation of access, and,  
iii) Enhancement of a fair and equitable benefit-sharing. 
Within this broad view of assessing the effectiveness of the implementation of ABS, 
Richerzhagen (2007) argued that it can further be refined by using a method that can provide 
an analysis that integrates a multilevel approach by examining the implementation of the ABS 
concept on the national and international level. She, therefore, came up with an analytical 
framework within her study that is derived from the application of new institutional economics 
theory’s major aspects to the concept of ABS.  
 
The major aspects of new institutional economics4 are: 
i) Property rights, 
ii) Bargaining solutions 
iii) Transaction costs and 
iv) Information asymmetries 
The work of Richerzhagen (2007) thus established an analytic framework to measure the 
effectiveness of the ABS concept on the national and regional level. She defined the 
effectiveness of the implementation of ABS as the capability of ABS regime to: 
i) set incentives for the sustainable use and the conservation of biodiversity, 
ii) to facilitate access to plant genetic material, and, 
iii) to enhance a fair and equitable benefit-sharing, which according to (Richerzhagen, 
2007) also implies the prevention of the misappropriation and the unapproved use 
of genetic resources. 
The main source of information for the study carried out by Richerzhagen (2007) was 
qualitative data collected through cases studies, primary and secondary literature with a focus 
on environmental and new institutional economics and biodiversity and biodiversity related 
topics. 
 
                                               
4 The NIE key concepts are discussed in further detail chapter 2 
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To enable her to measure the realization of these objectives, their determinants, and the 
factors, she defined a number of elements which she aptly named critical factors. She derived 
these factors by applying economic theory to the loss of biodiversity and the ABS concept and 
from the empirical findings of four ABS country case studies. 
 
The case studies she carried out provided a comprehensive and a comparative analysis of 
national and regional experiences in developing and implementing ABS policies, laws, 
institutions and regulatory regimes. The case studies became the vehicle through which she 
derived the critical factors and which she used to test their feasibility by analyzing how they 
are shaped in a country-specific context, i.e. whether they are already addressed, and/or 
whether gaps still existed. The countries she used for the case studies were Costa Rica, 
Ethiopia and the Philippines. 
 
From the results of their investigation Richerzhagen and Holm-Müller (2005) argued that the 
main objective of any ABS scheme is setting the incentives right. These can be complicated 
by unclear or inefficient property rights regimes, by enforcement problems due to time lags and 
informational asymmetries, and administrative complexity. The critical factors that 
Richerzhagen (2007) derived are:  
i) Assigning property rights and intellectual property rights, 
ii) Accounting for time lags, 
iii) Political and legal security in provider countries, 
iv) Information asymmetry concerning the behaviour of the investor, 
v) Administrative complexity, 
vi) Market Structure. 
1.2.3 Assumptions about the Critical Factors 
The underlying assumptions on which the critical factors are based can be seen as the 
following: 
i) The way we deal with the critical factors will determine whether or not we are 
successful in regulating access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing, 
ii) The critical factors provide a means to compare countries in terms of how they are 
dealing with the ABS issues at domestic levels, 
iii) The special circumstances of each country should not have a significant influence 
or impact on the outcome based on the critical factors and, therefore, they provide 
a good basis for comparisons across countries, 
iv) The critical factors are important not only at the national level but also at the 
international level. 
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1.3. RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY 
There are some limitations to the work of Richerzhagen (2007) and Richerzhagen and Holm-
Müller (2005), the most important being: 
i) Her study covered very few countries so it is not yet clear whether her results are 
generally applicable to other countries, 
ii) Her study was too broad for a general overview of the prevailing situations in the 
different countries concerned, 
iii) Indicators were not identified, 
iv) She may have overlooked important factors, given the fact that her work is the only 
study from this angle thus far. 
The current study aims, therefore, to address some of these limitations; it will therefore also 
attempt to apply ‘critical factors’ to both national and international levels for the international 
process on ABS. 
1.4 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The overall objective of this study is threefold; first it aims to confirm the critical factors in terms 
of their effectiveness to ABS, as well as the underlying assumptions in terms of ABS 
implementation at the national and international levels. It then seeks to carry out an in-depth 
re-consideration and analysis of, the critical factors, and lastly to develop indicators for the 
critical factors. This is thus another way of verifying the critical factors by means of a broad 
international survey. It is important to point out that the focus of the study was not to do a 
review of the Nagoya Protocol or domestic instruments in terms of their legal or non-legal 
aspects, but rather on the characteristics necessary to make implementation effective. 
 
The study has six (6) specific objectives which are as follows: 
1.4.1 Strategic Objective 1 
Determine whether the assumptions on the critical factors are valid at the international level. 
The research question that this objective seeks to answer is whether the assumptions 
regarding the critical factors are valid at all levels i.e. national and international levels. 
1.4.2. Strategic Objective 2 
Confirm whether the critical factors can be used as a comparison within a country to track the 
various changes that occur within a country in terms of dealing with ABS and what this means 
for a country.  
The research question for this strategic objective is whether the critical factors can be used to 
track changes within a country. This objective will be met through a case study of Namibia to 
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test the assumptions on the critical factors within a country and to see whether they can indeed 
be used to track changes within a country. 
1.4.3 Strategic Objective 3 
Confirm whether the dynamism of the evolution of ABS due to internal and external factors at 
the national level or international levels has an impact on the critical factors, 
The research question for this strategic objective is whether the internal and external factors5 
that influence change in the ABS policy arena have an impact on the critical factors. The 
internal and external factors have been derived from factors considered by (Siebenhüner and 
Suplie, 2005): 
 Key Political pressure 
 Changing demand levels 
 New competitors 
 New scientific findings 
 Technology innovations 
 Criticism from NGO 
 Criticism from Industry 
 Criticism from Media 
 Criticism from Governments 
 Change in legal frameworks
                                               
5 The basis of these factors came from the work of Siebenhüner and Supplie (2005). They pointed out 
that these factors are political pressures, changing demand structures, new competitors, new scientific 
findings, technological innovations, criticisms from NGOs, other parts of industry or from media. The 
other two factors, namely, criticism from government and change in legal framework, were added under 
this study.  
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1.4.4 Strategic Objective 4  
Confirm whether the definition of effectiveness of ABS hold true for all providers and 
users 
The research question for addressing this strategic objective is whether the understanding of 
the definition of the effectiveness of an ABS system is the same for all parties involved i.e. both 
provider and users, or can there be a difference in understanding about the success or 
definition of the effectiveness of an instrument? This means: what is successful or effective 
from the point of view of a provider country versus a user country? 
The study proceeds with the definition of effectiveness as defined by Richerzhagen (2007) as 
the capability of the Nagoya Protocol and domestic ABS legal instruments to do the following: 
 Set incentives for the sustainable use and conservation of biodiversity 
 Set incentives to facilitate access to genetic resources 
 Set incentives for the assertion and recognition of rights related to genetic resources 
and associated traditional knowledge 
 Set incentives to allow for the flow of benefits to both user and providers of genetic 
resources 
 
Slight modifications have been made to the definition by Richerzhagen (2007). Her definition 
did not include the fourth bullet which is incentives to allow for the flow of benefits to both user 
and providers of genetic resources. Her definition essentially was to look at effectiveness in 
relation to the three objectives as set by the CBD. 
1.4.5 Strategic Objective 5 
Determine if organizational learning6 or institutional learning has an impact on the development 
and changes on domestic legislation as well as the development of the Nagoya Protocol on 
ABS. 
Organizational learning within an institution can be regarded as important. The study will, 
therefore, attempt to answer the research question through a desk study approach based on 
a literature review and experts interviews, as to whether organizational learning took place in 
the CBD during the work of the ABS working group, which had the mandate to negotiate the 
international regime,now known as the Nagoya Protocol. This is essential since the finalization 
                                               
6 The factors under strategic objective 5 will also be considered under this objective since these factors 
can also be used to assess change. According to Siebenhüner and Suplie (2005), for the study of 
learning processes in organizations, these external and internal influences can be highly significant.  
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of the negotiations of the Protocol in 2010 will herald in the implementation phase of the 
Protocol by the Parties to the CBD.  
1.4.6 Strategic Objective 6  
Develop indicators for the critical factors 
The research question guiding the last strategic objective is whether good indicators exist for 
the critical factors at the national level. The work towards achieving strategic objective 1 to 5 
generated the necessary body of knowledge by way of a desk study approach as well as 
through interviews, in order to develop the indicators for the critical factors. They were derived 
from a comprehensive and comparative in-depth analysis of available literature of national, 
regional and international experiences in developing and implementing ABS policies, laws, 
institutions and regulatory regimes with a few to determining their effectiveness. The desk 
study was enriched with information gathered in workshops and conferences as well as 
through interviews.  
1.5 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH  
A suitable combination of literature review, desk studies, surveys and expert interviews was 
carried out to look at the s state of the art and to provide the theoretical foundation for the study 
and empirical work. The same approach has been used for the overall study. The literature 
review culminated in the critical analysis of the effectiveness of the critical factors as well as 
an analysis of the critical factors themselves. The review also leads directly into the 
development of indicators for the critical factors. Chapter 3 discusses the methodologies 
employed for each objective under this study in further detail. 
1.6 CONTRIBUTION AND OUTLOOK 
This study takes the work of Richerzhagen (2007) further. In her thesis she pointed out that a 
new focus has been brought into the debate on ABS in terms of addressing effective 
implementation of the ABS instruments at the domestic and international level. This will foster 
the move towards achieving the three objectives of the CBD. At the time of her work the 
negotiations for an international regime were ongoing in earnest. Today the Nagoya Protocol 
has been in place since 2010 and world governments are busy working towards its signing, 
ratification, accession and eventual full and effective implementation. 
 
The players in the ABS field have not changed since the time she has finished her work. Today 
a significant amount of literature is being generated on the Nagoya Protocol. What is needed 
is action - guided by a careful design of regulation for the Nagoya Protocol. Action to see 
whether the architecture of the Protocol, as designed by the ABS negotiators, will stand the 
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test of time, or whether it will fall, rendering the Protocol useless, impractical and un-
implementable. 
 
This current study also does not have the all the answers. It simply points the way and much 
more work needs to be undertaken by those willing and able to continue running with the flame 
of hope that one day world governments, industry, civil society, research and academia and 
the local and indigenous communities around the world will effectively implement the 
provisions of the Nagoya Protocol and domestic ABS instruments, leading to the sustainable 
use of biodiversity and the generation of benefits, in order to flow through ABS transactions 
and off-set conservation. 
1.7 STUDY OVERVIEW 
1.7.1 Research Approach and Structure of the Thesis 
This research focuses on assessing the effectiveness of instruments for Access and Benefit-
Sharing (ABS) implementation both at the national (domestic ABS administrative, legal and 
policy measures) and at the international level (Nagoya Protocol).  
 
This assessment here outlined, will be based on the critical factors and indicators (these are 
discussed in detail in chapter 1) derived for the critical factors. These critical factors were 
derived by Richardshagen (2007) using New Institutional Economics (NIE) as the theoretical 
frame. 
 
The Nagoya Protocol (NP) on ABS was negotiated under the CBD and has now to be 
implemented by member States once it comes into force. Institutional learning will be explored 
from the point of view of effectiveness of ABS implementation post-Nagoya. The study aims to 
ascertain whether the organizational learning that has emerged during the long and protracted 
negotiation process, if any, provides for a best practice that can guide the process of 
implementation of the Nagoya Protocol, as well as for the development of domestic ABS 
instruments. 
 
A mix of methodologies has been employed ranging from literature review, exploratory and 
standardized data collection and the corresponding evaluation techniques, are applied for all 
specific objectives. The literature review served to facilitate the choice of appropriate theories 
to guide and narrow down the set of variables within the frame of NIE for closer investigation. 
 
The dissertation is structured into 9 chapters which are briefly outlined below: 
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Chapter 1 provides the background and problem statement for this research and introduces 
the research subject ‘effectiveness of ABS administrative, legal and policy measures’. This 
chapter thus provides the state of the art with regard to the ‘critical factors‘. It then describes 
the strategic objectives of the study, the methodological approach and the countribution and 
outlook of the study.  
 
Chapter 2 provides the theoretical framework for the dissertation which is based on New 
Institutional Economics (NIE). It introduces the key concepts of NIE and their relevance to the 
ABS policy arena and discusses at some length the issues of effectiveness, efficiency and 
legitimacy in terms of ABS from the NIE perspective. 
 
Chapter 3 As essentially effective ABS implementation means that the market of 
bioprospecting is regulated effectively and transactions costs are low, a review of literature on 
bioprospecting was carried out to look at the issues and challenges around it. This chapter 
therefore takes a look at the issue of Bioprospecting and its relevance to the ABS. It introduces 
the link between the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Nagoya Protocol on ABS. It 
further attempts to put the issue of market for bioprospecting into perspective as well as the 
link between biotechnology and bioprospecting and finally concludes with an overview of the 
Nagoya Protocol on ABS. The Nagoya Protocol is central to the effective implementation of 
domestic ABS instruments as it provides the minimum requirements and central understanding 
of the key concepts of ABS at the international level. Therefore, this chapter provides a brief 
overview of the protocol and its key elements. 
 
Chapter 4 Serves as the main chapter for reviewing the literature neccessary for the 
development of the indicators for the critical factors as well as the further refinement and 
formulation of the existing critical factors and new critical factors. The literature review on the 
derivation of indicators for ABS considers the outcome of various studies that assessed the 
implementation of ABS instruments at the national level with the aim of identifying whether 
there are elements that emerge that can be used as potential indicators for the critical factors. 
 
Chapter 5 provides the methodologies used in carrying out the empirical parts of the study. 
The three main methods that underlie the research component of the dissertation are provided. 
i.e. the literature review, exploratory investigations, and a online survey on the effectiveness 
of ABS from various stakeholders. A case study on Namibia was carried out to test the 
indicators and to validate the critical factors and their underlying assumptions. Some aspects 
of the methodologies for this study are presented in this section although the bulk of 
methodologies are dealt with in greater depth in the chapter on Namibia itself. 
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Chapter 6 provides the results and discussion of the international survey on the effectiveness 
of ABS instruments. The indicators for the respective critical factors that arose out of this study 
are provided and discussed. The assumptions on the critical factors are provided and 
confirmed as well as the internal and external factors that may potentially affect the critical 
factors. This chapter also provides the definition of effectiveness of ABS implementation 
amongst others and concludes with reccommendations.  
 
Chapter 7 focuses on organizational or institutional learning from within the CBD negotiations 
towards the Nagoya Protocol on ABS. This chapter aims to provide guidance in terms of the 
implementation of the Nagoya Protocol at the international level, based on the institutional 
learning that led to the adoption of the Protocol. This is because effective implementation of 
the Nagoya Protocol is critical for operationalisation of the ABS framework at the National level. 
The indicators derived demonstrate that what will happen with regard to the implementation of 
the Nagoya Protocol impact on whether implementation of ABS at the national level is effective 
or not. Therefore, this chapter takes a critical look at ABS within the context of the CBD as an 
international institution and provides a new way of interaction based on institutional learning 
from the ABS Working Group that negotiated the Nagoya Protocol. 
 
Chapter 8 first considers the literature review on Namibia in terms of ABS implementation. It 
then presents the results of the case study structured by the various phases and stakeholders. 
As  interviewees were asked what they thought the lessons learnt were, these are also 
presented at the relevant sections in the results. There are no interpretative sections within the 
results section as they simply represent the results as they came from the interviews. The 
discussion is structured around the findings and interpretation of the results from the interviews 
by stakeholders. This is then followed by a focus on the key issues that arose for each of the 
critical factors in terms of ABS implementation in Namibia. It then provides an overall 
discussion on the findings. This chapter then concludes by considering all the key issues from 
the discussion and provides recommendations. 
 
Chapter 9 Is the final chapter that attempts to pull everything together by providing over all 
conclusions and policy reccommendations and implications of the dissertation. The chapter 
concludes with discussing the limitations of the study as well as its contribution and outlook for 
further research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY 
 
We live in a world of human imposed borders – political, disciplinary, and institutional. 
~J. Farley 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
New institutional economics uses different approaches to understand the performance of 
institutions (Betancourt, 2009; North 1997, Drobak and Nye 1997). Two important concepts 
among these are transaction costs and property rights. The principal premise is that the real 
cost of economic activities includes not only transformation costs but also transaction costs 
(Gandhi and Crase, 2009). Often, transaction costs are ignored, and when large, substantially 
reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of economic activities. A major effect of good 
institutions is to reduce transaction costs. According to North (1997), the major challenge is to 
evolve institutions in which:  
1. The transaction costs are minimised, 
2. The incentives favour cooperative solutions, in which experiences and collective 
learning are best utilised. 
The obvious question then to ask is what is an institution? Nabli and Nugent (1989, ch. 1) 
answer this question in the following manner. An institution is a set of constraints which 
governs the behavioural relations among individuals or groups. These constraints can take the 
form of either rules or behavioural norms. Both formal and informal organizations fall within the 
definitions as well as implicit and explicit contracts and rules of conduct (Betancourt, 2009). 
New institutional economics, then, identifies formal institutions - which have their foundation in 
the laws and structures of organised society, as well as informal institutions which often 
spontaneously develop to address specific issues and problems in the society (Williamson 
2000, Olson 2000, Picciotto 1995 cited by Gandhi and Crase, 2009). 
 
The effort to move economics beyond the limitations of neoclassical methods and models, and 
the progress that is being achieved is considered as truly exciting by Joskow (2008). The 
founders of the International Society for New Institutional Economics (ISNIE) in 1997 were 
motivated by NIE according to Joskow (2008). He further maintains that the founders of ISNIE 
had (and have) a broad range of interests and in and approaches to economic analysis. 
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Nevertheless, according to Joskow (2008) they shared a common set of basic beliefs which 
defined the research topics they would focus upon and the research methods that they would 
use and sought to foster the following: 
 Legal, political, social and economic institutions (‘institutions”) have important effects 
on economic performance. The effects of alternative public policies aimed at improving 
economic performance in various dimensions will vary along with the institutions that 
are available to respond to them. 
 Institutions may be analysed using the same types of rigorous theoretical and empirical 
methods which have been developed in the neoclassical tradition whilst recognizing 
that additional tools may be useful to better understand the development and role of 
institutions in affecting economic performance. 
 Theoretical and empirical analysis should be interactive and evolve together over time. 
Theory identifies relationships that may be examined empirically, whereas empirical 
regularities and “anomalies” raise questions about the relevance of received theory and 
suggest new targets of opportunity for theoretical advances. 
 Interdisciplinary research may make important contributions to understanding the role 
of institutions and how they affect economic behaviour and performance. Contributions 
from history, law, psychology, anthropology, sociology, religion, environmental 
sciences and related disciplines may play an important role in advancing our 
understanding of institutions and their effects on the economy and the consequences 
of economic policies. 
 Longer-term dynamic considerations associated with technological change, the 
diffusion of innovations, and the impacts of institutions on both, should play a more 
central role in economic analysis. 
 Our understanding of institutions should be rich enough to allow us to apply economic 
theory and empirical knowledge to a wide range of economic, cultural and political 
settings: industrialised and non-industrialised countries; countries with a range of 
political systems, including variations of the implementation of “democracy”; countries 
with a range of cultural, religious, ethnic, tribal, and family traditions. 
 Institutional analysis seeks to understand the role of government and political 
institutions in policy formation, implementation, and economic performance, but it does 
not itself have a political agenda.
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When new institutional economist speaks of institutions they have in mind the following 
(Furubotn and Richter, 2005; North, 2006, Joskow, 2008, Betancourt, 2009): 
i) Macro level institutions 
These are humanly devised rules or ‘the rules of the game’. These rules structure 
interactions i.e. formal and informal rules in human affairs. Examples of formal rules are 
constitutions, laws and property rights, whereas informal rules constitute traditions, 
conventions and codes of conduct. 
2) Micro level institutions 
These are the rules of the game or institutions of governance including markets or other 
modes of managing activities/transactions and seeing activities/economic activities 
through. We are in this paper concerned with micro level rules that govern ABS 
transactions. 
2.2 THE RELEVANCE OF NIE FOR ABS 
New Institutional Economics theory is based on the notion that there are institutions or rules 
that govern our behavior. These rules, therefore, govern the interactions or transactions 
between individuals, groups, organizations or firms. In everyday conduct we engage in 
transactions. If however, the transaction costs are too high, then there is no deal If the cost is 
appropriate, then there could be a potential deal. These transactions however are confounded 
and made complex by information asymmetries (i.e. in most transactions there is always one 
agent with more information than the other agent) which results in contractual relations 
amongst those engaging in transactions. It is, therefore, necessary to address all of these 
challenges when a need to bargain for solutions arises.  
The above is relevant to the transactions that occur in bioprospecting or the ABS field and, 
therefore, provides the insights or perspective through which the current study explores the 
effectiveness of ABS instruments in terms of implementation of ABS. 
As the work by Sampath (2005), Richerzhagen (2007) and Täuber (2011) has extensively 
explored ABS from the perspective of NIE, what is presented here is essentially a summary of 
the key schools of NIE that underpin the work of this current study. 
 
The three schools of NIE that serve as the theoretical frame of this study are: 
 Property Rights Theory 
 Principle Agent Theory (sometimes known as the Formal Contract Theory) 
 Transaction Costs Economics 
The relevance and application of these three schools of NIE will be briefly explored with relation 
to the debate on ABS. 
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2.2.1 Property Rights Theory 
Barzel (1989) and Eggertsson (1990) contributed useful insights on the early property rights 
research literature. It can be argued that through these insights Barzel (1989) came to view 
the existance of transaction costs as the starting point of the property rights literature. The 
essential question.of ‘Who owns what?’ Has shaped human history since time immemorial 
(Furubotn and Richter, 2005 p. 79). Property rights are the right to consume, obtain income 
from, and alienate (sell) an asset (Barzel 1989). These rights are difficult to delineate because 
transactions are costly.  
 
The transaction costs identified by Barzel (1989) are those associated with the transfer, 
capture and protection of property rights. What underlies the costliness of transactions is that 
commodities have many attributes that vary from one item to another (Betancourt, 2009). This 
allows wealth to spill over into the public domain in every exchange and provides individuals 
with an incentive to spend resources in capturing this spill over. As a result, divided ownership 
of commodities yields increased gains from exchange by allowing transfers of subsets of 
attributes. Restrictions that enhance the separation of individual rights also enhance the gains 
resulting from exchange by allowing the existence of divided ownership. The latter, in turn, 
diminishes the attributes that remain in the public domain, and thus economizes on resources 
that would be spent on wealth capture.  
 
The relevance of the above is that an underlying principle in Barzel’s analysis is that individuals 
attempt to maximise their wealth. Thus the central issue of whether ownership should be 
private (individual) or social (collective), was and is a hotly debated issue that has contributed 
to the enormous bloodshed of the twentieth century (Furubotn and Richter, 2005 p.79). This 
struggle still continues today in various guises.  
 
Table 2.1 summarises the issues that arise from NIE with regard to property rights and their 
relevance to ABS. It is clear that the issue of ownership is also crucial in the ABS policy arena. 
This is demonstrated through the concepts used that try to capture ownership of genetic 
resources e.g. country of origin, provider country and user countries. This issue is complicated 
by the linking of genetic resources utilisation to traditional knowledge, thus bringing in the 
intellectual property rights dimensionas well.. As genetic resources move up the value chain 
through value addition, the intellectual property that is generated significantly increases the 
value of that genetic resource. The issue of ownership in the ABS sector is further complicated 
by the prevalence of materials accessed before the CBD came into force. Materials contained 
in the deep sea bed and in the Antarctic, particularly so, as some view these materials as being 
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collectively owned by humanity. The question thus arises whether morally the benefits derived 
from such material should, therefore, also be shared with humanity.  
Table 2.1 Property Rights Theory and its relevance to ABS 
1. PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 
THEORY  
NIE Perspective on ABS 
Property Rights  
(Institutional 
Environment analysis) 
a) The economic property 
rights of an individual; ability to 
consume a good or the service 
of an asset directly or to 
consume it indirectly through 
exchange. 
(1) the right to use an asset, (2) 
the right to earn income from 
an asset and contract over the 
terms with other individuals, 
and  
(3) the right to transfer 
ownership rights permanently 
to another party. 
b) The legal property rights are 
the property rights that are 
recognized and enforced by the 
government.  
 
In the ABS game, which player has the 
right to consume the goods or services 
i.e. the right to grant access to a the 
genetic resource and/or the associated 
traditional knowledge  
 
b) who confer the property rights the 
government (provider /user) or the 
international community of 
governments? Where does that leave 
the local and indigenous community? 
Commons 
 
A scarce resource used in 
common, from which it is not 
feasible to exclude potential 
beneficiaries from using or 
consuming it, and for which 
each actor's use or 
consumption of it subtracts 
from its availability to others 
Some aspect of TK applies to this 
issue as well as genetic resources in 
the high seas, deep seabed genetic 
resources and the Antarctic as well as 
trans boundary genetic resources and 
TK 
Social Capital Features of social 
organizations, such as trust, 
norms, and networks, that can 
improve the efficiency of 
society by facilitating 
coordinated actions. 
In ABS the transaction is fraud by 
serious distrust amongst the players 
for various reasons. This will have 
implication for the costs of the 
transactions, the enforcement and 
compliance of all players in the game 
Source Own, based on Holm-Müller and Täuber (2010), Kleinaltenkamp, 1993, p 85; North, 1992, p, 32; 
Ricther and Furubotn, 1996, p, 292; ), Ricther and Furubotn, 1996 Visser et al., 2000, p. 8, Williamson 
1991 reffering to McNeil 1974; Masten and Sausier, 2000, Sampath 2005, Holm-Müller et al, 2005, 
OECD 2003, Richerzhagen 2007) Benham (2013); , North 1990, Rai 2001:5 IPR cited in Sampath 
2.2.2 Principal Agent Theory (Formal Contract Theory) 
According to Furubotn and Richter (2005), people in modern society operate within a social 
network of legally binding and legally nonbinding obligations into which they enter either 
voluntarily or through compulsion. The relevance to the ABS perspective is that in ABS 
transactions, legally binding contractual obligations occur relating to the transfer of property 
rights with respect to genetic resources and traditional knowledge. Contractual obligations can 
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be prepared, concluded, and excercised within various institutional frameworks. Transaction 
costs play a major role in any exchange process. Amongst the most important economic 
challenges that arise because of transaction costs, and because of the passage of time 
between the formation of a contract and its performance, are those associated with asymetric 
information and transaction-specific investments (Furubotn and Richter, 2005). The problems 
that arise due to the two challenges can manifest both before and after the conclusion of a 
contract, causing ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs. Essentially contracts need to mitigate 
the allocation of the risk of contingencies. 
 
In most economic transactional relationships there are two economic actors present: the 
principal and the agent (Furubotn and Richter, 2005). The principal engages the agent to 
perform some service on his behalf, and to facilitate the achievement of the activity he 
delegates some decision-making authority to the agent. This relationship is characterised by 
the information asymetries after their contract has been finalised in three ways: 
1) The agent’s action is not directly observable by the principal, 
2) The agent has made some observations that the principal has not made, 
3) It is too costly for the principal to either directly monitor the agent’s actions or acquire 
full knowledge of the agent’s unique observational information. In NIE these are 
understood as hidden action and hidden information; both are assumptions of moral 
hazzard.  
Within the nature of transactions, it can be assumed that the agent will not always act in the 
best interest of the principal and, therefore, there is a need to design contract options that seek 
to ensure that the agent works in the best interest of the principal. In so doing, opportunistic 
behaviour is minimised.  
 
Table 2.2 below considers formal contract theory and its application to ABS. Based on the 
above explanation, the challenge is to design ABS contracts and legal instruments that provide 
incentives for the bioprospecting market to operate efficiently, whilst making sure that 
opportunistic behavior and information assymetries are addressed and that the parties comply 
with their contractual obligations within the governance structure. 
To consider the various parties that have contractual obligations in the ABS policy arena it is 
useful to know who the players are within that system. The organisations issues depicted in 
Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2 Principal Agent Theory (formal contract theory) and its relevance to ABS  
PRINCIPAL AGENT 
THEORY (FORMAL 
CONTRACT THEORY) 
NIE Perspective on ABS 
Principal agent 
relations 
Consider only formal contracts as 
a governance form 
Function to transfer risk and align 
incentives to overcome problems 
of information asymmetry 
Relational contracts view 
governance as relations rather 
than discrete transactions 
 The following relations are seen with ABS: 
Firms seeking access vs National Access 
Authority (quantity of Genetic Resources 
(GR) and quality of GR and Traditional 
Knowledge (GR) 
Access Authority VS Local and Indigenous 
Communities (ILC‘s) whom they seek to 
represent 
Access Authority VS Firm in ex post stages 
(Research & Development (R&D) progress, 
systematic interest not to reveal) 
Governance Structure The system of rules plus the 
instruments that serve to enforce 
the rules. 
 
 
In the ABS system of rules, the contractual 
framework and the instruments that enforce 
the rules within which the exchange of 
genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge is located  
Governance structure 
analysis 
There are complete and 
incomplete contracts 
Pre-contractual opportunism 
i.e. misrepresentation of value and quality 
of both samples of GR and goals of R&D 
Post-contractual opportunism between 
parties  
i.e. monitoring relations 
Ex-post asset specificity due to legal 
uncertainty and imperfect enforcement 
issues 
Contracts A legally enforceable agreement 
which is a formal, legal 
commitment to which each party 
gives express (though not 
necessarily written) approval and 
to which a particular body of law 
applies 
The bioprospecting market is characterized 
by imperfections and uncertainty. 
Therefore, even if rational behavior was 
possible from the players in the game the 
information about the future is uncertain 
and there are needs contracts must 
address: 
Types of risk of 
agents 
Risk averse- certain income vs 
and uncertain income 
Risk-neutral – indifferent to all 
alternatives with same expected 
value 
Risk loving – uncertain value 
preferred to a certain value of the 
same expected value 
These risks are present in the ABS system 
Risk Averse- 
Collectors and intermediaries of GR and TK 
(ILC)  
National competent authority  
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Opportunistic 
behavior 
In the game some agents may be 
self seeking with guile and 
therefore refuse to give important 
information or even give false 
information when they know the 
other party cannot verify it 
In the ABS games this opportunistic 
behavior is very much relevant and it is 
therefore imperative for mutually beneficial 
exchange rules to be present although it is 
fraught with the challenge of dealing with 
public goods, trading in information and 
using complex contracts to capture those 
rules to provide disincentives for 
opportunistic behavior 
Organization A group of individuals bound by 
some common purpose to 
achieve objectives. Organizations 
include political bodies 
Who are the stakeholders in the ABS 
system?  
Providers/User/Indigenous and local 
communities and the industry 
Source Own, based on Holm-Müller and Sauber (2010), Kleinaltenkamp, 1993, p 85; North, 1992, p, 
32; Ricther and Furubotn, 1996, p, 292; ), Ricther and Furubotn, 1996 Visser et al., 2000, p. 8, 
Williamson 1991 reffering to McNeil 1974; Masten and Sausier, 2000, Sampath 2005, Holm-Müller et 
al, 2005, OECD 2003, Richerzhagen 2007) Benham (2013); , North 1990, Rai 2001:5 IPR cited in 
Sampath 
 
It was necessary to consider governance as pertaining to ABS. Because the literature review 
on governance and ABS did not deliver much, the research expanded to other natural 
resources. The water sector has been studied relatively well with regard to institutional and 
governance issues. It was found that within these issues there are insights that are relevant 
and useful to the effective implementation of domestic ABS issues. Of particular interest was 
the work by Gandhi and Crase (2009) on governance and the performance of water institutions 
in India. They cite characteristics of effective water management institutions as determined by 
Pagan 2003 cited by Gandhi and Crase (2009) which are as follows: 
1. Clear objectives: Good institutions show clear objectives and clarity of purpose. Clear 
objectives and their acceptance among stakeholders result in less conflict, greater 
congruence and lower transaction cost. 
2. Good interaction: Good institutions show good internal interaction, bringing formal and 
informal rules together. This helps reduce transaction costs and promotes cooperative 
solutions. There is also good interaction with other institutions so that external 
transaction costs are reduced. 
3. Adaptiveness: Facing change and variation in their internal and external environments, 
successful institutions demonstrate adaptiveness. Through this the institutions can 
sustain and grow while maintaining lowtransaction costs. 
4. Appropriateness of Scale: Good institutions have the appropriate scale of size and 
scope. If too large, their transaction costs are too high. If too small, they have little 
control over their affairs and high internal transaction costs. 
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5. Compliance ability: Good institutions show ability to bring compliance. If the rules and 
processes of the institutions are not followed by large numbers, the institutions cease 
to be meaningful, and transaction costs become too high. 
According to Gandhi and Crase (2009), good governance in organizations/institutions address 
at least three important rationalities: 
1. Technical Rationality: Dealing with efficiency: Good institutions achieve efficient 
conversion of inputs into outputs. This requires good/appropriate technology and 
productive efficiency. 
2. Organizational Rationality: Dealing with coordination: Division of labour and 
specialisation for efficiency leads to a large number of activities. The effective 
coordination across these activities becomes crucial for overall institutional 
performance. 
3. Political rationality: Dealing with justice: Most large institutions require substantial 
human/people interaction and involvement. In this, addressing of issues/perceptions 
of fairness and justice becomes very important for sustainability and performance. 
Where the rules of the organisation are rigid, chances of success are significantly reduced. 
Clear mechanisms for changing the rules and the authority to change the rules leads to greater 
success (Gandhi and Crase, 2009). Appropriate scale and systems of the institutions lead to 
substantially greater success in institutions. Where members are willing to follow rules of the 
organization, the chances of success are substantially increased. Where compliance to the 
rules is sufficient, the performance is better. 
If the organization pursues plans to achieve objectives, the success is significantly improved. 
If the organisation has been created by the government and the rules are determined by the 
government the chances of success are indicated to be significantly reduced (Gandhi and 
Crase, 2009). Where the institution uses its powers to bring compliance, the chances of 
success are significantly better.  
 
Using these insights for ABS we can state that, in order to ensure that benefits flow to all 
stakeholders it is important to have rules in place for equitable sharing of benefits derived from 
ABS. This is positively associated with clear organisational objectives, good interaction 
between parties, or stakeholders, and the relevant institution using its power to assure 
compliance in generating and sharing benefits. In general, however, this process seems to be 
found to be negatively associated with the creation of an institution by the government. This 
may be a challenge since most of the institutions for the regulation of ABS will be established 
by governments. Although there is this negative correlation when the organization is created 
by the government, it has been found that when the rules were determined by the government 
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this has a positive impact on equity. Government, thus, has a notable role to play in achieving 
better equity amongst the various players. 
 
These insights are indeed very important for the effective implementation of ABS at the national 
level since the issues of clear objectives, compliance, coordination, efficiency and justice all 
come into play in the ABS debate, and more so at the implementation and concrete action 
level. 
2.2.3 Transaction Costs Economics 
As we saw in the discussion of formal contract theory, contractual obligations lead to 
transaction costs. Transaction costs are clearly relevant for the analysis of institutions. First, 
the constraints that evolve in the operation of economic systems can be viewed as institutions 
designed to accommodate one or more of these costs (Betancourt, 1992). Indeed, a classical 
contribution to this field, Coase (1937), argues that the existence of firms as organizations or 
economic institutions is due to their function as a mechanism for lowering transaction costs 
incurred by participating in the market exchange. Moreover he argues that the boundary 
between firms and markets is determined by the minimization of transaction costs.  
Table 2.3 presents an overview of the main concepts of the transaction costs economics school 
and their relevance or application to ABS. In essence the table depicts that in any ABS 
transaction there is an exchange of genetic resources and/or related traditional knowledge. 
This transaction will involve a certain amount of cost and will also be plagued by information 
asymmetry that may exist between the two agents engaging in the transaction.  
Table 2.3 Transaction costs economics and its relevance to ABS 
TRANSACTION – 
COST ECONOMICS  
NIE Perspective on ABS 
Transaction 
(governance structure 
analysis) 
A transaction occurs when a good 
or service is transferred across a 
technologically separable 
interface. 
 
The ABS transaction involves the transfer 
of Genetic Resources and or Traditional 
Knowledge 
Transaction Costs The costs of resources utilized for 
the creation, maintenance, use, 
and change of institutions and 
organizations 
If the cost in the ABS transaction amongst 
the players based on the rules are too high 
there may be no game or vice versa (see 
table 3 for ABS related transaction costs) 
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Information 
Asymmetry 
One agent in many transactions 
may have more information or 
better information than the other 
agent. The presence of private 
information leads to incentive 
constraints and the need for 
mechanisms to enable contractual 
relations: 
These are: 
Moral Hazards – Hidden Action 
Adverse selection 
 Hidden information; to address 
this there is need for screening, 
signaling and reputational effects 
In ABS transactions information asymmetry 
is prevalent and adverse selection occurs: 
There are: 
Uncertain product quality 
Parties use intermediaries which lead to 
reputational effects 
There are spot markets  
There is hidden knowledge (uncertain 
product quality and the market for TK 
related information) 
 
Source Own, based on Holm-Müller and Täuber (2010), Kleinaltenkamp, 1993, p 85; North, 1992, p, 32; 
Ricther and Furubotn, 1996, p, 292; ), Ricther and Furubotn, 1996 Visser et al., 2000, p. 8, Williamson 
1991 reffering to McNeil 1974; Masten and Sausier, 2000, Sampath 2005, Holm-Müller et al, 2005, 
OECD 2003, Richerzhagen 2007) Benham (2013); , North 1990, Rai 2001:5 IPR cited in Sampath 
Täuber (2011) has comprehensively described the costs involved in ABS transactions. This is 
summarised in Table 2.4 below which has been enhanced with additional insights from other 
literature sources. The essential message for ABS transactions is that the transaction costs 
within the ABS markets and its regulatory frameworks both at the national and international 
levels will have a significant influence on the effectiveness of ABS transactions and the 
willingness of actors to initiate and follow through with ABS transactions. If the various 
categories of transaction costs, as outlined in the table below, are too high then this may 
complicate effective ABS implementation as many of the different stakeholders e.g. the private 
sector and research and academia, may not engage in the market. Therefore, no benefits will 
be generated and thus no sharing of benefits.  
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Table 2.4 Forms of transaction costs according to basic literature, supplemented with findings 
from access and benefit-research 
Forms of transaction costs Examples of transactions cost in the ABS process 
causing transaction cost 
Search and identification costs  Identification of the potential providers and users 
 Identification of supply/request (what exactly does 
the provider supply and what exactly does the 
target group demand) 
 Identification of the required genetic resource or the 
traditional knowledge 
 Screening for reliability (providers/users) 
 Identification of competent authority for ABS 
negotiations (State, Indigenous and local 
communities, private persons) 
Minimizing bureaucratic 
costs of access 
Negotiation and bargaining 
costs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Negotiation of contract: 
 (PIC, MAT – Scope of access rights, 
  time frames and time to benefits, 
  benefit-sharing obligations and 
mechanisms 
 Intellectual property and property rights 
 Evaluation of offer/request 
o Assessment of resource/information quality 
o Assessment of rights 
o Assessment of possible benefits 
 
Decision costs 
 
 
 
Agreement costs 
Monitoring and enforcement 
costs 
 Legal verification of the contract 
 Monitoring / verification of misconduct of the other 
contracting party 
o User: Acquisition, utilization, transfer, 
commercialization 
o Provider: Agreed on items of supply such 
as quality, knowledge and exclusivity of 
supply of genetic resources and related 
knowledge 
Adjustment costs Renegotiation of the contract 
Enforcement costs  Dispute settlement 
 Sanctioning /remedies 
Finishing costs 
Source: Holm-Müller and Täuber (2010) based on finding from Kleinaltenkamp, 1993, p 85; North, 1992, 
p, 32; Ricther and Furubotn, 1996, p, 292; Sampath, 2005; Visser et al., 2000, p. 8. 
 
 54 
 
2.2.4 Social Capital and its Relevance to ABS  
In the search for insights on effective implementation for ABS, the NIE literature provided 
additional clarity through the concepts: organization and social capital. NIE defines social 
capital as the glue that holds society together. Aspects of NIE literature also include the 
concept of trust as an essential part of such social capital, and provides legitimacy (Lieberherr, 
2009; Menard and Shirley, 2005). NIE theorists have found that repeated behaviour leads to 
embedded institutions of customs and norms that become legitimate as human actors trust 
and thus consent to the rules attached to such behaviour (Menard and Shirley, 2005; Hodgson, 
2006). 
 
Trust can also be seen as helping to offset transaction costs. Because it applies to all modes 
of coordination trust can assist in minimizing transaction costs in any exchange (Lieberherr, 
2009). The issue of distrust and hence the need for cooperation to achieve enforcement also 
comes to the fore (Menard, 2000; Greif, 2005). The above considerations on trust or social 
capital are very relevant to the issue of ABS, because as distrust builds up over years any new 
institutions that are to govern ABS will have to take this into cognisance if transaction costs 
are to be minimized.  
 
Social capital then, in the ABS policy arena, refers to the presence of networks and 
connections within the ABS market. It also includes the presence of relations of trust and 
mutual support, formal and informal groups, common rules and sanctions, collective 
representation, mechanisms for participation in decision-making and the presence of effective 
leadership within the ABS sector. 
 
Indirectly the critical factors when addressed effectively and thus assuring an effective regime 
at both national and international levels, will contribute to trust developing amongst and 
between the various stakeholders in ABS transaction. This can also help deal with the 
Principal-Agent problems caused by information asymmetry between the parties. 
 
The issue of trust can be considered from a number of viewpoints; trust between contracting 
parties of the CBD that ABS agreements and implementation are being undertaken in 
accordance with the provision of the CBD and the Protocol (IR). Trust between provider and 
user countries that access has been granted on mutually agreed terms and that the sharing of 
benefits has been equitable. Trust between the indigenous and local communities and the 
industry or their own governments that the local institutions will be respected, that the consent 
given and the mutually agreed terms agreed to will be honoured, and that benefits will indeed 
accrue to them should there be benefits generated monetary and otherwise. 
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The issue of trust then can apply to all modes of coordination, cooperation, interaction, 
reputation, signalling, monitoring and compliance as combined with contracts; it can assist in 
minimizing transaction costs in any exchange. Moreover, companies are increasingly 
developing best practice standards associated with biotrade, and seeing this as an extension 
of ethical trading, good business practice and social responsibility, rather than only for 
purposes of compliance with the CBD (Laird and Wynberg, 2008; Union for Ethical Biotrade, 
2007) 
2.2.5 Effectiveness and Efficiency of ABS Instruments from an NIE 
Perspective 
Since the study is assessing the effectiveness of the implementation ABS instruments, and the 
critical factors themselves were derived to assess the effectiveness of ABS instruments, it was 
found necessary to look at the concept of effectiveness itself to provide insights as to what 
effectiveness means from a NIE theory perspective and to see how it can assist with the 
development of the indicators for the respective critical factors. 
  
According to Lieberherr (2009) effectiveness is the most difficult concept/criterion/element to 
decipher in NIE theory. Complications with this term arise due to the fact that it is often 
intertwined with the efficiency concept in NIE literature (Furubon and Richter, 2005). 
Effectiveness through the perspective of NIE may be perceived as an outcome of efficiency as 
NIE theorists utilise this criterion to refer to offsetting transaction costs. For example, an 
economic exchange is described as being effective if the transaction is conducted in the most 
efficient way (i.e. transaction costs are eliminated as much as possible). Hence it can be 
argued that economic exchanges are made more effective by rational individuals choosing the 
best feasible or most efficient outcome (Greif, 2005). 
 
Effectiveness is also used in NIE theory in relation to the presence of institutions which act to 
coerce, restrain and enforce contracts, thus serving to enhance economic performance and 
support economic exchanges as well as ensuring the enforceability of such exchanges. NIE 
does note that in order to provide legitimacy, these institutions must be effective, which can 
only be achieved when agency problems, such as judicial bias or governmental corruption, 
opportunistic behaviour of the agent (e.g. a private contractor) are counteracted by coercion 
controlling institutions (Lieberherr, 2009). These are all relevant to the ABS policy formulation 
and subsequent implementation. Furthermore, effectiveness and authority are linked, since 
the authority of enforcing institutions are described as being effective when they are backed 
by the ‘authority of the state’ (Greif 2005: 737). This is exactly what the Nagoya Protocol on 
ABS is seeking to achieve in terms of implementation. The authority of States or parties to the 
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Protocol as well as the different ABS policy, legal, administrative and regulatory measures at 
the domestic level, will provide this backing to the efficient economic exchange between 
providers and users and ensure that benefits are also flowing in return for this efficiency.  
 
Effectiveness then, provides more insight into implementing efficiency at the broader 
institutional environment level; it further also elucidates the issue of enforceability that is central 
to NIE. The institutional environment is what will determine the effectiveness of a system. The 
players in that system will play by the rules to achieve their objective in the ABS, the reduction 
of transaction costs as the final outcome that will determine whether access is granted and 
benefits are generated. It is important to note that the reduction of transaction costs is not an 
aim by itself. It is a necessary condition for exchange to take place.  
Table 2.5 Summary of effectiveness from an NIE perspective 
Definition Mode/Level  Mechanism Indicator Explanation Outcomes 
Effectiveness 
Existence of 
best feasible 
outcomes (i.e. 
the most 
efficient 
institutions 
that make 
contracts 
more 
enforceable 
Institutional 
environment 
Rational 
choice 
Best feasible 
alternative 
Rational 
individuals 
choose the 
most efficient 
outcomes 
Reduction of 
transaction 
costs 
Contract law 
Property 
rights 
Separation of 
power 
Enforceability Contracts are 
made 
enforceable 
via contract 
enforcing (i.e. 
legal or 
regulatory) & 
coercion 
restraining 
institutions 
Source: Lieberherr (2009) 
2.2.6 Efficiency and its Relevance to ABS 
The previous section outlined the close link between the concepts effectiveness and efficiency 
and warrants further exploration as to its linkages to ABS.  
 
According to Lieberherr (2009) NIE operates on the premise that efficient economic 
coordination stems from aligning multiple imperfect contractual and institutional arrangements 
to find the most appropriate means to conduct an exchange, which should minimise transaction 
costs as much as possible (Brousseau and Glachant, 2002). Hence efficiency can be defined 
as perceived net benefits provided by one institutional arrangement in relation to another.  
 
These definitions of efficiency are not equivalent, but are all encompassed by the idea that 
nothing more can be achieved given the resources available. Within the ABS sector efficiency 
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could, therefore, be described as an exchange of genetic resources and the sharing of benefits 
which takes place at the lowest possible transaction cost. This then translates into the 
generation of benefits to both the provider and user of the resources, as well as all other actors 
that were involved in this transaction, such as indigenous and local community. The 
procedures that will govern these transactions must, therefore, provide incentives for the 
various stakeholders to engage and meet the three efficiency criterion above. The design and 
implementation of the various domestic frameworks must ensure that the structure in and of 
itself should not stifle efficiency in the sector, thus becoming a barrier to the effective flow of 
transactions.  
2.2.7 Legitimacy and ABS 
While at first NIE does not seem to address the issue of legitimacy, the theory does touch on 
consent, constraint, as well as controlling power and trust. These three elements can be 
considered as indicators of legitimacy (Lieberherr, 2009). They are linked to the concept of 
social capital and also have some relevance to the Principal Agent Theory and Contract Theory 
as it relates to ABS. Another way of looking at this concept is its link to governance structures 
as well as the legitimacy of enforcing contract, the legitimacy of exchanging goods and thus 
transactions.  
 
However, despite some indicators that NIE takes into account, it seems that even while 
addressing the issues related to this issue of legitimacy, and the logic of NIE, theorists often 
seem to come back to the efficiency criterion (and the underlying motive of minimizing 
transaction costs) or they outsource the problem to political science (Lieberherr, 2009 and 
Furubon and Richter, 2005). 
2.2.8 Legitimizing Authority at the level of Governance 
The question here is why human actors consent to authority of an employer (i.e. the visible 
hand) rather than maintaining their freedom under the invisible hand of the market (Menard 
and Shirley, 2005). Since consent has been established as a basic characteristic of political 
legitimacy and moral action (Peter, 2004), by addressing this issue NIE theorists touch on the 
question of legitimacy.  
 
It must be noted though that focusing on the human actors’ set of choices, which can be 
legitimized through their freedom to consent to an alternative, does not provide insight into the 
institutional constraints under which these actors must make decisions (Peter, 2004). NIE 
takes institutional environment into consideration which explains whether the constraints 
placed on humans provide them with enough freedom to choose from attractive alternatives or 
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whether they are coerced into unattractive options due to their institutional environment. In 
other words, whether the choices provided are legitimate or not.  
 
The issue of legitimacy has implications for ABS in that implementation will require knowledge 
of political and market forces. Success may depend on whether the market will determine the 
choices made by the players or whether political imperatives will determine the choice. It also 
will have implications in terms of ownership rights, legal clarity and certainty. Since legal 
frameworks to assure legitimacy of contracts are still, too often, subject to interpretation at the 
national level, choice may be a principle determinant of the outcome of influencing factors. The 
challenge will be whether those with power will be more accountable to those they control by 
employing consent (Liebenherr, 2009). This will be true for both provider and user 
governments. 
2.2.9 Legitimizing Coercive Power at the Level of Institutional Environment 
On the broader level of the institutional environment, the NIE theorist does acknowledge the 
need to constrain coercive power. Restraining power is often linked to the issue of legitimacy 
(particularly in political science) because in order for powerful entities, such as governments, 
to function properly they need to be accepted by those they affect (Peter, 2004; Menard and 
Shirley, 2005). This issue is also linked to market mechanisms as they may wield coercive 
power and hence should be validated. ABS policy, legal and administrative frameworks will be 
designed by the powerful entities and implemented by them. The challenge is whether the 
powerful, in implementing these instruments, will have regard for the views of those they affect 
and whether those they affect will accept these instruments and use them in order to achieve 
what they were meant to ensure i.e. efficient and functional implementation that reduces 
transaction costs. It is important to point out that coercive power can be used to forbid 
something but it cannot be used to force anyone to do something e.g. to engage in research, 
or enter into a contract etc. 
 
Consent is important for legitimacy in the implementation of ABS legal and policy frameworks. 
The Nagoya Protocol is built upon the principle of Prior Informed Consent7 (PIC) this implies 
that PIC coupled with trust will contribute greatly to the effective implementation of the Nagoya 
                                               
7 Prior Informed Consent (PIC) refers to the principle that in transactions where genetic resources and/or 
traditional knowledge is accessed such access must be based on the prior informed consent of the 
owners and holders of such genetic resources and traditional knowledge. This must further occur on the 
basis of Mutually Agreed Terms (MAT) between those who are accessing and those who are granting 
access. 
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Protocol and domestic ABS frameworks. The willingness to cooperate, and accepting the rules 
and conditions, has clear relevance to ABS and PIC and Mutually Agreed Terms (MAT). 
  
It seems then what is emerging from the literature on NIE and its relevance to ABS is that we 
can view ABS implementation as effective when it reduces transaction costs and, therefore 
facilitates appropriate incentives to allow for these transactions to materialise. According to 
Richerzhagen (2005, 2007) this is only the first step. There is a need to ensure that the 
transaction does take place. It is important, though it may not help in achieving the other goals 
such as equitable benefit-sharing. Such transaction must of course meet the core demands of 
ABS access transactions as determined by the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol i.e. PIC, MAT 
and Benefit-sharing. The issue of trust is also emerging and is also further emphasized under 
legitimacy. Table 2.5 indicates that trust facilitates exchange and reduces transaction cost. 
This is clearly important because once PIC and MAT have been granted, the first hurdle for 
exchange has been passed and the transaction i.e. the exchange of genetic resources, can 
occur, and then facilitate the flow of the appropriate benefits. 
 
Since essentially ABS will require the setting up of governance structures at both the national 
and international levels, the principal challenge will include whether these will be accepted or 
whether players would need to be coerced into accepting these governance structures that will 
bring about new ways of conducting transactions. This calls therefore for measures to build 
trust amongst the different players that hopefully can create a level playing field through 
addressing information asymmetries and reducing transaction costs in the ABS field. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW: BIOPROSPECTING THE ISSUES 
There seems to be some perverse human characteristic that likes to make easy things 
difficult. ~ Warren Buffett 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The particular field of applied biology today known as bioprospecting is central to the issue of 
Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS). The questions around ABS have led to the entire 
controversy and intricacies around the regulation of access to genetic resources, the 
associated traditional knowledge, and the sharing of the resultant benefits. It is, therefore, 
important to explore this issue as part of an attempt to generate indicators for the effective 
implementation of ABS policy, together with its legal administrative and regulatory frameworks.  
 
Bioprospecting can be defined as the purposeful search for, and evaluation of, wild biological 
material, in the pursuit of interesting valuable new products or bio-molecules (Laird and 
Wynberg, 2003) which may have potential for commercial application. It includes the collection, 
from local communities, of traditional knowledge relating to the use of these resources.  
 
A term that has become associated with bioprospecting is “biopiracy”, which essentially refers 
to a situation wherein biodiversity or knowledge about biodiversity is collected without 
permission from the owners of these resources, and is then patented (Laird and Wynberg, 
2003).  
 
Bioprospecting has always been a central activity in human development. The earliest known 
record of bioprospecting is found in Egypt were Queen Haspetuth commissioned a search for 
interesting bio-materials in ancient times. She sent a team of collectors to the land of Punt, 
which is today the area near Eritrea, north-eastern Sudan and Ethiopia (Van der Walt, 2005 
and Wynberg et al, 2009).  
 
In its modern form bioprospecting involves the application of advanced technologies to develop 
new pharmaceuticals, agrochemicals, cosmetics, flavourings, fragrances, industrial enzymes, 
and other products from biodiversity. Until recently organizations that engaged in 
bioprospecting were under no obligation to compensate countries from which the biological 
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materials had been collected (Artuso, 2002). With the entry into force of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD), open access to biological resources was replaced by a recognition 
of the sovereign rights of each country to control access to the biodiversity existing within its 
borders. 
 
While research into the potential of such products has developed at great speed, awareness 
by local communities and governments of the earning potential in the areas of biodiversity has 
grown. Recognition of the need for control in this economic field has led to greater 
protectionism. However, notwithstanding the fact that such research may lead to commercial 
application in the future, it is important that fear of bioprospecting should not stifle academic or 
conservation research. Care must also be taken that the commercial use of natural resources 
especially the trade in commodities (biotrade) should not be negatively affected (Laird and 
Wyberg, 2003), particularly since biotrade represents a natural feature of local economies and 
is vital to the livelihood security of many communities around the world.  
 
Furthermore, bioprospecting itself refers to a small group of activities undertaken by a small 
number of commercial sectors. As a result, and because bioprospecting usually involves taking 
small samples or materials, its impact on the environment is much less than many other more 
destructive practices – such as large scale clearing for commercial agriculture, or 
unsustainable logging (Laird and Wynberg, 2003). The fact that the sample size is small makes 
the transboundary movement of samples for bioprospecting relatively easy today. With the 
development of this area of research and the great potential it holds for economic development, 
often in underprivileged communities, incentives must be put in place to minimise and/or 
regulate bioprospecting to ensure that it is done ethically. In other words, that it is sustainable, 
fair, (Laird and Wynberg, 2003) and results in benefits for both the provider and the user, as 
well as for biodiversity in general.  
3.2 BIOPROSPECTOR DEFINED 
Polski (2005) analyzed the economic and policy issues connected with collecting biological 
materials and using them in biomedical applications. She identified essentially three types of 
bioprospectors: - Knowledge Creators (Shamans, teachers, and scientists); Entrepreneurs 
(Farmers, vendors, and biotechnologists) and Collectors.  
 
This categorization is very useful as it highlights the need for ABS domestic frameworks to 
cater for a wide range of bioprospectors, some who will be from within a given country and 
some who will be from outside of the country.  
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The Knowledge Creators, Polski (2005 p. 547) maintains, generally prospect to advance 
knowledge and in the process create new knowledge, products, processes, or applications. 
They can also create profitable products and add to collections of genetic resources. The 
Entrepreneurs on the other hand, bioprospect for business.. These may be small, medium, or 
large scale enterprises organised inside or outside the country in which the resources are 
located. Their primary interests are often to survive and develop profitable products. In this 
manner they may also advance knowledge, solve problems, and develop new processes and 
applications. Collectors essentially harvest specimens to expand their own collection or to sell 
to others. Their activity has a single and relatively static economic dimension – the harvesting 
of Non-Human Biological Materials (NHBM8) for immediate consumption. As such, Knowledge 
Creators and Entrepreneurs are multi-dimensional, involving both static and dynamic 
economic activities (Polski, 2005 p. 547). The material they harvest has a known, specific use, 
so that it is relatively easy to calculate the value of this type of bioprospecting as well as to 
design incentives to protect biodiversity in this regard. 
 
From the above description it follows that these three categories can represent a wide range 
of industries ranging from pharmaceutical, seed, crop protection, cosmetic and personal care, 
botanical medicine, biotechnology and horticulture industries (Laird and Wyberg, 2003) 
 
It is generally perceived that the challenge is regulating only the big multi-national companies 
but this perspective which recognises the wide economic potential of the products collected, 
begs otherwise. Perhaps the intermediaries who may fall under the category called ‘Collectors’ 
may pose an even greater challenge than the multi-national company since they are small, 
may not suffer significantly from reputational effects, and are often on the ethical borderline of 
the issue (Sampath, 2005). 
 
3.3 INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO REGULATE ABS: THE CBD 
AND THE NAGOYA PROTOCOL ON ABS 
As the issue of unregulated access to genetic resources and traditional knowledge continued 
unabated in 1992 the international response was ushered in by the Convention on Biological 
                                               
8 According to Polski (2005 p. 545) the CBD defines biological diversity to include “all aspects of 
variability evident within the living world, including diversity within and between individuals, populations, 
species, communities, and ecosystems.” She maintains that this is a very broad definition that potentially 
includes all nonhuman biological materials (NHBMs) as well as all human biological materials (HBMs) 
in the world as we know it at a given time 
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Diversity (CBD) by introducing global new rules to govern the players in the biodiversity 
conservation and use arena. In accordance with the CBD bioprospecting, organizations are 
now expected to share the benefits and transfer of technology in exchange for access to 
biochemical resources (Artuso, 2002). Transactions for genetic resources are to be 
underpinned by a quid pro quo: access to genetic resources in return for a share of the benefits 
derived from their use (Glowka, 2001). 
 
Many countries, especially developing countries, in response to this provision started the 
process of drafting legislation to ensure access to genetic resources and the sharing of 
resultant benefits (Glowka, 2001). As biological material is transboundary, supra-national 
legislation on ABS also started to see the light in some countries, particularly in Asia and South-
America. An attempt was made by the African group of countries through the development of 
the OAU model law for the protection of community rights which was proposed as a sui-generis 
legislation.  
 
There is a wide divergence of views on what constitutes fair and equitable sharing of benefits 
and how best to promote it as well as its implementation on the ground. This led to the 
formulation and subsequent adoption of the Bonn Guidelines (UNEP, 2002) in an attempt to 
put in place voluntary measures for implementing this provision. This response by the global 
community however did not suffice since these guidelines were voluntary. In 2002 during the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development in South Africa a further global call was made to 
negotiate an international regime that can regulate access to genetic resources and associated 
traditional knowledge. This call led to the negotiation and development of the Nagoya Protocol 
on access to genetic resources which was briefly discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
One source of continued misunderstanding is the disparity between the market value of 
products derived from biological resources and the compensation provided for the raw 
materials themselves. According to Simpson et al (1996) the demand curve for biological 
samples is like all other goods - downwards sloping. Given this basic economic fact the market 
price for randomly collected biological samples is likely to be little more than the cost of 
collecting them.  
 
3.4 THE MARKET FOR BIOPROSPECTING  
The market for bioprospecting is another area that has received increasing attention as 
attempts to understand the markets and the transactions that occur around bioprospecting 
have increased. A model involving monopolistic competition for a differentiated product more 
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accurately reflects the complex reality of the market for biological samples, extracts and 
derivative products (Artuso, 1997b).  
According to Robinson (1933) monopolistically competitive markets have the following 
characteristics: 
 There are many producers and many consumers in the market, and no business has 
total control over the market price. 
 Consumers perceive that there are non-price differences among the competitors' 
products. 
 Producers have a degree of control over the price. 
The above characteristics support the claim by Artuso (1997b) about the nature of the 
bioprospecting market. There are many producers or suppliers of NHBMs from both 
industrialised and non-industrialised countries for bioprospecting and this, therefore, requires 
effective regulation and in order to ensure that such resources are acquired in the appropriate 
manner, and as prescribed by the CBD. 
 
Artuso (1997b) further maintains that source country suppliers that can provide biological 
samples and derived products which combine relatively rare ecological characteristics with 
associated cultural and scientific knowledge, low production costs, a stable political 
environment, etc., have the potential to obtain significant rents. 
 
There is a distinction between the value of finished products containing or derived from 
biochemical resources, and the significantly lower value of raw biological material, as an input 
in the research or production of these products. The need for access to technology to enable 
producers, especially those in non-industrialised countries, to add value to the raw biological 
material in order to increase potential benefits, is, therefore, highlighted in this regard. 
 
Although markets for products derived from, or containing biochemical resources, are 
substantial, competition between suppliers of biological material, low probabilities of 
developing a new product from any given sample, and continued advances in alternative 
Research and Development (R&D) technologies, will continue to limit the compensation that 
bioprospecting organizations are willing to provide for unevaluated biological samples (Artuso, 
1997b; Simpson et al., 1996). It remains a fact, however, that many biochemical compounds 
still cannot easily be synthesized. In addition, increasing numbers of- consumers prefer to use 
natural products instead of synthetic substitutes. This creates opportunities for developing 
commercial-scale operations for production and extraction of biochemical material. The bulk 
supply of raw materials and purified natural products can provide a source of revenue and a 
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means of developing technical and management capabilities. It must be noted, however, that 
the laws of supply and demand still hold; unless the commodity can be differentiated on the 
basis of quality or other characteristics, prices and profits will be limited by the ability of other 
suppliers to enter the market (Artuso, 2002). 
 
In a competitive market environment, generating significant long-term benefits from 
bioprospecting activities will require the development of differentiated products and services 
that combine access to biodiversity with associated knowledge, technical capabilities, and 
marketing arrangements (Artuso, 1997b, 1999, Rauser & Small, 2000). 
 
The entrepreneurial and institutional capabilities required for developing and marketing new 
biologically-derived products are quite similar, whether the product is recombinant interferon, 
a plant-derived anti-cancer agent, or a novel industrial enzyme derived from microbial diversity 
(Artuso, 2002).  
 
Most of the bioprospecting activities underway in developing countries have been initiated by 
foreign organizations and the host countries have not responded by developing more proactive 
efforts to promote bioprospecting or laws that govern bioprospecting (Artuso, 2002). 
 
What is important, especially for provider countries, is the recognition that it is the interaction 
of the biological and associated abiotic characteristics of biological resources that can give rise 
to value-added bioprospecting. The interaction between conservation of biological resources, 
bioprospecting, and knowledge generating investments thus becomes critical. 
 
The above points to the need for a bioprospecting strategy at national level that can facilitate 
the understanding of the ABS market and its drivers, as well as the generation of essential 
knowledge about a country’s biodiversity that may be interesting from a bioprospecting 
perspective. It can, therefore, be argued that a country’s optimal bioprospecting strategy will 
include some level of knowledge-generating investment. Padmashree (2005) argues that the 
biodiversity infrastructure investment that the CBD requires parties to make in terms of 
inventories of genetic resources and of ethnobotanical knowledge, makes it possible for a 
country to structure an estimate of the economic value of its own genetic wealth. This does 
however, require that the necessary human capital be developed or empowered, in order for 
such knowledge investment to be effective in the long term.  
 
According to Artuso (2002) Costa Rica and South-Africa are two countries that are using the 
experience and technical capabilities gained from initial bioprospecting endeavours to develop 
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more comprehensive value-added bioprospecting programs. Many other countries that are 
obliged to regulate access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing may not have invested in 
the necessary human and information capital necessary for the effective use of biodiversity 
infrastructure. 
 
For many developing countries potentially beneficial bioprospecting activities and projects may 
never be developed due to an inhospitable policy environment, or due to a lack of institutional 
or technical capacity within the country. An effective (and efficient regulatory framework at the 
national and international levels, supported by innovative programmes and strategies at the 
national level for the development of biochemical resources, can promote bioprospecting 
investments, facilitate successful technology transfer, and support the formation of a profitable 
industrial sector that is linked with the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity (Artuso, 
2002). 
 
It is particularly interesting to note that despite the international regime negotiations that are 
currently underway, very few countries have integrated bioprospecting and biotechnology 
development efforts to a significant degree (Artuso, 2002). At the most basic level a critical 
mass of scientists and technicians trained in biochemistry and molecular biology is essential 
for R&D activities involving bioprospecting and modern biotechnology. 
 
It is important to note that in the final analysis with regard to bioprospecting in developing 
countries the transactions will be between providers in developing countries and users (firms) 
in developed countries. It is therefore important that dialogues between industry and providers 
occur to foster understanding between the two sectors. This can also help in terms of contract 
formulation issues to address the information asymmetry that disadvantages providers. 
 
Glowka (2005) in his proposal for the establishment of a bioprospecting certification system 
also considered the need for dialogue between the different stakeholders. His concern was 
how to determine which category of stakeholders could cover the operational cost and secure 
sources of income for the establishment and operationalisation of a bioprospecting certification 
system. The major stakeholders, he argues, that could participate in this system are the private 
sector, the public sector (e.g. provider countries), intermediaries and local and indigenous 
communities. He points out though that the private sector demand for a certification system is 
unclear, the demands and interests of non-profit and commercial intermediaries are also 
unclear. With regard to the demands of provider countries or indigenous and local 
communities, the demands may be clear but participation in the system may also need to be 
clarified. 
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The above is mentioned under this section because essentially the same group of stakeholders 
may have to face the same challenges in terms of the implementation of domestic ABS 
frameworks, and dialogue may be necessary to ensure that interests are clear, understood, 
catered for and respected, as far as relevant and appropriate, if the systems are to be 
successfully implemented. 
3.5 THE LINK BETWEEN BIOTECHNOLOGY AND 
BIOPROSPECTING 
Bioprospecting and modern biotechnology also overlap in more specific ways. Biotechnology 
techniques are used as a means of producing commercial quantities of complex natural 
products that were discovered through bioprospecting activities, but have proven too difficult 
or costly to synthesise chemically.  
 
As can be seen below, biotechnology development strategies and value-added bioprospecting 
programmes also share many of the same policy and business development issues. Potential 
synergies exist in three areas, namely the scientific and technical linkages, common policy and 
programmatic issues, and reciprocal benefits. 
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Table 3.1 Potential synergies between biotechnology development and value-added 
bioprospecting 
Scientific and Technical 
linkages 
Common Policy and 
programmatic issues 
Reciprocal benefits 
Biochemistry  
 
Genetics 
 
 
Cell & tissue culture 
 
 
Fermentation techniques 
 
 
 
Recombinant production of 
natural products 
 
 
Prospecting for genes 
conferring valuable agronomic 
traits or coding for valuable 
enzymes and other products 
Foreign investment policies 
 
Technology licensing 
arrangements 
 
 
Intellectual property rights to 
isolated biochemicals 
 
Coordination of public-private 
R&D activities 
 
 
Finance and business 
development for start-up 
enterprises 
 
Access and benefit-sharing for 
use of wild biodiversity 
Creation of conservation 
incentives 
 
Additional sources of funding 
and technical assistance 
 
Broader allocation of policy and 
program development costs 
 
Diversification of market 
opportunities 
 
 
 
Growth of GDP/ general 
economy of the country 
Source: Artuso (2002) 
 
These linkages are mentioned here to highlight the need for investment in synergistic 
strategies for biodiversity, bioprospecting and biotechnology research and development that 
would require multi-skilled, cross-sectoral human, technical and financial resources. If 
countries are to deal with bioprospecting effectively, there should be a quest for them to 
become users and creators of value-addition of their own biodiversity, and not simply providers. 
3.6 THE NAGOYA PROTOCOL ON ACCESS AND BENEFIT-SHARING 
AND ITS LINK TO BIOPROSPECTING 
The discussion in this chapter so far has focused on bioprospecting and the issues around it. 
The Nagoya Protocol is a direct outcome of some of the challenges that faced the ABS policy 
arena such as, for example, the need to ensure Prior Informed Consent and Benefit-Sharing. 
 
The Nagoya Protocol emerged under the CBD which enshrines the fundamental principles 
upon which the Protocol on ABS is based. These are derived from Article 15 of the CBD (CBD, 
1992) which recognizes the sovereign rights of Member States. over their natural resources, 
and that the authority to determine access to genetic resources rests with the national 
governments and is subject to national legislation. ; Access to genetic resources shall be based 
on Prior Informed Consent (PIC) and Mutually Agreed Terms (MAT), including the sharing of 
benefits arising from the commercial and other utilization of genetic resources. 
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These provisions of the CBD were, however, not fully implemented because provider countries 
maintained that despite the CBD and its voluntary Bonn Guidelines, cases of misappropriation 
of genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge remained rampant. It was 
recognized by both provider and user countries that there was a critical need for legal certainty 
and transparency at the international level especially regarding how to ensure benefit-sharing 
once genetic resources had left the provider country and were being utilized in user countries. 
This necessitated the need for an international framework to address cases when a Genetic 
Resource was accessed illicitly and then developed for economic advantage in another 
jurisdiction. Clear procedures in user countries, when accessing genetic resources and/or the 
associated traditional knowledge, was, thus, also needed.  
 
The negotiations towards an international regime on ABS began in earnest after the call by 
world governments in 2002 in Johannesburg, South Africa, for a legally binding instrument on 
ABS. The negotiations culminated in the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol in Japan in 2010. 
 
Table 3.2 below provides the chronological emergence and establishment of multilateral 
attempts to regulate access to genetic resources and protect knowledge up until the time when 
the Nagoya Protocol was concluded. 
Table 3.2 Chronological emergence of multilateral agreements on genetic resources and/or the 
associated (traditional) knowledge relevant to the ABS process and the Nagoya Protocol on ABS. 
(You need to decide if you want the font in this table to be the same as the others – look at the 
headings as well. Your headings in all tables should probably look the same, bolded or upper 
case, etc.) 
Instrument Year 
established 
Objective/Mandate 
Union for the Protection 
of New Varieties of Plants 
(UPOV) 
1961, 1978, 
1991 
Provides common rules to protect new plant varieties 
World Intellectual 
Property Rights 
Organization (WIPO) 
1967 To encourage creative activity, to promote the protection 
of intellectual property throughout the world 
Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) 
1992 To ensure sustainable use of conservation of biological 
resources and the equitable sharing of benefits arising out 
of such use  
WTO’s Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual 
Property rights (WTO - 
TRIPS) 
1995 Aims to promote effective and adequate protection of the 
intellectual Property Right on a global scale 
 
Organization of African 
Unity (OAU) Model Law 
on ABS AU  
1999 Protect the rights of local African communities in respect 
of their knowledge and genetic resources 
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International Treaty on 
Plant Genetic Resources 
for Food and Agriculture 
2001 Ensure non-restriction of genetic resources for Food and 
Agriculture  
Bonn Guidelines 1999 Provides Voluntary Guidelines to Member States of the 
CBD to assist in the regulation of access to genetic 
resources and the equitable sharing of benefits 
Nagoya Protocol on ASB 2010 Provides legally binding rules and obligations regarding 
access and benefit-sharing to user and provider countries 
of genetic resources and/or the associated traditional 
knowledge 
Source: Own based on the literature Kamau et al, (2010) 
The Nagoya Protocol was opened for signature at the United Nations (UN) Headquarters in 
New York, from 2 February 2011 to1 February 2012. The Protocol will enter into force 90 days 
after the date of deposit of the 50th instrument of ratification. The Protocol counts, to date, 15 
ratifications and 92 signatures. A significant and growing body of literature on the Nagoya 
Protocol provides in-depth analysis of the Protocol and its respective articles from various 
viewpoints. See for example, Laird and Wyberg (2012); Buck and Hamilton (2011) Bavikate 
and Robinson (2011); Nijar (2011); Prathapan and Rajan (2011); Hodges (2011) and Kamau 
et al., (2010) amongst others. An indepth analysis is beyond the scope of this study, as it simply 
looks at what critical factors are necessary to implement the Nagoya Protocol as well as 
national ABS measures that effectively assure successful implementation at all levels. 
3.6.1 The Core Elements of the Nagoya Protocol9 
The Nagoya Protocol has four core elements, which are, access to genetic resources; fair and 
equitable sharing of benefits; compliance; and, traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources. Below follows a succinct discussion of these four core elements. 
3.6.2 Access  
The Protocol provides for sovereign rights over natural resources. Access to such genetic 
resources is subject to the Prior Informed Consent (PIC) of the provider country. It requires 
ABS measures at the national level, that provide for: 
 legal certainty, clarity and transparency 
 fair and non-arbitrary rules and procedures  
 clear rules and procedures for PIC and MAT 
 the issuance of a permit or equivalent 
                                               
9 The reference for the next sections is the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefits Sharing and the 
fact sheet prepared by the CBD Secretariat 
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3.6.3 Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits 
Regarding Benefit Sharing, the Protocol provides for an obligation by signatories to take 
measures to ensure that benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources, as well as 
subsequent applications and commercialization, are shared with the provider country. It further 
provides that such benefits are to be shared on Mutually Agreed Terms (MAT). 
 
Such benefits may be monetary and non-monetary (access fees, milestone payments, license 
fees, royalties, transfer of technology, sharing results of research, effective participation in 
research).  
3.6.4 Compliance 
Under the Compliance provisions of the Protocol, signatories are under obligation to provide 
measures to ensure that genetic resources utilized within a Party’s jurisdiction have been 
accessed in accordance with PIC and MAT; to address situations of non-compliance; and, to 
cooperate in cases of alleged violation of domestic ABS legislation or regulatory requirements. 
 
Parties are further obligated to take measures to monitor the utilization of genetic resources. 
This provision calls for the designation of effective check points for collection of information at 
any stage of research, development, innovation, pre-commercialization or commercialization. 
Member States are also required to take measures to encourage reporting requirements on 
MAT, to encourage cost-effective communication tools and to use the Internationally 
Recognized Certificate of Compliance as evidence that PIC was obtained and that MAT was 
established. 
 
The Compliance obligations also provide for tools to encourage compliance by users and 
providers, and encourage the development, update and use of Model Contractual Clauses for 
MATs and the development and use of Codes of Conduct, Guidelines and Best Practices 
and/or Standards. 
3.6.5 Provisions Related to TK and to Indigenous and Local Communities 
The provisions under this core element are similar, or related to, the above mentioned access, 
benefit-sharing and compliance. They apply to Traditional Knowledge (TK) associated with 
genetic resources, as well as access to genetic resources where indigenous and local 
communities have established rights to genetic resources, in accordance with national laws.  
3.6.6 Tools and Mechanism to Assist with Implementation 
The Protocol has a number of measures to ensure assistance to parties implementation of the 
Protocol. These tools or measures relate to: 
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 Capacity-building/Awareness-raising 
 Technology Transfer 
 National Focal Points and Competent National Authorities 
 ABS Clearing House 
 Financial Mechanisms 
 Monitoring and Compliance with the Protocol 
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CHAPTER 4 
DEVELOPMENT OF INDICATORS TO MEASURE 
EFFECTIVE ABS IMPLEMENTATION AT THE NATIONAL 
AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS 
One of the greatest indicators of our own spiritual maturity is revealed in how we respond to 
the weaknesses, the inexperience, and the potentially offensive actions of others. 
~ David A. Bednar  
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
As a major part of this study is focused on developing indicators to assess the effectiveness 
of ABS implementation based on the critical factors, this warrants a short exploration of 
indicators. Countries around the world today within the environmental policy arena, are faced 
with increased public awareness of environmental issues, their international aspects, and their 
linkages with social and economic issues.  
4.1.1 Indicators and the Issues around them 
There is now a demand for reliable, harmonised and easily understandable information, not 
only from the environmental community but also from other public authorities, businesses, the 
general public, environmental NGO’s, research and academia and other stakeholders (Linster, 
2003) This has resulted in the production of environmental information that is more responsive 
to policy needs, their implementation and the way in which they meet public information 
requirements. The aim of this process is to strengthen the capacity of countries to monitor and 
assess environmental conditions and trends so as to increase their accountability and to 
evaluate how well they satisfy domestic objectives and international commitments as well as 
obligations under a number of multi- and bilateral environmental agreements. Indicators have 
emerged as a valuable and cost-effective tool for monitoring and evaluation (M&E) in this 
process (Linster, 2003). 
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Indicators have been used for a long time as an M&E tool with which more information can be 
obtained about issues as varied as people’s health, weather, and economic welfare 
(Segnestam, 2002). An indicator points to an issue or condition, thusserving as a sign or signal 
that relays a complex message, potentially from numerous sources in a simplified and useful 
manner (Jackson et al., 2000). Its purpose is to show how well or effectively a system is 
working. If there is a problem, an indicator should help to determine what direction to take to 
address the issue. The primary uses of an indicator are to characterize current status and to 
track or predict change (Jackson et al., 2000). Indicators are as varied as the types of systems 
they monitor. Effective indicators, however, have certain characteristics in common (UNECE 
Expert Group, 2005): 
 
Effective indicators are characterised by being relevant to the topic they are to assess, easy 
to understand by those doing the assessment, reliable and based on readily accessible data. 
Indicators can be useful as proxies or substitutes for measuring conditions that are so complex 
that there is no direct measurement. For instance, it is hard to measure the ‘contribution of 
ABS to sustainable development of a country’ and, not least, people may have different 
opinions on which conditions count most. Compared to indicators of economic and social 
aspects, indicators related to the environment are a relatively new phenomenon (Segnestam, 
2002).  
 
Segnestam (2002) points out that indicators, or indices, are not ends in themselves – they are 
a means to improved decision-making . Analyses based on indicators, indices, and, sometimes 
data, are carried out, resulting in information, which form the basis for sound decision-making. 
For the analyses to be complete and accurate, more data, or other indicators than the ones 
originally monitored, or from other sources, may have to be included. This is quite natural as 
the purpose of an indicator is for it to indicate a change – not necessarily disclose all aspects 
behind a change. Not until all information is gathered, and the decision-making processes have 
integrated the gathered information, has the goal of indicator development been reached. 
It is suggested that due to the above complexity it is useful to break down the relevant critical 
factors into several building blocks that constitute that critical factor and to develop indicators 
that measured each factor. Considering the broad social, political and economic impact of ABS, 
mostly qualitative indicators have been utilised for the purposes of this study. As was pointed 
out by the UNECE Expert Group on Indicators (2005) certain topics, particularly in the field of 
social performance measurement, cannot be easily made subject to quantification. Indicators 
for the critical factors for effective ABS implementation, face the following quantification 
challenges , as elucidated by the UNECE Expert Group on Indicators: A number may not 
provide a clear sign of a positive or negative impact with regard to ABS implementation 
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(UNECE Expert Group, 2005). Numerical values may lose significant information through the 
process of consolidation. For example, certain measures necessary for effective ABS 
implementation may simply be incomparable across countries.  
 The nature of certain issues at the national level regarding ABS implementation may 
make quantitative measurements impossible.   
They advise that in situations where quantitative measures are not effective one should rely 
on qualitative measures. Therefore, in the design for indicators for this study, a broad survey 
was developed to test the indicators for effective ABS implementation which include queries 
of a more open-ended nature regarding ABS policies and programs and issues relevant to 
ABS implementation at the national and international levels. This kind of qualitative indicator 
is based on responses that are scalable rather than a request for open-ended descriptive 
statements. From another side, qualitative indicators have been complemented, as far as 
possible, by quantitative indicators. 
 
Based on the above, indicators have been developed to measure the effectiveness of critical 
factors related to ABS implementation from two broad perspectives namely: 
i) Those indicators that measure activities that deliver implementation of ABS regimes, 
such as the establishment of institutional frameworks, developing policies, making 
available information and best practices, etc. 
ii) Those indicators that measure effects or outcomes of implementation. 
4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ABS 
REGIME WITH A VIEW TO DERIVE INDICATORS  
This section attempts to identify potential indicators from the literature on the assessment of 
ABS implementation at all levels globally. 
 
Laird and Wynberg (2003) classified countries that regulate access to genetic resources or 
plan to do so into three categories namely: 
 Countries and regional groups already regulating access to genetic resources to 
ensure prior and informed consent and benefit-sharing (1 region group and 12 
countries) 
 Those planning to regulate access to genetic resources to ensure prior informed 
consent and benefit sharing (2 regional groups and 32 countries) 
 Those who may also be planning to regulate access to genetic resources in the near 
future (10 countries) 
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The state of play has seen substantial change since 2003 when negotiations for the Nagoya 
Protocol commenced. Since then there has been movement within the various areas of 
concern which the Protocol negotiations addressed, fuelled particularly by the onset of the 
negotiations themselves which concluded in 2010 with the adoption of the Protocol. There is 
now renewed effort by Member States of the CBD to implement the Protocol through the 
development of the requisite legislation at national level, thus ensuring compliance. 
 
The Secretariat of the CBD established that the forms of current ABS legislation in the world 
can be divided into the following five categories (Qin, 2009): 
 Authorization clauses in the existing framework of environmental law 
 Amendment or broad interpretation of existing legislation to cover ABS 
 Comprehensive legislation with broader goals including ABS provisions 
 Special ABS legislation, and, 
 Supra-national legislation of regional organizations. 
Significant legislative ABS measures are currently being developed around the globe to 
regulate bioprospecting and benefit-sharing. The key question is, however, whether these 
measures are effective in doing what they are intended to do. The following section considers 
literature with regard to existing legal frameworks and case studies of ABS, with a focus on the 
reasons why these legal frameworks or measures are effective or not. It also derives indicators 
for the critical factors based upon the literature. 
 
A study by Garforth et al., (2005) reviewed the ABS measures of 35 countries from Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Asia, the South Pacific, Africa, Europe and North America and 
regional measures of the Andean Community and the Nordic countries. This review focused 
on and examined the relevant laws and policies, and their provisions on scope, prior and 
informed consent, mutually agreed terms on benefit-sharing, compliance and monitoring and 
enforcement, as well as any access agreements that were granted. The study also analysed 
workshops that occurred during or within that time and capacity building projects related to the 
implementation of ABS. This review was carried out at the time of the onset of the ABS 
negotiations, i.e. ABS Working group three. 
 
The assessment found that while the details of laws and policies varied from one system to 
another, there were a number of commonly included basic elements. These elements provided 
useful indicators for ABS implementation and are presented below. 
 The establishment and identification of an ABS permitting authority 
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 Requirements and procedures for obtaining Prior Informed Consent (PIC) from 
government authorities and indigenous and local communities 
 Requirements for the negotiations of Mutually Agreed Terms (MAT) and benefit-sharing 
provisions among national authorities and other providers 
 Presence of and enforcement of compliance measures  
 Clarity on who can issue PIC and MAT and how this would be done 
 Legal certainty and clarity  
 Basic commercial and administrative rights 
 Clarity on the meaning of commercial and non-commercial access as well as how to 
deal with activities that fall in the grey area between these two issues 
 The use of a clear definition for genetic resources and biological resources 
 Clear purpose and rationale for the creation and implementation of ABS measures 
 Presence of clear user measures such as disclosure of information 
 Strategy for increased awareness about ABS  
 Active strategy for engaging with ABS  
 Presence of a clear and functional ABS legal framework or administrative measure 
Investment of national resources into ABS capacity development (Garforth et. al., 2005) This 
assessment described the need for clarity regarding effective implementation as enumerated 
above. 
 
Three years after the above study, a detailed look at the ABS climate of four developing 
countries in Africa – Botswana, Ghana, Uganda, and Zambia – was carried out by UNEP 
(2008). This assessment presented the countries’ own views on national implementation and 
ABS policy development. The assessment focused on the following parameters: 
 What policies, legislation and legal capacities exist, or are proposed, in order for the 
countries to deal with access to genetic resources and the sharing of their benefits 
(ABS)? 
 Which institutions in these countries are engaged in the management and 
implementation of ABS activities? What are the administrative arrangements for ABS 
management, and what are the major gaps and constraints? 
 What projects with ABS components are being implemented in the countries? 
 Who are the major ABS stakeholders? 
 Based on the identified needs and gaps, what actions can be undertaken to clarify, 
develop and implement ABS measures in each country? 
The main outcomes of this assessment (UNEP, 2008) pointed to the fact that: 
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 Poverty alleviation, food security, human security and revenue generation are key 
issues which countries see as the desired objectives of any national ABS policy. 
 The decentralised nature of decision-making on natural resources issues affects the 
development and implementation of policies in the ABS policy arena. 
 All the countries have extensive policies relating to natural resource management, although only 
one country was regulating access as per the provisions of the CBD and others were 
considering adapting the African Union (AU) model10 legislation on ABS. 
The potential indicators that this assessment brings to the fore are: 
 Presence of ABS national technological capacities 
 Presence of measures to raise awareness of ABS principles 
 Presence and maintenance of effective and functional ABS institutional capacity 
 Measures to link ABS and poverty alleviation 
 Ability to addressing the lack of ABS policy at the national level and increasing the 
national capacity to implement existing ABS policies  
 Presence of measures to allow for full and effective engagement of local and 
indigenous communities and,  
 Presence of measures to allow for the effective monitoring and enforcement of ABS 
agreements in user and provider countries  
The assessment also highlighted the need for private sector engagement which would include 
business perspectives and practicalities in ABS policy design and implementation. It further 
points out that the valuation of components of the genetic resources of biodiversity would 
encourage conservation and sustainable use. The need for trained and knowledgeable 
personnel – researchers, natural resource managers and community leaders with awareness 
of the ABS process and principles - are also shown to be important in both development and 
implementation of ABS policies. 
4.2.1 Case Studies of Review of Implementation of ABS Instruments 
Around the World 
Three case studies in Kamau and Winter (2009) have been very insightful in considering what 
practical realities are faced by those countries in the process of developing and implementing 
domestic ABS instruments. These are the Kenyan, Australian and South African cases and 
are briefly presented here to elucidate the important elements that emerged and can be 
                                               
10 The African Union Model refers to model legislation that was developed under the auspices of the 
Organization for African Unity that was meant to serve as the template for African countries to follow or 
adopt as is to regulate access to genetic resourcs and traditional knowledge in Africa 
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considered as potential indicators for the critical factors. The potential indicators extracted will 
be presented after each case study and will be reflected in the positive sense. 
4.2.1.1 The Kenyan Case 
A study that almost resembles the analytical approach of Richerzhagen (2007) is that by 
Kamau and Winter (2009) on the Kenyan study. In this study they investigate procedural and 
substantive requirements of access authorizations with a view to identifying unnecessary 
transaction costs and attempt to suggest possibilities of streamlining procedures and criteria. 
In their investigation they focused on Kenyan access regulation. The results can be considered 
as representing similar situations in many other developing countries.  
 
The regulations that they looked at were fairly recent and can, therefore, be regarded as part 
of the new generation of legislation in the ABS arena. The law that regulates ABS in Kenya is 
the Environmental Management and Co-ordination (Conservation of Biological Diversity) and 
Resource, Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-sharing regulations of 2006 (Kamua and 
Winter, 2009). They focused mainly on the access procedures established by the Kenyan 
regulations.  
 
From the analyses of three regulations, they established that the following conditions or 
elements may impact the effectiveness of the Kenyan ABS regulations: 
i) Lengthy procedures 
ii) Cumbersomeness 
iii) High costs 
iv) Multiple costs 
v) Overlapping procedures 
vi) High costs same as iii above 
vii)  Long delays 
viii) Vagueness 
ix) Uncertainty 
x) Ambiguity 
Their assessment is that these characteristics of the procedures that they analyzed would most 
likely discourage basic research. Likewise, they might not be capable of attracting potential 
commercial bioprospectors (Kamua and Winter, 2009) as a result.  
 
They further provide a table presenting, in a condensed form, the negative characteristics (for 
access) identified in the Kenyan regulations which they maintain are also prevalent in the ABS 
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regimes of many other countries, including those of forerunner countries (first generation ABS 
regulators), such as the Philippines (Executive Order 247) and Brazil (Provisional Measure No 
2.186-16). The negative impacts they are likely to produce are also shown.  
 
They concludethat the Kenyan ABS regime does not facilitate, but rather impairs, access to 
Genetic Resources. 
 
The Kenyan case study highlights the following potential indicators for some or all of the critical 
factors: 
 Low transaction costs, 
 Legal certainty and clarity,  
 Non-complex administrative procedures,  
 Need for one stop shop 
 Use of one permit system 
 Timely processing of permits 
 Efficient coordination, harmonisation and cooperation 
 Incentives to promote basic research  
 Need for empowerment and capacity building of community stakeholders 
 Clear authority for granting access, PIC and MAT 
 Understanding of the ABS market and its needs 
 Own practical experience with using one’s own biodiversity 
 Clear assignment of property rights and intellectual property. 
4.2.1.2 The Australian Case 
Burton (2009) in Winter and Kauma (2009) provide an assessment of how Australia is 
implementing the Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their Utilization (the Bonn Guidelines). The Australian 
federal ABS law is found at Part 8A – Access to biological resources in Commonwealth areas 
of the Environment Protection Biodiversity Conservation Regulation 2000.  
 
According to Burton (2009) the (six) objectives of the federal access to biological resources 
law are set out as regulation 8A. 01 of Part 8A of the Environment Protection Biodiversity 
Conservation Regulations 2000. 
 
 The assessment focuses first on the objectives of the regulations and finds them consistent 
with both the CBD and the Bonn guidelines. The assessment then proceeds to look at the 
 81 
 
system in further depth. It identifies the access requirements and procedures required by the 
regulation. A comparison is then made to see whether the Australian ABS law and 
administrative structure implements the Bonn Guideline. The conclusion drawn is that policy, 
administrative and legislative actions of the Australian government introduced by the ABS 
system through Parts 8A and 17 of the Environment Protection Biodiversity Conservation 
Regulations 2000, follows closely the advice and instruction set out on the Bonn Guidelines 
for providing countries. Its relative clarity and comprehensive coverage warrants it being 
regarded as a model ABS legislation. The implicit assumption in the conclusion of this study is 
that it is effective in regulating access and benefit-sharing within the ambit of the ABS system. 
 
Burton (2009) also states that providing legal certainty (for compliance, enforcement and 
verification) for any party considering investing in research and development of Genetic 
Resources it is important to maximise the amount of research undertaken and to maximise the 
economic value of genetic resources as a vital ecosystem service. The Australian system, i.e. 
the Genetic Resources Information Data Base (GRID), provides this through a low-cost system 
of ‘virtual’ certificates of origin and evidence of legal provenance as one way of doing this. 
 
Burton (2009) argues that the Australian GRID system also provides transparency about what 
materials have been collected, by whom, when, where and on what terms. The GRID system 
also supports domestic and foreign researchers to protect the intellectual property in their 
discoveries on all potential markets (Burton, 2009). Transparency also provides an important 
signal to governments responsible for protecting ecosystem services. If governments are clear 
about which areas are of scientific interest, or are giving rise to the development of new and 
valuable bio-derived products, then they have a better basis for allocating scarce conservation 
dollars. Burton (2009) maintains that this is important in the field of micro-organisms that have 
no iconic status and where community awareness of their contribution to society is limited. 
 
Burton (2009) points out that the effectiveness of this instrument lies in its clarity, 
comprehensiveness, time in processing the permits and the cost involved in processing the 
permit. Transparency seems to be another indicator of effectiveness as well as the steady 
increase of applications for access to the federally managed Genetic Resources.  
 
The Australian case highlights a number of potential indicators for some or all of the critical 
factors which is namely: 
 Transparency about materials collected, by whom, when, where and on what terms 
 Protection of IPR and discoveries in potential markets 
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 Efficiency in time required for processing permits  
 Low transaction costs in processing a permit 
 Local capacity to use one’s own biodiversity 
 Enhanced information sharing 
 Disclosure of information 
 Signal about the importance of bioprospecting to governments 
 Relative clarity and comprehensive coverage of ABS core elements 
 Legal certainty (for compliance, enforcement and verification) 
 Resource investment for biodiversity knowledge generation and infrastructure 
 Use of the certificate of origin  
 Use of evidence of legal provenance 
The Australian case is interesting, given the fact that Australia is a mega-diverse country, and 
at the same time an industrialised country that serves both as a provider country and a user 
country. Australia also has the challenge of taking cognisance of and having regard for its 
indigenous communities/people. 
4.2.1.3 The South African Case 
South Africa has put in place an ABS regulatory framework, articulated through a chapter of 
the National Environmental Management Biodiversity Act (10 of 2004) and the regulations 
passed under that Act (Wynberg and Taylor, 2009). This legislation came into effect in April 
2008. Wynberg and Taylor (2009) examined the new legislative framework regulating 
bioprospecting and ABS in South Africa and explored some of the challenges experienced in 
implementing it.  
 
The examination of the South African ABS regulatory framework did not focus on assessing 
the effectiveness of the legislation but rather, identified a number of legislative gaps and 
inconsistencies. These legislative gaps and inconsistencies will present significant constraints 
towards the achievement of an efficient and coherent legal framework that will facilitate access 
to genetic and biological resources and will also ensure the fair and equitable sharing of 
benefits derived from their use. 
 
According to the review by Wynberg and Taylor (2009) the Act has created confusion in 
regulating research and there is thus a need for urgent clarity if natural product development 
is to be stimulated and not impeded.  
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The Act also fails to deliver wider community benefits from bioprospecting. Another major 
challenge identified is insufficient capacity, political will and a lack of awareness as to the rights, 
roles and responsibilities of different interest groups and constituencies. This may result in long 
administrative procedures, time delays, lack of transparency, overlapping, duplication and 
omission of powers and mandates caused by unclear division of powers and mandates among 
involved departments. The issue of intellectual property rights protection seems also not to be 
adequately addressed in the Act, and the protection of farmers’ rights remains a key legislative 
gap in South Africa. 
 
The process of drafting the South African ABS legislation took almost 14 years to complete. 
This is a significant fact given that South Africa is amongst the most developed countries in 
Africa with significantly better resources and capacities than many other countries. Despite this 
advantage and the length of time taken to develop the legislation, it still had a number of 
deficiencies that had to be addressed after the law was passed and its implementation had to 
commence. This has significant implications for other African countries as well as for other 
non-industrialised countries from other regions.  
 
This case study does have relevance to the critical factors developed by Richerzhagen (2007) 
and points to the following indicators: 
 Legal certainty, transparency and clarity 
 Efficient and coherent legal framework for ABS 
 Efficient and transparent regulation of basic research 
 Accounting for community benefit sharing 
 Political will and commitment 
 Awareness on the rights, roles and responsibilities of different interests groups and 
constituencies 
 Non-complex and non-bureaucratic administrative procedures 
 Timely decision making 
 Transparent processes 
 Coordination, synergistic implementation of the legal framework with other relevant 
policies and legislation 
 Clear responsibilities, authority and mandates among institutions 
 Clear assignment of IPR and property rights 
 Low transaction costs 
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4.3 EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NAGOYA PROTOCOL 
The Nagoya Protocol is key to the effective implementation of the ABS domestic instruments. 
A literature search was, therefore,carried out by the researcher to determine whether potential 
indicators exist for the effective implementation of the Protocol on the basis of the critical 
factors mentioned earlier.  
 
Young and Tvedt (2009), in an attempt to assist parties during the negotiations process of the 
Nagoya Protocol, consider what building blocks could be used to ensure a functional and 
balanced ABS Protocol. They argue that possible building blocks for a creating a balanced 
ABS regime should:  
 Include a clear “map” of the coverage and processes that comprise ABS  
 Enable countries to use which ever “legal vehicles” are most appropriate within their 
own systems for ABS implementation 
 Sharpen the basic understanding of the ABS process, within the generally accepted 
views among parties on ABS, about which activites constitute“utilization of genetic 
resources”, , thus, defining one core trigger of the obligation to share benefits 
 Include a global ‘ABS Ombudsman” as a useful component of such a regime 
 Establish standards, models and forms in a balanced regime 
 Establish a method for official communication between the various users, providers, 
middlemen, countries and other stakeholders that are directly involved in each ABS 
transaction. 
The central thesis in the analysis by Young and Tvedt (2009 p. 1) is to consider what is critical 
for the functionality of an ABS regime based on contracts and, what would be enforceable in 
respect to the above building blocks. They consider what provisions in the draft Protocol could 
affect the functionality of “ABS on the ground”, in other words what provisions are neccessary 
to enable the adoption of the international regime and implementation of a balanced approach 
with user-side measures which would be compatible with provider legislation, by each CBD 
Party and would encourage their adoption by non-CBD countries. This very same concern is 
important for consideration of the implementation of the Protocol and domestic ABS 
instruments. Young and Tvedt’s (2009 p. 1) main focus is, therefore, to focus on identifying 
legal specific issues and proposals for making ABS functional on the ground. 
Young and Tevdt (2009 p. 1) maintain that in the time after the entry into force of the CBD, the 
bulk of focus has been on the provider side of this balance. The challenge for effective 
implementation of the Nagoya Protocol and the domestic ABS measures of parties is, 
therefore, to decide which user and provider side measures could enable a balanced and 
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functional ABS implementation. Care would need to be taken by both sides in the ABS policy 
arena, i.e. user and providers, so that the way they choose to implement the Protocol and the 
domestic ABS instruments would allow for both the user-side and provider side, and would 
ensure that implementation would not be impractical, unreasonable or undesirable. 
Young and Tevdt (2009 p. 1) argue that the world is not uniformly divided into “user countries” 
and “source countries”. This therefore calls for a recognition that: 
 Any country may be a source of genetic resources 
 Any country, whether highly developed or not, may be a user country 
This, by implication, means that many countries may be serving as both users and providers. 
For this reason, whichever way the Protocol or national domestic ABS instrument is 
implemented, it could serve as a two-edged sword, applying to the country itself, as well as to 
outsiders. 
An advantage of the Nagoya Protocol is that it has now provided legal certainty at international 
level. It is now up to countries to follow through and to provide legal certainty at the domestic 
level forboth providers and users. 
 
The observation of Young and Tevdt (2009 p. 2) that the negotiations for the Nagoya Protocol 
had to work on two fronts, must be recognised as correct, namely, that they hold major 
implications for implementation and functionality. These two fronts were: 
 The identification and provision of positions that would most strongly affect national 
positions and the negotiation of clauses which ensure that the regime will support 
national interests; while on the other hand,  
 The need for negotiators to develop a regime that would function in law as well as in 
practice in a consistent and integrated way, across all CBD countries and sectors. 
The political and practical elements of the negotiations were intensively intertwined which has 
made it difficult to separate political negotiations from functionality (Young and Tvedt, 2009 p. 
3). This will certainly be the case again during the process of full and effective implementation 
of the Nagoya Protocol, especially in the ongoing talks to operationalise the Protocol. Care 
must however, be taken to ensure that those involved recognise that the dynamics have to 
change to ensure effective implementation. A critical partner, namely the industry, will have to 
be significantly involved , particularly since they have different interest from the political 
imperatives. Industry requires a functional framework that provides for incentives, and is 
facilitated by low transaction costs in a time-efficient manner and, which also allows for the 
generation, flow and sharing of benefits. 
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It is up to Member States to the Nagoya Protocol to decide whether this will indeed be the 
case. The Protocol paves the way for that. 
 
Tvedt and Rukundo (2010) attempted to highlight the issues of functionality as it related to the 
Protocol.  It must be kept in mind though that at the time they made their analysis the 
negotiations for the Protocol were still not concluded. 
 
Tvedt and Rukundo (2010) provided their analysis as an attempt to contribute to a better 
technical understanding of some of the issues at the core of the negotiations. They further 
aimed to assist in the preparations for the last round of negotiations before the adoption of the 
Protocol, with a view to ensuring that the Protocol would effectively contribute to the fulfillment 
of the third objective of the CBD.  
The provisions of the Protocol, as they currently stand, will not be conducive to the fair and 
equitable sharing of benefits unless the wording can be further clarified, to ensure that the 
Protocol will be implemented through the passing into national legislation. This is a concern 
since the Protocol provisions, and the related national legislation would have legal standing in 
relation to users of genetic resources. Particular attention has to be given to issues related to 
the scope, utilization, and relationship of the prospective Protocol with other international 
instruments, pathogens and elements at the nexus between access and compliance. 
 
Tvedt and Rukundo (2010 p. 2) maintain that at its core, the ABS-challenge is about creating 
incentives for private (or public) entities (which create benefits using ‘genetic resources’), to 
share these benefits in a fair and equitable manner. ABS becomes an international issue when 
a genetic resource of one country is used in another jurisdiction or country. 
 
The functionality of the Protocol will rest on finding an adequate balance between two 
imperatives (Tvedt and Rukondo, 2010, p. 2), as follows: 
 On the one hand, developing countries often advocate for strong compliance 
mechanisms coupled with clear benefit-sharing obligations. This is essentially based 
on a view that provider-side law and contractual provisions are currently insufficient in 
dealing with misappropriation and/or misuse. 
 On the other hand, it is not enough to require user-side measures: the Protocol must 
also make those measures reasonable from the perspective of the user side. The 
challenge is how to create an adequate balance between these two imperatives 
without compromising effective compliance and without introducing undue legal 
uncertainty and burden for users of genetic resources. 
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One basic assumption seems to be that ABS is made functional by the use of contracts 
between the providing country and the user. The challenge is, however, twofold (Tvedt and 
Rukondo, 2009, p. 2), namely:  
1) Creating incentives for users to enter into such contracts, and,  
2) Making such contracts enforceable in the jurisdictions where the genetic resources are 
being used.  
The legislation of the user country needs to be clear as to the situations in which users will be 
bound by specific ABS obligations. The response to this can be found in the CBD in its Article 
15.7 (Tvedt and Rukondo, 2010 p. 2). They further maintained that utilization of genetic 
resources11 can act as the trigger-point for benefit sharing. Thus several of the difficult issues 
in the current negotiations can be solved by enhancing clarity and certainty on the concept of 
utilization as a trigger-point/end-point as regard to when benefits shall be shared. This clarity 
was achieved by the negotiators when the Protocol was concluded since the Protocol defines 
the concept of the utilization of genetic resources (Nagoya Protocol, 2010) 
 
Another challenge of a legal nature that Tvedt and Rukondo (2010 p. 2) identify is that the 
Protocol and the CBD itself are binding upon states, whereas benefits are created by private 
entities, such as companies, universities etc.  
 
Thus, Tvedt and Rukondo (2010, p. 2) maintain that for the Protocol to have any effects on the 
private users of genetic resources, its obligations need to be implemented in the home 
jurisdiction of the user. They further assert that the challenge in international law, is that the 
principle of sovereignty prevents the law of one country (the providing country) from having 
legal effect in the jurisdiction of another country (user country), unless the user country 
recognizes any such legal effects (reciprocity) in its own legislative area. If one user of genetic 
resources would be expected to enter into mutually agreed terms (MAT) and share a fair and 
equitable portion of the benefits arising out of utilization of genetic resources, there would need 
to be incentives for that user to do so. The private company would need to be obliged under 
the laws in its home jurisdiction to share benefits or to have an agreement describing how 
benefits are to be shared. 
 
                                               
11 Utilisation of genetic resources is defined as ‘research and development on the genetic and/or 
biochemical composition of genetic resources, including through the application of biotechnology as 
defined in Article 2 of the Convention’ (Nagoya Protocol, 2010, p. 4) 
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The Protocol has now provided for this concern under User Measures And Compliance 
Measures. 
 
Essentially what is now required is to put this instrument, and other instruments that will 
emanate in response to it at the national levels, to test. It is hoped that this study can assist in 
making that test of effectiveness and functionality come to pass in an efficient manner. 
 
The final issue for which the Protocol has also provided legal certainty, is the concept of genetic 
resources which remains as defined under the CBD. These definitions as they are now 
provided for in the Protocol, addresses the information asymmetry that has plagued the ABS 
debate for a significant number of years. What is now required is that these definitions are 
understood and used by all ABS as stakeholders in the implementation of the Protocol and the 
development and implementation of domestic ABS frameworks. 
 
The study of Young and Tevdt (2009) as well as Tevdt and Rukondo (2010) became available 
at the height of the negotiations for the Protocol. In this study - post protocol adoption –the 
study by Young and Tevdt (2009) was of particular interest to this study, and was analysed to 
see what elements could emerge as potential indicators for some, or all, of the critical factors 
listed above, as well as drawing upon the emphasis of functionality in each case. Twenty-two 
(22) elements with the potential to be used as indicators for the critical factors were identified 
from this study. They are briefly discussed below. For ease of reference the potential indicators 
from this study will be numbered. 
4.3.1 Need for Legal Clarity, Transparency and Certainty  
Young and Tevdt (2009, p. 2) defined legal certainty as the ability of each user, provider, 
national legislator, official, judge, arbitrator or other person to know with a relatively high degree 
of confidence whether the regime applies to a particular person or action, and if so, what the 
regime would require in each case. 
 
The commercial system is designed around the ability of the user to know with certainty the 
following; (Young and Tvedt, 2009, p 2 and 48):  
i) Which resources and rights require permission or payment 
ii) Which are un-owned and thus can be freely used  
iii) What processes to be followed in order to acquire specific resources and rights  
iv) Which legal requirements and costs are relevant to the process of assessing and 
determining the commercial risk and value of every transaction. 
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Legal certainty in a source country in granting access to genetic resources and/or the right to 
utilize them is a two-edged sword From the provider perspective, legal certainty provides 
assurance that the user will comply with the terms contained in a given country‘s chosen legal 
vehicle for ABS, ensuring that obligations are performed, and, that following failure to do so, 
legal or informal recourse is provided for. 
 
At the contract level, the Nagoya Protocol provides legal certainty to cross-border situations 
only where each user, provider, agency, judge, arbitrator or other person knows precisely 
which regime applies to each individual resource or activity. A commercially acceptable level 
of legal certainty can exist in ABS only where all participants in any transaction involving 
biological material or rights would be able to answer the following question with certainty: Is 
the subject matter of this contract a ‘genetic resource” or not? 
4.3.1.1 Use of the Definition of Genetic Resource as provided for by the 
Protocol 
The Protocol defines what constitutes a genetic resource, provides legal certainty, and 
addresses the information assymetry that previously existed amongst parties regarding this 
concept. 
4.3.1.2 Use of the Definition of the Concept of Utilization of Genetic 
Resources  
The definition of the concept “utilization of genetic resources” has vastly simplified ABS, both 
practical and legally. It not only enables parties to easily recognize each “utilization of genetic 
resources’ rather than guessing which biological materials have been used, but also proves 
whether each of them is ‘biological’ or ‘genetic”. Young and Tevdt (2009, p. 12) argued that 
the approach of focusing on “utilization of genetic resources” which is more apparent on the 
user-side of each transaction than on the provider side, may decrease the number of activities 
and approvals required at the time of collection, thereby “streamlining the access process” 
without diminishing ABS coverage or obligations. It is, therefore, critical that implementation of 
the Nagoya Protocol and domestic ABS measures take into consideration and support the 
needs of collectors and users who comply with ABS requirements. Such implementation 
should also recognize their positive contribution to international conservation, sustainable use 
and equity. 
4.3.1.3 Supporting ABS Complying Users to Minimize the Challenge of 
Non-Compliance 
Young and Tevdt (2009, p. 13) maintain that most analyses that attempt to develop a 
functioning regime are primarily focused on users who wish to comply with ABS. These users 
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and bioprospectors make no attempt to conceal their desire to search and screen an area or 
a grouping of organisms. Being clear about their “genetic-resource-utilisation” intention, these 
users generally seek to comply with access legislation and contracts.  
 
On the other hand, Young and Tevdt (2009, p. 13) further point out that most discussions 
regarding ABS compliance focus on the number of persons and entities who utilise genetic 
resources without ABS contracts. Measures that are sufficient to regulate users who wish to 
comply with ABS will, therefore, normally not be sufficient to enforce provider-side 
requirements, especially where the user is operating outside of the provider-side country. 
4.3.1.4 Measures for Dealing with Benefits Arising 
In order to deal with the issue of benefit sharing, it is important to determine the point at which 
benefits “arise out of utilization” of genetic resources, and must be shared (unless an ABS 
contract exists that states a different time and/or type of benefit-sharing) (Young and Tevdt, 
2009, p. 15). In this regard Young and Tevdt identified fixed-points for benefit sharing and 
process-oriented benefitsharing arrangements as a potential way of dealing with the issue of 
benefit-sharing. Essentially, this could imply that parties may need to consider the 
development of benefit sharing strategies on a case by case basis in the process of 
implementing the Protocol and domestic ABS instruments.  
4.3.1.5 The Use of Primary Legal Vehicles of Access to Genetic Resources 
Young and Tevdt (2009 p. 16) point out that the ABS rights and responsibilities under the CBD 
are seen to revolve around the provider/source country and the manner in which they exercise 
their sovereign rights over those resources. In their analysis of the available legal vehicles of 
access to genetic resources they find that the approaches as outlined in table 1 (legal vehicles) 
are available to to the provider side of ABS implementation. They point out that despite the 
fact that the value and use of non-binding contractual instruments are frequently understated, 
the parties to such instruments are bound by a ‘duty of good faith’ to “use best efforts” to 
achieve the instrument’s objectives.
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Table 4.1 Use of Legal Tools 
Legal tool for ABS (access-side) 
Implementation 
On the Ground Experience with this Tool 
Enforceable contracts 
 
12 countries require a formal contract under 
their national law 
Memoranda of Understanding and other non-
binding instruments 
Although the MoU option is  not mentioned in 
the law of any country, nearly all ABS contracts 
between a provider and a user are 
unenforceable by law 
Implied or equitable (de facto) contracts This is the tool chosen by the ITPGRFA 
Permits enforceable as contracts 15 national laws require negotiation of permits 
that might render them enforceable contracts 
Other permits, licenses or approvals 8 national laws impose permit requirements that 
would not be enforceable as contracts 
Relevant regulatory control by law or agency, 
requiring no permit or approval 
18 national laws impose specific requirements 
on users and collectors and presume that they 
will be enforceable even after collection has 
occurred (i.e., when the user may have taken 
the resources and left the country.) 
No relevant national law in place Only 39 countries have filed measures in the 
ABS database, and only 18 of these include 
binding legal requirements. Other national laws 
may be relevant, even if not called ‘ABS law” or 
mentioning “genetic resources” 
Transactions outside the scope of the ABS 
regime 
A large number of researchers, commercial 
users and others have concluded that their 
activities are outside the scope of ABS, citing 
various reasons.  
Source: Young and Tvedt (2009, p. 17) 
4.3.1.6 Assurance of Contractual Certainty 
For players in the ABS to enter into contractual relations certainty about the contracts are 
essential, including knowledge of the following: Who owns the genetic resource? Who has the 
right to grant access to the genetic resource? Who has the right to give permission to utilize 
the genetic resource? Who has the power to decide how benefits will be shared? How will this 
knowledge be known/determined? (Young and Tvedt, 2009, p. 22). 
4.3.1.7 Industry Standards 
For ABS, the desire to have recognized industry standards could create an incentive for 
commercial users to be more open about the contents of their contracts (Young and Tvedt, 
2009 p. 23). 
4.3.1.8 Clear Basic Commercial and Administrative Rights on the Provider 
Side 
Basic commercial and administrative rights are important for efficient functioning of the private 
sector. Clarity on the basic commercial and administrative rights that are prevalent at the 
national level are, therefore, important for the effective implementation of the international 
regime. In this regard each country’s “access” requirements should be clarified. 
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Young and Tevdt (2009 p. 22) argue that this is critical also for effective and clear 
implementation in that the access requirements of each country, since it would make it easier 
for users to know what is needed and required. The general laws of provider countries should 
be studied as they apply to ABS, including:  
i) the ownership of various kinds of property and/or property rights;  
iii) ii)  the particular rights of an owner under national law;the finality of contracts and 
administrative/legal decisions;  
iv) the rights of the party to a final contract or under a final decision;  
v) legal protection of the Parties to contracts and administrative documents and 
negotiations (especially the parties that are least able to protect themselves); and, 
vi) the system for oversight, implementation and/or enforcement and for administrative or 
judicial action within the country. 
It would be virtually impossible for the ABS regime to adopt provisions which require countries 
to change or harmonise these basic laws, for two reasons:  
The types of laws at the national level mentioned above are very complex and detailed in many 
countries and further, it would be important for users, user-countries, judges, prosecutors, 
arbitrators and others, would know with certainty what laws of provider-side country are 
relevant in each case or transaction. 
Young and Tevdt (2009 p. 49) argue that the functionality of the regime would depend on 
whether each country can formally and officially identify the specific laws, requirements and 
relevant information necessary to inform any user as to the basic commercial and 
administrative rights that are applicable in each case. 
4.3.1.9 Compliance Measures  
Compliance measures need to be in place for remedies and processes to operate successfully. 
Ultimately the success of effective ABS implementation will depend on willingness to 
collaborate, rather than on a command-and-control-style legal mandate. Beyond this it is often 
extremely difficult for foreign parties to effectively utilize the legislative, administrative and 
arbitration processes of any other country.  
 
There may, further, be a need to develop guidance, technical assistance programmes or 
appoint an ombudsman to assist providers and source countries seeking to protect their ABS 
rights and to enable a better mechanism for applying conventional remedies to ABS claims 
(Young and Tvedt, 2009 p. 25). 
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4.3.1.10 The Use of Model and Default Clauses 
If parties to ABS contracts are willing to use model and default clauses, the regularity of ABS 
practices (which would initiate the process of defining ‘industry standards’) would increase 
without using any kind of compulsion or mandatory provisions. That willingness might be 
increased where all CBD countries in the regime specifically state that agreed model clauses 
are automatically valid and enforceable in their respective national courts (Young and Tvedt, 
2009 p. 25). 
4.3.1.11 Incentive Measures in both Provider and User Countries 
If ABS implementation is to depend entirely on formal oversight and enforcement by the source 
countries, user countries, NGOs and/or private claimants, it will be very unwieldy, and possibly 
unworkable. Internationally agreed and/or nationally adopted incentives and motivational 
measures could encourage user participation in, and compliance with, ABS. This will be 
successful when the value of the reward, as perceived by the user, is much greater than the 
cost of compliance. Incentives and motivation measures place the onus of responsibility on the 
user, not by mandate, but by self-interest. The user will comply if they want to receive the 
benefit. Although this would not completely eliminate the need for governmental oversight, 
incentives eliminate the need to inspect and compel individual user. In a functional system, 
users recognize that if they comply with the requirements, they will receive the ‘reward’ but 
otherwise they will not (Young and Tvedt, 2009 p. 29).  
4.3.1.12 Measures to Ensure Equity and Equality 
These measures are aimed at facilitating transactional assistance for traditional and rural 
providers. ABS is an undisputedly complex subject and information assymetries are prevalent. 
As a result, in carrying out transactions between commercial entities and rural communities or 
individuals, the former often experience high levels of uncertainty regarding the capacity of the 
rural individuals or communities to effectively negotiate in their own interest. In many cases 
the communities or rural individuals themselves feel similar misgivings. This uncertainty poses 
a significant risk that an administrator or judge could find that the commercial entity had exerted 
an unfair level of control in the contractual negotiations due to the rural parties’ lack of 
commercial and legal sophistication (Young and Tvedt, 2009 p. 31). 
4.3.1.13 User-Side Approaches 
In their analysis, the authors thoroughly examin the then-current situation in 2007 relative to 
the adoption of user-side measures for applying and enforcing any type of legal vehicle 
regulating ABS aspects, law or contracts. They find very few actual user-side measures 
adopted in any country. Returning to this question two years later in 2009, the situation has 
changed very little (Young and Tvedt, 2009 p. 32). According to them, this result should not be 
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suprising as it reflects the very serious legal obstacles faced by most developed countries 
when trying to address user-side obligations. There is, however, an emergence of countries 
who rose to the challenge of dealing with the implementation of user measures, e.g. Norway 
and Japan (Young and Tvedt, 2009 p. 32). They demonstrate that the effective implementation 
of the Protocol will require that user countries should, in their legislation, policy or 
administrative measures, provide for the import of genetic resources from a state which 
requires prior informed consent to use or export. This import of genetic resources should only 
happen in compliance with the user, having the genetic resource in hand, would be bound by 
the conditions and limitations for the consent. 
4.3.1.14 Provider Side Approaches 
Provider countries should put in place requirements and procedures for obtaining prior 
informed consent (PIC) from government authorities and indigenous and local communities. 
There is also a need for requirements for the negotiations of Mutually Agreed Terms (MAT) 
and benefit sharing provisions with national authorities and other providers (Young and Tvedt, 
2009).  
4.3.1.15 Informational Mechanisms 
Young and Tevdt (2009 p. 28) further argue that effective implementation of the international 
regime will also require the use of an ABS Clearing House Mechanism (CHM) or some other 
international communication mechanism, as an official source of information regarding every 
country’s legal choices that are relevant to ABS. The underlying condition is that CBD countries 
would be willing to make specific commitments in order to ensure official accuracy of 
information as well as evidence required under both mechanisms. It would also ensure that 
they would consider the provider-side legal vehicle as a valid basis for enforcement, as well as 
for other legal action on the user side, so long as the provider/source country complies with 
the relevant prerequisites. 
4.3.1.16 Use of an ABS Clearing House Mechanism (CHM)  
The effective coordination of national measures to form an operational and functional ABS 
System appears to depend on the ability of user, providers, agencies, communities, NGOs, 
advisors, judges, arbitrators and others, from any CBD country, to obtain officially sanctioned 
information about the key matters of certainty and evidence required by each country, with 
specific regard to access to, collection and utilization of its genetic resources (Young and 
Tdvet, 2009 p. 53). They, therefore, argue that the use of an ABS-CHM will enhance 
functionality and that such a mechanisms should be the primary vehicle for international 
implementation of the functional elements of cross-border implementation of the Nagoya 
Protocol. 
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4.3.1.17 National Decision-Making Procedures 
Effective implementation will require that all countries adopt, enact or otherwise ensure that 
these provisions form a part of their national legal basis which underlies ABS implementation 
and enforcement. This means that at the national level effective coordination, communication, 
consultation and cooperation amongst all the national stakeholders, must be in place (Young 
and Tvedt, 2009 p. 54). 
4.3.1.18 Information on Evidentiary Rules 
It is necessary for users and all other parties and decision-makers to know what specific 
evidence is needed (on both provider-side and user-side) to demonstrate that a particular user 
complied, or failed to comply, with national law. There are clear rules as to what kind of proof 
must be presented in order to meet the “documentation of source“ requirements and a specific 
benefit-sharing amount (or standard for determining the amount in each case) and/or 
performance that would be required where a user could not make the above proof (Young and 
Tvedt, 2006, p 49). 
4.3.1.19 ABS Ombudsman 
Young and Tevdt (2009 p. 52) propose the establishment of an ABS Ombudsman as inevitable, 
during the process of implementation and beyond. Parties to the Nagoya Protocol will be 
expected to operate in a coordinated manner, applying and enforcing legal requirements 
across national borders. It will also be necessary to develop some mechanisms to facilitate 
cross border communication and functionality. 
 
The ABS Ombudsman should be a permanentinstitution working in the field of ABS, and 
chosen for credibility of balancing ABS and enjoying ABS-relevant expertise. 
4.3.1.20 Communication Processes and Strategies and Disclosure 
Requirements 
 Another key international element of any cross-border legal relationship is the need for official 
communication between the various users, providers, intermediaries, countries and others that 
are directly involved in each ABS transaction. This will include disclosure requirements (Young 
and Tvedt, 2009 p. 54). 
4.3.1.21 Enabling Bilateral Action  
Through bilateral discussions, two countries can determine key factors, including some of the 
matters identified as essential certainties for the development of any ABS relationship. Such 
negotiations can “prepare the way” for the negotiation of particular ABS contracts by individuals 
and entities from the two countries, as well as helping to protect the parties against 
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misunderstandings and allegations of bad-faith and/or biopiracy that may arise where the 
individual negotiation goes forward without confirmation of key certainties (Young and Tvedt, 
2009 p. 54). 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
The literature search points out two major issues: 
The empirical framework provided by Richerzhagen (2007) has not been used by workers to 
carry out and advance the assumptions contained in, or underlying, her work, and no literature 
that further utilised her work later is evident. The search, however, also provides ample 
indication that the work of Richerzhagen (2007) provides the most comprehensive and 
systematically structured framework to analyse the effectiveness of ABS regimes at the 
national and international levels up to the current time.  
 
The literature review reveals that over the years there has been a significant effort towards 
building a body of knowledge on ABS implementation globally. It also elucidates the fact that 
there has been no development of indicators for ABS implementation in a systematically and 
empirical manner based on an analytical framework as provided by the critical factors. 
 
The three cases studied represent the realities and challenges facing many provider and user 
countries in terms of regulating ABS at the national level. The other cases in general, and the 
three cases discussed in particular, have pointed out a number of potential indicators. There 
was a deliberate attempt to restrict the literature search to the most up-to-date analysis of ABS 
legal instruments at the time of the study. The author has restricted himself to those relatively 
new or recent literatures on ABS regime. Since the Nagoya Protocol was adopted before the 
development of the indicators and given the centre stage role of the Nagoya Protocol in the 
ABS debate some indicators, therefore, also had to be relevant to the implementation of the 
Nagoya Protocol. It can be inferred that some of them relate to the critical factors either directly 
or indirectly and thus, hopefully with some modifications where necessary, can be developed 
into useful indicators. 
 
It was decided to enlarge the scope of the literature review to include literature not only on ABS 
alone, but that would also identify whether studies or literature in New Institutional Economics 
(NIE) theory existed that could have potential indicators on the critical factors themselves as 
opposed to simply looking at existing ABS regimes. This part of the literature search is 
discussed in the chapter on NIE. 
The information and insights contained in this chapter and that were aquired from expert 
interviews will form the basis for the questionaire for the global survey on ABS. 
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CHAPTER 5 
METHODOLOGY 
The end justifies the means or does the means justify the end? 
~Anon 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The present study has investigated the critical factors necessary for accessing the 
effectiveness of ABS instruments at the national and international levels. It further seeks to 
develop indicators for the critical factors and determine whether the indicators can be used to 
monitor progress in a country in order to determine the extent of development and 
implementation ofthe national ABS policy and legal framework in a given country.  
 
In order to develop these indicators a number of expert interviews were completed which 
provided an initial set of potential indicators for critical factors as well as providing additional 
critical factors. This outcome of this information eventually delivered the basis of the 
questionnaire that was used in the international online survey on ABS. The final steps of the 
study consisted of the interviews for the Namibia case studies as well as the desk study for the 
institutional learning objective of the study.  
 
 5.2 GLOBAL AND NAMIBIA EXPERT INTERVIEWS 
Expert interviews were undertaken internationally with knowledgeable individuals in the field 
of ABS and another series of interviews were done with experts in Namibia. Twenty five (25) 
people from Namibia were contacted and interviewed. Their expertise was on ABS but also 
included related expertise in terms of the development of policies and laws from different 
sectors within Namibia. Table 1 below provides a breakdown of the technical details of the 
participants in the Namibian and global expert interviews on the critical factors. 
 
The objective of the interviews was to seek their opinion on: 
1. The critical factors and their relevance to Namibia, and, 
2. The changes in Namibia since independence to date in terms of developing, implementing 
and generally dealing with, ABS. 
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Thirty five (35) ABS experts from various countries and international organizations were 
contacted and interviewed for the global ABS expert view assessment. 
 
The objective was to seek their opinions on: 
1. The critical factors and the assumptions about the critical factors, 
2. The definitions on what effective ABS implementations means, and,  
3. Whether external and internal factors have an impact on the critical factors. 
Following on from these interviews the critical factors were discussed and further explored, 
with a view to establish additional critical factors, as well as to develop potential draft indicators. 
 
Table 5.1 Technical Details of the Face-to-Face Expert Interviews that Preceded the Online 
Survey 
TECHNICAL DETAILS OF THE FACE TO FACE EXPERT INTERVIEWS THAT PRECEDED THE 
ONLINE SURVEY 
Tools used Namibian Survey International Survey 
Literature review Yes Yes 
Face to Face interviews Yes Yes 
Participants profile ABS experts from a range of 
sectors in Namibia: 
 ABS Chief Negotiators 
(Namibian) 
 Research and 
Academia 
 Industry 
 Indigenous and Local 
Communities 
 Inter-Governmental 
Organizations 
 Private Individuals 
 
ABS international experts from 
a range of sectors:  
 
 ABS Chief Negotiators 
 Research and 
Academia 
 Industry 
 Indigenous and Local 
Communities 
 Inter-Governmental 
Organizations 
 Private Individuals 
 
Number of participants 25 35 
Questionnaire used Yes Yes 
 
5.3 GLOBAL ON-LINE SURVEY 
A Draft Survey was designed based on the outcome of preliminary international interviews. 
The Draft was sent out to a number of people from various backgrounds for testing, including 
a few from the ABS sector. This was done to determine the readability, coherence and 
structure of the Draft Survey. The Draft Survey was then further subjected to a workshop on 
ABS in Namibia to further strengthen it before it was finalized. The questionnaire contained a 
section establishing the demographics of the participants, followed by questions on what 
constituted the effectiveness of ABS. It then proceeded to assess the importance of the 
indicators derived for each critical factor based on a likert scale. This section concluded with a 
question on whether there were other potential indicators. Potential indicators were then 
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developed for each critical factor. Some critical factors ended up with over thirty (30) indicators 
of effectiveness of ABS. The lowest number of indicators for the critical factors was eight (8). 
The questionnaire concluded with an assessment of whether the critical factors were important 
at the national or international level, as well as the importance of the external and internal 
factors that impacted the critical factors. See Appendix 1 for the questionnaire for the global 
survey on ABS. 
 
The population was comprised of delegates who participated in ABS-Working Groups at the 
6th, 7th, and 8th sessions, and that were mandated to negotiate the international regime on ABS, 
now is known as the Nagoya Protocol on ABS. The rationale for utilizing these groups was 
based on the premise that: 
1. The concrete elements of the International Regime had started emerging at ABS 
Working Group 6; and, 
2. It can be argued that those delegates who participated in the Nagoya Protocol were, at 
the time, probably the most knowledgeable individuals, globally, on the current state of 
affairs on ABS and the Nagoya Protocol implementation at all levels. 
The survey also included persons who were knowledgeable about ABS but who were not 
involved in the ABS negotiations. Table 5.2 indicates the technical details of the global online 
survey. 
Table 5.2 Technical Details of the Online ABS Global Survey  
Tool used SurveyMonkey 
complete the survey 
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx?sm=aBZLU_2fRX_2bUFf
D7_2byq1JLvg_3d_3d  
Approximate number of 
addressee 
About 1035 
Period  11 November 2011 – 9 December 2011 
Number of questions 31 
Number of questions 
evaluated for the study 
30 
Statistical analysis 
software 
SPSS 21 
Microsoft Excel 2007 
 
The above methodologies were used to address Strategic Objectives 1 – 5 
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5.4 INSTITUTIONAL LEARNING: THE CASE OF THE ABS 
NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL 
DIVERSITY 
A review of literature was carried out on institutional learning in general and also on the CBD 
and other Intergovernmental Organizations in particular. Some elements on institutional 
learning were included in the Namibian expert questionnaire, in order to track the institutional 
changes in Namibia and the learning that influenced those changes within Namibia. 
5.5 DATA ANALYSIS 
The data acquired from the online survey were ordinal i.e. ordered, or the classification of 
cases into a set of ordered classes, such that each case was considered equal to, greater 
than, or less than, every other case. Given the ordinal nature of the data, parametric statistics 
could not be performed. The data were analyzed using the SPSS 21 statistics program and 
Windows Excel 2007. One dimensional descriptive statistics such as frequency counts, 
cumulated frequencies and median (appropriate measure for mean value for data with ordinal 
scales) were carried out. 
 
All variables were tested for normal distribution with the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test12 and it was 
found that they were not normally distributed (Marusteri and Bacarea, 2010). The sample size 
was relatively small and data characteristics i.e. non-normally distributed and scale, meant that 
bivariate evaluations methods were chosen to analyze patterns in the data (Norman G, 2010). 
Table 5.3. Show the statistical measures applied in the evaluation of the online survey on ABS. 
 
Table 5.3 The Statistical Measures Applied in the Evaluation of the Online Survey 
Statistical measures applied in the evaluation of  the online survey 
 Dichotomous Nominal Ordinal 
Dichotomous Fisher’s exact test Contingency-
Coefficient 
Mann-Whitney U test 
Nominal X (Not applied) Kruskal Wallis-Test 
Ordinal X X Kendall’s Tau –C 
 
5.5.1 The Chi Square Test 
The chi-square test was used to determine whether there was any relationship between two 
categorical variables. The Chi Square Test assumes that the expected value of each cell is 
five or higher. 
                                               
12 This test compares the cumulative distribution of the data with the expected cumulative normal distribution, 
and base its p-value simply on the largest discrepancy. 
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5.5.2 Fischer’s Exact Test 
This test was used on the data. The Fisher’s exact test is used when there is a need to conduct 
a chi-square test, but one or more of the cells have an expected frequency of five or less. The 
chi-square test assumes that each cell has an expected frequency of five or more, the Fischer’s 
test however has no such assumption and can be used regardless of how small the expected 
frequency is. In SPSS, it is possible to conduct a Fisher’s exact test on a 2x2 table, and these 
results are presented by default. 
5.5.3 Measure of Association 
To determine whether, in any particular question, sub-population 1 tended to have higher (or 
lower) scoring for this item than sub-population 2. A measure of association was used rather 
than a formal test for differences (Clason and Dormody, 1994). This was due to the fact that 
the discrete and ordinal nature of the responses restricted the measures that could be used. 
Kendall’s tau coefficient was an appropriate choice when the sub-populations were ordinal in 
some sense (Clason and Dormody, 1994; Goodman and Kruskal, 1979).  
 
The tau test is used to evaluate whether the results can be generalized to the population. In 
the Kendall's tau the denominator is more complex, resulting in a statistic that is more 
'conservative' (typically lower in value) than gamma. Gamma is calculated by counting the 
number of concordant pairs of cases in a contingency table, subtracting from this the number 
of discordant pairs and then dividing the result by the total number of pairs. This has to do with 
tied pairs.Gamma does not consider tied pairs while tau counts them negatively. So, tau will 
only reach 1.0 when all of the cases in a table are on the major diagonal of the table, while 
gamma can reach 1.0 with cases off the major diagonal (Prysby and Scavo, 2004, Brosius 
2007). Kendall's tau is often reported in two variations: tau-b and tau-c.  
Tau-b is used for square tables (tables where the rows and columns are equal), while tau-c is 
used for rectangular tables, which don't have major diagonals.  
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Tau-b is computed as the excess of concordant over discordant pairs (P-Q), divided by a term 
representing the geometric mean between the number of pairs not tied on x (X0) and the 
number not tied on y (Y0) :  
tau-b = (P - Q)/ SQRT[((P + Q + Y0)(P + Q + X0))] (Liebetrau, 1983) 
 
Table 5.4 Type of data calculated by tau-b 
CITY SIZE BY 
RIOT INTENSITY 
City Size 1 City Size 2 Row Totals 
Riot Size 1 1 0 1 
Riot Size 2 3 4 7 
Column Totals 4 4 8 
Source: Garson (2013) 
When a table is square, tau-b is virtually the same as tau-c (Prysby and Scavo, 2004, Nelsen 
2001). Table 5.4: Type of data calculated by Kendall’s tau-b.  
Kendall’s tau-c, also called Stuart’s tau-c, is a variant of tau–b for larger tables. It equals the 
excess of concordant over discordant pairs times another term representing an adjustment for 
the size of the table.  
tau-c = (P - Q)*[2m/(n2(m-1))] (Liebetrau,1983): 73-74 
Where m is the number of rows or columns, whichever is smaller, and n is sample size (Garson 
2013; Prysby and Scavo, 2004,) . 
Table 5.5 Type of Data Calculated by Kendall’s Tau-c13 
CITY SIZE BY 
RIOT INTENSITY 
City Size 1 City Size 2 City Size 3 Row Totals 
Riot Size 1 6 0 0 6 
Riot Size 2 0 5 4 9 
Column Totals 6 5 4 15 
Source: Garson (2013)  
 
                                               
13 This table simply serves to explain the difference between the type of sample that was used in this 
study and that is relevant for the use of tau-b and not tau-c. Thus tau-c was not calculated under this 
study.  
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5.6 FACTOR ANALYSIS 
Factor analysis is used to determine what variable groups go together. It is a correlation of a 
matrix into a few major groups so that the variables within the groups are more highly 
correlated with each other than with variables in other groups. 
 
A factor analysis is performed by examining the pattern of correlations (or covariance’s) 
between the observed measures, thus indicating what variable groups go together or are linked 
(DeCoster, 1998). Measures that are highly correlated (either positively or negatively) are likely 
influenced by the same factors, while those that are relatively uncorrelated are likely influenced 
by different factors. Factor analysis thus uses correlations among many items to sort related 
variables into clusters called factors. (Neil, 2014). 
 
The primary objective of the Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) in this study was to determine: 
1. The number of common factors influencing the indicators derived for the critical factors. 
In other words, the aim was to determine whether the large number of indicators could 
be reduced to fewer indicators (variables) better suited for theoretical explanation. 
2. The strength of the relationship between each factor and the indicators for the critical 
factors. 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was used to derive a relatively small number of 
components that could account for the variability found in a relatively large number of 
measures (Domelen, 2013). The procedure used for this is called data analyses and is 
preferred when the researcher does not want to include all of the original measures in analysis 
but still wants to work with the information that they contain (Domelen, 2013). In PCA the 
principal components are based on the measured responses and, as they are defined simply 
as linear combinations of the measurements, they will contain both common and unique 
variance. This study was interested in deriving a set of indicators for the critical factors and, 
therefore, only data reduction was performed. This means that the number of variables i.e. 
indicators would be reduced to a number of factors (Neil, 2014). 
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Source: Adapted from DeCoster, J (1998) 
Figure 5.1 The model for Principal Component Analysis 
5.6.1 Test to Determine Whether Factor Analysis Can Be Undertaken On 
the Data 
5.6.1.1 Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling Adequacy 
The KMO is a statistic which tells whether each factor has sufficient items. It compares the 
magnitudes of the observed correlation coefficients in relation to the magnitudes of the partial 
correlation coefficients i.e. the strength of the relationship between any two variables when the 
other variables are held constant (Phillips, 2013). This measure varies between 0 and 1 and 
values closer to 1 are preferable. A value of .50 is suggested as the minimum (Phillips, 2013). 
5.6.2 Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity 
Bartlett’s test is used to check that the original variables are sufficiently correlated. This test 
should come out as significant (p < 0.05), thus rejecting the null hypothesis, i.e. that the 
correlation matrix is an identity matrix in which all of the diagonal elements are 1 and all of the 
diagonal elements are 0 (Phillips, 2013).  
Taken together as a group, the above tests provide the minimum standards which should be 
passed before a factor analysis (or a principal component analysis) could be conducted 
(Philips, 2013).  
5.6.3 The Steps Involved in Performing Exploratory Analyses 
5.6.3.1 Assumption Testing for Factor Analysis 
The primary aim of the factor analysis for this study was to reduce the number of indicators 
derived for each critical factor to a manageable number of indicators. The assumptions made 
about the variables were that all variables were suitable for correlational analysis. i.e. they 
should be ratio/metric data or at least Likert data with several interval levels (Neil, 2014). This 
Indicator 1 
Indicator 3 
Indicator 2 
Indicator 4 
Indicator 5 
Factor 1 
Factor 2 
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assumption was met because the questionnaire was based on a Likert scale. Other 
assumptions were that the variables were normally distributed and that there were linear 
relations amongst the variables (Neil, 2014). 
5.6.3.2 Type of Factor Analysis: Principal Component Analysis 
The data was subjected firstly to the default setting for SPSS to use the Kaiser stopping 
criterion (i.e. all factors with Eigenvalues greater than 1) to decide how many factors to extract 
(UC, 2013). A scree plot or diagram was further employed to determine the number of factors 
to extract (UC, 2013). A second analysis was run with an extraction number set to a specific 
number of factors (UC, 2013).  
5.6.3.3 Number of Factors & Items Removed 
Factors for non-complex administrative procedures were set for 10 factors, whereas for all the 
other critical factors it was set at 5 factors. The rationale for this was that non-complex 
administrative procedures had 32 indicators, whereas the other critical factors had a lower 
number of indicators ranging from 18 to 8.  
5.6.3.4 Rotation Method 
A rotation method gets factors that are as different from each other as possible and assists in 
the interpretation of the factors by placing each variable (in this case the indicators) on one of 
the factors (UC, 2013). It was decided to use the orthogonal rotation method i.e. Varimax 
rotation. The rationale for this was that most of the analyses used in published articles used 
Varimax rotation (UC, 2013). The rotated solution provided factor loadings for each individual 
indicator in the data set, which is what was used to interpret the meaning of the different factors 
(Brannic, 2013). 
5.6.3.5 Factor Loadings 
The factor loading show the loading or correlation for the respective indicators towards the 
derived factors. Factors with fewer than three (03) items are generally regarded as weak and 
unstable, whereas factors with 50 or more, indicate a desirable and solid factor. 
5.6.3.6. Label Factors 
The final step in an analysis such as this one, after analysis of the factor and the variables 
(indicators) that correlated highly with them, is to propose names or labels for the extracted 
factors. An attempt was made to provide labels for the factors that were an accurate, useful 
description of the underlying construct. The diagram below shows the various general steps 
involved in the application of factor analysis to a set of data.
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Source: Phillips (2013) 
Figure 5.2 The factor analysis process 
 
5.7 NAMIBIA AS A CASE STUDY 
A literature review was carried out on Namibia and the state of ABS in Namibia. An approach 
towards the interviews based on the critical factors and the results of the literature review was 
then developed. A number of individuals were selected for face-to-face interviews in Namibia. 
Another larger group received an open-ended survey questionnaire which was followed up 
with face-to-face consultations as necessary for clarification. The respondents were selected 
from Namibian experts that work in the Namibian environment sector and in the Namibian ABS 
field. A qualitative approach was used to analyze the results of the Namibian survey. 
5.8 ORGANISATIONAL/INSTITUTIONAL LEARNING: THE CASE OF 
THE CBD AND THE NEGOTIATION OF THE NAGOYA PROTOCOL 
This part of the project was based largely on the literature review, on institutional learning, on 
the experience of the researcher as a key negotiator in the process of negotiating the Nagoya 
Protocol, as well as on other CBD processes. 
Step 1 
RESEARCH QUESTION: 
Are there underlying structures or 
dimensions for the data collected? 
 i.e. exploratory factor analysis 
Step 2 
VARIABLES are grouped  
-R-type of factor analysis 
Step 5 
SPECIFYING THE FACTOR 
MATRIX: 
How many variables are retained? 
Step 6 
ROTATION OF FACTORS: 
Orthogonal – Varimax Method 
Step 7 
NAMING THE FACTORS: 
Significant loadings 
Step 4 a):  
ASSUMPTIONS: 
 Normality 
 Linearity & 
Homoscedasticity 
 Homogeneity of sample 
 factorability 
Step 4 b) 
EXTRACTION OF FACTOR 
-Using Principal Component 
Analysis 
Step 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN: 
 Variables to be included 
 How the variables are to be 
measured 
 The appropriate sample 
size 
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CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ONLINE SURVEY ON 
ABS 
An ounce of action is worth a ton of theory. 
~Friedrich Engels 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the results and discussion of the study for strategic objectives 1-5. The 
only results that will be dealt with in another chapter are those of the Namibian case study i.e. 
Strategic Objective 6. 
6.2 CRITICAL FACTORS DERIVED FOR THE STUDY 
The critical factors and indicators were derived from theory (chapter 2). The validity of the 
factors and the indicators was “tested” via the survey of various ABS experts. 
6.2.1 List of Critical Factors 
The critical factors are:  
a) Good governance structure in both provider and user countries 
b) Assigning property rights and intellectual property rights 
c) Effective, functional and non-complex administrative structure/framework  
d) Addressing or accounting for time lags in the generation and sharing of benefits 
e) Effective measures to address information asymmetry in the ABS implementation 
framework  
f) Efficient understanding of the ABS market structure within which the transaction must 
take place in the country 
g) Presence of an effective and functional biodiversity valorization strategy at national 
level 
h) Presence of effective and efficient measures to build trust (social capital) amongst 
stakeholders.  
The critical factors (a) – (f) emerged from the theory and (g) – (h) emerged from experts 
interviews and were further elaborated upon through a comprehensive theoretical overview. 
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Literature on the countries that are already regulating access, who are planning to regulate 
access and those who may consider regulating access, were consulted. The main objective 
was to study the domestic ABS regulatory framework with a view to see whether elements or 
indicators emerged that could be viewed as important for the effective implementation of such 
frameworks. The indicators that emerged and which were tested in the online survey for 
importance, are reflected in Appendix 1: Questionnaire for the global online survey on ABS.  
6.3 THE ONLINE ABS SURVEY - RESULTS 
6.3.1 Demographics 
The demographics of the online survey show that most participants classified their country as 
both a provider and user of genetic resources. The number of respondents classifying their 
country as either ‘only provider’ or ‘only user’ of genetic resources, were much fewer.  
 
None of the different types of private sector categories - as determined from the literature 
review and reflected in the questionnaire - participated in the survey. There was provision 
made for respondents to select the category “other” for industry. Those that selected this 
category were few. In analyzing what sectors they represented, it became apparent that they 
were either individual consultants or legal experts operating in the private sector. This resulted 
in a situation where no data was available for the selected private sector categories. 
Consequently, no statistical analysis could be performed for this sector in terms of their 
responses vis-a-vis other categories of ABS players. 
 
The research organization category type is largely dominated by the University sector.  
 
A much larger percentage of respondents also served as negotiators of the ABS Nagoya 
Protocol than those who did not. 
Relatively few Indigenous and Local Communities (ILC) participated in the online survey. Table 
6.1 below depicts the demographics of the online survey.
 110 
 
Table 6.1 The Demographics of the online Survey 
  
Categories ABS Stakeholders Total Response 
Count  
% Response 
Count 
Type of country (N = 135) Provider  22 16.30 
User 27 20 
Both Provider User 87 64 
Type of Civil Society (N = 37) National 15 48 
International 19 52 
Intergovernmental Organization (N = 26) Specialized agency 26 100 
Private Sector (N = 4) Pharmaceutical 0 0 
Intermediary 0 0 
Biotechnological 0 0 
Neutraceutical 0 0 
Cosmetics and 
Health Care 
0 0 
Other 4 100 
Type of Indigenous and Local 
Community (N = 16) 
Non-industrialized 
country 
9 56.25 
Industrialized 
country 
7 43.75 
Type of research organization (N = 29) University 25 52.08 
Botanical 4 8.33 
Museum 2 4.21 
Other 17 35.41 
Negotiators (N = 143) ABS Negotiators 81 56.64 
Non-Negotiators 62 62 
6.3.2 The Definition of the Effectiveness of Domestic ABS Administrative, 
Policy and Legal Framework 
The results (Table 6.2) indicate that the majority of the respondents viewed effective 
implementation of an ABS instrument as the ability of that instrument to set incentives to allow 
for the flow of benefits to both users and providers. This is followed by its ability to set incentives 
for the sustainable use and conservation of biodiversity. It is, therefore, suggested to keep the 
two top definitions as a single group which is focused on sustainable use, conservation and 
incentives for the flow of benefits to both provider and user of genetic resources. These are 
then followed by the group of the next two highest scoring definitions i.e. incentives for 
facilitating access to genetic resources and incentives for the assertion and recognition of the 
rights related to genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge. The definition that 
scored lowest is that of setting incentives to facilitate access to genetic resources.
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Table 6.2 Definition of the effectiveness of ABS as Determined by the ABS Players 
 
Definition option Vote by key players (%) Response count 
Set incentives to allow for the flow of 
benefits to both users and providers of 
genetic resources 
78.6 110 
Set incentives for the sustainable use and 
conservation of biodiversity 
77.9 109 
Set incentives for the assertion and 
recognition of rights related to genetic 
resources and associated traditional 
knowledge 
65.7 92 
Set incentives to facilitate access to genetic 
resources 
59.3 83 
None of the above 0.7 1 
Do not know 0.7 1 
N = 140 who answered the question 
6.3.3 The Types of User Firms Involved in the ABS market 
Table 6.3 provides an overview of the results to the question: What type of firms are using 
genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge? It is clear that the categories 
Nutraceutical, Pharmaceutical and the plant breeding industry seem to be the most common 
ABS user firms. 
Table 6.3 The Type of User Firms Involved in the ABS market (%) 
Type of user firm Percentage score Response Count 
Pharmaceutical 59.6 62 
Cosmetic and Personal Care 55.8 58 
Biotechnological 46.2 57 
Plant Breeding and Seed Industry 51.9 54 
All the above 46.2 48 
Phytomedicine 39.4 41 
Nutraceutical 33.7 35 
Intermediary 39.4 27 
Other  7.7 8 
Do not know 2.9 3 
N = 104 who answered the questions 
 
6.4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS FOR THE FACTOR ANALYSIS  
6.4.1 Theoretical Underpinning for Factor Analysis on ABS 
Based on the literature review, no previous study appears to have been done which attempts 
to derive indicators for the effectiveness of ABS policy and legal instruments through the use 
of critical factors. Therefore, due to a lack of previous critical factor analyses or analysis of 
indicators derived for the critical factors there are no previous conceptualizations and 
measurements of indicators for ABS. The literature simply indicates what factors may have led 
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to the success or failure of current ABS legal, policy and administrative instruments. These 
factors were used to derive the indicators.  
6.4.2 Assumption Testing for Factor Analysis 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) and Bartlett’s Test is used to determine whether the data 
obtained can be subjected to principal component or factor analysis. High values (close to 1.0) 
generally indicate that a factor analysis may be useful for the data acquired. If the value is less 
than 0.50 the results of the factor analysis probably won’t be useful (Phillips, 2013). From the 
results (Table 6.4) achieved from the KMO Bartlett’s test the principal component analysis can 
be undertaken. All the criteria have been met with highly significant p values for all critical 
factors, as well as the importance of the critical factors at the national and international levels, 
and finally also, the internal and external factors that may impact the critical factors. This 
means that the strength (based on the score) of the relationship among the variables 
(indicators) is strong and appropriate for factor analysis. The only critical factor that just made 
the minimum criterion of .50 for the KMO test is that of noncomplex administrative structures. 
The other critical factors scored satisfactorily. 
Table 6.4 Results of the KMO, Bartlett’s Tests and Cumulative Variance of the Factor Analysis 
Critical factors KMO Bartlett’s Test Cumulative Variance 
accounted for by 
extracted  Factors 
Assigning Property Rights and 
IPR 
.84 670.29 and P = .000 82.22 
Understanding of the Market 
Structure 
.82 749.68 and P = .000 80.46 
Accounting for time lags to 
benefits 
.80 567.90and  P = .000 72.61 
Importance of critical factor at 
national level 
.80 246.71 and P = .000 70.50 
Measures to build social capital .79 376.39 and P = .000 78.21 
Valorization of biodiversity .78 335.20 and P = .000 80.10 
Addressing information 
Asymmetry 
.74 508.30 and P = .000 83.08 
Importance of critical factors at 
international level 
.72 288.93 and P = .000 83.36 
External and internal factors 
impacting on critical factor 
.62 315.37 and P = .000 68.19 
Non - complex administrative 
structures 
.50 1009.96 and P = .000 81.34 
    
6.4.3 Type of Factor Analysis: Principal Component Analysis 
The data were subject first to the default setting for SPSS to use the Kaiser stopping criterion 
(i.e. all factors with Eigenvalues greater than 1) to decide how many factors could be extracted 
based on Eigenvalues. A scree plot or diagram was further employed to determine the number 
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of factors to extract. A second analysis was run with an extraction number set to a specific 
number of factors. 
 
The analysis of the Eigenvalues of all factors extracted indicated that all original variables 
(indicators) were correlated with the new factors derived, and that all variables (indicators) 
could be retained. It also demonstrated that more factors could be extracted than what had 
been extracted for all the respective critical factors. This meant that all the information 
contained in the original variables were now contained in the factors indicating that the data 
reduction objective had been met. Appendix 2 – Appendix 11 present the results for 
eigenvalues and the rest of the steps for the factor analysis for all the critical factors. 
 
6.4.4 Number of Factors and Items Removed 
The cumulative percentages achieved, indicated the cumulative percentages of variance 
accounted for by the current factors and by all preceding factors. This demonstrated the total 
amount of variance for which the extracted indicators accounted. The results showed that all 
the factors extracted accounted for a total variance above 70 percent. This was positive, except 
for the factors derived for the external and internal factors that could impact or influence the 
critical factors under investigation - of which the total cumulative variance accounted for 68.19 
percent. 
 
Factors for noncomplex administrative procedures were set at ten, whereas for all the other 
critical factors it was set at five. The rationale for this was that noncomplex administrative 
procedures had 32 indicators, whereas the other critical factors had a lower number of 
indicators ranging from 18 to 8. The results showed that some of the critical factors ended up 
with more than five indicators. This was due to the fact that during the analysis of the factors 
and the indicators that correlated most strongly to those factors, it became clear that some 
indicators could be stand-alone factors. Based on the results from the Eigenvalues, this could 
be allowed for since more factors could be extracted than were set. 
 
Since the ultimate aim would be to develop indicators for the critical factors, it was decided to 
retain all original indicators as sub items under the factors that emerged out of the factor 
analysis. The different countries which could find the derived indicators useful would be at 
different stages of development and, therefore, the choice would be left to them as to what 
sub-items under the indicators they would choose. 
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6.4.5 Rotation Method 
A rotation method gets factors that are as different from each other as possible and assists in 
the interpretation of the factors by placing each variable - in this case, the indicators - primarily 
with one of the factors. It was decided to use the orthogonal rotation methods, i.e. Varimax 
rotation. The rationale for this was that according to UC (2013) most of the analyses used in 
published articles where factor analyses were used in the methodology, used the Varimax 
rotation as a preferred rotation.. The rotated solution provided the factor loadings for each 
individual indicator in the data set, which was what was used to interpret the meaning of the 
different factors. 
6.4.6 Factor Loadings 
For factors with fewer than three items, .03 was generally regarded as weak and unstable, 
whereas factors with .50 or more indicated a desirable and solid factor (reference). Most factors 
indicated very strong factor loadings, i.e. above .50  
 
Table 6.5 Dimension Reduction of Indicators for the Critical Factors 
Number of  
Factors derived  
Critical Factor Initial total indicators 
before reduction 
7 Good governance structure in both provider and 
user countries 
18 
5 Assignment of property rights and intellectual 
property  
10 
10 Effective, functional and non complex administrative 
structure/framework 
32 
5 Addressing or accounting for time lags to the 
generation and sharing of benefits 
17 
5  Efficient understanding of the ABS market structure 
within which the transaction must take place in the 
country 
13 
6 Effective measures to address information 
asymmetry in the ABS implementation framework 
11 
5 The presence of an effective and functional 
biodiversity valorization strategy at national level 
13 
5 The presence of effective and efficient measures to 
build trust (social capital) amongst stakeholders 
8 
Indicators were developed for the critical factors, and after data reduction, these were reduced 
to a smaller number of factors. Table 6.5 showed the overall number of factors (reduced 
indicators) that emerged from the initial number of indicators. It was evident from Table 6.5 
that the factors derived had reduced the number of indicators, from fairly large to more 
manageable numbers. Notably, the indicators for administrative complexity and good 
governance reduced from 32 and 18 to 10 and 7, respectively.  
 
The aim was to reduce all the indicators from the original numbers to at least five or 10. This 
was achieved for all the indicators except for good governance structure and information 
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asymmetry, and was due to some of the remaining indicators not fitting into the factor after 
reduction. It was, therefore, decided to retain these indicators as factors, as they were still 
considered important for implementation. 
6.4.7 Labeling of Factors Derived 
The proposed names for the extracted factors were listed in the factor-derived columns in the 
tables. In some cases the top one or two loading items for each factor was used as the most 
appropriate name. An attempt was made to stipulate labels for the factors that would provide 
an accurate, useful description of the underlying construct. The tables below present the 
factors derived under their new labels for each of the respective critical factors. They also point 
to the number of indicators that are strongly correlated with them. 
6.5 THE INDICATORS DERIVED FOR THE CRITICAL FACTORS 
A general observation about the results obtained for all the indicators for the critical factors 
was that they illustrated that most responses viewed the proposed indicators as falling within 
the categories labled as either very important or important. Very few of the other categories 
were chosen as they were not seen as relevant.. The other categories were also scored 
generally lower than the two categories of very important and important. This overall trend 
seemed to indicate that the indicators were critical. This was despite the fact that some of them 
were scored lower by respondends of the global online survey but still fell within the category 
labeled very important or important. 
6.5.1 Indicators for Good Governance Structure as a Critical Factor 
The results illustrated that all the indicators for factor 1, factor 3, factor 4, factor 6 and factor 7 
fell into the category very important. There were essentially only two indicators under factor 2 
that fell within the category important. This seemed to indicate that it was more important to 
actually have the good governance structures in place, and that the intent to put these 
structures in place was not always enough. The same trend occured in Factor 5, i.e. a clear 
statement or intent to sign/ratify the Nagoya Protocol was labled as important. Yet, what was 
labled as very important was to actually sign and ratify the Protocol. Action was thus, 
considered as better than intent in this regard. 
 
The results of the factor analyses responded closely to the indicators that scored highest in 
terms of frequency counts. Table 6 provides the indicators for good governance structure in 
both provider and user countries. 
 116 
 
Table 6.6 Indicators for good governance structure in both provider and user countries 
 
Factors and their Indicators Categories of Importance 
VI I NI NVI DNK RC 
FI  User Measures        
User countries guarantee support for measures in 
provider countries to ensure functionality and 
effectiveness 
43.2 % 
(54) 
36.8% 
(46) 
12.8% 
(16) 
2.4% 
(3) 
4.8% 
(6) 
125 
An assurance provided by the ABS framework that the 
user will comply with the terms of the provider 
country’s chosen legal vehicle for ABS are clear 
49.2 % 
(60) 
36.1% 
(44) 
7.4% 
(9) 
0.8% 
(1) 
6.6% 
(8) 
122 
Functional and effective user country measure in 
place 
50.0 % 
(61) 
41.0% 
(50) 
5.7% 
(7) 
1.6% 
(2) 
1.6% 
(2) 
122 
Assurance that the user will perform his obligations 51.2 % 
(64) 
40.8% 
(51) 
5.6% 
(7) 
2.4% 
(3) 
0.0% 
(0) 
125 
 F2 Domestic ABS instruments are in place       
A clear policy statement on putting in place a domestic 
ABS legal, administrative or policy framework 
52.4 % 
(66) 
31.8% 
(48) 
6.3% 
(8) 
1.6% 
(2) 
1.6% 
(2) 
126 
Clear policies and strategy on ABS at the national 
level is in place 
61.8%  
(76) 
32.5% 
(40) 
4.9% 
(6) 
0.8% 
(1) 
0.0% 
(0) 
123 
The process of developing its ABS legislation, 
administrative or policy measure has been initiated by 
the country 
44.4% 
(56) 
49.2 
% (62) 
5.6% 
(7) 
0.8% 
(1) 
0.0% 
(0) 
126 
Self-interest of the government of the provider for 
accomplishing ABS agreements 
32.2% 
(39) 
42.1 
% (51) 
19.0% 
(23) 
3.3% 
(4) 
3.3% 
(4) 
121 
F3  An effective, functioning and reliable legal 
system 
      
A reliable legal system 76.4 % 
(97) 
23.6% 
(30) 
0.8% 
(1) 
0.0% 
(0) 
0.0% 
(0) 
127 
For each transaction the relevant legal requirements 
and costs are clear at the national level 
47.2 % 
(59) 
45.6% 
(57) 
5.6% 
(7) 
1.6% 
(2) 
0.0% 
(0) 
125 
F4  The political will and commitment towards 
ABS implementation  
      
Political stability prevails in the country 53.2 % 
(66) 
39.5% 
(49) 
6.5% 
(8) 
0.0% 
(0) 
0.8% 
(1) 
124 
Political consistency prevails in the country 48.0 % 
(59) 
35.8% 
(44) 
14.6% 
(18) 
0.0% 
(0) 
1.6% 
(2) 
123 
A clear policy statement that indicates political will and 
ability to engage on ABS issues 
53.2 % 
(67) 
29.4% 
(37) 
12.7% 
(16) 
2.4% 
(3) 
2.4% 
(3) 
126 
F5: Signing and Ratification of the ABS Protocol       
A clear statement regarding the 
ratification/implementation of the ABS Protocol 
33.1% 
(41) 
45.2 
% (56) 
16.9% 
(21) 
1.6% 
(2) 
4.0% 
(5) 
124 
Signing and ratification of the Nagoya Protocol by the 
Government 
45.6 % 
(57) 
37.6% 
(47) 
12.8% 
(16) 
2.4% 
(3) 
1.6% 
(2) 
125 
F 6: Rule of Law is guaranteed       
Access to courts for plaintiff from another country is 
assured 
43.2 % 
(54) 
37.8% 
(47) 
15.2% 
(19) 
0.8% 
(1) 
32% 
(4) 
125 
Upholding the rule of law is guaranteed 54.9 % 
(67) 
37.7% 
(46) 
5.7% 
(7) 
0.0% 
(0) 
1.6% 
(2) 
122 
F 7: Assistance to rural providers of Genetic 
Resources 
      
Guaranteed equity and equality in terms of 
transactional assistance for traditional and rural 
providers of Genetic Resources 
50.0 % 
(62) 
35.5% 
(44) 
9.7% 
(12) 
1.6% 
(2) 
3.2% 
(4) 
124 
VI = Very Important; I = Important ; NVI = Not Very Important; DNK = Do Not Know; RC = Response 
Count 
*RC indicates the number of responses received per indicator 
Only the category that received the highest number of responses is indicated per indicator 
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The principle indicators for good governance in both provider and user countries were shown 
to be the following: 
 Functional and effective user country measures in place 
 Domestic ABS instruments in place (provider measures) 
 Reliable legal system 
 Political will and commitment towards ABS implementation prevails in the country 
 Signing and ratification of the ABS protocol 
 Rule of law is upheld and is guaranteed 
 Equity and equality in terms of transactional assistance for traditional and rural 
providers of Genetic Resources is guaranteed 
The creation of legal certainty was found to be at the core of the negotiations for the ABS 
Protocol and, as the literature pointed out, was important for the functionality of ABS policy and 
legal instruments (Burton, 2009; Garforth et al 2005; Rukundo and Tvedt, 2010; and Young 
and Tvedt, 2009). The results of this study indicated that a reliable legal system scored the 
highest with 76.4 %. This was followed by the need for having clear policies and ABS strategies 
in place at the national level, backed by the necessary political will and commitment towards 
ABS implementation at the national level. This included political stability (53%) and consistency 
(48%). These indicators pointed to the fact that this critical factor set the stage for active 
engagement in the ABS sector at the national level by all stakeholders - especially the private 
sector. This was because legal certainty and political stability were found to be critical for 
providing an enabling environment for ABS transactions and economic development. 
 
These measures as outlined in the study seemed to be more important for the national level 
of provider countries. User measures scored relatively low. This could be problematic for 
implementation of ABS. Young and Tvedt (2009 p. 49) have pointed out that the effective 
implementation of the Nagoya Protocol would require user countries to provide measures in 
their legislation, policy or administrative processes, which ensured that the import of genetic 
resources from a provider state had received prior informed consent. Furthermore, the use or 
export of these resources could only happen in compliance with such consent. It became 
important, therefore, that the good governance critical factor also took into account this 
reciprocal relationship between user and provider states. It also had to consider that the user 
countries had to be bound by the conditions and limitations of consent. (Tvedt 2009). 
 
Generally, the study seemed to indicate that the current focus was more on good governance 
from the provider sides. The findings by Young and Tvedt (2009, p 13) support this view. In 
their examination of how user-side countries were doing in terms of putting in place measures 
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for applying and enforcing any type of legal vehicle that regulated ABS, the results showed 
that very few actual user-side measures were adopted in any country. They explained this was 
not surprising, given the very serious legal obstacles faced by most industrialized user 
countries when trying to address user-side obligations (Young and Tvedt, p.13).  
 
The Nagoya Protocol has clear provisions for user-side measures and only the full and 
effective implementation of those measures would be able to signal good governance from 
user countries. This is important since the divide i.e. the arbitrary division of countries between 
user and provider countries has seemed to be disappearing, as shown by the results of the 
analysis of the demographics of this survey.  
 
Good governance was also viewed as providing assistance to rural providers of genetic 
resources as ABS transactions would need to guarantee equity and equality (50%). Young and 
Tvedt (2009 p 31) have maintained that ABS is an undisputedly complex subject and that 
information asymmetries are prevalent. They also argued that as a result, in transactions 
between commercial entities and rural communities or individuals, the former often experience 
high levels of uncertainty regarding the capacity of the rural individuals or communities to 
effectively negotiate in their own interests. The same argument also applies on the side of 
communities. This uncertainty has posed a significant risk that an administrator or judge could 
find that the commercial entity had exerted an unfair level of control in the contractual 
negotiations due to the rural parties’ lack of commercial knowledge (Young and Tvedt, 2009, 
p 31). Therefore, consideration of good governance dictated that assistance was required in 
terms of these negotiations. 
 
There was no significant difference between the various categories of countries in terms of 
how they rated these indicators i.e. all p values were shown to be greater than .05. Some 
further associations were observed, however. 
6.5.2 Indicators for the Assignment of Intellectual Property Rights as a 
Critical Factor 
The critical factor assigning intellectual property and property rights seemed to be viewed as 
crucial for the effective implementation of ABS instruments. The indicators for this critical factor 
had the highest scores (frequency counts) for the category very important compared to the 
scores achieved by the other indicators for the critical factors. 
 
Table 6.7 provides the results for the assessment indicators for assigning property rights and 
intellectual property rights, which demonstrated that the effectiveness of a domestic ABS 
 119 
 
framework would be dependent on its ability to establish clear rules as to who had ownership 
over the genetic resources (who had the rights to transfer those resources (59.0%), which 
resources required permission or payment (66.4%) who had the right to grant PIC (75.9) and 
who had the right to grant access (77.6%)). 
Table 6. 7  Indicators for the assignment of property and intellectual property rights 
 
Factors and their Indicators Categories of Importance 
VI I NI NVI DNK RC 
F 1:  Clear rules on who can issue PIC and MAT       
Clear rules on who can issue Prior Informed Consent 75.9 % 
(88) 
19.0% 
(22) 
3.4% 
(4) 
1.7% 
(2) 
0.0% 
(0) 
116 
Clear rules on who has the right to give access 77.6 % 
(90) 
17.2% 
(20) 
2.6% 
(3) 
2.6% 
(3) 
0.0% 
(0) 
116 
F2: Clear rules on how genetic resources and 
knowledge will be transferred to third parties 
      
Clear rules on how the transfer of genetic resources to 
third parties will be handled 
59.5 % 
(69) 
35.3% 
(41) 
3.4% 
(4) 
0.9% 
(1) 
0.9% 
(1) 
115 
F 3: Clear rules as to which resources and 
knowledge require permission before accessing 
      
Clear rules as to which resources and rights require 
permission or payment 
66.4 % 
(77) 
27.6% 
(32) 
4.3% 
(5) 
0.9% 
(1) 
0.9% 
(1) 
116 
Clear rules as to how shared genetic resources will be 
treated 
57.3 % 
(67) 
34.2% 
(40) 
6.8% 
(8) 
0.0% 
(0) 
1.7% 
(2) 
117 
F 4 : Commercial rules and administrative rights 
are clearly defined 
      
Clear rules to ensure that private property rights are 
respected 
41.7% 
 ( 48) 
46.1 
(53) 
7.8% 
(9) 
1.7% 
(2) 
2.6% 
(3) 
115 
Clear rules to ensure that confidentiality issues are 
taken into account by users and providers 
47.8 % 
(55) 
38.3% 
(44) 
11.3% 
(13) 
1.7% 
(2) 
0.9% 
(1) 
 
Basic commercial and administrative rights are clearly 
defined 
41.7% 
(48 ) 
47.8 
% (55) 
7.0% 
(8) 
1.7% 
(2) 
1.7% 
(2) 
115 
Clear rules for disclosure requirements 58.8 
(67) 
30.7% 
(35) 
3.5% 
(4) 
2.6% 
(3) 
4.4% 
(5) 
114 
F5 : Clear rules on the responsibilities for both 
providers and user regarding IPR and Property 
rights 
      
Clear rules on the roles and responsibility of both user 
and providers with regard to the above rights 
62.6 % 
(72) 
33.9% 
(39) 
3.5% 
(4) 
0.0% 
(0) 
0.9% 
(1) 
115 
VI = Very Important; I = Important ; NVI = Not Very Important; DNK = Do Not Know; RC = Response 
Count 
*RC indicates the number of responses that was received per indicator 
The bold figures indicates the highest response count received per indicator 
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The main indicators for demonstrating the effectiveness of how a country assigned intellectual 
property rights in its domestic ABS legislative framework were shown to be a need for clearly 
defined rules on the following: 
 Who can issue Prior Informed Consent and MAT 
 How the transfer of genetic resources and knowledge will be transferred to third parties 
 Which resources and rights require permission before accessing 
 Commercial rules and administrative rights  
 Roles and responsibility of both user and providers with regard to the above rights. 
The indicators under Factor 4, i.e. commercial rules and administrative rights, were clearly 
defined. These all scored relatively lower than the indicators for this critical factor. It was also 
only under this Factor that results were obtained for indicators ranked only as important - since 
the indicators under all the other factors were considered very important. These indicators 
were shown to be at the core of industry since industry needed to be assured in this regard, in 
order to be able to generate benefits that would be equitable and fair (Young and Tvedt 2009, 
p48). Young and Tvedt (2009, p 48) further maintain that basic commercial and administrative 
rights are important for the private sector and, therefore, essential for the effective 
implementation of the international ABS regime (Nagoya Protocol). Thus, they argue for clarity 
on the basic commercial and administrative rights that are prevalent at the national level.  
 
In this regard Young and Tvedt (2009, p 48) further maintain that it is important to determine 
how the general law of the provider country applies to ABS including:  
 The ownership of various kinds of property and/or property rights; 
 The particular rights of an owner under national law; 
 The finality of contracts and administrative/legal decisions; 
 The rights of the party to a final contract or under a final decision; 
 Legal protection of the parties to contracts and administrative documents and 
negotiations (especially the parties that are least able to protect themselves); and, 
 The system for oversight, implementation and/or enforcement, and for administrative 
or judicial action, within the country. 
 It was disappointing to see that these indicators were ranked as not very important as this 
would, in the opinion of the researcher, have serious implications for private sector participation 
in ABS transactions at the national level. Consequently, despite being ranked as not very 
important, these rights would need to be clearly spelled out and assured. 
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6.5.3 Indicators for Non-Complex Administrative Structure as a Critical 
Factor 
From the results provided in table 6.8 it appeared that Factors 1, 2, 9, 10 and 11 were 
considered as imperative, because the indicators under them were all ranked very important, 
and they also had relatively high frequency counts. 
 
The three indicators - Time frames needed to reach a decision for granting access to both 
commercial and non-commercial research, as well as for a decision on PIC and MAT and 
benefit-sharing under Factor 12 scored just under 50 %. They were viewed as important by 
respondents. This was also a crucial point during the negotiations for an ABS Protocol. The 
indicators reflected the fear by some parties to the negotiations that ABS instruments could 
simply restrict access to genetic resources, and thereby also cut off access for noncommercial 
research or basic research. Research was important for ABS and, without access, there could 
be no research, especially in provider countries. Moreover, no shared benefits would, in turn 
be generated, if access was not facilitated by domestic instruments. A delay in granting access 
could, therefore, also translate intoextended the time lags for the generation of benefits.  
 
Factors 3 and Factor 7 dealing with decentralization and clear authority for decision making, 
as well as the use of model contractual clauses, voluntary codes of conduct guidelines and 
best practices and/or standards for access and benefit-sharing, were considered important but 
scored relatively low (frequency count). These were interesting results in light of the fact that 
decentralization for some countries, could enhance effective and efficient decision-making 
resulting maybe in more equitable sharing of benefits. Voluntary codes of conduct, guidelines 
and best practices, and/or standards for access and benefits-sharing, seemed to score low 
most probably due to the experience with the voluntary Bonn Guidelines.  
 
The researcher is of the opinion that what would be needed next would be the implementation 
of legally binding measures. A case could be made for model contractual causes since they 
would help address information asymmetry for countries that are just now beginning to regulate 
access. 
 
Many governments face a two-fold challenge, namely, to develop the relevant and complex 
laws and policy frameworks required in this case, and also how to make these legislative and 
policy structures functional and easily understandable (Garforth et al, 2005; Kamau and 
Winter, 2009; Burton, 2009 and Wynberg and Taylor 2004). 
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Thus, what was shown to be important for this critical factor was that the administrative 
structure would need to be simple, functional, effective, implementable and noncomplex 
(70.6%). It also need to be born in mind that simple could also be complicated in terms of 
implementation. Functionality would thus, need to be the final aim. Further, it would be 
important that the National Competent Authority for that system was identified and established 
(73.4%), and also that processes be clarified that would need to be undertaken at the national 
level, in order to acquire the resources needed or desired.  
 
Table 6.8 Indicators for Effective, Functional and Non-Complex Administrative Structures 
 
Factors and their Indicators Categories of Importance 
VI I NI NVI DN
K 
*RC 
FI  Availability of information about the national 
system for access and use of genetic resources  
      
Availability of information about the national system for 
access and use of genetic resources 
63.9 % 
(69) 
33.3% 
(36) 
2.8% 
(3) 
0.0% 
(0) 
0.0
% 
(0) 
108 
Access authorities should make available to the public 
information that is used as a basis for decision making 
and price setting  
41.5 % 
(44) 
40.5% 
(43) 
13.2
% 
(14) 
0.9% 
(1) 
3.8
% 
(4) 
106 
There is a manual of the ABS process at the national 
level 
35.2% 
(38) 
41.7 
% (45) 
14.8
% 
(16) 
5.6% 
(6) 
2.8
% 
(3) 
108 
There is a guidance manual for the national ABS law, 
administrative or policy measure 
38.3% 
(41) 
44.9 
% (48) 
11.2
% 
(12) 
5.6% 
(6) 
0.9
% 
(1) 
107 
The fee structure for ABS permits is clear and 
transparent 
48.1 %  
(52) 
44.4% 
(48) 
4.6% 
(5) 
1.9% 
(2) 
0.9
% 
(1) 
108 
 F2 Effective and functional institutional 
administrative framework in place  
      
A clear, simple and functional institutional framework 
is in place 
70.6 %  
(77) 
25.7% 
(28) 
3.7% 
(4) 
0.0% 
(0) 
0.0
% 
(0) 
109 
The National Competent Authority for granting access 
is established 
73.4 %  
(80) 
22.0% 
(24) 
2.8% 
(3) 
1.8% 
(2) 
0.0
% 
(0) 
109 
It is clear what processes one must go through at the 
national level in order to acquire the resources and 
rights one desires 
65.1 %  
(71) 
32.1% 
(35) 
2.8% 
(3) 
0.0% 
(0) 
0.0
% 
(0) 
109 
There is no confusion and uncertainty regarding the 
administrative rules and their implementation 
56.5 %  
(61) 
37.0% 
(40) 
5.6% 
(6) 
0.0% 
(0) 
0.9
% 
(1) 
108 
A national ABS Multi-sectoral Committee/Council is in 
place 
27.5% 
(30) 
40.4 
%(44) 
19.3
% 
(21) 
6.4% 
(7) 
6.7
% 
(7) 
109 
F3 Decision-making on ABS application is clear 
and decentralized  
      
Decision-making on ABS application is decentralized 
and clear authority for decision making is given to 
lower levels 
19.6% 
(21) 
38.3 
% (41) 
27.1
% 
(29) 
5.6% 
(6) 
10.3
% 
(11) 
107 
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F4 The Right to Appeal is provided for in case 
access is denied for reasons that the firm/users 
did not intend or cannot change  
      
A right to appeal is provided for in case access is 
denied for reasons that the firm/users did not intend or 
cannot change 
31.1% 
(33) 
49.1 
% (52) 
13.2 
% 
(14) 
2.8 
% (3) 
3.8 
% 
(4) 
106 
F5 Stakeholders are identified and the competent 
authority is known  
      
Clear competencies of actors for access negotiators 38.0% 
(41) 
49.1 
% (53) 
5.6% 
(6) 
2.8% 
(3) 
4.6
% 
(5) 
108 
There is a clear framework for stakeholder 
identification to facilitate effective implementation 
36.4% 
(39) 
50.5 
% (54)  
8.4% 
(9) 
0.0% 
(0) 
4.7
% 
(5) 
107 
Competent contact partner in provider country is 
established and is reachable 
41.7% 
(45) 
45.4 
% (49) 
8.3% 
(9) 
2.8% 
(3) 
2.8
% 
(3) 
108 
F6 One Permit system is being used         
The international recognized certificate is being used 38.1% 
(40) 
43.8 
% (46) 
9.5% 
(10) 
2.9% 
(3) 
5.7
% 
(6) 
105 
 A One-Stop-Shop for all permits and other 
requirements has been established 
26.9% 
(29) 
45.4 
% (49) 
19.4
% 
(21) 
3.7% 
(4) 
4.6
% 
(5) 
108 
Only one permit is required 19.8% 
(21) 
43.4 
% (46) 
23.6
% 
(25) 
4.7% 
(5) 
8.5
% 
(9) 
106 
 F7 Model contractual clauses are in use        
Model sectoral and cross-sectoral contractual causes 
are being used 
19.8% 
(21) 
46.2 
% (49) 
25.5
% 
(27) 
4.7% 
(5) 
4.7
% 
(5) 
106 
Model contractual clauses to ensure voluntary codes 
of conduct guidelines and best practices and/or 
standards for access and benefit-sharing are being 
used 
19.4% 
(21) 
39.8 
% (43) 
27.8
% 
(30) 
6.5% 
(7) 
6.5
% 
(7) 
108 
 F8 Clear rules are being used for PIC, MAT and 
MTAs for applicants seeking access to GR and TK  
      
There are clear rules, guidelines and information on 
procedures for PIC, MAT and MTAs for applicants 
seeking access to TK associated with genetic 
resources 
30.8% 
(33) 
67.0 
% (71) 
3.7% 
(4) 
0.9% 
(1) 
0.0
% 
(0) 
106 
Grounds on which access can be denied or revoked 
should be mentioned and enforced in a transparent 
manner 
50.9% 
(55) 
 
44.4% 
(48) 
3.7% 
(4) 
0.9% 
(1) 
0.0
% 
(0) 
108 
 F9 Effective, simple and functional compliance 
measures are in place  
      
Tools to monitor compliance are in place and are not 
complex 
50.0 %  
(42) 
38.9% 
(42) 
10.2
% 
(11) 
0.0% 
(0) 
0.9
% 
(1) 
108 
Check points are established 29.9% 
(32) 
54.2 
% (58) 
13.1
% 
(14) 
0.0% 
(0) 
2.8
% 
(3) 
107 
 F10 There are clear rules and/or processes for the 
involvement of the ILC for access to genetic 
resources and associated TK  
      
There are clear rules and/or processes for the 
involvement of the ILC for access to genetic resources 
and associated TK 
67.0 %  
(71) 
22.6% 
(24) 
5.7% 
(6) 
0.9% 
(1) 
3.8
% 
(4) 
106 
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F11 There are clear rules, guidelines and 
information on procedures for benefit-sharing 
      
There are clear rules, guidelines and information on 
procedures for benefit-sharing 
61.7 %  
(66) 
29.0% 
(31) 
7.5% 
(8) 
0.9% 
(1) 
0.9
% 
(1) 
107 
F12 Clear  time frames for processing and 
granting access are determined 
      
A clear time frame is provided of the time needed to 
reach the decision whether to grant access for non-
commercial research 
37.4% 
(40) 
49.5% 
(53) 
11.2
% 
(12) 
0.9% 
(1) 
0.9
% 
(1) 
107 
A clear time frame is provided of the time needed to 
reach the decision whether to grant access for 
commercial research 
39.3% 
(42) 
45.8 
% (49) 
10.3
% 
(11) 
3.7% 
(4) 
0.9
% 
(1) 
107 
 42.6% 
(46) 
43.5 
% (47) 
9.3% 
(10) 
2.8% 
(3) 
1.9
% 
(2) 
108 
VI = Very Important; I = Important ; NVI = Not Very Important; DNK = Do Not Know; RC = Response 
Count 
*RC indicates the number of responses received per indicator 
Only the category that received the highest number of responses is indicated per indicator 
 
The main indicators for indicating an effective, efficient and non-complex ABS administrative 
structure at the national level and to ensure effective implementation of its domestic ABS 
legislative framework were shown to be the following: 
 Availability of information about the national system for access and use of genetic 
resources  
 Effective and functional institutional framework in place  
 Decision-making on ABS application is clear and decentralized  
 A right to appeal is provided for in case access is denied for reasons that the firm/users 
did not intend or cannot change  
 Stakeholders are identified and the competent authority is known  
 One Permit system is being used  
 Model contractual clauses are in use  
 Clear rules are being used for PIC, MAT and MTAs for applicants seeking access to 
GR and TK  
 Effective, simple and functional compliance measures are in place  
 There are clear rules and/or processes for the involvement of the ILC for access to 
genetic resources and associated TK.  
The results also indicated that it was not only important that the system was functional, but that 
information about the system was made available to potential users and other stakeholders 
(63.9 %). 
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The importance of model and contractual clauses for the private sector, and to some extent 
for the provider countries, was determined and elucidated by Täuber (2011). Young and Tvedt 
(2009) also found that the prevalence of recognized industry standards had potential to create 
an incentive for commercial users to be more open about the contents of their contracts. The 
results obtained for this indicator i.e. model contractual clauses, were relatively low. This was 
another area of concern, particularly as Young and Tvedt (2009, p 25) had pointed out that if 
parties to ABS contracts were willing to use model and default clauses, the regularity of ABS 
practices (thus beginning the process of defining “industry standards”) would increase without 
the need for any kind of compulsion or mandatory provisions. This willingness might be 
increased if the terms of implementation of ABS domestic instruments and the Nagoya Protocol 
states could agree that model clauses would automatically become valid and enforceable in 
their respective national courts. 
 
The results also illustrated a high score for the indicators dealing with clear rules and guidelines 
and information on procedures and processes. This critical factor generated the most 
indicators and the literature also demonstrated that most of the challenges of implementation 
fell within the range of this critical factor. If coupled with lack of political will and commitment, 
and unclear property rights, it could significantly increase transaction costs and thus minimize 
the incentives for engaging in the ABS market of that particular country. It could also lead to 
non-compliance with the formal regulatory system if the costs of doing business outside the 
formal system were lower and more attractive. 
6.5.4 Indicators for Time Lags to Benefits as a Critical Factor 
The overall percentages (frequency) for the indicator of this critical factor are low. Only three 
indicators achieved a percentage of 50% (Table 9) - one under Factor 2 and two under Factor 
4. The percentages ranged from 51% to as low as 32%. This was the first critical factor with 
such a spread. It was expected that indicators for Time Lags to Benefits would have received 
more scores. However, the study indicated that the process to get to the benefits was 
considered more important than the time that it took to obtain them. 
 
These results raised the following questions: Were the results in this critical factor an indication 
that perhaps the current players were not the best at generating benefits, and were, therefore, 
not concerned about the time needed to receive the benefits? Were they thus more concerned 
about setting up the administrative and legal framework but not too concerned about its 
functionality? Was there, therefore, any consideration for managing the expectations of 
benefits? 
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From an industry perspective it could be argued that the sooner the benefits were derived the 
better,as that would signal return on investment. The less transaction cost were involved in the 
process to get to the benefits the better the turn-over would be. This result could have 
implications on the understanding of the importance of the time it may take to generate 
benefits.  
 
It was interesting to note that benefits that should be allocated for biodiversity conservation 
measures scored high as an indicator under Factor 4. This denoted that the continued survival 
of biodiversitywas considered important and that it was not only the benefits that were 
important. This could also affirm that ABS should contribute to the sustainable use of 
biodiversity and thus biodiversity conservation, as pointed out by UNEP (2008). Issues of 
human security, revenue generation, poverty alleviation, food security and national economic 
development were seen as key issues by some countries, and thus viewed as the desired 
ultimate objective of policies of any national ABS policy, legal or administrative measure 
(UNEP, 2008). These issues were however integrally linked to the sustained conservation of 
biodiversity, toward which ABS could contribute through the generation of benefits. 
 
The two most important indicators for the ministries of finances and economic development, 
i.e. the contribution to national economic development, state revenue generation, education 
and conservation were found under Factor 1 and they received the lowest percentage. It could 
be argued that the benefits from ABS should contribute directly and indirectly to the national 
development goals of any country. The question this finding posed was this: Was there an 
underlying assumption that ABS could not generate benefits or were these benefits difficult to 
translate into benefits for the national development agenda? 
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Table 6.9 Indicators for Measures to Address Time Lags to the Generation of Benefits 
 
Factors and their Indicators Categories of Importance 
VI I NI NVI DNK RC 
F 1 Contribution of ABS to national economic and 
human development through monetary and non- 
monetary benefits 
      
Number of contracts negotiated under the ABS 
regime 
16.8% 
(17) 
41.6 
% (42) 
21.8% 
(22) 
9.9% 
(10) 
9.9% 
(10) 
101 
Amount of benefits registered as a result of the ABS 
regime 
23.8% 
(24 ) 
43.6 
% (44) 
19.8% 
(20) 
4.0% 
(4) 
8.9% 
(9) 
101 
Total contribution of bio-prospecting activities to the 
national budget 
24.5% 
(25) 
32.4 
% (33) 
23.5% 
(24) 
8.8% 
(9) 
10.8% 
() 
102 
Total contribution of bio-prospecting activities to 
biodiversity conservation and education 
30.7% 
( ) 
34.7 
% (35) 
21.8% 
(22) 
7.9% 
(8) 
5.9% 
(6) 
101 
Number of nationals trained under ABS agreements 24.2% 
(24) 
42.4 
% (42) 
22.2% 
(22) 
6.1% 
(6) 
6.1% 
(6) 
99 
F2:  National strategies for the application of 
technology, skills transfer, biodiversity valuation 
and negotiating capacities in place 
      
Mechanism in place at national level to ensure that 
short term benefits do not overrule long term benefits 
35.0% 
(36) 
37.9 
% (39) 
18.4% 
(19) 
1.9% 
(2) 
6.8% 
(7) 
103 
A national strategy in place for the application of 
technology, skills and expertise transferred as 
benefits under ABS deals 
42.6 % 
(43) 
35.6% 
(36) 
13.9% 
(14) 
3.0% 
(3) 
5.0% 
(5) 
101 
A strategy is in place for building capacity for 
negotiating ABS contracts (PIC, MAT and appropriate 
benefit-sharing) 
50.5 % 
(52) 
32.0% 
(33) 
10.7% 
(11) 
4.9% 
(5) 
1.9% 
(2) 
103 
National and regional strategies in place to promote 
use of biodiversity for value creation and economic 
development 
45.6 % 
(47) 
34.0% 
(35) 
15.5% 
(16) 
1.9% 
(2) 
2.9% 
(3) 
103 
A strategy for building capacities of negotiating skills 
for communities 
41.7 % 
(43) 
34.0% 
(35) 
18.4% 
(19) 
4.9% 
(5) 
1.0% 
() 
103 
F 3 Clear rules for scientific and research co-
operation 
      
Clear rules for scientific, technical and research co-
operation 
40.8% 
(42) 
46.6 
% (48) 
8.7% 
(9) 
2.9% 
(3) 
1.0% 
(1) 
103 
Assistance for the development of appropriate 
adaptation of relevant foreign technologies 
26.7% 
(27) 
46.5 
% (47) 
17.8% 
(18) 
3.0% 
(3) 
5.9% 
(6) 
101 
F 4 Clear rules and guidelines for benefit sharing 
are in place 
      
Mechanisms are in place to ensure that benefits are 
allocated for biodiversity conservation measures 
49.5 % 
(51) 
34.0% 
(35) 
10.7% 
(11) 
3.9% 
(4) 
2.9% 
(3) 
103 
Clear understanding at the national level of the value 
chain of genetic resources in the ABS pipeline and 
the implications for benefit-sharing 
50.5 % 
(52) 
42.7% 
(44) 
5.8% 
(6) 
1.0% 
(1) 
1.0% 
(1) 
103 
Clear rules and guidelines for how monetary and 
non-monetary benefits will be shared 
47.6 % 
(49) 
38.8% 
(40) 
10.7% 
(11) 
1.9% 
(2) 
1.0% 
(1) 
103 
F 5 Checkpoints are established to ensure the 
transparency of the value chain through which 
the genetic resources is going to ensure 
appropriate benefit-sharing 
      
Checkpoints are established to ensure the 
transparency of the value chain through which the 
genetic resources is going to ensure appropriate 
benefit-sharing 
46.1 % 
(47) 
36.3% 
(37) 
10.8% 
(11) 
3.9% 
(4) 
2.9% 
(3) 
102 
VI = Very Important; I = Important ; NVI = Not Very Important; DNK = Do Not Know; RC = Response 
Count 
*RC indicates the number of responses received per indicator 
The bolded figures indicate the highest response count received per indicator 
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The main indicators for illustrating how effectively a country would address the issue of time 
lags to benefit-sharing in order to ensure the effectiveness of its ABS domestic instruments 
were as follows: 
 Contribution of ABS to national economic and human development through monetary 
and nonmonetary benefits 
 National strategies for the application of technology, skills transfer, biodiversity 
valuation and negotiating capacities in place  
 Clear rules for scientific and research co-operation  
 Clear rules and guidelines for benefit sharing are in place  
 Checkpoints are established to ensure the transparency of the value chain through 
which the genetic resources are going to ensure appropriate benefit-sharing  
 Contribution of ABS to national economic and human development through monetary 
and nonmonetary benefits 
Technology transfer as an indicator under Factor 2 did not receive a high scoring (42.6%) - 
although it was considered as very important by the respondents. Consideration was given to 
the possibility that herein could lie the missing link to transforming countries that were simply 
serving as providers of raw materials of genetic resources to become users of their own genetic 
resources. This could potentially also add value to their own biodiversity and contribute to a 
better understanding of the ABS markets and the flow of benefits through the value chain.  
 
This issue was considered in article 16 of the Convention on Biological Diversity which dealt 
with access to, and transfer of, technology (CBD, 1992) and was raised to some level within 
the negotiations. It has however not received significant attention to date.. Technology transfer 
was also seen to be a serious cross-cutting issue with many aspects of the Convention and 
beyond the Convention. The results here pointed to the need to recommend the initiation of 
intergovernmental processes to negotiate and establish a United Nations Convention on the 
Transfer of Technology (UNCTT). While it had to be recognised that in some cases technology 
was present, what was most often lacking was the capacity, education and other skills required 
to make use of the technology, taking into account the socio-cultural developmental level of 
each country. 
6.5.5 Indicators for Information Assymetry as a Critical Factor 
The results of the indicators for this critical factor zoomed in on the two areas that produced 
some controversy during the negotiations of the Nagoya Protocol. These factors were all 
covered under Factor 1 (Table 6.10), and refer to the definition of the concept “genetic 
resources” (Young and Tvedt, 2009, p. 11) and the use of the definition of the concept 
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“utilization of genetic resources” (Young and Tvedt, 2009, p. 15) as provided by the Nagoya 
Protocol. These two indicators scored the highest, i.e. 54.5 and 62.4 respectively, and indicate 
the need for provider and user countries to work within the definitions provided by the Protocol. 
The danger of venturing into areas of information asymmetry, was an issue that was prevalent 
(given the lack of clear understanding what these concepts meant) before it was defined in the 
Protocol which was then adopted (Nagoya Protocol, 2010; Young and Tdvet, 2009, Tvedt and 
Rukundo, 2010).  
 
Young and Tvedt (2009, p. 12) found that the definition “utilization of genetic resources” vastly 
simplified ABS, both practically and legally. It enabled parties to easily recognize each 
“utilization of genetic resources”, rather than guessing which biological material had been used 
and then prove how each of them would be utilized, i.e. “biological” or “genetic”. The approach 
of focusing on the “utilization of genetic resources” - which is more apparent on the user-side 
of each transaction than on the provider-side - may decrease the number of activities and 
approvals required at the time of collection, thus “streamlining the access process” without 
diminishing ABS coverage or obligations (Young and Tvedt, 2009, p. 14). It was therefore 
critical that, implementation of the Nagoya Protocol and related domestic ABS measures, 
would consider and support the needs of collectors and users who comply with ABS 
requirements. Implementation should also ensure recognition of their positive contribution to 
international conservation, sustainable use and equity (Young and Tvedt, 2009 and UNEP, 
2008).  
 
The second interesting point that respondents zoomed in on was the potential for information 
asymmetry with regard to Traditional Knowledge. 
 
The researcher was aware of the perception, mainly amongst the industrialized countries, that 
traditional knowledge was a challenging and complex issue, not well understood, that it was 
codified and, therefore, difficult to regulate. The holders of traditional knowledge could accept 
these challenges and complexities. However, being a dynamic system, traditional knowledge 
was constantly evolving as with any other body of knowledge. Access to traditional knowledge 
could be regulated by existing measures or sui-generis systems, or a combination of both. This 
issue was recognised as a potential source of significant information asymmetry and was 
integrally linked to the flow of benefits from the ABS system to both humans and ecosystems. 
The indicator for this issue scored high (62.2%). 
 
Effective communication was considered crucial for addressing information asymmetry. At the 
time of this study there remained many areas in the field of ABS that still needed to be 
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communicated. This was most probably why the indicator dealing with effective and functional 
communication channels under Factor 6, also scored high. All avenues of communication 
would need to be explored, in order to arrive at agreements that reduced information 
asymmetry and facilitated the flow of benefits to all parties at the table, including ecosystems. 
 
Although Factor F 2, which dealt with the issue of technology transfer and the presence of a 
policy on science, research and technology, as well as its role in economic development, was 
marked as important and very important, it received a low score of below fifty (50) percent. It 
is important to build the national capacity for science, research and technology. Science and 
technology are the tools that can be used to generate added value to biodiversity. In the end, 
these value-added products can lead to increased benefits both monetary and otherwise. 
 
The presence of a national ABS clearing house mechanism and a Communication Education 
and Public Awareness (CEPA) initiative (Factor 3) were also deemed very important but scored 
below fifty percent. These would be the potential tools to ensure effective communication 
channels for information sharing and redressing information asymmetry. 
 
The indicator for the presence of an ABS National Advisory Council/Committee with a multi-
disciplinary approach and multi-stakeholder representation under Factor 4, scored below forty 
- although deemed important by the respondents. In order to meet this indicator it would appear 
that the challenge that could face many countries would be if whether effective multi-
stakeholder representation would allow for effective, transparent and non-biased 
representation by industry on these committees, and not be too heavily influenced by national 
politics. 
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Table 6.10 Indicators for Measures to Address Information Asymmetry 
 
Factors and their Indicators Categories of Importance 
VI I NI NVI DNK RC 
F 1: The definitions in the Nagoya Protocol are 
being used especially for GR and Utilization 
      
Definition of the concept of Genetic Resources as 
provided for in the Nagoya Protocol is understood by 
all players 
54.5 % 
(55) 
32.7% 
(33) 
8.9% 
(9) 
1.0% 
(1) 
3.0% 
(3) 
101 
The definition of the concept of the utilization of 
genetic resources as provided for in the Nagoya 
Protocol is understood by all players 
62.4 % 
(63) 
29.7% 
(30) 
5.0% 
(5) 
0.0% 
(0) 
3.0% 
(3) 
101 
Clear rules, guidelines and process for dealing with 
traditional knowledge (TK) are in place 
62.2 % 
(61) 
26.5% 
(26) 
5.1% 
(5) 
1.0% 
(1) 
5.1% 
(5) 
98 
F2:  A clear policy on science, research and 
technology including tech transfer is being used 
      
A clear policy and understanding of technology 
transfer at national level 
41.6% 
(42 ) 
45.5 
% (46) 
11.9% 
(12) 
1.0% 
(1) 
1.0% 
(1) 
101 
There is a clear policy on science, research and 
technology and its role in national and economic 
development 
44.0% 
(44) 
43.0% 
(43) 
10.0% 
(10) 
2.0% 
(2) 
1.0% 
(1) 
100 
F3:  A functional CEPA initiative on ABS is in 
place at national level with a special focus on 
traditional knowledge 
      
A national strategy for awareness raising on the value 
of Traditional Knowledge associated with genetic 
resources in place 
40.6%  
(41) 
41.6 
% (42) 
10.9% 
(11) 
5.0% 
(5) 
3.0% 
(3) 
101 
A functional and effective Communication, Education 
and Public Awareness Initiative on ABS in place at the 
national level 
30.7% 
(31) 
48.5 
(49) 
16.8% 
(17) 
0.0% 
(0) 
4.0% 
(4) 
101 
F 4:  Effective, efficient and functional institutional 
and administrative measures are in place 
      
A national ABS Clearing House Mechanism is in place 45.5 % 
(45) 
36.4% 
(36) 
8.1% 
(8) 
4.0% 
(4) 
6.1% 
(6) 
99 
An ABS National Advisory Council/Committee with 
multi-disciplinary and multi-stakeholder representation 
in place 
37.0% 
(37) 
39.0 
(39) 
16.0% 
(16) 
3.0% 
(3) 
5.0% 
(5) 
100 
F5:  Measures are in place to reduce potential 
negotiating and other inequalities between 
stakeholders 
      
Measures are in place to reduce potential negotiating 
and other inequalities between stakeholders 
45.5 % 
(46) 
39.6% 
(40) 
13.9% 
(14) 
0.0% 
(0) 
2.0% 
(2) 
101 
F6:  Rules and guidelines to ensure that functional 
and effective communication process at the 
national level are clear 
      
Rules and guidelines to ensure that functional and 
effective communication process at the national level 
are clear 
31.0%  
(31) 
52.0 
% (52) 
12.0% 
(12) 
3.0% 
(3) 
2.0% 
(2) 
100 
VI = Very Important; I = Important ; NVI = Not Very Important; DNK = Do Not Know; RC = Response 
Count 
*RC indicates the number of responses received per indicator 
The bold figures indicate the highest response count received per indicator 
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The main indicators for indicating how effectively a country would address the issue of 
information asymmetry in order to ensure the effectiveness of its ABS domestic instruments 
were as follows: 
 The definitions in the Nagoya Protocol are being used especially for GR and Utilization 
 A clear policy on science, research and technology, including technology transfer, is 
being used 
 A functional CEPA initiative on ABS is in place at national level with a special focus on 
traditional knowledge 
 Effective, efficient and functional institutional and administrative measures are in place 
 Measures are in place to reduce potential negotiating and other inequalities between 
stakeholders 
 Rules and guidelines to ensure that functional and effective communication process at 
the national level are clear 
6.5.6 Indicators for the Efficient Understanding of the ABS Market 
Structure as a Critical Factor 
For all the other critical factors discussed so far, there was a fair mix of the indicators between 
the categories very important and important. For this critical factor all responses fell only in the 
important category and none fell into the very important category (Table 6.12). As was the 
case with indicators for the critical factor measuring time lags to benefits, the indicators for 
efficient understanding of the market structure for ABS scored lower overall compared to the 
scores obtained for indicators of the other critical factors.  
 
The market for bioprospecting and the transactions that occur within it were shown to be 
complex. According to Artuso (1997b), a model involving monopolistic competition for a 
differentiated product would more accurately reflect the complex reality of the market for 
biological samples, extracts and derivative products. Source countries that could provide 
biological samples and derived products, and which combine relatively rare ecological 
characteristics with associated cultural and scientific knowledge, low production costs, a stable 
political environment and an understanding of the market, were shown to have the potential to 
obtain significant rents (Artuso, 1997b). 
 
The indicator measures in place to resolve the cultural and social complexities and equity 
issues relevant to the ABS market at the national level, scored the highest (49%) under Factor 
4. According to Sampath (2005, p. 75), the problem of uncertain product quality in the market 
for traditional knowledge-related information and tangible genetic resources - where the quality 
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of genetic resources samples or the reliability of the traditional knowledge-based information 
or both, could only be verified after an item has been traded - leads to problems of adverse 
selection and, in extreme cases, to a breakdown of market exchange. This problem is further 
confounded by the social and cultural complexities that may characterize the communities who 
provide the knowledge and the genetic resources, coupled with expectations of benefit-
sharing. Sampath (2005, p.75) maintains that spot-market practices for the sale of tangible 
genetic resources and related information is common. As a result, uncertainty about quality 
prevails in these transactions. As Laird (1993 p.112) observes, “there is a tendency to 
overstate the importance of the genetic collections to pharmaceutical firms that launch such 
research and development programs and hence demand large sums of money that has already 
incensed many in the pharmaceutical industry.” It would, therefore, be important to address 
these issues to facilitate understanding of the market by communities and the public sector 
stakeholders. 
 
Under Factor 1, Low transaction costs in the ABS market, the indicator identified as the 
bargaining and decision-making costs in the market for bio-prospecting, scored low at 45.8 %. 
Artuso (1997b) has pointed out that low production costs are an important incentive for ABS 
transactions to take place. Under Factor 3, the indicator, domestic public and private 
institutions, related to adding value to genetic resources, scored 44.8 %.  
 
The demographics section results pointed out that many countries currently were both users 
and providers of genetic resources. This meant that at the national level, the capacity to add 
value to genetic resources became important. Artuso (2002) pointed out that for many 
developing countries, potentially beneficial bio-prospecting activities and projects might never 
be developed due to an inhospitable policy environment or lack of institutional or technical 
capacity within the country. An effective regulatory framework at the national and international 
levels, supported by innovative programmes and strategies at the national level for the 
development of biochemical resources could promote bio-prospecting investments, facilitate 
successful technology transfer and support the formation of a profitable industrial sector linked 
with the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.  
 
The indicator results for this critical factor led to the question: why would they be considered 
only as important and why did they score relatively low in comparison to indicators for the other 
critical factors?  
 
A number of reasons could be suggested, namely that:  
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1) The respondents may not fully have understood the issue of markets as they related to 
the ABS debate 
2) The respondents may not fully have understood the process and strategies involved in 
ABS products making it through the value chain from the village member who collected 
it to the pharmaceutical plant, then to the marketer and onto the shelf in the pharmacy. 
Acknowledgement would need to be given to the fact that this was a long and complex 
process that required multiple skills and knowledge not related to everyday ABS 
negotiators or government officials.  
3) The issue of markets and the actual process of generating the benefits, i.e. the value 
addition chain, had no real importance for the current players in the ABS debate. What 
was considered very important was to put in place the institutional, administrative, legal 
and policy framework. 
4) Industry stakeholder could have provided a different perspective on this issue and the 
results may have varied. This stakeholder group was not, however, well represented in 
the survey. 
The points above may have serious implications for the full and effective implementation of 
domestic ABS instruments and the Nagoya Protocol as outlined below. 
 
The stakeholders who had, up until the time of writing, negotiated the Nagoya Protocol may 
not have been the right stakeholders to assure the implementation of the Protocol. There may, 
therefore, have been a need to bring new stakeholders to the negotiating table, both at the 
national and international levels, e.g. at the Intergovernmental Committee on the Nagoya 
Protocol (ICNP) level, as well as the national legislative design and implementation process. 
 
A critical analysis of the stakeholders involved in the ABS debate and their main interests was 
considered necessary. Table 11 below provides a breakdown of the perceived main interests 
of the players in the ABS debate at the time of writing. Balancing these interests was a daunting 
task and the challenge was to interrogate to what extend these interests and perceptions would 
influence the design and implementation of ABS instruments at the national levels, either 
positively or negatively. Industry also needed to be considered very carefully as this group was 
mainly considered as a lobbying group and was, therefore, not really actively involved in the 
negotiations as the other groups per se, e.g. the Indigenous and Local Communities (ILC’s). 
In addition, many, especially in the provider country “camps”, considered industry 
representatives as the “enemy” or the “bad guy”, or even as bio-pirates who had only been 
misappropriating genetic resources and traditional knowledge without the sharing of benefits. 
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Table 6.11  The Various Stakeholders Who Participated In The ABS Negotiations And Their 
Respective Interests 
Stakeholder 
categories 
Main interests 
Provider countries Regulate access to genetic resources and associated traditional 
knowledge 
Ensure acceptance of the necessary provider measures 
Ensure that equitable benefit-sharing is assured (conservation, use and 
benefits) 
Ensure  biodiversity protection and conservation  
Regard industry as bio-pirates and, therefore, the enemy 
Had a weak industry lobby 
User countries Regulate access to genetic resource and associated traditional knowledge 
Ensure acceptance of the necessary user measures 
Ensure equitable benefit-sharing (conservation, use and benefits) 
Ensure interests of negotiators from a diverse range of government 
representations with different backgrounds 
Had a strong industry lobby 
Research and 
Academia 
Ensure that basic research is not compromised by the outcome of the 
negotiations 
Legal experts 
(Provider, User 
countries and Private 
Sector) 
Ensure legal certainty  by the Protocol, as far as possible 
Check for legal precedents and ensur that legal systems of their countries 
of origins are adhered to and not infringed upon by the Protocol 
Diplomats (both from 
provider and user 
countries) 
Ensure the protection of sovereignty of the negotiating states 
Intergovernmental 
organizations 
Ensure the maintenance and protection of mandates and “turfs” of different 
intergovernmental organizations 
Ensure that already established institutions with similar mandates as the 
Protocol are not “hollowed out” or weakened by the Protocol 
Indigenous and Local 
Communities 
Ensure respect for their right to their traditional knowledge and respect for 
the related genetic resources 
Ensure the flow of benefits to them as providers of traditional knowledge 
and in some cases, of genetic resources 
Aim to secure their basic human rights and the right to self-determination  
Industry and Private 
Sector 
Ensure the protection of  the interests of industry  
Source: Own. Based on the expert interviews and the literature review 
 
The results of the indicators for this critical factor further demanded another critical look at the 
ABS markets and market forces that would allow for the flow of benefits, ultimately the main 
objective of all the main players around ABS. 
 
The industry sector was considered as the one category of ABS players who had the skills, 
know-how, technology, innovation and capacity to unlock the secrets of what markets wanted 
based, on their product research (Artuso, 1997b; Simpson et al., 19960).Industry had to be 
recognised as the one category of players that would be able to transform biodiversity and 
traditional knowledge into marketable, value-added products that could enter the market and 
thus allow for the flow of benefits – as well as generating benefits to providers before 
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marketable products had been reached (Artuso 1997b, 1999 and Rauser & Small, 2000). 
However, for this to happen, access to genetic resources and traditional knowledge would 
need to be granted on the basis of PIC and MAT, before benefits could be generated. The two 
aspects were recognised as being linked. The importance to all the other groups of industry 
also had to be recognised. It was imperative, therefore, to create a mutually supportive, 
integrated and beneficial relationship between all the stakeholders, if the ABS Protocol and 
domestic ABS instruments were to be effective and would allow for the flow of benefits through 
the establishment of the most appropriate incentives.
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Table 6.12 Indicators For Efficient Understanding Of The ABS Market Structure 
 
Factors and their Indicators Categories of Importance 
VI I NI NVI DNK RC 
F 1: Low transaction costs in the ABS market       
Low bargaining and decision-making costs in the bio-
prospecting market  
16.7% 
(16) 
45.8 
% (44) 
16.7% 
(16) 
5.2% 
(5) 
15.6% 
(15) 
96 
Low monitoring and enforcement costs in the bio-
prospecting market  
25.0% 
(24) 
42.7 
% (41) 
13.5% 
(13) 
5.2% 
(5) 
13.5% 
(13) 
96 
Pro-active policy approach towards the private sector 
and investors interested in investing in the bio-
prospecting market at the local level  
29.2% 
(28) 
42.7 
% (41) 
15.6% 
(15) 
3.1% 
(3) 
9.4% 
(9) 
96 
Bargaining occurs under competitive conditions 12.6% 
(12) 
34.7 
% (33) 
27.4% 
(26) 
8.4% 
(8) 
17.9% 
(17) 
96 
Low search and information costs in the bio-
prospecting market  
16.7% 
(16) 
38.5 
% (37) 
24.0% 
(23) 
7.3% 
(7) 
13.5% 
(13) 
96 
F2:  Measures are in place to allow investors to 
assess the commercial risks and opportunities in 
a country 
      
Measures are in place to allow investors to assess the 
commercial risks and opportunities in a country 
28.1% 
( 27) 
46.9 
% (45) 
10.4% 
(10) 
0.0% 
(0) 
9.4% 
(9) 
96 
Measures are in place to provide potential investors 
ideas about the potential value of ABS transactions in 
the market 
21.9% 
( 21) 
41.7 
% (40) 
20.8% 
(20) 
4.2% 
(4) 
11.5% 
(11) 
96 
F3: A national ABS value addition strategy is in 
place in the provider country 
      
Market opportunities in relevant sectors are identified 
and fed into the national ABS strategy of the provider 
or user country 
31.3% 
(30) 
45.8 
%  
(44) 
15.6% 
(15) 
1.0% 
(1) 
6.3% 
(6) 
96 
Domestic public and private institutions add value to 
Genetic Resources 
35.4% 
(34) 
44.8 
% (43) 
10.4% 
(10) 
0.0% 
(0) 
9.4% 
(9) 
96 
Public and private sector incentives for undertaking 
bio-prospecting are in place 
31.6% 
(30) 
38.9 
% (37) 
16.8% 
(16) 
5.3% 
(5) 
7.4% 
(7) 
95 
F4: Potential challenging issues in the market for 
ABS such as TK and socio-cultural concerns are 
being addressed 
      
Measures are in place to resolve issues related to the 
nature of the market demand for traditional knowledge 
28.1% 
(27) 
37.5 
% (36) 
15.6% 
(15) 
3.1% 
(3) 
15.6% 
(15) 
96 
Measures are in place to resolve the cultural and 
social complexities and equity issues relevant to the 
ABS market at national level 
30.6% 
( 30) 
49.0 
% (48) 
8.2% 
(8) 
2.0% 
(2) 
10.2% 
(10) 
98 
F 5:  The biodiversity resource base is being 
monitored, evaluated, managed and used 
sustainabl,y and necessary conservation laws are 
in place   
      
Provider has a concept for resource evaluation 25.5% 
(24) 
42.6% 
(40) 
14.9% 
(14) 
1.1% 
(1) 
16.0% 
(15) 
94 
VI = Very Important; I = Important ; NVI = Not Very Important; DNK = Do Not Know; RC = Response 
Count 
*RC indicates the number of responses received per indicator 
The bold figures indicate the highest response count received per indicator 
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The indicators for the critical factor efficient understanding of the market structure for ABS were 
established as the following:  
 Low transaction costs in the ABS market 
 Measures are in place to allow investors to assess the commercial risks and 
opportunities in a country 
 There is a national ABS value addition strategy in the provider country 
 Potential challenging issues in the market for ABS such as TK and socio-cultural 
concerns are being addressed 
 The biodiversity resource base is being monitored, evaluated, managed and used 
sustainably, and necessary conservation laws are in place  
6.5.7 indicators for Valorisation of Biodiversity as a Critical Factor 
As was the case with the critical factor market structure and time lags to benefits, the results 
for the indicators for the critical factor measures to address valorization of biodiversity 
achieved, on average, a low scoring. Only one indicator i.e., a national strategy for the 
promotion of the use of biodiversity for value creation and economic development, was in place 
under Factor 1, which achieved a score of 50.5 % (Table 6.13). This single indicator was 
interesting in that it recognizes the importance of having a strategy for the promotion of the 
use of biodiversity for value creation and economic development at the national level. One 
could, therefore, argue that it encapsulated all the other indicators. 
The two indicators under Factor 4, i.e. domestic public and private institutions are involved in 
the identification of the commercial value of biodiversity; and the existence of potential 
research partners in the provider country are made public, received the next highest scores, 
of above 45%. These indicators were interesting because they both served as signals to others 
that the country had the capacity to carry out value addition processes. The link between, and 
the combination of, the critical factors - measures to address time lags to benefits; efficient 
understanding of the ABS market structure; and, measures to ensure value addition to 
biodiversity at the national levels - could in future constitute the steps towards the realization 
of true benefits from ABS as well as the integral and critical involvement of industry and those 
other stakeholders who know how to add value and create benefits, allowing for equitable 
sharing. 
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Table 6.13 Indicators for Measure to Address Valorization of Biodiversity in Provider Countries 
Factors and their Indicators Categories of Importance 
VI I NI NVI DNK RC 
 F1 A national strategy for the promotion of the 
use of biodiversity and ethno-botanical 
knowledge14 for value creation, human and 
economic development is in place at the national 
level 
      
Economic valuation methods for valuing biodiversity 
with potential for ABS are being used 
33.7% 
(32) 
38.9 % 
(37) 
12.6% 
(12) 
5.3% 
(5) 
9.5% 
(9) 
95 
A national programme to validate the importance of 
ethno-botanical knowledge for modern medicinal 
research in order to capitalize on the economic value 
is in place 
37.9 % 
(36) 
27.4% 
(26) 
23.2% 
(22) 
4.2% 
(4) 
7.4% 
(7) 
95 
A strategy is in place to ensure that the stage of 
collection of plant material, screening, and advanced 
screening, advanced research and development are 
all conducted reputably and with quality of 
cooperation 
36.2 % 
(34) 
34.0% 
(32) 
16.0% 
(15) 
3.2% 
(3) 
10.6
% 
(10) 
94 
A clear national process for identification of market 
opportunities in relevant sectors of importance to 
ABS is in place 
29.8% 
(28) 
38.3 % 
(36) 
20.2% 
(19) 
6.4% 
(6) 
5.3% 
(9) 
94 
A national strategy for the promotion of the use of 
biodiversity for value creation and economic 
development is in place 
50.5 % 
(49) 
36.1% 
(35) 
8.2% 
(8) 
1.0% 
(1) 
4.1% 
(4) 
97 
F2 Clear rules and guidelines on how the 
economic valuation will contribute to ABS permit 
decisions 
      
Clear rules and guidelines on how the economic 
valuation will contribute to deciding on ABS permits 
40.4 % 
(38) 
30.9% 
(29) 
14.9% 
(14) 
5.3% 
(5) 
9.6% 
(9) 
94 
F3 A biodiversity inventory and investment 
centre is in use at the national level 
      
Efficient biodiversity infrastructure at domestic levels 
for inventories of genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge are in place 
36.8% 
(35) 
40.0 % 
(38) 
11.6% 
(11) 
5.3% 
(5) 
6.3% 
(6) 
95 
An investment centre at national level which has 
information or a database on the species of interest 
and with potential for value addition 
33.3% 
 (32) 
38.5 % 
(37) 
14.6% 
(14) 
4.2% 
(4) 
9.4% 
(9) 
96 
A data base covering the economic valuation 
information is in place 
42.6% 
(40) 
33.3 % 
(31) 
9.6% 
(9) 
4.3% 
(4) 
7.4% 
(7) 
93 
A list of species with potential investor interest and 
their current stages of research in terms of R&D 
31.3% 
(30) 
37.5 % 
(36) 
20.8% 
(36) 
5.2% 
(5) 
5.2% 
(5) 
96 
F 4 Domestic public and private institutions are 
involved in the identification of the commercial 
value of biodiversity 
      
Domestic public and private institutions are involved 
in the identification of the commercial value of 
biodiversity 
46.4 % 
(45) 
36.1% 
(35) 
10.3% 
(10) 
3.1% 
(3) 
4.1% 
(4) 
97 
F5 Existence of potential research partners in the 
provider country are made public 
      
Existence of potential research partners in the 
provider country are made public 
34.0% 
(33) 
45.4 % 
(44) 
14.4% 
(14) 
2.1% 
(2) 
4.1% 
(4) 
97 
VI = Very Important; I = Important ; NVI = Not Very Important; DNK = Do Not Know; RC = Response Count 
*RC indicates the number of responses that was received per indicator 
The bold figures indicates the highest response count received per indicator 
                                               
14 This should also extend to ethno-zoological as well as ethno- fungal/bacterial/protists etc. 
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The ABS Capacity Development Initiative (CDI) (2010) indicated that the potential for ABS 
business partnerships to contribute to national and local economic development as well as 
poverty alleviation has not yet been realized and perhaps, as these results indicate, may also 
not be fully understood. This highlights the fact that there are a number of challenges that need 
to be overcome (ABS CDI, 2010), namely: 
 The need to put in place effective ABS policies and legislative frameworks at the 
national level in order to serve as requirements for investment and valorization of 
genetic and biochemical resources 
 Limited research and development capacities to identify and pre-process genetic and 
biochemical resources of (potential) commercial interest in the provider countries 
 Insufficient focus on public investment in sustainable commercialization processes and 
business partnerships.  
The ABS CDI (2010) proposed that one way of addressing these barriers and making positive 
steps towards successful partnerships, real value addition and ABS implementation, is through 
a hands-on exchange of information and views between key stakeholder groups - especially 
including business representatives from different ABS related sectors such as medicine, 
industrial enzymes, food and agriculture, healthcare and cosmetics. 
 
Frank, open and exploratory discussions could lead to significant ABS partnerships and 
research collaboration. Sampath (2005, p. 26) pointed out that most existing, previous and on-
going research collaborations were a combination of some sort of public-private or public-
public forms of partnerships. There is however, also a need for private research collaboration. 
There have been very few cases where large pharmaceutical firms have approached 
developing countries directly for access to genetic resources and/or traditional knowledge 
(Sampath, 2005, p. 29). Most private research collaboration has taken place in the stages of 
intermediation where smaller firms/research institutes or botanical gardens have offered 
important services or through spot-market transactions. National agencies could begin to play 
the role of such intermediaries, or even replace them in certain circumstances, if they perform 
the same task of adding value. A good example of this has been INBio, which was established 
by the Costa Rican government (Sampath, 2005, p. 26). 
 
These could all be elements contained in a national biodiversity strategy. 
 
The ABS CDI (2010, p. 7) found that surprisingly different perspectives from public and private 
sector complemented each other well in an ABS Business dialogue. Requests from business 
to fill the gaps on capacity and infrastructure in provider countries in order to enter into ABS 
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agreements could, to some degree, be addressed with existing Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) instruments. There might however, be a need to develop more specialized 
instruments. It was understood that the private sector,especially in ABS, saw it as their 
responsibility to achieve sustainable development. This included employment creation and 
transfer of know-how and technology – provided adequate structures were in place (ABS CDI, 
2010, p. 7). 
 
Some of the conclusions of the ABS CDI (2010, p. 8) ABS stakeholder business dialogue 
points to the fact that private–public dialogue would be needed to bridge language differences 
and to work together jointly. A real opportunity for the private sector could exist if a robust 
framework that enabled action was put in place. The focus would need to be on creating 
conducive workable environments. It would further, be important to note that ABS CDI (2010, 
p. 9) maintained that neither the public, nor the private sectors could achieve ABS 
implementation and the generation of benefits on its own. This was because none of them had 
the means. Developing countries have been shown to lack institutional infrastructure, research 
and development capacities and know-how, and SMEs did not have the requisite financial and 
human resources to bridge the gap. Only very big companies could provide for this but they 
were not necessarily the ones that would bring sustainable development to local partners. 
 
The business dialogue pointed out that the identification of local partners who could act as 
facilitators and thus, remove many challenges, barriers and hassle from the private sector, was 
needed (ABS CDI, 2010, p. 9). It would be important that these local partners were trusted by 
other stakeholders, especially local communities, who would in turn, need to be trained in 
applied research capabilities. 
Throughout the negotiations, some stakeholders kept pointing out that an important aspect of 
ABS was that benefit-sharing as an incentive and tool for conservation and sustainable use at 
the local level. This importance could be increased if it was focused on the local level where 
people had the resource and tenure. Resource tenure was an important leverage to success 
both in partnerships and sustainability (ABS CDI, 2010, p. 9). 
 
Finally, in order to ensure that practical rules and regulations supportive of business 
partnerships and which did not run counter to such partnerships, as well as research and 
development, and value addition, there was an urgent need for the private sector to advice on 
legislation/regulation, both at the national and international level. This pointed to a radical shift 
in the conduct of the meetings of the ABS Nagoya implementation process in terms of full and 
effective private sector engagement in the implementation process and the ABS policy arena. 
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The indicators for measures to address valorization of biodiversity in provider countries were: 
 A national strategy for the promotion of the use of biodiversity and ethno-botanical 
knowledge for value creation, human and economic development is in place at the 
national level 
 Clear rules and guidelines on how the economic valuation will contribute to deciding on 
ABS permits 
 A biodiversity inventory and investment centre is in use at the national level 
 Domestic public and private institutions are involved in the identification of the 
commercial value of biodiversity 
 Existence of potential research partners in the provider country are made public 
6.5.8 Indicators for Measures to Build (Trust) Social Capital as a Critical 
Factor 
Table 6.14 illustrates that the three indicators that scored the highest as indicators for 
measures to build trust amongst the ABS stakeholders, were essentially the critical factors 
themselves, i.e. the indicators under Factor 1: good governance structures in provider and 
user countries (64.6 %); an effective, transparent legal, policy and administrative ABS 
domestic framework is in place (75.3); and, an effective and functional administrative 
procedures are in place (66.7 %). This was a confirmation that the effective presence and 
implementation of these three critical factors at the national level in and of themselves were 
important measures that engendered trust in the various stakeholders and, therefore, 
promoted effective implementation of ABS measures.  
 
Factor 5 contained the critical factor measures to address information asymmetry (44.8 %), 
and the use of the Internationally Recognized Certificate (IRC). The IRC constituted a measure 
to address information asymmetry i.e. it reduced information asymmetry amongst the ABS 
stakeholders as the genetic resources moved up the value chain. The use of the IRC also 
scored relatively high (52 %). 
It had to be noted that under the indicators for the critical factor relating to issues focused on 
addressing information asymmetry, the use of the definition of genetic resources and utilization 
of genetic resources scored the highest. Under this critical factor, the use of the IRC was the 
third specific element of the Nagoya Protocol mentioned as important for the effective 
implementation of the ABS instruments at national level.  
 
This also had to be viewed while bearing in mind that the gap between provider and user 
countries was fast disappearing and, therefore, compliance measures would affect both 
provider and user countries. 
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It was also noteworthy that under Factor 4, the indicator A “Black List” of those firms and 
organizations that contribute to bio-piracy (including the end pharmaceutical companies who 
buy such genetic resources from intermediaries) was in place, scored relatively low (42.7 %), 
although it is considered as very important over all. It would have been expected that, given 
all the controversy around bio-pirates and misappropriation, especially at the onset of 
negotiations, it would have scored relatively higher. This result may have indicated a move 
towards maturity and mutual understanding amongst the ABS stakeholders, as well as the 
need to engender trust.  
It was also noteworthy that the presence of a valorization strategy (Factor 2) as an indicator 
also scored relatively low (36.8 %). efficient implementation of a value addition strategy at the 
national level would thus serve as a signal that the transaction costs would be lower in a given 
country. The low rating of this indicator could have been because the search and bargaining 
costs would need to be addressed - as was discussed under the critical factor measures to 
address valorization of biodiversity in provider countries. The results here further confirmed 
that the actual measures necessary to signal that implementation had proceeded beyond 
simply putting in place the necessary legal and administrative frameworks seemed not to be 
receiving significant attention. This notion was further underscored by the two indicators under 
Factor 2, i.e. mechanisms to signal the quality of genetic resources to potential bio-prospectors 
are in place (45.3%); and a valorization strategy is in place (36.8%); which received a relative 
low scoring. The same applied to the indicators under Factor 3 and Factor 5, as all of these 
indicators had the commonality of serving as a signal to interested stakeholders that measures 
to address information asymmetry within the ABS policy arena and market was being 
addressed in a particular country, thus lowering transaction costs. 
 
The rest of the indicators were all considered important and were subsets of measures to deal 
with information asymmetry. This served to facilitate the development of trust between the 
investor and the area in which he would be investing. In other words, the investor would be 
receiving the signal that transaction costs would be low because significant knowledge on the 
ground as generated by the implementation of these measures existed, and the investor would 
thus have confidence that ABS transactions could take place and the return on investment 
would be relatively assured. 
 
These results seemed to indicate that some of the critical factors themselves were important 
in order to foster, engender and build trust amongst those at the ABS table, and that their 
implementation would ensure the effectiveness of ABS instruments at the domestic level. 
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This study recognised that the presence of networks and connections within the ABS market 
of any country builds social capital, specifically trust, as they provide platforms for dialogue 
and for the exchange of experiences. Social capital also includes the presence of relations of 
trust and mutual support, formal and informal groups, common rules and sanctions, collective 
representation, mechanisms for participation in decision-making and the presence of effective 
leadership within the ABS sector. Because partnerships are built upon trust, an important 
precondition for forging successful business partnerships would be information sharing and 
exchange with private sector companies, as well as dialogues with public sector institutions, 
that could frame, regulate, enable or support these partnerships (ABS CDI, 2010, p. 7).  
 
It could be argued that the underlying goal of the Nagoya Protocol was to allow for the profitable 
development and equitable marketing of genetic resources and their biochemical compounds. 
That would have provided an economic and social incentive for conservation and sustainable 
use of local biodiversity (ABS CDI, 2010 p. 7). If the Nagoya Protocol would not then be utilised 
to create business partnerships between providers and users of genetic resources and 
associated traditional knowledge, then it would remain an empty shell. This would also be true 
for domestic ABS instruments. These partnerships however, would depend on how countries 
chose to deal with the role of the private sector, and related sectors such as research and 
academia, in terms of implementation of both the Nagoya Protocol and domestic ABS 
measures.  
 
The ABS CDI (2010, p. 10) pointed out that the potential of ABS business partnerships to 
contribute to national and local economic development as well as poverty alleviation, was not 
yet being realised accross the board, especially in Africa. A number of reasons were given for 
this situation: 
i) The absence of ABS policies and legislative frameworks at the national level as 
requirements for investment and valorization of genetic and biochemical resources. 
ii) Limited research and development capacities to identify and pre-process genetic and 
biochemical resources of (potential) commercial interest in the provider countries 
iii) Insufficient focus on and public investment in sustainable commercialization processes 
and business partnerships. 
What the results under this critical factor, as well as in others, pointed out was that fundamental 
steps to bridging the gap between drafting legislation and inclusive implementation, had not 
been made. Moreover, the link between the public and private sector in the ABS policy arena 
in terms of real action on the ground, had also not been effectively made. The underlying 
suspicions that led to mistrust still seemed too strong to allow for the full realization by the 
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various parties involved, that these sectors needed each other, and that dialogues would 
highlight complementing perspectives among public and private sector actors. This 
understanding was also demonstrated by the ABS CDI (2010, p. 9). Effective implementation 
of the Nagoya Protocol and domestic ABS legislation would, thus require support and trust and 
would not simply be a matter of transposing the Nagoya Protocol into domestic legislation. 
That action would not be enough. The critical need was demonstrated to create an ABS 
framework that could handle, promote, enable and develop the interaction between providers 
and users, both at national and international level. The critical need for establishing enabling 
environments for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) matched with the capacity of non-
industrialized countries, and a focus on employment creation, as well as the transfer of know-
how and technology, could not be over-emphasized (ABS CDI, 2010, p. 8). 
In fostering trust there would also be the need to consider the language and concepts used by 
the various ABS actors. The deep-seated mistrust that crept into the ABS policy arena over 
the years, was sometimes fueled by misunderstandings of languages and concepts used by 
one stakeholder group. Effective dialogue in a positive and exploratory environment could 
allow for clarification and understanding of the needs and perspectives of stakeholders.  
 
In order to have practical and supportive rules and regulations that would not run counter to 
business partnerships, an urgent need was indicated for the private sector to advice on 
legislation/regulation. For this to happen, all stakeholders would need to invest in measures 
that promote and enable social capital. 
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Table 6.14 Indicators For The Development Of Trust-Building Measures Among Stakeholders In 
The ABS Game 
Factors and their Indicators Categories of Importance 
VI I NI NVI DNK RC 
F1 An effective, functional and efficient 
institutional, administrative, legal and policy 
framework is in place at the national level 
      
A good governance structure is in place at the 
national level 
64.6 % 
(62) 
31.3% 
(30) 
2.1% 
(2) 
2.1% 
(2) 
0.0% 
(0) 
96 
An effective, transparent legal, policy and 
administrative ABS domestic framework is in place 
75.3 % 
(73) 
21.6% 
(21) 
3.1% 
(3) 
0.0% 
(0) 
0.0% 
(0) 
97 
Effective and functional administrative procedures 
are in place 
66.7 % 
(64) 
29.2% 
(28) 
2.1% 
(2) 
1.0% 
(1) 
1.0% 
(1) 
96 
F 2 A biodiversity valorization strategy is in 
place at the national level  
      
A valorization strategy is in place 34.7% 
(33 ) 
36.8 % 
(35) 
16.8% 
(16) 
2.1% 
(2) 
9.5% 
(9) 
95 
Mechanisms to signal the quality of genetic 
resources to potential bio-prospectors are in place 
17.9% 
(17 ) 
45.3 % 
(43) 
28.4% 
(27) 
3.2% 
(3) 
5.3% 
(5) 
95 
F 3: Reputable networks of research 
collaborators with best practice codes are 
created at the national level 
      
Measures to ensure that the stages of collection of 
plant material, screening, and advanced screening, 
advanced research and development are all 
conducted with reputation and quality of 
cooperation 
36.8% 
(35 ) 
44.2 % 
(42) 
10.5% 
(10) 
2.1% 
(2) 
6.3% 
(6) 
95 
Creation of reputable networks of research 
collaborators with best practice codes 
36.5% 
(35) 
51.0 % 
(49) 
5.2% 
(5) 
4.2% 
(4) 
4.2% 
(4) 
96 
F 4: Measures to create social compliance 
within the ABS sector are in place at the 
national level 
      
A “Black List” of those firms and organizations that 
contribute to bio-piracy is in place (including the 
end pharmaceutical companies who buy from such 
genetic resource intermediaries) 
42.7 
(41) 
20.8% 
(20) 
18.8% 
(18) 
6.3% 
(6) 
11.5
% 
(11) 
96 
The development of ethical bio-trade guidelines 
and codes of conduct in country 
38.5% 
(37 ) 
42.7 
(41) 
16.7% 
(16) 
1.0% 
(1) 
1.0% 
(1) 
96 
F 5: Effective, functional and efficient 
compliance measures are being used including 
the internationally recognized certificate 
      
The internationally recognized certificate is being 
used 
52.1 
(49) 
31.9% 
(30) 
8.5% 
(8) 
5.3% 
(5) 
2.1% 
(2) 
94 
Measures are in place that deal with addressing 
information asymmetry 
33.3% 
(32 ) 
44.8 % 
(43) 
13.5% 
(13) 
3.1% 
(3) 
5.2% 
(5) 
94 
VI = Very Important; I = Important ; NVI = Not Very Important; DNK = Do Not Know; RC = Response 
Count, F = Factor 
*RC indicates the number of responses that was received per indicator 
The bold figures indicates the highest response count received per indicator 
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The indicators for measures to build trust amongst stakeholders in the ABS game are: 
 An effective, functional and efficient institutional, administrative, legal and policy 
framework is in place at the national level 
 A biodiversity valorization strategy is in place at the national level  
 Reputable networks of research collaborators with best practice codes are created at 
the national level 
 Measures to create social compliance within the ABS sector are in place at the national 
level 
 Effective, functional and efficient compliance measures are being used including the 
internationally recognized certificate. 
The issue of social capital, especially trust, could then apply to all modes of coordination, 
cooperation, interaction, reputation, signalling, monitoring and compliance, as they are 
combined with contracts, in order to assist in minimizing transaction costs in any exchange. 
Moreover, it could be envisaged that companies would increasingly develop best practice 
standards associated with bio-trade, as an extension of ethical trading, good business practice 
and social responsibility, rather than for purposes of compliance with the CBD (Laird, 2008; 
Laird and Wynberg, 2008; Union for Ethical Biotrade, 2007). 
6.6 CONFIRMATION OF WHETHER THE CRITICAL FACTORS ARE 
IMPORTANT FOR THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
NAGOYA PROTOCOL AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL OR NOT 
Table 6.15 below illustrates that the results followed the same trends as what was observed 
during the discussion on the indicators. 
Factor 1 had only two critical factors ranked as very important - which all scored relatively low. 
All the other critical factors under this factor, however, were considered important, and none 
scored above fifty percent. 
 
It should be noted that this Factor was the one that dealt with measures to unlock the flow of 
benefits from ABS through addressing information asymmetry and building trust amongst the 
ABS players. 
Factor 2 and 3 all scored high and dealt with the critical factors good governance, non-complex 
administrative structures and the assignment of intellectual property rights. 
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Table 6.15 Importance of Critical Factors at the National and International Levels 
Derived Factors and their Indicators Categories of Importance 
VI I NI NVI DNK RC 
CRITICAL FACTORS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL       
F1: Measures to unlock the flow of benefits from 
ABS through addressing information asymmetry 
and building trust amongst the ABS players 
      
Measures to address time lags/timeline to benefits 29.9% 
(29) 
48.5 
% (47) 
11.3% 
(11) 
5.2% 
(5) 
5.2% 
(5) 
97 
Measures to address information asymmetry 32.3% 
(31) 
49.0 
% (47) 
11.5% 
(11) 
1.0% 
(1) 
6.3% 
(6) 
97 
Efficient understanding of the market structure 25.0% 
(24 ) 
45.8 
% (44) 
17.7% 
(17) 
6.3% 
(6) 
5.2% 
(5) 
96 
Adding value to biodiversity at the national levels 42.7 % 
(41) 
35.4% 
(34) 
14.6% 
(14) 
2.1% 
(2) 
5.2% 
(5) 
96 
Measures to build trust amongst stakeholders at the 
national level 
39.6% 
(38) 
34.4% 
(33) 
15.6% 
(15) 
2.1% 
(2) 
8.3% 
(8) 
96 
F2:  An effective, functional and efficient 
institutional, administrative, legal and policy 
framework is in place 
      
Good governance structure  73.5 %  
(72) 
24.5% 
(24) 
1.0% 
(1) 
1.0% 
(1) 
0.0% 
(0) 
98 
Effective, functional and noncomplex administrative 
structure 
55.7 % 
(54) 
40.2% 
(39) 
2.1% 
(2) 
2.1% 
(2) 
0.0% 
(0) 
97 
F3: Measures to assign property and intellectual 
property rights 
      
Assignment of property rights and IPR 53.6 % 
(52) 
24.5% 
(24) 
1.0% 
(1) 
1.0% 
(1) 
0.0% 
(0) 
97 
CRITICAL FACTORS AT THE INTERNATIONAL 
LEVEL 
      
F1:  Measures to ensure an effective understanding 
of, value addition to biodiversity and build trust 
amongst the ABS players  
      
Understanding of the market structure    34.1% 
(31 ) 
37 % 
(34) 
16.5% 
(15) 
5.5% 
(5) 
6.6% 
(6) 
94 
Measures to add value to biodiversity  42.6 % 
(40) 
30.9% 
(29) 
18.1% 
(17) 
3.2% 
(3) 
5.3% 
(5) 
93 
Measures to build trust (social capital) amongst the 
different stakeholders 
38.7 % 
(36) 
31.2% 
(29) 
17.2% 
(16) 
3.2% 
(3) 
9.7% 
(9) 
93 
F2: An effective, functional and efficient 
institutional, administrative, legal and policy 
framework is in place  
      
Good governance structure in provider countries 69.5 % 
(66) 
22.1% 
(21) 
8.4% 
(8) 
0.0% 
(0) 
1.1% 
(1) 
95 
Assignment of property rights and intellectual property 57.9 % 
(55) 
24.2% 
(23) 
13.7% 
(13) 
0.0% 
(0) 
4.2% 
(4) 
95 
Effective, functional and noncomplex administrative 
structure  
55.3 % 
(52) 
34.0% 
(32) 
8.5% 
(8) 
1.1% 
(1) 
1.1% 
(1) 
94 
 F3: Measures to address information asymmetry       
Measures to address information asymmetry   42.4 % 
(39) 
33.7% 
(31) 
17.4% 
(16) 
4.3% 
(4) 
2.2% 
(2) 
92 
F4:  Measures to address time lags to the 
generation of benefits 
      
Measures to address time lags to benefits 35.9 % 
(33) 
32.6% 
(30) 
22.8% 
(21) 
7.6% 
(7) 
2.2% 
(2) 
92 
VI = Very Important; I = Important ; NVI = Not Very Important; DNK = Do Not Know; RC = Response 
Count 
*RC indicates the number of responses received per critical factor 
The bold figures indicates the highest response count received per critical factor  
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6.7 CONFIRMATION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CRITICAL FACTORS 
AT NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS 
The Table 6.15 above demonstrated that the critical factors measures to address time lags to 
the generation of benefits (48.5 %), measures to address information asymmetry (49.0 %) and 
efficient understanding of the market structure (45.8 %), were important at the national levels 
whereas all the other critical factors were indicated as very important. Good governance 
structure in both user and provider countries (73.5 %), efficient administrative structures (55.7 
%) and the assignment of intellectual property (53.6 %), all scored high.  
Factor 1, a complex mixture of five of the critical factors,was interesting in that in its complexity 
lay in its simplicity. It denoted a major concern in the ABS debate, i.e. the generation of 
benefits, but the issuewas confounded by information asymmetry about the market, the genetic 
resource, the information itself and the time lags to benefits.  
 
These results maintained the trend been observed throughout the study, namely thatthe focus 
of action and understanding till the time of writing had been on putting in place a legal and 
administrative framework while exposing an absence of understanding of the very the sector 
such a framework would need to regulate. If done well the framework would allow efficient 
implementation, as was discussed under the different critical factors, especially under the 
critical factor that dealt with social capital. 
 
The results, therefore, seemed to imply that countries, in terms of implementation, now needed 
to focus on effectively dealing with the critical factors outlined under Factor 1. This would be 
the area in which countries would have to exert more effort if benefits were to flow as they 
envisaged.  
 
The importance of critical factors at the national level could be expected to vary from country 
to country, since a number of factors at the national levels would affect their presence and 
effective implementation. Many countries would be at different stages of development and 
would, therefore, have different priorities dictated by national development goals and 
objectives. Some countries would have put in place only domestic administrative measures or 
policies, whereas others may have gone the full way in putting in place legal framework. It 
could thus be argued that these realities would affect the weight a country might give to critical 
factors and their indicators at the national level. 
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Interestingly, at the international level, all critical factors were considered as very important. It 
was only the critical factor for efficient understanding of the market structure under the 
important category. 
The same trend was observed in terms of the importance of the critical factors at the national 
level. Good governance structure (69.5%), efficient administrative structures (55.3%) and the 
assignment of intellectual property (57.9%) were again ranked highest. 
 
At the international level, countries were expected to have minimum standards as determined 
in this case, by the CBD and related intergovernmental organizations. The CBD set the Bonn 
Guidelines as the voluntary standards that countries should use in terms of dealing with ABS, 
and was further strengthened by the adoption of the legally binding Nagoya Protocol on Access 
and Benefit-Sharing. This Protocol provided a way for countries to deal with the critical factors 
at the international level, but its implementation would, however, differ in terms of priority and 
relevance in any given national situation. 
 
It was interesting to note that efficient understanding of the market structure as an indicator 
scored low (37%) and that measures to address time lags to the generation of benefits (35.9%) 
scored the lowest.  
 
The above underscored the overall finding of this study, specifically that more work needed to 
be done both at national and international level to ensure that policies and legislation being 
developed were truly able to allow for the market to function efficiently and that it would indeed 
generate benefits as desired, particularly since the status quo seemed to indicate that the 
contrary was the case. 
6.8 INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS THAT COULD IMPACT OR 
INFLUENCE THE CRITICAL FACTORS 
The impact of internal and external factors on the critical factors is shown by table 16 below. 
Political pressure (74.2%) would have the greatest impact on the critical factors, followed by 
change in legal frameworks (72.2%), technological innovations (51.6%) and special 
circumstances at the national level (31.2%). The factors that would have a moderate impact 
on the critical factors would be changing demand levels, criticism from media, NGO’s and the 
private sector industry. It was striking that criticism from government was also indicated as 
having a significant impact on the critical factors. 
 
Also remarkable was that technology innovations stood amongst the three factors with 
significant impact on the critical factors. The other two factors, i.e. criticism from different 
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interest and advocacy groups, and change in legal frameworks, were linked and mutually 
influenced each other. 
 
Changing demand levels and criticism from industry/private sector was perceived to have a 
moderate impact on the critical factors both scoring (44.7%) and (44.8%) respectively. This 
was again important as it pointed to the underlying question of whether the role of industry 
/private sector was really understood. It also addressed its importance for the success of the 
ABS process to achieve its main objective, namely the flow of benefits as an incentive for 
conservation. 
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Table 6.16 Internal and External Factors that May Impact on the Critical Factors 
Derived factors and internal and external factors Categories of Importance 
SI MI VLI NI DNK RC 
       
F1:  Criticism from different interests and 
advocacy groups and change in legal frameworks 
      
Change in legal frameworks 72.2 % 
(70) 
21.6% 
(21) 
4.1% 
(4) 
0.0% 
(0) 
2.1% 
(2) 
97 
Criticism from NGO 26.0% 
 (25) 
49.0 % 
(47) 
17.7% 
(17) 
5.2% 
(5) 
3.1% 
(3) 
96 
Criticism from Media 31.3% 
(30 ) 
42.7 % 
(41) 
22.9% 
(22) 
2.1% 
(2) 
2.1% 
(2) 
96 
Criticism from government 47.9 % 
(46) 
36.5% 
(35) 
10.4% 
(10) 
2.1% 
(2) 
3.1% 
(3) 
96 
Criticism from private sector/industry  36.5% 
(35) 
44.8 % 
(43) 
19.8% 
(19) 
0.0% 
(0) 
1.0% 
(1) 
96 
F 2: Advancement in science and technology as 
well as special circumstances at the national level 
      
New scientific findings 46.9 % 
(45) 
38.5% 
(37) 
9.4% 
(9) 
2.1% 
(2) 
3.1% 
(3) 
95 
Technology innovations 51.6 % 
(49) 
37.9% 
(36) 
4.2% 
(4) 
2.1% 
(2) 
4.2% 
(4) 
95 
Special circumstances at the national level 31.2 % 
(29) 
31.2% 
(29) 
16.1% 
(15) 
1.1% 
(1) 
22.6
% 
(21) 
93 
 F3: Political Pressure and changing demand 
levels 
      
Political pressure 74.2 % 
(72) 
23.7% 
(23) 
2.1% 
(2) 
0.0% 
(0) 
1.0% 
(1) 
97 
Changing demand levels 36.2% 
(34) 
44.7% 
(42) 
6.4% 
(6) 
3.2% 
(3) 
9.6% 
(9) 
94 
SI = Significant Impact; I = Moderate Impact ; VLI = Very Low Impact; DNK = Do Not Know; RC = Response 
Count 
*RC indicates the number of responses received per internal/external factor 
The bold figures indicate the highest response count received per internal/external factor 
 
6.9 OVERALL DISCUSSION 
The overall results confirmed that the indicators derived for the respective critical factors were 
valid and important. This was deduced from the fact that all the indicators were ranked either 
 153 
 
as very important or important and that the other category received very low scoring. The 
results also indicated that all the critical factors were important with good governance in 
provider countries, the assignment of intellectual property rights and property, as well as 
efficient and non-complex administrative structures, seen as the most important critical factors. 
The demographics finding , that most countries today are both provider and users of genetic 
resources, highlighted the fact that the critical factor of good governance in provider countries, 
should be changed to good governance in both user and provider countries - as it was shown 
to be important for implementation of the ABS policy and legal framework. 
 
The results further indicated that more work and understanding was needed for the role of the 
private sector in ABS implementation, especially regarding action in the ABS market, the 
valorisation of biodiversity, and the generation of benefits, as well as the time it could take to 
receive the benefits. This seemed to have been the missing link in the ABS policy arena in 
terms of implementation and the fact that there had been very few successful ABS cases.  
There was clearly a need to reflect on rational and efficient implementation of ABS within an 
environment of partnership cooperation, dialogues and mutual understanding of the 
perspectives, as well as the needs and challenges facing the various actors in the ABS policy 
arena. This called for good governance in the area of ABS. Gandhi and Crase (2009) identified 
three important factors which they called rationalities and which were important for good 
governance in organizations/institutions. These were summarized as follows: 
1. Technical Rationality, which dealt with efficiency. From this perspective good 
institutions achieved efficient conversion of inputs into outputs. Relevant and 
good/appropriate technology and productive efficiency was a critical requirement. 
2. Organizational Rationality, which dealt with coordination. The division of labour and 
specialisation for efficiency lead to a large number of activities. The effective coordination 
across these activities became crucial for overall institutional performance. 
3. Political rationality, which dealt with justice. Most large institutions required substantial 
human/people interaction and involvement. The need to address issues/perceptions of fairness 
and justice became very important for sustainability and performance. 
In a sense, the above summarized the results on the indicators for effective implementation as 
well as on the importance of the critical factors. Good governance in provider countries had 
consistently scored high, followed by assignment of property rights and efficient administrative 
structures. What was being pointed out was the need for technical rationality that ensured 
good/appropriate technology and productive efficiency. This was very relevant for ABS 
implementation as was discussed under the indicators for the critical factor valorization of 
biodiversity.  
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Effective coordination or organization rationality would require partnerships, consultations and 
dialogues if overall institutional performance in the ABS policy arena in terms of implementation 
were to be achieved. 
 
Political rationality was probably the most important factor to be considered. This was 
confirmed by the results of the internal and external factors impacting upon the critical factors. 
The decisions that were sometimes taken at the national level in terms of implementation often 
had nothing to do with fairness, but dealt with addressing political imperatives. These would 
not necessarily improve ABS implementation and could even lead to inefficiencies in 
implementation. Justice, or fairness requires the ability to consider and provide a platform for 
all stakeholders to contribute meaningfully in the interests of the collective within the ABS policy 
arena. The higher national development goals and priorities of revenue generation, job 
creation, empowerment and overall social and economic development of the country, or the 
collective, would need to be kept in mind however. 
 
The results further drew attention to the importance of efficient and functional administrative 
structures. Dietz et al (2003) pointed out that there was a critical need for devising flexible and 
adaptable institutional arrangements, which were congruent with specific resource conditions 
when dealing with environmental resources. They maintained that such arrangements would 
have to address the following elements: 
i) Information: This element refered to the need for high quality, reliable information 
about the state of the resources, in order to effectively regulate the resource, including 
providing information about stocks, flows, processes, interactions and human activities, 
uncertainty, and values. This aspect wasobviously very relevant to the ABS issue. 
ii) Consultation and conflict management: Inclusive, participatory processes would be 
more likely to produce appropriate information, decisions, commitment, coordination, 
and cooperation than more authoritarian processes. The implication here was that the 
institutional and administrative structures being developed for ABS implementation 
would have to take into account the need for consultation and conflict management and 
that this provision would need to be enabled. 
iii) Rule compliance: The most effective approach to ensuring rule compliance was to 
consistently deliver progressive sanctions that would include a variety of informal and 
formal mechanisms, and which would require adequate resources for monitoring and 
enforcement. In the ABS policy arena compliance is a critical element. Therefore, 
administrative structures that would be put in place would need to be such that 
compliance was preferred because it lowered transaction costs compared to the cost 
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of non-compliance. The incentives within the administrative structures would also need 
to be such that in the end they engendered social compliance by all ABS actors. 
iv) Infrastructure: Appropriate physical, technological and institutional infrastructure was 
required to create accountability. In the case of ABS implementation these 
administrative structures would need to be such that they facilitated for conflict 
resolution.  
v) Change: It was shown here that codified rules, which relied on current knowledge and 
static conditions, were less effective in coping with long-run change than more general 
principles that addressed objectives and consequences, and allowed for adaptation. In 
the ABS policy arena, since the market for bioprospecting was dynamic and constantly 
evolving, it would be necessary to ensure that applied administrative structures were 
amenable and responsive to changes. Rigid structures would not be able to deliver in 
terms of effective implementation of ABS.  
The critical factor assignment of property rights and intellectual property rights also 
emerged as one of the most important critical factors. This critical factor, as was pointed 
out in the previous section on the discussion on indicators, would be important for legal 
certainty. 
 
Young and Tvedt (2009 p. 10) argued that the commercial system was built on the ability of 
the user to know with certainty, the following: 
i) Which resources and rights required permission or payment 
ii) Which were un-owned and could thus be freely used and 
iii) What processes would have to be undergone in order to acquire the resources and 
rights desired 
iv) For each transaction, would be necessary to identify precisely the relevant legal 
requirements and costs as part of the process of assessing commercial risk, and in 
determining the value of the transaction. 
It was vital, therefore, to note that in developing ABS domestic instruments legal certainty was 
a two edge sword. In granting access to genetic resources and/or the right to utilize them, the 
source country and/or provider would also require certainty. From the provider perspective, 
legal certainty would mean assurance that the user would comply with the legal terms of a 
country’s chosen vehicle for ABS, performing his obligations, and that if he failed to do so, the 
provider or source country would have avenues of legal or informal recourse. 
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6.10 CONCLUSIONS 
The indicators for the critical factors were confirmed, together with the importance of the critical 
factors themselves, both at the national and international levels. The relative importance of the 
indicators could be gauged by the scoring they received as well as their rankings. These must, 
however, be seen within the context of the discussions in this study. 
 
The factor analysis allowed for all original indicators derived, to be retained for use as 
indicators for the critical factors. Actors in the ABS policy arena would now have a tool to 
measure their own progress and effectiveness in terms of ABS implementation, or to ensure 
that in the development and design of their domestic ABS policy and legal frameworks, they 
would have access to the indicators to continually gauge their effectiveness. 
6.11 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The main recommendations from this study points to a greater need for ongoing dialogue 
between the players in the ABS policy arena in terms of implementation and geared towards 
issues arising from real deals that could unlock the generation of benefits and thus ensure 
equitable sharing of benefits. If the ABS private sector was not allowed to engage meaningfully 
in the ABS implementation process, this would be difficult. The indicators developed provide a 
check list to governments as to what elements they should consider within their ABS domestic 
frameworks that would assure a measure of success. It is, therefore, recommended that those 
involved in the ABS policy arena use these indicators so that they could be further tested and 
refined in the interest of effective ABS implementation.  
 
There will be a critical need for working actively towards building social capital amongst the 
various actors in the ABS policy arena as well as building real political will and commitment. 
This would not only have to come from the high level decision makers, but also from the 
technocrats and bureaucrats. 
 
Finally, given the importance of access to technology and technology transfer, the need for the 
development of an international instrument on technology transfer was highlighted. 
 
 157 
 
CHAPTER 7 
INSTITUTIONAL LEARNING: THE CASE OF THE ABS 
NEGOTIATIONS  
WITHIN THE CBD LESSONS TOWARDS EFFECTIVE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NAGOYA PROTOCOL ON ABS 
AND DOMESTIC ABS INSTRUMENTS 
 
If you always do what you always did, you will always get what you always got.  
~Henry Ford 
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
The prolific negotiation agenda, immediately following the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development UNCED in 1992, Rio De Janeiro, Brazil, has produced a 
complex array of agreements and instruments, resulting in an impressive amount of 
environmental governance and regulation. Intense negotiations, however, have come at a 
price (Munoz et al 2009 p. 1). They have spread thin the limited financial and human resources 
devoted by nations to Global Environmental Governance and created a mess of seemingly 
unmanageable institutions (Biermann 2000, p. 22; and Esty and Ivanova 2002, p. 5. cited in 
Munoz et al., 2009). The negotiation burden has been particular heavy for developing 
countries, which often have the fewest resources and weakest capacity. This has led to what 
some have described as a sense of negotiation fatigue because of an expanded and unwieldy 
negotiation load (Chasek 2005, p. 74; von Moltke 2005, p. 175; and Najam et al. 2006 cited by 
Munoz et al., 2009).  
 
The proliferation of environmental negotiations has seemed to take on a life of its own and 
created a nearly “permanent” global environmental negotiation enterprise where negotiations 
itself seem to have become the goal, sometimes to the detriment of actual treaty 
implementation (Munoz et al, 2009). This in turn, leaves the negotiators immensely tired, but 
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with little sense of real achievement. Many environmental negotiators have expressed concern 
about “negotiation fatigue” which has resulted from the heavy negotiation burden. (Munoz et 
al, 2009). Negotiation fatigue can be particularly heavy on developing and small countries, 
whose limited resources are particularly stretched by the growing negotiation burden (Munoz 
et al, 2009 p. 4). In the ABS negotiations this was true. Especially as the time pressure mounted 
towards Nagoya and when the negotiators started counting the days to the end signaling close 
of negotiations. 
 
This proliferation of environmental treaties have further brought with it the issue of institutional 
interplay due to the rising density of institutions at the international level. All of this calls for 
greater attention to interaction and interplay,given that institutions have a definite spatial remit 
(in terms of issue, jurisdiction and membership) that brings with it the so-called “boundary 
problems” central to institutional interplay (Moss 2004 p. 2 cited by Chambers et al 2008). The 
boundaries that are at stake according to Chambers et al (2009) relate to political 
responsibilities and social spheres of influence.  
 
Institutions are not self-contained entities and so the effectiveness of specific institutions in 
terms of implementation depends not only on their own features but also on their interactions 
with other institutions. In the case of the Nagoya protocol the various international 
organizations enumerated in the preceding paragraph will impact on its effective 
implementation. Chambers et al (2008) outline that the question of how parties to international 
negotiations and concluded agreements, in this case the Nagoya Protocol on ABS, should deal 
with the situation of interplay. The question, therefore, that comes to mind is what implications 
does this interaction hold for the interests of the stakeholders, particularly with regard to the 
formation, operation and implementation of the specific institution, for its performance, and 
effectiveness, and for the overall global governance context? It is further necessary to look at 
the political and policy efforts to strengthen overall governance with a view to identify and 
stimulate interlinkages among institutions (legal, normative, operational and functional) in order 
to reduce institutional conflict and resource-draining duplication (Chambers et al (2008). Put 
differently, in what ways can issues and processes across institutions be strategically linked 
and arranged to re-enforce each other? These questions and the issue of interplay was 
considered through looking at the biosafety protocol under the CBD after its conclusion. These 
questions are relevant to the issue of the effective implementation of the Nagoya Protocol.  
The ABS Nagoya Protocol has interface with a number of other international organizations 
such as the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture; the FAO 
Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture; he United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea; the Antarctic Treaty; International Regimes pertaining to Pathogens; 
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and, International Regimes Pertaining to Traditional Knowledge of Indigenous and Local 
Communities and with international regimes on Intellectual Property. When ABS emerged as 
an issue in the negotiations of the CBD in the late 1980’s, it was largely in reaction to the 
development of intellectual property regimes that could deprive developing countries of rights 
over their resources. That issue is still not resolved. 
 
The questions above lead to consideration of what to do with regard to the implementation of 
the Nagoya Protocol on ABS, and whether the negotiation process provides us with lessons 
from which the CBD and entire Multi-lateral system can learn in order to enhance effective 
implementation of the Nagoya Protocol on ABS. This would constitute organizational or 
institutional learning.  
 
This chapter focuses on an analysis of the ABS policy arena in terms of whether there has 
been institutional learning within ABS policy setting processes. The intention was to see 
whether institutional learning has taken place that could provide meaningful feedback for 
adaptive management at the national level. Since institutional learning is also relevant at the 
international level in terms of the implementation of the Nagoya Protocol, a section is devoted 
to looking at institutional learning within the CBD - notably the ABS working group - and 
whether it necessitated the conclusion and successful adoption of the Nagoya Protocol on 
ABS. This understanding was essential since the finalization of the negotiations of the Protocol 
in 2010, have heralded in the implementation phase of the Protocol by the Parties to the CBD. 
The implementation itself would require ongoing engagement at the international level to 
address issues and actions necessary for implementation. This reflection aims to guide that 
process. 
7.2 OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES AROUND ORGANIZATIONAL 
LEARNING BASED ON THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
It is important to adhere to the longstanding argument in the design tradition of policy making 
that proposes that policies be treated as experiments, with the aim of promoting continual 
learning and adaptation in response to experience over time (Dewey, 1927). This prescriptive 
argument is the foundation of adaptive management strategies, which consist of policy 
experiments designed to detect (and correct) errors in a reliable, efficient manner (Lee, 1993). 
These arguments suggest designing institutional arrangements to promote learning and 
adaptation in policy practice (Ostrom, 1999; Schneider and Ingram, 1997; May, 1992). Such 
policy design becomes even more important within the implementation phase and is very 
relevant for ABS measures. Busenberg (2001) has argued that these concepts lead to a range 
of questions on learning processes and policy change. He has raised the following questions: 
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What forms of learning arrangements (and learning constraints) can be identified in different 
policy domains? What observable impacts do these institutional arrangements have on policy 
change over time? In what way do these impacts of learning arrangements (and focusing 
events) vary according to the characteristics of the policy domains in which they occur? How 
does the learning differ in policy domains marked by conflicting values? In response to these 
questions, Busenberg (2001) has maintained that answering these questions would require 
comparative studies across a broad array of jurisdictions and policy domains. 
 
These questions and the key concepts of learning and adaptation within the design of policy 
making were seen to be highly relevant to the ABS policy arena. The focus within this chapter 
is to demonstrate how the ABS policy design could be translated into effective implementation 
strategies and whether the institutional and organizational learning from the design phase 
points to lessons that could be helpful in the ABS policy implementation phase.  
7.2.1 The Institutional Environment and Institutional Arrangements and 
their Relevance to Institutional Learning 
The overall theoretical and analytical framework of this thesis is New Institutional Economics 
(NIE). NIE tries to provide an economics theory about institutions. It is thus a complement to 
traditional neo-classical micro-economics. Chapter 3 provided an overview of NIE theory. In 
this chapter only those key concepts relevant to institutional or organizational learning will be 
provided. Challen (2000 p. 13) has clarified that within the context of institutional economics 
the term institutions is not used to refer to organizations or groups of people such as financial 
institutions, business corporations, churches, family units or governmental agencies. Rather it 
is used to denote the humanly devised rules of behavior that shape human interaction (North, 
1990 p. 3). The purpose of institutions is to provide a set of rules for cooperation and 
competition and thereby, adjust conflicting claims of different individuals and groups for scarce 
resources. These organizations are, however usually founded on and operate according to 
formal or informal rules of behavior. Such rules however, do fall within the definition of 
institutions as the term is most commonly used in economics (Challen 2000 p. 13). 
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Challen (2000 p. 13) points out that some characteristics of institutions based on literature are 
that they: 
 Are socially organized and supported 
 Include formal and informal rules as well as informal conventions and codes of behavior 
 Are slow-changing relative to the activities that they guide and constrain 
 Prescribe prohibitions as well as conditional permissions. 
 
Institutions from Challen’s (2000 p. 15) perspective then, form the basis for a relationships 
between individuals within a society, with formal or informal institutions existing to govern 
almost all situations and interactions. 
 
These observations were seen to be relevant to the ABS negotiation and implementation issue. 
It was important to look at what rules structured the interactions of the negotiations of the ABS 
Protocol politically, economically, and socially. The questions arose as follows; What rules 
delineated the game within which the institutional arrangements (governance structures) of the 
ABS negotiating process were organised? How did that process actually operate, what where 
the prescribed rules of conduct within which the negotiating process took place?  
 
NIE according to North (1990) looked at types and levels of institutions which were the 
Institutional Environment (IE) and the Institutional Arrangements (IA) also known as the 
governance arrangements. 
 
Slangen and Heringa (2009) and North (1990) described the nature of the IE and IA. The IE is 
the man-made constraints that structure political, economic, and social interactions. It 
delineates the rules of the game within which the institutional arrangements (governance 
structures) actually operate, and also prescribes the rules of conduct within which human 
actions take place (Slangen and Heringa, 2009).  
 
The IA consists of the basic formal laws and rules of society, the way these are enforced, and 
monitored, and sanctions and conflict-resolving mechanisms are applied) and informal rules 
(consist of sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, norms, values and beliefs and common 
codes of behavior) in a society (Slangen and Heringa ,2009). The differentiating point between 
these two types of institutions is that the rules mainly define the environment of the governance 
structure. A governance structure is a way of implementing and operationalizing the “rules of 
the game” (North, 1990).  
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Social capital (shared knowledge, understandings, norms, rules, and expectations about 
patterns of interactions that groups of individuals bring to a recurrent activity e.g. multilateral 
negotiations) also belongs to the institutional environment. Trust is perhaps the most important 
component of social capital. A small amount of social capital in society will lead to higher 
transactions costs (Slangen and Heringa, 2009). The institutional environment differs between 
countries and even within countries the basic rules are not always the same. The rules are not 
always bound to borders and, therefore, some parts of IE are more dynamic and change rather 
quickly, while other parts change more slowly.  
 
The issue of property rights which bears prominence in the ABS policy arena belongs to the 
IE. Property rights determine who has the power to control transactions within an institutional 
arrangement and consequently who has the right over the residual income from those 
transactions. Institutional arrangements or governance structures comprise the whole 
spectrum of co-ordination mechanisms, with markets as one polar case situated at the one 
end, and centralized organizations as another situated at the other end of the spectrum.  
 
Having considered definitions of the IE and IA a consideration of the characteristics of 
institutions as laid out by Challen (2000 p. 13) were also relevant and visible in the ABS 
negotiating process and would influence ABS implementation at all levels.  
 
Challen (2000 p. 15) characterizes property rights in terms of the legal relations established by 
institutions, based on literature as follows (Hallowell, 1943, cited by Bromley, 1989 pp. 202 -
3): 
 The nature and kinds of rights that are exercised, and their correlative duties and 
obligations 
 The individuals or groups in whom these rights and duties are vested, and those who 
play the correlative roles 
 The objects of social value to which the property relations pertain. 
 
Thus, a property right provides an entitlement to behave in a manner that may impose costs 
on another party (Challen, 2000 p. 16). The ABS negotiating process was governed by 
established UN rules and codes of conduct, and relations that guided parties as to their rights 
and responsibilities. As discussed by Challen (2000), these rules sometimes served as a 
limitation and adaptation to the current context, which although difficult, were sometimes 
required. They were also evident in the ABS negotiating process, For example, during 
negotiations by blocs for their rights, only parties could introduce text, and they had the first 
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right to be heard as opposed to the rights of indigenous and local communities, research and 
academia or the private sector. This had a significant influence on all these stakeholders, 
especially in terms of the implementations of the negotiated provisions of the Protocol since 
these provisions may have unintended consequences on the interest, rights and 
responsibilities of these actors. 
7.2.2 How Does Institutional Change Occur?  
The above section related to the institutional environment and the institutional arrangements. 
The questions that arose were whether these could be changed should situations arise that 
required adaptive responses.  
 
North (1990 p. 6) maintains that institutional change is a complicated process because the 
changes at the margin can be a consequence of changes in rules, in informal constraints, and 
in kinds and effectiveness of enforcement. Institutional change is complicated by the diverse 
forms of rules and behavioral norms that institutions comprise (Challen 2000 p. 47). Scott 
(1989a) cited in Challen (2000 p. 47), proposes four means by which institutional change has 
occurred historically: 
 Spontaneous and discontinuous change by revolutions and conquest 
 Spontaneous and incremental change from the working of custom and common usage’ 
 Incremental change by judicial processes and evolution of common law 
 Incremental change created by imperial, bureaucratic or political means. 
 
Challen (2000 p. 47) argues that the last three ways of effecting institutional change are 
entrenched in modern democratic cultures. The most accepted model for institutional change 
is focused on the role of institutions in determining the magnitudes of transaction costs and 
external costs and benefits accruing to, and arising from, economic exchange (Challen, 2000 
p. 47). Institutional change occurs through a political system (Challen 2000 p. 50). Thus, a 
private entrepreneur investing in institutional change could do so, thereby attempting to 
influence the behavior of the political entrepreneurs in the relevant polity. Such influence is 
exerted by either influencing the political agent directly or indirectly through lobbying (Challen, 
2000 p. 50). In the ABS policy arena this means that stakeholders from academia and 
research, indigenous and local communities, and the private sector, must by necessity, 
influence the parties should they want their views and concerns to be reflected in the final 
negotiated output. Even this can be problematic and challenging depending on how these 
views and concerns are viewed by parties who may have opposing views and concerns. 
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The whole idea of this attempt to influence the political agent is to reduce transaction costs, or 
other costs for the private agent15 especially during the perceived implementation phase. The 
influence is however, impacted upon by perceived costs and benefits of the political action, the 
existing institutions, the political tastes and believes of the political agent and the state of social 
technology (Challen, 2000 p. 50). The existing institutions will affect the perceived costs and 
benefits of political action defining political processes and determining the costs of designing 
institutional structures and the costs of implementing those structures via a collective policy. 
Political taste and benefits comprise economic and social ideologies whereas social 
technology comprises such factors as institutional precedents, and states of political and social 
knowledge (Challen 2000, p. 50).  
 
The implication of these issues were considered during the negotiating process for the ABS 
protocol.Numerous calls were made by certain stakeholders to consider the possibilities and 
implications of the practical implementation of some of the provisions. This was because many 
of the issues being negotiated for inclusion in the text of the protocol were new, thus creating 
legal precedents e.g. the issue of check points, and compliance measures. Lee (1998 p. 81) 
argued that most multilateral environmental treaties imposed symmetric obligations on all 
signatory nations – that is, they require all signatories to do the same thing. That “same thing” 
may take several forms. It may involve the establishment of common administrative 
procedures to regulate some activity. However, in most cases, when a nation becomes a 
signatory to a treaty its interests are highly asymmetric regarding the environmental issue 
being negotiated – depending on how strongly a state would seek to improve it and on how 
much it would cost to make any particular level of contribution to the effort. While treaties with 
simple, symmetric obligations offer important negotiating advantages, symmetric deals among 
asymmetric parties can create serious institutional inefficiencies and inequities. (Lee, 1998 p. 
81). 
 
Depending on the above, the political agent will undertake investment in institutional change 
through the relevant processes of the policy or political collective (Challen 2000, p. 50). There 
is thus a need for a political process that will result in changes to the institutional framework 
and to the economic environment of the private agent. From this perspective, institutional 
change consists of many transactions between economic and political agents with associated 
                                               
15 In the case of ABS the private agent can be considered the private sector, academia or research 
institutions. The perceived costs and benefits of political action may override the desire for actions that 
truly reduce transaction costs and assure efficiency due to political imperatives, and that may perhaps 
be imbedded in the governance arrangements of the institution. 
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transaction costs (Challen 2000, p. 50). The above all bear relevance to the ABS policy and 
implementation arena. 
7.2.3 Issues Facing Empirical Research on Organizational Learning 
Process 
Busenberg (2001) built a conceptual framework to guide focused empirical research on 
learning processes and policy change over time. His framework synthesizes relevant concepts 
from studies of learning in public policy and organizational learning. He maintains that the 
policy literature suggests the presence of a set of variables that constrain the impact of learning 
processes and policy change. For a given policy domain, these variables include (1) the 
characteristics of the issue in question, (2) the distribution of political authority and influence in 
the domain, (3) the natural, economic, and technical resources available to support policy 
actions, (4) the institutional structures of the governments active in the domain, and (5) the 
value structures of the cultures active in the domain (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Rose, 
1993; Kingdon, 1995 cited in Busenberg, 2001 p. 177).  
 
Bussenberg (2001 p. 177) further argues that these contextual variables set boundaries on the 
process of learning and policy change, because they inhibit certain courses of action. He 
explains that learning arrangements can generate policy proposals that are unfeasible 
because they are too costly, technically impractical, incompatible with social value structures, 
or inconsistent with institutional procedures (Kingdon, 1995 cited in Busenberg 2001, p 177). 
Learning may be inhibited in domains where the impact of policy change cannot be readily 
measured, as well as in domains that involve fundamental conflicts of values between different 
actors (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999). It is shown that in some cases, public and political 
satisfaction with a given policy program may, in fact, weaken social support for further learning 
and improvement (Rose, 1993). In sum, the policy impact of institutional arrangements and 
political events are shaped by the context in which they occur. Furthermore, that context may 
shift over time. For example, a shift from one governing coalition to another could create new 
support for value choices (and policy proposals) that had received less support in the past 
(Rose, 1993). 
These issues are relevant to the case of the ABS implementation process. Especially variables 
(3) (the natural, economic, and technical resources available to support policy actions) and (4) 
the institutional structures of the governments active in the domain (Busenberg (2001 p. 177). 
The challenge is how to look for learning that makes the generation of policy proposals feasible 
for practical ABS implementation on the ground, based on the provisions of the Nagoya 
Protocol. There is thus a need to ensure that in terms of implementation these policy proposals 
are not too costly, not technically impractical, not incompatible with social value structures or 
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inconsistent with institutional procedures (Kingdon, 1995 cited in Busenberg 2001 p. 177). 
Given the lack of effective implementation of many ABS frameworks around the world, it seems 
that there is a real need for care to be taken during the implementation of the Nagoya Protocol 
on ABS, especially in relation to the development and design of domestic ABS measures. 
 
Another consideration is that variable 4 means in the case of ABS that the available resources 
that are there from the mother organization16, the subscribing governments and other 
stakeholders will have an impact on the implementation of the Nagoya protocol and therefore 
institutional change that may have serious obligatory implications on resource availability from 
some of the key stakeholders from especially the public sector both industrialized and non-
industrialized may be opposed or supported depending on the politically perceived costs and 
benefits.  
 
It is also important to point out the issue that in some cases and in some countries public and 
political satisfaction with a given ABS policy program based on the Nagoya Protocol, may 
weaken social support for further learning and improvement that would push boundaries further 
through innovation. Busenberg (2001 p. 177) further points out that to consider policy learning, 
the context within which that policy is being set, is also important since the policy impacts of 
institutional arrangements and political events are shaped by the context in which they occur, 
as well as the ability of the context to change and to adapt to changeover time. This means 
that within the context of implementation, there may be an opportunity to consider the design 
of policy options based upon limitations of current rules of the game as set by the Protocol, 
whilst simultaneously creating new value choices that may not have been considered 
previously. For such change to occur, consideration would need to be given to what is 
necessary for effective ABS implementation and who could meaningfully assist in this 
implementation. 
 
From the above it is clear that the issue of institutional learning can be approached from various 
perspectives. The perspective taken in this paper was that of Siebenhüner (2005 p. 508) who 
understood institutional learning as a process in which individuals or collective actors acquired 
knowledge that led to a change in their behavior and resulted in modified institutional 
arrangements. Actors in this sense are the citizen groups, interests groups, business 
corporations, governments or actor networks (Mitchel et al., in press, Christiansen and Tagen, 
2002 cited in Siebenhüner, 2005 p. 511). 
                                               
16 In this case the CBD 
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7.2.4 Institutional Learning as Change in the Behavior of Individual 
Resulting in Changed Institutional Arrangements 
From this perspective, Siebenhüner (2005 p. 511) argues that institutional learning begins with 
the assumption that actors act in an uncertain environment and on the basis of incomplete 
information. During policy processes such as negotiations, consultations, bargaining, or within 
assessments processes, actors develop new knowledge and acquire existing knowledge from 
others.  
 
Based on literature with regard to organizational learning, the following factors have been 
identified in empirical studies and theoretical considerations to be influential in learning 
processes (Siebenhüner, 2005 p 511): 
 Intense, open and transparent communication structures for information diffusion 
 Existence of effective learning mechanisms such as regular evaluations, specific 
committees, workshops etc. 
 Commonly shared values and norms in relation to the solution of actual problems 
 Conflict over resources, values and identities which foster the demand for change and 
might spark off learning processes. 
 
Siebenhüner (2005 p. 511) maintains that learning processes in organizations are triggered by 
external factors rather than by internal ones. He determines these factors to be political 
pressures, changing demand structures, new competitors, new scientific findings, 
technological innovations, criticism from NGOs, others parts of industry or from media. He 
proceeds with analyses of the implementation of the CBD’s access and benefit-sharing 
provisions from an institutional learning perspective. Access legislation has been enforced, 
either as a rather general environment, as sustainable development framework laws which 
regulate bioprospecting and export activities, as specific new laws or modifications, or as 
existing legislation. Most of them spell out the principles of prior informed consent and mutually 
agreed terms (Glowka, 1998). Siebenhüner (2005 p. 513), for the purposes of his study on 
institutional learning within the CBD, defines institutional learning as a process where individual 
or collective actors acquire knowledge and advance practically through the process of 
achieving agreement on the international regulation, on the access to genetic resources and 
on the sharing of the benefits arising from their utilization. 
 
Siebenhüner (2005 p. 513) divided the learning phases from 1992 -1998. 
 
 168 
 
During this phase, countries who served as importers of genetic resources started to involve 
business and industry as well as the scientific community in the debate through dialogues and 
other means of sharing information. Their response towards the suggestions of regulation of 
bioprospecting through standardized measures was apprehensive. However, the WSSD 
paved the way towards the negotiation of an internationally binding instrument or regime. 
 
Siebenhüner (2005 p. 515) points out that the CBD is an international agreement between 
governments, but it addresses issues that bear great relevance for other sectors such as 
NGOs, business and industry, science, as well as indigenous and local communities. In the 
international policy arena and the debate on the ABS provisions, a number of coalitions 
between these actors emerged that were grouped around certain common commercial or 
development interests. The different layers of interests made the commonly used classification 
of North-South conflict problematic.  
 
A new set of classifications emerged during the processand are described below, based on 
Siebenhüner (2005 pp. 516 – 517): 
Strong User Interests 
The coalition of those representing user interests i.e. mainly industrialised countries as well as 
user firms, has reservations with regard to internationally binding ABS regulations and strives 
to enable bioprospecting research activities in biodiversity rich countries with as few 
administrative restrictions as possible (Nijar and Fern, 2012), Ling (2010) and Rosendal 
(2006). 
 
Process Facilitators 
These stakeholders have the interests of balancing industry interests and development goals 
on the basis of an international regulation that sets clear standards and rules and, thereby, 
enables scientific research through eliminating uncertainties. They are facilitated through 
financing organized meetings, drawing up drafts of guidelines and promoting negotiations 
foran international regime. This can be seen as the so-called developed countries, with a few 
emerging in the true facilitator role e.g. Norway, Switzerland and the EU. The countries that 
came to formpart of the ABS Capacity Development Initiative17 also fall in this category. 
 
Provider Interests 
                                               
17 This Initiative started as the Africa ABS Capacity Development initiative funded by Germany and the 
Netherlands and later also by Denmark. It is now called the ABS Capacity Development Initiative since 
other regions also wanted to be capacitated and reference to Africa was dropped. 
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This group of countries demanded a more progressive strategy for the implementation of the 
ABS provisions of the CBD. Their interests include building up national regulatory and 
administrative capacities to deal with the use of genetic resources and to facilitate project 
funding as well as stakeholder participation. It can be argued that many of the Asian and Latin 
American countries fall in this category 
 
Africa and the Caribbean Countries 
Lacking the necessary technological capacity, these countries, although also serving as 
provider countries, focus on poverty alleviation and prevention of biopiracy. According to 
Siebenhüner (2005) they view all bioprospecting dangerous as they have no resources to 
challenge biopirates and patents and to enforce ABS agreements. It is their desire to establish 
a regime which will protect their interests in foreign countries and which will help respond to 
their poverty issues. Essentially this group together with the provider interests group, all were 
asking for a legally binding instrument with a strong compliance regime. 
 
Indigenous and Local Communities (ILC) and Advocacy Groups 
ILC and advocacy groups also brought issues of provider interests to the fore. It can be argued 
that it was perceived by some observers that for some advocacy groups it was not benefits-
sharing but anti-globalisation, against multi-national corporations advancing through 
bioprospecting due to the link to biotechnology (Ling 2012). This link also brings to the fore 
sentiments that emanated from the biosafety negotiations18. They sought to enhance their 
power against the international trade (multi-lateral trade) system and thus this may have led to 
a perception of a tripartite system i.e. power vs trade vs globalisation. 
 
The analysis of the above stakeholders by Siebenhüner (2005 p. 517) was done based on the 
following key elements: 
 Communication structures for information diffusion 
 Effective learning mechanisms  
 Commonly shared values and norms in relation to the solution of actual problems 
 Conflict over resources, values and identities which foster the demand for change and 
might spark off learning processes. 
                                               
18 At the onset of the ABS dialogue, negotiations for the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety were at their 
height.Many groups were anti-biotechnology and genetic engineering and, since ABS also used 
biotechnology. some of the advocators against biotechnology also came into the ABS dialogue with the 
same sentiments they had harbored under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety negotiations. 
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Siebenhüner (2005 p. 519) concluded that there was indeed institutional learning in the CBD 
that can be attributed to a number of influencing factors: 
 The existence of actor coalitions with balanced and strong facilitation interests 
 The establishment of reflexive mechanisms that gather and assess the existing 
knowledge and prepare new decisions 
 A functioning communication and process facilitation infrastructure 
 Predominantly productive conflicts; and  
 International negotiation dynamics that pressurized the processes in the policy arena. 
Siebenhüner (2005) looked at the issue of institutional learning in the CBD until 1998 with the 
conclusion of the Biosafety protocol. The following section looks at the phase 1998 – 2010 to 
see whether this institutional learning has continued within the CBD as an institution and its 
institutional arrangements following the same perspectives used by Siebenhüner (2005). This 
will be viewed however from the perspective of the ABS Nagoya Protocol negotiation process. 
The classification of the different stakeholders, as done by Siebenhüner (2005), remains 
relevant. 
7.2.5 Communication Structures in the ABS Policy Arena 
Siebenhüner (2005 p. 517) has argued that according to the organizational learning literature 
the flow of knowledge between the actors involved is an indispensable ingredient of collective 
learning processes. Therefore, open and transparent communication structures are key for the 
diffusion of knowledge and, by the same token, for the promotion of trust amongst different 
actors. 
 
This has been the significant learning curve in the Nagoya Protocol negotiations of the Nagoya. 
Hours were spent in devising mechanisms to allow for meaningful, insightful, open, frank and 
transparent communication structures to help the actors come to the same understanding 
about the key issues and to address the information asymmetries that had kept them apart. 
These communication structures helped the various actors to elaborate on their 
understandings about governance structures that they saw as relevant and appropriate for a 
functional ABS regime. It helped to foster an understanding of the ABS market to some extent. 
The role of technology transfer and the value of biodiversity valuation was perhaps not fully 
explored. This must, however, be seen against the background of the interest of the main 
actors as discussed by Siebenhüner (2005). The issue of benefit-sharing remained key to the 
discussions and was facilitated by communication. However, time lags to benefits may not 
have been communicated to the extent required, given the interests of some of the key actors. 
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Siebenhüner (2005 p. 517) further pointed to the general distrust that existed between groups 
from industry and indigenous and local groups from biodiversity-rich countries. Moreover, in 
looking back at the negotiations and to the end of the negotiations, it appeared that the real 
distrust may have been between the provider countries and the industry groups. Indeed the 
ABS processes had, in terms of communication processes, been inclusive towards non-
governmental organizations and indigenous groups (Siebenhüner, 2005 p. 517). The voice of 
industry was, however, silent amongst the actors from provider countries and was assumed to 
be heard through the user or recipient countries.  
 
It should be pointed out that although there was still a prevalence of general distrust in terms 
of government-to-government communication in some regards, Siebenhüner (2005 p. 517) 
pointed out that this did not fundamentally hamper the progress of the implementation process 
i.e. the effective negotiation and conclusion of the negotiation for the regulation of genetic 
resources. 
 
The transparent, open, honest and insightful communication structures facilitated the 
development of a significant body of social capital amongst the actors (Siebenhüner, 2005 p. 
517). This then contributed to an increase in shared knowledge, understandings, norms, rules, 
and expectations about patterns of interactions that the actors brought to the recurrent activity, 
namely the negotiation process. It should be pointed out that the ongoing international 
negotiations were also shown to belong to the institutional environment as defined by NIE 
theory (North, 1990).  
 
Sources of trust are related to the institutional environment and to institutional arrangements 
(Slangen, 2003 slide 26). Trust, being perhaps the most important component of social capital. 
a small amount of social capital within a group, organization or society would lead to higher 
transaction costs (Slangen, 2003 slide 25). 
 
In the case of the ABS negotiations as trust increased amongst the actors so the transactions 
cost decreased, and issues could be concluded more easily. The high levels of trust generally 
led to better cooperation, co-ordination and motivation which in turn brought about easier 
transactions (North, 1990), Slangen 2003).  
 
Trust plays an important role outside, but also between and within the organization, in that it 
lowers the cost of search and monitoring, and reduces the cost of contracting and control. 
These are important elements in the ABS implementation process. 
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According to Slangen (2003, slide 26) there are 3 different notions of trust which are: trust in 
people (behavioral trust), trust in the institutional environment (confidence), trust in 
organizations (and government). All these notions were important in the Nagoya Protocol 
negotiation process and will continue to be important in the implementation stage. Parties and 
other stakeholders thus need to continue to find ways to increase social capital, especially trust 
amongst themselves. 
7.2.6 Reflexive Mechanisms 
In the organizational learning literature, reflexive mechanisms are seen as crucial platforms for 
the exchange of knowledge, the fertilization of past experiences i.e. the continued use of best 
practice based on past experiences and, thorough reflection on new perspectives on the 
problems at hand, and on possible solutions and the current situations (Poper and Lipshitz, 
1995, Siebenhüner (2002a). Siebenhüner (2005 p. 517) maintains that typical examples are 
regular evaluations, specific committees, or topic-centered workshops. 
 
In this area of reflexive mechanisms most significant learning occurred (Siebenhüner 2005, p. 
517). The process saw the emergence of good will and understanding towards innovative and 
out-of-the-box thinking. A new group of facilitators emerged out from the set institutional 
environment during the ABS negotiations. These were individuals from the collective19 who 
were able to design, generate the necessary consensus and implement innovative strategies 
towards consensus building through intense exploration of the core challenging issues. It 
appears that in the ABS negotiations for the Nagoya Protocol the issue of reflexive 
mechanisms also provided the most significant learning. This issue was explored in more detail 
as regards the ABS negotiating process in section 7.7.5 of this chapter. 
7.2.7 Values, Norms and Conflicts 
As the organizational learning literature suggests, commonly shared sets of values and norms 
committed to creativity, flexibility, and the solution of actual problems help learning processes 
to come about and to materialize in concrete actions. Siebenhüner (2005 p. 518) points out 
that certain sorts of conflicts among different values and identities have been found as 
instigative for learning processes. Siebenhüner (2005 p. 518) further maintains that in the ABS 
policy arena one can observe conflicts among highly diverse interests and fundamental values 
that by and large, are shared by the coalitions described above. These are: 
                                               
19 The collective refers to all the different negotiating stakeholders put together and these individuals 
came from this pool. 
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 A strong focus on fulfilling human needs through the development of commercial 
products rather than the preservation of genetic resources  
 The development of a functional voluntary regime with due attention to the preservation 
of natural habitats and environmental conservation  
 Equity issues on a global scale (Siebenhüner, 2005 p. 518) 
 
Conflicts with regard to values do not necessarily hamper learning processes but require the 
agents to get to know each other’s values and basic interests in order to reflect upon their own 
values and then promote solutions formed around compromises between these differences 
(Siebenhüner (2005 p. 518). 
 
Such conflicts essentially continued to prevail throughout the negotiation process. Some of the 
players, however, made significant learning progress in terms of the values that they 
represented and the process allowed them to clarify their core values and interests. This 
happened in a number of innovative ways, emissaries being sent, an exploration of the key 
values through friends of the chairs, and through contact groups. These processes minimized 
the perceived barriers that kept the groups apart. 
 
7.3 EXTERNAL INFLUENCES 
Siebenhüner (2005, p. 519)) maintains that progress in ABS has been influenced by factors 
that originated from outside of the arena outlined above. External influences that were 
identified by Siebenhüner (2005, p. 519) as some of the key drivers for change were present 
throughout the process till the adoption of the Protocol. The pressure on the international 
environmental governance organizations to produce some success stories remained. 
Copenhagen20 in the climate change policy arena was a failure. The dry land issues were not 
placed at the forefront at all, since the Strategy was put in place ahead of time and biodiversity 
focused essentially on two main issues i.e. the Cartagena Protocol and the Nagoya Protocol. 
There were, of course, also some other external factors such as the fact that the final 
negotiations took place in Japan. It was for some of the stakeholders essential that the deal 
be concluded in Nagoya as failure may have resulted in no Protocol deal at all in the future. 
Siebenhüner (2005) concluded that institutional learning could provide a way to solve 
fundamental policy problems. 
 
                                               
20 Reference to the Copenhagen 2009 Climate Change Conference under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change which took place in Denmark. 
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The findings from the global survey (reported in chapter 5) on the effectiveness of ABS 
implementation showed that criticism from different interests and advocacy groups would have 
a moderate impact on ABS implementation. Significantly however, criticism from government 
would have a significant impact compared to the perceived moderate impact from NGO’s, 
media and the private sector. Governments would, in the end, be the ultimate decision-makers 
in the ABS policy arena and in the implementation of the Nagoya Protocol. It is interesting to 
note though that the findings (as reported in chapter 5) rated as very high impact 
implementation to change in the legal framework. This indicates that in the end, the changes 
in the legal framework, if facilitating ABS transaction and minimizing transaction costs, may 
foster successful implementation as if they were increasing transaction costs and inhibiting 
ABS transactions, thus hindering implementation. It could be argued that the innovation 
employed during the negotiation process was also an attempt to change the legal framework 
within which the negotiations were taking place. Moreover, as was discussed, these realities 
had, in the end, a facilitator effect on the negotiations - addressing information asymmetries 
and fostering consensus and understanding of the key issues that emerged during the process.  
 
Advancement in science and technology, as well as special circumstances at the national level, 
was indicated by the findings of the global survey for effectiveness, as having a significant 
impact on implementation. It could be argued that they also contributed to learning within the 
negotiations, especially in understanding the concepts of utilization of genetic resources and 
the definition of genetic resources – both of which facilitated a significant momentum towards 
the adoption of the Protocol. 
 
Finally, political pressure and changing demand levels were also considered important for 
implementation. However, the impact of political pressure was more significant,whereas 
changing demand levels were perceived as having a moderate impact. It could be argued that 
political pressure contributed significantly to the adoption of the Protocol and would thus also 
be important for its implementation. Changing demand level,a market driven factor, and can to 
some extent be argued that as contributing to the successful conclusion of the negotiations. 
This is because, throughout the negotiation the market for ABS prevailed, thus making a case 
for the need to regulate the ABS transactions. 
 
7.4 DISCUSSION 
This chapter considered institutional learning within the ABS negotiating process. During the 
process there were inherent limitations within the negotiating frame that were not amenable to 
consensus and institutional learning. The first among these were the archaic rules and 
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procedures that governed the negotiation process as determined by the United Nations. These 
rules were very rigid and were protected from too much change for political imperatives. It 
would be important to retrace this learning to the mother body i.e. the Convention itself - since 
this learning essentially took place within a subsidiary body of the Convention. The learning in 
itself would not be useful if the Convention did not take note of it. Herein lay the difficulty, since 
the Convention itself was part of the larger UN governance structures and property rights. It 
could be argued that such governance structures and property rights may have triggered the 
need to find new communication structures and reflexive mechanisms. While many have 
attempted to change the UN itself, that was not the focus of this study - although such a 
prospect could be interesting to consider in terms of its relevance to reducing transaction costs 
in the implementation of ABS regime in accordance to the Nagoya Protocol. 
 
In the ABS case, the use of the consensus rule for decision making also had implications for 
effective implementation. Narlikar (2006), writing about fairness in international trade 
negotiations, maintains that the actual norm of the UN in terms of decision-making is based, 
not on majority voting, but on consensus. He points to the difficulties that this may present for 
some actors. For a decision to be passed, no member present at the meeting at which the 
decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed decision. To achieve this situation the 
following is assumed (Narliker 2006, p 1014): 
 Presence in the meeting 
 Open show of hands rather than a secret ballot 
 Facilitated consensus-building through a process which involves many green room 
meetings, contact group meetings or buzz groups, which often meet on invitation of the 
Director General (the chair in the ABS case) of that meeting and may result in the 
exclusion of some critical actors from the key discussion and negotiation stages.  
 
In the context of the CBD and the negotiations of the ABS Protocol, these three challenges 
also emerged. Since the ABS Protocol was an intergovernmental process set to pave a way 
for international governance and regulation of ABS, it could be assumed that the decision-
makers would be governments of both provider and user states. However, the activity to be 
governed was complex and required interaction of those who engaged with it. Industry and 
indigenous and local communities were sometimes not allowed into the meetings at which 
consensus was being fostered, and had to rely on lobbying to have their voices and concerns 
reflected in the final consensus outcome. The criteria above thus were not entirely met. It could 
still take a while before governments would be able to fully break down barriers that may act 
as blocks to effective consensus decision-making, and that would allow for effective 
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implementation of the measures needed for international environmental concerns such as the 
issue being addressed by the ABS Protocol.  
 
In this regard it could be argued that institutional or organizational learning did not take place 
across the board. The crucial aspect of this challenge would liewithin the UN framework for 
negotiation. 
 
Narlikar (2006 p. 1014) argues that in the case of trade negotiations, many developing 
countries feared that open dissent to a motion that a developed country was supporting would 
result in retaliatory consequences and penalties against them outside the meeting room. 
Hence, many chose to remain silent. Silence, however, was also interpreted as consensus. 
This action did not, therefore, provide them with the desired outcome. 
 
Narlikar (2006 p. 1015) further argues that there is room for developing countries to collectively 
override the norm of consensus decision-making and insisted on majority voting as per the 
GATT rule-book. However, besides the obvious problems of collective action in employing 
such a strategy, this strategy would have entailed the risk that developed countries might 
withdraw their commitment to the GATT and turn to alternative bilateral and regional 
arrangements. The costs of such arrangements and the decline of the multilateral trading 
system would have been the highest for developing countries. These would include 
susceptibility to greater bilateral arm-twisting, but also the losses that would result from the 
end of the free-ride that they had enjoyed on tariff reductions by developed countries. 
 
Fortunately, this may not entirely have played out in the ABS arena, as was shown through the 
institutional learning studied here. This study has made the point that essentially the system 
was able to learn and improve collective decision making - especially in implementation of 
multilateral agreements such as the Protocol. The call was, therefore, to allow for industry and 
other stakeholders that had been in the shadows previously, but who play(ed) a critical role in 
the ABS value chain, to be involved in the implementation of the Nagoya Protocol, as well as 
implementation of its domestic ABS measures or instruments. 
7.4.1 Institutional Mechanisms to Facilitate Cooperative Outcomes in ABS 
Implementation 
Rainer (2002, p. 114) considers four institutional mechanisms that can facilitate cooperative 
outcomes in his attempt to look at policy learning within the EU. These are: 
1. Norms that provide standards of behavior and outcomes  
2. Changing configurations of actors and opportunities  
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3. Council decision routines that support policy learning and include standard 
mechanisms for resolving conflicts, and  
4. Vertical differentiation within the Council system that can unblock issue-specific 
rigidities. 
 
Rainer (2002 p.115) further points out that first, the rules of negotiation in the EU as a whole 
differs from those in individual member states. Member-state negotiations are embedded in 
formal and informal norms because of actor heterogeneity and uncertainty about the political 
agenda. In the ABS negotiations the different negotiating blocks also had to embed themselves 
in the formal and informal norms of the UN through the CBD for the same reasons as provided 
here by Rainer (2002 p.115).  
 
According to Rainer (2002 p.116) informal norms and understandings can be expected to play 
an important role in “treaty-making” decisions, in an area where formal rules provide even less 
guidance for member states. Second, the EU institutional setting continually reconfigures 
coalitions of support and opposition in relation to member states’ domestic settings. It brings 
different actors into the game and changes the opportunities for the pursuit of interests. In 
particular, it empowers supranational organizations that favor integration by providing them 
with formal rights in the decision-making process. 
 
There is room for such learning to take place in the ABS implementation arena, but there is 
also a need for the empowerment of supranational organizations that would favor effective 
implementation of ABS to allow for the effective flow of benefits. These are actors that have 
the capacity, understanding and willingness to do this, with the remit of the ABS protocol and 
national domestic ABS measures. 
 
Third, the EU decision-making routines not only provides standardized mechanisms for 
resolving issue-specific conflicts among member states, but also increases the amount of 
information available about the consequences of policy change (Rainer (2002 p.116). Member 
states are particularly likely to learn if the discussed proposals promote new ideas, if the 
proposals are complex or if the domestic situations are multidimensional, so that neither the 
EU rules nor their effect on the domestic structures can be easily assessed. These learning 
processes are likely to result in member states’ changing their preferences if the processes 
appear to reveal that current domestic arrangements have limited efficiency or are inconsistent 
(Rainer (2002 p.116).  
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This is relevant to the ABS sector in that such routines become more important in the 
implementation of ABS in a situation of actor heterogeneity and uncertainty about the political 
and development agenda. Given the fact that due to implementation challenges already faced 
by many countries, there are not many successful cases of ABS, there is a critical need for 
those in the ABS game to learn from each other and obtain new insights from each other in 
terms of implementation.  
 
Such learning would be enriched if the dynamics of the negotiation process would be altered 
and lessons learned during the negotiation process, is integrated in order to address specific 
conflicts that may arise amongst various players during the implementation of the ABS 
Protocol. The governing body of the ABS Protocol needs to ensure that any innovations during 
negotiations become routine - as such processes remain riddled with significant challenges 
and information asymmetries. The experts’ presentations, such as those made during 
meetings of Subsidiary Body on Scientific Technical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA), 
could be a useful mechanism for ABS implementation.  
 
Rainer (2002 p.116) finally maintains that the vertical differentiation of the Council, ranging 
from its working groups to the heads of state, helps to resolve profound conflict interests. (This 
means that shifting the level of negotiations upward21 subjects issue-specific concerns to 
broader political considerations that can support, though not necessarily dictate, a cooperative 
outcome) (Rainer, 2002, p. 116).  
 
This lesson was visible in the ABS negotiations, although generally the ABS negotiators were 
weary of using vertical integration as a means of cooperative outcome due to fears it could 
leading to dictatorship by one or the other interest groups e.g. industrialized countries or non-
industrialized countries.. It was also further confounded by the fact that the ABS issues were 
complex, with the occurrence of fraud, and with many unknowns and thus it was amenable to 
information asymmetry. Capacitating the political decision makers may not be an easy task, 
as it would require significant time, coordination and financial resources, especially for 
developing countries negotiating as a UN regional block e.g. the African group of countries. An 
added challenge would be that some political decision makers would have multiple portfolios, 
which would result in conflicting demands and priorities both at the national and international 
level. Further confounding this situation would be the fact that movement at the top political 
                                               
21 This would require forwarding difficult issues, which cannot be resolved at the technical level upward 
to the political level for further discussion and negotiation at a higher level i.e. the ministerial level, and 
finally to the Head of State level, as required. 
 179 
 
levels for some countries could be rapid and unpredictable, resulting in significant turnover. 
For most democratic countries turnover cycles could change every five years, whereas 
negotiations could take much longer than that, impacting on institutional memory, particularly 
if such change also happened at the national level. 
7.4.2 Non-Continuity of Key Negotiators and Characteristics of the Key 
Negotiators 
If there is too much of a movement in terms of the key negotiators it can impact on the social 
as well as psychological dynamics within the negotiations and the negotiation setting. This has 
implications for dealing with information asymmetries, building social capital and the rules that 
govern the process as time and effort may be wasted by all those involved in tracing back 
decisions and progress made. During the ABS negotiation ways of dealing with this effectively 
were found and progress was made since the core group of negotiators remained the same 
throughout the negotiating phase. 
7.4.3 Use of Language and Ways of Communicating 
It must be kept in mind that the human dimension remains an important aspect of any 
negotiating setting. The mode of communication as well as the communication concepts will 
have a bearing on the process through the social interactions. It can be argued that the use of 
a specific language in negotiations may be a potential barrier towards effective implementation 
of outcomes. 
 
During the ABS negotiations, the key concepts that may be relevant in this context are the “Us 
vs Them” rhetoric. This rhetoric has burdened negotiation dynamics through concepts that 
were trying to view the world as two dimensional i.e. use of concepts pertaining to the North–
South divide, developing vs developed countries, or provider vs user countries. Although these 
groupings were based on primary perceived interests, they did not capture the reality of true 
interests. This was due to the fact that concepts are framed within an archaic view of the world 
and, therefore, cannot reflect the reality of modern day life. There is thus a need for new 
approaches. Within the ABS field, we have seen the emergence of the concept ‘Megadiverse 
Group’ of countries. This grouping, however, also suffered from the realities on the ground and 
did not last throughout the negotiating process. What came to the fore was a move to the 
emergence of strategic interests which has not simply followed the long established UN 
regional groupings. 
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7.4.4 Blocking of Movement in One Forum to Await Perceived Progress in 
Another 
This is a negotiating tactic that has bearing on the achievement of efficient outcomes. The ABS 
negotiations have seen some of this. There have been attempts to influence negotiations 
through insisting that one issue or another could not be dealt within the ABS negotiation since 
it is being dealt with somewhere else. This hampered progress as ABS was truly a cross cutting 
issue with the potential to affect other international treaty implementation. There was thus a 
need for the ABS Protocol implementation phase to move towards inclusion of stakeholders 
that could be impacted upon by such implementation, in order for them to provide input and 
through that clear any informational asymmetry that could hamper implementation. The ABS 
implementation would then proceed through adaptive management and could, in the end, 
result in outcomes that could signal progress for the related issue.  
 
The following section considers how adaptive management, or learning by doing, assisted in 
moving the negotiations forward. 
7.4.5 Innovation and Adaptive Management of the Negotiating Process for 
the Nagoya Protocol 
As was pointed out by Siebenhüner (2009 p. 519, the establishment of reflexive mechanisms 
that would gather and assess the existing knowledge and prepare new decisions based on 
that knowledge, provided significant learning in the ABS policy arena. This could be viewed as 
innovation based on adaptive management to foster progress. Table 7.1 below provides a 
chronological account of the various methods and strategies that were employed to overcome 
the limitations and challenges of the UN institutional arrangements. It is based on the notion 
that to understand current challenges that one is facing and to overcome them, it is necessary 
to look into the past and take the best practice from that. The next step then would be to 
innovate in the present in order to have a measure of control of future events and of situations 
- in this case the implementation of the Protocol being negotiated. 
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The various methods below fall essentially into three broad categories as follows: 
a) Established UN negotiating methods 
(Contact groups, friends of the chair and friends of the president, established UN 
regional blocks, use of Co-chairs) 
b) Methods used in other environmental negotiating process  
(Bullet and Bricks, Scenario notes, Chatham House Rule, Side events, workshops and 
panel discussions) 
c) Methods that have emerged from innovation under the negotiations of the 
Nagoya Protocol on ABS 
(LLMMC, Group of Asia-Pacific Countries, Group of like-minded in spirit women, 
fortune cookies, the confessional process, high degree of ILC participation, rules of 
engagement) 
 
Table 7.1 The Methods of Innovation Used That Can Be Regarded As Contributing To  
Institutional Learning towards More Efficient Negotiations Under The CBD 
THE METHOD TIME FRAME COMMENTS 
Contact groups, Friends of 
the chair and friends of the 
President 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 
2004 
Issues were negotiated in 
small groups called contact 
groups, polarized issues 
were negotiated by smaller 
groups called friends of the 
President, and difficult issues 
were handled by friends of 
the chair. 
Formation of Groups such as 
the Group of Like-Minded 
Megadiverse Countries 
(LMMC)  
Before the onset of 
negotiations and throughout 
the negotiations 
The LMMC numbered 17 
countries i.e. Bolivia, Brazil, 
China, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Ecuador, India, 
Indonesia, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Peru, Philippines, 
South-Africa and Venezuala 
Menu of options on the 
scope, nature, objectives and 
elements for an international 
regime 
2005, Bangkok This document was lengthy, 
highlighting the need for 
serious compromise but also 
the complexity of the issue  
Call for more gaps and 
analysis and work on a matrix 
of such gaps 
2005, Bangkok This call also highlighted the 
complexity of the issues, but 
at the same time served as a 
delay mechanism for the 
onset of  full blown 
negotiations 
The African draft legally 
binding international regime 
Granada, Spain, 2006 This was an attempt to start 
the negotiations based on a 
draft regime with an assumed 
legally binding nature 
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Use of Co-Chairs Through-out the negotiations This allowed for ensuring that 
there is a balance and 
independence in the 
guidance of the negotiating 
process 
Bricks and Bullets Geneva, Switzerland, 2008 This was introduced by two 
Co-chairs of a contact group. 
An item classified as a “brick” 
meant it had consensus and 
was thus a building block of 
the Regime, whereas an item 
classified as a bullet meant 
that it did not have 
consensus and would 
therefore, not serve as a 
building block as it needed 
further discussion. It was also 
made clear that marking 
anything as a bullet did not 
mean that it was no longer 
considered a component of 
the international regime. 
Chatham House Rules 2008, Bonn, Germany  This rule was evoked by the 
chair of a small working 
group. This group was set up 
to work on terms of reference 
for three technical experts 
groups. Discussions under 
the Chatham house rules 
managed to unlock significant 
understanding of key issues 
Establishment of the group of 
like-minded Asia-Pacific 
countries 
2009, November, Montreal, 
Canada 
This group consisted of both 
developed and developing 
countries. This group was not 
an active collective 
participant in the negotiations 
due to fundamental 
differences between 
developing and developed 
countries. 
Scenario Notes and non-
papers 
 
Fortune cookies for those 
who made a difference 
2009, Canada, Montreal The two Co-chairs of the ABS 
working group prepared a 
scenario note in which they 
re-affirmed their commitment 
made at the outset of their 
tenure to transparency, 
openness and 
responsiveness. 
The non-papers covered 
operative text submitted by 
Parties and which became 
the basis of two separate 
contact groups on traditional 
knowledge as it related to 
ABS 
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Source: Own based on Ling (2010), Nijar and Fern (2012) 
High Degree of direct 
participation of indigenous 
peoples’ groups in the ABS 
talks 
Throughout the negotiations This situation was a 
significant precedent and 
unique to the CBD amongst 
the environmental treaties 
3-5 days meeting of the 
Friends of the Co-chairs 
meeting 
January, 2010, Canada, 
Montreal 
The group was established to 
try and find ways to 
convergence of positions and 
to find solutions to the key 
issues.  
Inter-regional informal 
consultation prior to the ninth 
meeting of the ABS working 
group 
March, 2010 Colombia The group had specific and 
clear terms of reference as to 
the composition and work 
agenda 
Establishment of the Like-
Minded in Spirit Group of 
Women 
2009, November, Montreal, 
Canada 
The group comprised of a 
mixed group of women 
transcending the traditional 
UN divisions and seeking for 
gender balance 
The Cali Setting 2010 March, Cali Colombia The negotiating blocks were 
seated in a roundtable format 
with the chief negotiators at 
the head of each negotiating 
block 
Meeting of Chief Negotiators 
only without representation of 
the Secretariat and the two 
Co-Chairs 
2010 March, Cali, Colombia This meeting was called by 
one of the Chief Negotiators 
after an impasse to try and 
find a way forward, 
determined by Parties only. 
The ABC of ABS 2010 March, Cali, Colombia This represent the core 
issues of the Protocol 
identified by the Co-Chairs 
Rules of Engagement 2010 July, Montreal These rules were set-up to 
allow for the negotiators to 
achieve consensus easier 
Establishment of the Inter-
regional Negotiating Group 
(ING) 
2010 July, Montreal, Canada The Group was established 
to move negotiations faster 
as the deadline for 
negotiating was fast 
approaching 
ABS Working Group 2010 September, Montreal, 
Canada 
The meeting could not 
resolve anything. However it 
served to maintain the 
negotiating momentum and 
sense of urgency 
Confessions of negotiators 2010 October, Nagoya Japan This setting was introduced 
by two co-chairs of a contact 
group to allow for the break 
of an impasse 
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Side events (seminars, workshops and panel discussions) by NGOs, indigenous peoples’ 
groups, international organizations and some governments as well as expert groups provided 
a useful way to synthesize some of the issues facing negotiators throughout the negotiations 
with a view to clarify interest, concepts and positions (Ling 2010). These were complemented 
by numerous and innovative strategies as can be seen in Table 7.1 above. Given the length 
of the table, not all the strategies were discussed here. However a few were discussed in this 
paper in order to demonstrate the innovation that occurred. 
 
The formation of groups such as LMMC and the Asia Pacific group of like-minded countries 
was an interesting move that brought new dimensions to the negotiating table. It also 
represented the recognition that the traditional UN groupings could no longer suffice around 
certain issues. It also however, brought challenges in terms of leadership, key negotiators and 
common positions, as well as implications for the positions of the other groups to which they 
originally belonged, as well as confidentiality of issues discussed when a member belonged to 
two different groups during the negotiations e.g. the African countries in the LMMC. (Ling 2010, 
Nijar and Fern, 2012). 
 
The bricks and bullets approach was first used in negotiations for the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety. The use of the “bricks and bullets” led to the emergence of the first concrete 
proposals in the negotiations towards a potential functional regime. 
 
During COP 8 the use of the Chatham House Rule22 led to an open and frank discussion 
amongst the key stakeholders that helped to advance progress made through the bricks and 
bullets. From that point onward, learning started to take place based on the realization that 
consensus could be reached by using strategies that moves away from what were conceived 
of as archaic institutions that governed the UN system. The consensus rule, the arbitrary 
categories which no longer reflected the reality of representatives during the negotiations, as 
                                               
22 The Chatham House Rule is used when, in a meeting or part thereof, participants are allowed or given 
the freedom to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker (s), 
nor that of any other participant, may be revealed. It is used to encourage openness and the sharing of 
information (Chatham House, 2014). This allows people to speak as individuals, and to express views 
that may not be those of their organizations and, therefore, encourages free discussion. People usually 
feel more relaxed if they don’t have to worry about their reputation or the implications of what they say 
being publicly quoted (Chatham House, 2014). 
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well as current political pressures, were seen as some of the strategies that blocked learning 
and moving forward. 
 
The use of “Friends of the Chair” is a United Nations practice whereby, in cases where the 
views and positions of countries are diverse and divergent, the chair of a negotiation group 
may select a much smaller group of negotiators who have been active, to informally meet for 
discussions or negotiations. The aim is to facilitate more in-depth and frank exchanges so that 
there can be a better understanding of positions and solutions sought to arrive at a consensus 
when formal negotiations resume (Ling 2010. p 58). This method was used repeatedly by the 
negotiations by both the co-chairs of the ABS working group and other chairs appointed during 
the course of the negotiations e.g. contact group chairs. 
 
Another innovative reflexive mechanism was the use of ”fortune cookies” which were awarded 
to deserving colleagues who were able to work towards making a breakthrough towards a 
better understanding of the issues during the negotiations. This served as an incentive to other 
negotiators to do the same, with the hope of also being awarded with a “fortune cookie” for 
their efforts. The “fortune cookies” were awarded daily to negotiators who were regarded as 
deserving by participants who had made significant contribution towards advancing the state 
of the negotiations. 
 
The Inter-regional Negotiating Group23 (ING) consisted of five spokespersons self-selected 
from among the parties from each of the five UN regions, two representatives each from 
indigenous and local communities, civil society, research institutions and private sector, as well 
as the current (Germany) and incoming (Japan) COP Presidents. These representatives could 
be replaced, as needed, by each grouping. All other Parties and observers were also in the 
room to ensure transparency of the proceedings. Observers at the table could provide 
“guidance” on the items being negotiated, while textual inputs were the prerogative of the 
Parties. This right was later extended to representatives of local and indigenous communities 
provided their proposals were supported by at least one party (Ling 2010, p. 71). This set-up 
was an attempt to force negotiators to be focused and to move swiftly through the issues and 
towards dealing with the difficult issues. The use of “observers in the room” was an innovative 
step as well as the presence of ILCs at the negotiating table. 
                                               
23 The ING was set up by the two Co-chairs of the ABS Working Group as an attempt to help advance 
negotiations in a smaller group, and followed UN procedures closely with a bit of digression from the 
rules and procedures. 
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Use of language also emerged as a reflexive mechanism e.g. the core chairs coining the 
concept of “the ABC of ABS” which represented access, benefit-sharing and compliance. The 
ING focused on these issues in the first week of negotiations.  The rules of engagement were 
introduced by the Co-Chairs and these rules urged Parties to “exercise maximum restraint” 
and “avoid insertions that only reflect your positions”. Any proposed text should improve the 
draft protocol and “accommodate the views of others”. Parties were urged to try to 
accommodate each other’s concerns while ensuring that their own interests were reflected in 
a balanced manner, bearing in mind that the protocol was to implement the CBD’s third 
objective of fair and equitable benefit-sharing. (Ling 2010, p 74).  
 
Amongst the last innovative reflexive mechanisms in Nagoya during the negotiations was the 
emergence of the “confessional process” that allowed for a transparent, yet confidential 
practice driven by the need for key actors i.e. head of delegations and chief negotiators to 
disclose their absolute red line on some of the most difficult issues. This process was based 
on the idea that a confession of the chief negotiators from the various regional groups as to 
their absolute red lines regarding the issue of compliance could help unlock the impasse on 
this issue. Chief Negotiators lined up in a queue to have a “confessional session” with the two 
co-chairs about their absolute red lines as per their negotiating mandates, with the 
understanding that the co-chairs would never disclose these “red lines” and that the 
confessions would be used by the negotiators to develop a compromise text that would be 
close to the redlines of all regions but would maintaining a fine balance that was acceptable to 
all negotiating blocks. Again goodwill towards innovative reflexive mechanisms prevailed and 
yet another step towards the adoption of the Protocol was made. 
 
Other methods employed were changing of seating formats e.g. the Cali setting, the friends of 
the chair meetings, etc. which again provided opportunity for in-depth, frank and unbiased 
discussion on the challenges that faced the different actors. Use of time as a limiting factor 
was also identified as a reflexive mechanism as well as use of co-chairs respected by all sides 
and who maintained a professional, neutral but demanding stance.  
 
One key turning point in the negotiations was also the draft text that was tabled by the Co-
Chairs, during a session in Colombia, as a basis for further negotiation, and which became 
known as the Cali text. Another reflexive mechanism was to ensure the continuity of the key 
actors throughout the process, especially for maintaining momentum and for furthering 
understanding of the key issues. 
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As was pointed out by Siebenhüner (2005 p. 517), the professional facilitation through the 
Secretariat was maintained. This was despite the fact that reflexive mechanisms had to be put 
in place and it became evident that the best process would be for the Secretariat to remain a 
professional facilitator and not a player or actor in the game. The role of the Secretariat staff 
also became very important as the holders of institutional memory during the entire process of 
the negotiations. 
 
The identification of the African Group as one of the major actors was another major reflexive 
mechanism , and led to a significant shift in the dynamics of the negotiations as well as in the 
understanding of the process by the group itself and the other actors. This was mainly due to 
the emergence of the ABS Capacity Development Initiative that allowed for this renewed sense 
of purpose, conviction and ability to negotiate as equal partners with reduced information 
asymmetry in the African group. 
 
The emergence of a strong, empowered, able and willing-to-engage African Group, was a 
reflection not expected by many actors. This new actor (African Group) was able to forge 
alliances based on its new understanding of its values, interests and norms and caught many 
unaware in both the traditional allies24 and the user camps.  
 
In the dying moments of the negotiations, yet another reflexive mechanism came into play 
when the President of the 10th Conference of the Parties to the CBD produced a carefully 
balanced text remaining objectively close to the issues and challenges negotiated, and 
maintaining the key conclusions and spirit of the text developed by the actors. This text 
contained the unresolved issues that were essentially at the heart of the negotiations of the 
Protocol – derivatives, scope, publicly available TK and the strength and effectiveness of the 
compliance mechanism (Nijar, and Fern, 2012 p. 29). This helped the actors to reflect and 
make the quantum leap25 towards the adoption of the Protocol. As Nijar and Fern (2012 p.29) 
put it “the protocol was concluded by a process that did not involve negotiations’ 
                                               
24 The African Group traditionally would ally with other developing countries blocks such as the Group 
of 77 plus China countries, Latin America, Asia and the Small Island State and the Caribbean. During 
the ABS negotiations, however, the African group chose to look at its interests, and based on that, made 
strategic alliances which sometimes meant going against the advice and directions of its traditional allies 
e.g. calls for walking out of the negotiations by its allies were repeatedly not followed by Africa since 
they had more to lose than their allies. 
25 As pointed out by Nijar and Fern the final end product of the Protocol was not negotiated technically 
by Parties. The question remains whether if the Presidency did not do what they did whether the Protocol 
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Just as it seemed unlikely in the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) for the 
decision to be taken, it seemed just as unlikely for the Protocol to be concluded in Nagoya. Yet 
these collective reflexive mechanisms helped all actors to make that jump in faith and to 
conclude the negotiations. 
 
Finally, the various innovations used under the negotiations of the ABS protocol point to the 
fact that adaptive management was needed to break the organizational culture of the UN if 
progress was to be made. As is evident from the table above. the innovations and diversions 
from established practice increased as the intensity of the negotiations increased and as the 
deadline approached. New groups were established and routines were continually being 
broken and the setting kept changing, incentives were devised, strategies kept being refined, 
dropped and improved. Numerous meetings official and unofficial, behind the scenes, in the 
corridors, notes sent to each other in the room, during smoking sessions, bars and hotel rooms 
were employed, all to advance the negotiations and to break through the rigid and archaic rules 
of the UN that did not easily foster the achievement of consensus. 
7.4.6 A New Way of Interaction for ABS Implementation 
There has not been much tolerance for institutional learning within the UN system. It can, 
however, be argued that the ABS process pushed boundaries and a case can also be made 
for the achievement of sustained success of institutional reform within the negotiating process. 
This will be even more required during the process of implementation.  
 
The lessons learned above point to the need for a new reflexive mechanisms to approach the 
full and effective implementation of the Nagoya Protocol. In the future it will be particularly 
important to review the communication structures and to look at the outsiders in this structure. 
There will also be a need for the business and industry sector, as well as research and 
academia, to come to the fore in terms of implementation of the Protocol if this process of trust 
building and learning is to continue, which this study argues it must. 
Ostrom (2009 p. 31) in looking at the challenge of implementation of the climate change 
strategies, stated the following: 
“Acknowledging the complexity of the problem, as well as the relatively recent agreement 
among scientists about the human causes of climate change, leads to recognition that waiting 
for effective policies to be established at the global level is unreasonable. Rather than only a 
global effort, it would be better to self-consciously adopt a polycentric approach to the problem 
                                               
would have been concluded in Nagoya. Thus the statement that this process introduced by the 
Presidency assisted the parties to move beyond their positions and adopt the Protocol. 
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of climate change in order to gain the benefits at multiple scales as well as to encourage 
experimentation and learning from diverse policies adopted at multiple scales.” 
 
Although ABS is different from climate change this statement has significant implications for 
ABS implementation. ABS is complex - there is a global level policy framework in place, the 
issue of bioprospecting has been researched by scientists for a while now, economists have 
joined the party and, what now essentially remains is implementation, which will lead to the 
gaining of benefits at multiple scales.  
 
Ostrom (2009 p. 35) points out that the extensive empirical research on collective action 
discussed has repeatedly identified the central and necessary core of trust and reciprocity 
among those involved, in order to be associated with successful levels of collective action. 
Ostrom (2009 p. 35 in referring to climate change states that if the only policy related to climate 
change was adopted at the global scale, it would be particularly difficult to increase the trust 
that citizens and firms need to have that other citizens and firms located halfway around the 
globe are taking actions similar to those being taken “taken at home.” When participants fear 
they are being “suckers” for taking costly actions while others free ride, more substantial effort 
is devoted to finding deceptive ways of appearing to reduce emissions while not doing so. A 
key problem thus (Ostrom, 2009 p. 36) points out is monitoring to ensure compliance or social 
compliance.  
 
The advantage of a polycentric26 approach is that it encourages experimental efforts at multiple 
levels, as well as the development of methods for assessing the benefits and costs of particular 
strategies adopted in one ecosystem, and comparing these with results obtained in other 
ecosystems. Building such a commitment, and the trust that others are also taking 
responsibility, can be more effectively undertaken in small-to medium-scale governance units 
that are linked through information networks and monitoring levels. 
 
Although the issue Ostrom (2006) addresses is that of climate change, there is relevance for 
a polycentric approach in the implementation of ABS, thus taking it further from the institutional 
or organizational learning over the years. It can be argued that despite the complexity of ABS 
and of issues surrounding effective ABS implementation, the necessary building blocks are in 
place. It is the act of placing these building blocks in a functional manner at multiple levels that 
                                               
26 A poly centric approach can be viewed as a system of interaction of many circles in a synergistic 
manner.  
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is the challenge i.e. the Nagoya Protocol at the international level, regional level strategies that 
are coordinated and harmonized, and the various national level measures that are coordinated 
and harmonized at the national level. At all these stages effective ABS implementation would 
require a polycentric approach towards collective action and decision-making. 
 
At all stages, there would also be the one big circle representing traditional ABS players 
(governments both providers and users) and the traditional ABS outsiders (Industry, ILC, 
Government departments (finance, trade, research and development, education and national 
development), civil society and Research and Academia. These two circles would merge at an 
area called the transitional area/ area of synergy. In this area old and new would interact 
together, new approaches would emerge and be tested, new language would develop and the 
elements of organizational learning would need to be employed to allow for adaptive 
management of ABS i.e. learning by doing.  
 
The use of the circles for traditional players and traditional outsiders takes into account that 
some of these players may be involved in the other circle. The challenge however lies in the 
decision-making process. The argument is that since the minimum standards are now in place 
at the international level (ABS Nagoya Protocol) and the challenge of information asymmetry 
have been addressed, there should be enough goodwill, trust and commitment for the political 
decision makers to allow the old traditional ABS players to be fully and effectively part of the 
collective process. This is to ensure that they contribute meaningfully to the collective ABS 
implementation decisions and that these “close to the on-the-ground” political and institutional 
realities are taken into account.  
 
It could be expected that in the two circles resulting within the process, a larger circle would 
be embedded demonstrating the following characteristics: 
 transparent multi-and trans-disciplinary and sectoral communication, interaction and 
coordination towards collective decision making and action 
 Functional and efficient translation of the Nagoya protocol into the building blocks of a 
standardized system at the international level influencing national systems 
 Traditional ABS outsiders are consulted and are allowed into contributing meaningfully 
to the decision making process 
 The emergence of new institutions or new rules that govern the ABS game or system, 
based on true reflection, institutional learning and adaptive management of ABS 
implementation. 
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The pay-offs of using such a polycentric approach towards ABS implementation could be 
expected to be: 
 Reduced transaction cost 
 Reduced information asymmetry 
 Improved information 
 Improved communication 
 Effective trust building that may result in enhanced political will and commitment 
towards ABS implementation. 
The objective of this approach is to allow for the flow of benefits (monetary and otherwise) 
through the ABS system for both user and provider of genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge. These benefits would need to be translated and framed in terms of the social 
context e.g. contribution to national economic development as this is more effective in 
changing behavior than messages stressing just factual information (Shultz et al, 2007 and 
Mumford, 2007 cited in Ostrom, 2009 p.38). 
  
This would then give rise to the ultimate aim of sustainable use and conservation of 
biodiversity. 
7.5 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
This chapter has made the case that institutional learning indeed took place during the 
negotiations for the Nagoya Protocol. The case is also put forward here that the challenge 
would be to ensure that the formula followed, which is maintained here is successful, could be 
institutionalized and maintained, in order to inform the ABS policy arena in terms of 
implementation.  
 
A polycentric approach is being proposed for ABS implementation, based on the lessons from 
the institutional learning which were observed to occur during the negotiation process. The use 
of the polycentric approach that includes both traditional players and traditional outsiders, it 
was here shown, would allow for more enriched debates and perspectives to be introduced 
into the policy arena and would ensure a shift of balance that would be more realistic, 
particularly since the policy-making process may have potential unintended consequences on 
some of the players. These unintended outcomes could be minimized. The private sector 
would need to be allowed to be integrally involved in the implementation of the Protocol, as 
well as the indigenous and local communities, if implementation were to be effective. The 
polycentric approach demands the inclusion of all relevant stakeholders to be involved. 
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It was also further recommended here that some of the strategies outlined in this chapter be 
institutionalized within the CBD, and especially in the work of the implementation of the Nagoya 
Protocol. It was further recommended that ongoing studies should be carried out, considering 
institutional learning within the various environmental treaties in order to outline underlying 
synergies and so that more effective negotiations could be fostered in which social capital i.e. 
trust, could be fostered. 
 
The argument is made here for a need to critically consider the challenges the negotiations 
faced from the polycentric approach perspective in order to further develop and refine them 
over time in the interest of efficiency and effectiveness, as well as in terms of implementation 
of global multilateral environmental negotiations and the implementation of the outcomes of 
those negotiations. 
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CHAPTER 8 
AN ASSESSMENT OF NAMIBIA AS A CASE STUDY, AND 
ITS UTILISATION OF THE CRITICAL FACTORS IN 
RELATION TO ABS 
 
However, the Namibian experience predicts that we would appoint a consultant at great 
expense that would write a glowing recommendation, and that we would believe that report.  
~Anon 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Namibia is situated in the south western part of Africa, just above South Africa and below 
Angola. The country’s ecological distinctiveness is partially defined by the Namib Desert along 
the western coastline and the Kalahari Desert in the east. Its coastline borders the cold and 
fertile Atlantic Ocean, characterized by the cold Benguela Current (Barnard et al, 1998). These 
characteristics give Namibia an interesting biogeography - with a myriad of species which 
display unique evolutionary adaptations that enable them to survive and inhabit the hostile 
environments of Namibia, characterised by low and variable rainfall, hot deserts conditions and 
poor soils (Barnard et al., 1998). 
Namibia gained independence from colonial apartheid South-African rule in 1990.  
 
The country inherited a suite of policies and legislations that, over twenty years later, no longer 
answered the needs of a newly independent country (Seeley and Montgomery, 2009). This 
contributed to a flurry of policy development and legislation over the next decade, based on a 
newly adopted and progressive, innovative and modern Constitution that set the stage for 
Namibia’s development post-apartheid. This Constitution became one amongst the few in the 
world with specific explicit reference to the importance of biodiversity, an aspect which is crucial 
to the whole debate of ABS. Article 95 (l) of the Namibian Constitution sets the principal 
foundation for all environmental action plans, policies and legislation. The article reads “ The 
state shall actively promote and maintain the welfare of the people by adopting .... policies 
aimed at maintenance of ‘ecosystems, essential ecological processes and biological diversity 
of Namibia and utilisation of living natural resources on a sustainable basis for the benefit of 
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all Namibians, both present and future....(Namibian Constitution, 1990). It is noteworthy to 
point out that the Constitution was written two years before the international call was made by 
world governments in Rio 1990 to conserve and sustainably use biodiversity through the 
objectives of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). At this conference, Namibia 
presented its Green Plan that, together with the Constitution, set the tone for sustainable 
development and served as the guiding document for an array of policies and programmes 
(Seely and Montgomery, 2009 p. 9).  
8.2 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
This chapter presents the case study of Namibia and has two specific objectives which are 
related to the specific objectives one (1) and two (2) of the overall thesis. They are as follows: 
8.2.1 Specific Objective 1 
To confirm whether the critical factors (Chapter 6) can be used as a comparison within a 
country to track changes in terms of dealing with ABS over time. 
To test the results from the global survey (discussed in chapter 6 of this thesis) in terms of 
assessing the effectiveness of Namibia’s approach towards ABS implementation over time. 
8.2.2 Specific Objective 2 
Confirm whether the critical factors are impacted by the dynamism of the evolution of ABS due 
to internal and external factors in the country  
This study builds on the results obtained from the global survey on the critical factors necessary 
for successful or effective ABS implementation. Under this survey, indicators for the critical 
factors were developed and will be used in the assessment in this study. 
8.3 LITERATURE REVIEW - THE EVOLUTION OF ABS IN NAMIBIA 
8.3.1 ABS in Context - Key Concepts of ABS in the Namibian Context 
It is important to have a brief overview of the key concepts around ABS to set the context for 
the rest of the chapter. ABS or Access and Benefit-Sharing, has three central concepts namely 
bioprospecting, biotrade and biopiracy.. 
 
Bioprospecting, refers to the “...collection, search for, research and use of biological and/or 
genetic material that are isolated, if possible synthesized, patented for purposes of applying 
the knowledge and products derived there from for scientific and/or commercial purposes.” 
(Martinez and Biber-Klemm, 2010 p. 3; UNU cited Du Plessis, 2008 p.1 and UNEP, 2012)”. In 
short, it can also be viewed as the systematic research, collection and utilization of biological 
resources (Krugman and Katjirua, 2007 p. 10). 
 195 
 
This process involves the collection by researchers of many different kinds of plants and 
animals from their natural habitat, often guided by local knowledge about the location and use 
of these resources. Bio-prospecting then leads to the second concept which is biotrade - the 
“trade in biological resources”.  
 
In any industry, there have been cases where the rules of the game seems not to have been 
followed and this leads to the third concept, namely biopiracy - the “unauthorized and 
uncompensated taking and use of biological resources for valuable research purposes, or in 
other words, the illicit appropriation of genetic resources and/or associated information and the 
generation of profitable products (Martinez and Biber-Klemm, 2010 p. 3). This misappropriation 
of genetic resources and use of traditional knowledge by some firms has caused them to be 
called biopirates.  
 
The difference between biotrade and bioprospecting is that bio-trade is a wide catch-all phrase 
covering everything from raw materials to ecosystem services. Biotrade, therefore, according 
to du Plessis p. 3 in du Plessis and Becherer (2008), can be regarded as trade in biological 
resources that is NOT classical bio-prospecting (i.e. aimed at generating exclusive or formal 
Intellectual Property). Du Plessis p.3 in du Plessis and Becherer, (2008) further admonishes 
that it is important to note this distinction because bio-trade can generate substantial pro-poor 
benefits at the local level and caution should be taken that ABS administrative, policy and legal 
measures do not hinder the trade in biological resources.  
 
The issue of ABS has been around for decades and started with the advent of colonialism and 
empire building by the powerful nations of the world. The emergence and establishment of 
multilateral attempts by the world governments in the last two decades to regulate access to 
genetic resources and protect knowledge and the ratification of the Nagoyo Protocol27 in 2010 
has brought the issue of ABS to the forefront and has created awareness and advocacy for 
the complexities around it and the need for effective regulation. 
 
The negotiations towards an international regime on ABS began in all earnest after the call by 
the world governments in 2002 in Johannesburg28, for a legally binding instrument on ABS. 
The negotiations culminated in the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol in Japan in 2010. The 
                                               
27 Chapter 3, section 3.6 provides a discussion on the link between the Nagoya Protocol and 
bioprospecting 
28 The World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) Rio + 10 was held in Johannesburg, South 
Africa. 
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Protocol is now open for signature, ratification and accession at the UN Head Quarters in New 
York. 
 
The Nagoya Protocol has four core elements, which are access; fair and equitable sharing of 
benefits; compliance and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources.  
8.3.2 The Namibian Response to ABS 
Namibia became a signatory to the CBD in 1992 and ratified it in 1997. By then measures were 
already being developed at national level to give effect to Article 95 (l) of Namibian Constitution. 
In fact, Namibia’s efforts to put in place a national ABS legislation date back to the late 1990s. 
Namibia’s National Biodiversity Programme (NNBP) was established in 1994 and the first 
official meetings of the biotrade working group were held in 1998. It is important to note that 
work first started with a focus on biotrade and not ABS per se. This has implications on the 
evolution and understanding of ABS in Namibia today, as a significant number of products 
were developed under biotrade that may not qualify as ABS products. The importance 
however, is that this work contributed to Namibia’s approach that later developed as the 
national approach to ABS. Work on drafting Namibia’s policy and legislation on access to 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge protection was initiated in 1999 by the Ministry of 
Environment and Tourism (MET) together with the Ministry of Agriculture Water and Rural 
Development (MAWRD) (Krugman and Katjirua, 2007 p. 18).  
 
In Namibia, as within other parts of Africa, there was an increased awareness on ABS fueled 
by cries of rampant biopiracy across the continent. Moreover, in the international work on 
biosafety and its implications for biodiversity and rural communities, calls were also being 
made for a model law on ABS under the Organization of African Unity (OAU) which later 
became the African Union (AU). Namibia became a critical player on the work for an ABS 
model law under the OAU as of 1998. This instrument was finalized and became known as the 
OAU model law on the rights of local communities, farmers and breeders (OAU, 1999). 
Namibia’s effort to develop its ABS legal and administrative framework was heavily influenced 
by the development and finalisation of the OAU Model Law on ABS (Krugman and Katjirua, 
2007 p. 18). The various drafts of the Namibian Legislation subsequently introduced some 
important adjustments to the OAU Model. Notably, farmers’ rights and breeders’ rights sections 
that were included originally in the ABS draft legislation were removed with the intention that 
they be covered in two separate pieces of legislation that were specifically on 
underdevelopment (Krugman and Katjirua, 2007 p. 18). The OAU Model Law warrants a bit of 
discussion as it was given great prominence in the ABS policy arena in Namibia. 
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In 1997, the OAU (Organization of African Unity), in response to the activities at the 
international level embarked on a process to develop model legislation on ABS to assist African 
countries in fulfilling their obligations under the CBD as well as under the TRIPS 29agreement 
of the WTO. This must be viewed within the context of the prevailing international debate on 
ABS at that time. The CBD mandates countries that have ratified the Convention to regulate 
access to biodiversity within their borders, respect the rights of local communities, and protect 
their traditional knowledge, while TRIPS requires all members to protect IPRs on plant 
varieties, be it through patents or a sui generis system. In 1998, the OAU Heads of State 
endorsed the ABS Model Law and recommended that it become the basis of all national laws 
on the matter across Africa. Countries could, therefore, adopt it without amendment, or use it 
as a skeleton upon which to suit their national circumstances. 
The OAU Model Law on ABS aims to balance the rights of farmers, plant breeders and local 
communities based on the explicit recognition that in Africa all parties have an important role 
to play in the conservation, improvement and sustainable use of biodiversity. The Model Law 
has four components (OAU, 1998) which are: Access to Biological Resources, Community 
Rights, Farmers’ Rights and Plant Breeders’ Rights. 
 
Internal national reflection by actors within the Namibian policy arena around the year 2000, 
and consideration about what approach to take to ensure effective implementation of ABS in 
Namibia, resulted in the changes being adopted in Namibia in terms of how to deal with the 
provisions of the African Model law. 
8.3.3 The Namibian National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan and 
ABS Implementation 
This strategy needs to be reflected on since it provided the first substantive framework and 
strategy for Namibia in terms of a road map for ABS in the country. Namibia finalized its 
National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan in 2002, in time for the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development (WSSD). It was a process that involved massive consultatory 
processes amongst all stakeholders in a truly multi-sectoral, cross-sectoral, interdisciplinary 
and multi-disciplinary fashion.  
                                               
29 The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is an international 
agreement administered by the World Trade Organization (WTO) that sets down minimum standards 
for many forms of intellectual property (IP) regulation as applied to nationals of other WTO Members. 
The TRIPS agreement introduced intellectual property law into the international trading system for the 
first time and remains the most comprehensive international agreement on intellectual property to date. 
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The Namibian Secretariat of the National Biodiversity Program deliberately decided to include 
all available knowledge of the state of biodiversity and the known associated challenges based 
on the Namibian Biodiversity Country Study that was concluded in 1998 (personal comm. 
Zeidler, 2012). This decision was taken in the fully knowledge that the financial resources 
needed to implement such a strategy would be astronomical and that the requisite human 
resource pool with the necessary knowledge and skills was limited. This strategy was yet 
another milestone for Namibia’s innovative approach towards biodiversity conservation, 
management and use. The NBSAP had as its objective “to protect ecosystems, biological 
diversity and ecological processes through conservation and sustainable use, thereby 
supporting the livelihoods, self-reliance and quality of life of Namibians in perpetuity” (Barnard 
et al, 2002). For functionality, 10 strategic themes with 55 strategic aims had to be addressed, 
and 242 time-bound targets had to be reached through focused implementation. The 
implementation of the NBSAP was coordinated by the Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 
with actions carried out by government agencies, NGOs, local communities, donor projects, 
and the private sector.  
 
It has subsequently been updated and reviewed to cover the next decade (2011 – 2020). The 
review showed that 102 targets were fully achieved, with 93 partly achieved (80.4% of targets 
fully or partly achieved). The NBSAP Chapter 2 (sustainable use of natural resources) Strategic 
Aim 2.5, dealt specifically with biotrade and bioprosprecting and had the following three sub 
aims which are as follows: 
1. Improve national and local capacity to benefit from and control biotrade 
2. Raise public and political awareness of issues, costs and benefits of biotrade and 
bioprospecting 
3. Promote effective cooperation at relevant levels. 
Appendix 13 provides a full outline of the ABS strategy as reflected in the NBSAP.
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Under chapter 9 of the Strategy (Capacity-building for biodiversity management in support of 
sustainable development) strategic aim 9.4 was to “strengthen communities to participate as 
equal partners, e.g. in biotrade and bio-prospecting”. This was to be achieved through the 
following actions: 
1. Develop an Equitable Benefit-Sharing Framework 
 Formulate sui generis legislation, regulatory structures, and mechanisms for the 
protection of community intellectual property rights considering customary and other 
laws; 
 Establish a mechanism to monitor the benefits for communities from agreements 
involving profitable use of their knowledge, and the application of prior informed 
consent (PIC) procedures; 
 Identify new income-generating activities based on biological resources and empower 
local communities to manage those resources sustainably; 
 In collaboration with local communities, establish a national Indigenous Knowledge 
Systems Fund, with clear guidelines on the Fund’s sources and potential uses, 
administrators, financial control, and role in resource management and cultural 
development. 
2. Promote Mechanisms for Communities to Share their Knowledge with Other 
Partners 
 Create public awareness of and respect for the value of indigenous knowledge systems 
through the mass media and education curricula; 
 In collaboration with local communities, identify and analyse existing customary codes 
of ethical conduct, and develop appropriate models of ethical conduct for information 
on indigenous knowledge systems; 
 Initiate dialogue with local communities on:  
o The content and process of relevant UN procedures and conventions such as 
CBD, UNCCD and UNFCCC; 
o Case studies on the impact of international agreements, such as TRIPS, UPOV 
and ITPGR, on local communities; 
o Local communities ‘rights over their knowledge and resources. 
In retrospect, these two strategic aims did guide Namibia’s approach towards biotrade and 
bioprospecting in many regards, as will be seen in the following sections. This strategy was 
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forward looking and addressed most of the relevant issues at that time with regards to ABS 
implementation, both at the national and international level.  
The aim for effective cooperation, namely regulatory efficiency, called for the inclusion of a 
range of stakeholders at the national, regional and international levels. With this in mind, 
Namibia started to engage aggressively in the regional and international ABS policy arena. 
Namibia further participated in the negotiations of the Bonn guidelines which were finalized in 
1999 under the CBD. 
 
A consideration of this strategy in light of this study seem to indicate that the critical factors 
that formed the basis and foundation of this study were all largely covered and, should, 
therefore, have assured effective implementation. 
 
In 2002, in Johannesburg, South-Africa, the world commemorated the first ten years after the 
Rio Earth Summit. A call was made for the negotiations of a legally binding international regime 
on ABS. In 2004, Namibia chaired the first round of negotiations for an international regime. 
As from 2007 to 2010, Namibia served as the chief negotiator on ABS for Africa until the 
adoption of the Nagoya Protocol on ABS. Table 8.1 below depicts the chronological events of 
the history of ABS evolvement in Namibia. 
 
Table 8.1 Chronological Depiction of Namibia’s Involvement in the ABS Debate 
Year  ABS event for Namibia 
1990 Article 95 (l) of the Constitution formulated 
1992 Namibia  participates in the Rio Earth Summit, CBD is adopted 
1994 Namibia National Biodiversity Programme established 
1997 Namibia signs and ratifies the CBD 
1998  First meeting of the biotrade working group as well as the indigenous 
knowledge working group 
 Namibia becomes involved in the development of the OAU Model Law 
1999 Process to develop legal framework for ABS is jointly initiated by two Ministries  
2000 The Namibian National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (2000 – 2010) is 
completed containing an action plan for biotrade and bioprospecting 
2002 Namibia participates in WSSD in Johannesburg where the call is made for an 
international regime on ABS 
2004 Namibia Chairs the first round of negotiations of the ABS regime 
2007 Namibia becomes ABS Chief Negotiator for the African Group 
2010 The Nagoya Protocol on ABS is finalised 
2011 Nationwide consultation on the draft ABS bill and the Nagoya Protocol is embarked 
upon 
2012 Namibia’s ABS bill is cleared for tabling in Cabinet 
Source own: based on the literature (Namibian Constitution (1990). Art 95 (l); Barnard, p. (Ed) (1998); 
Barnard, P., Shikongo S., & Zeidler, J (eds)(2000); MET (2002), Shikongo (2013) 
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With the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol, Namibia seemed to have put in place a strategy at 
the national level which was based on internal reflection about what exactly the Protocol meant 
for the national level implementation of ABS. This was evident from the nationwide public 
consultations that occurred shortly after the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol. These 
consultations also included briefing meetings with high level decision makers on ABS in 
Namibia. 
 
Attention will now be turned to what emerged from literature that could be constituted as the 
development of the Namibian ABS legal framework.  
8.3.4 Development of Namibia’s ABS Legal Framework 
The Namibian process of developing a national ABS policy, legal and administrative measures, 
took a significant amount of time to be completed. By the time of completion of this study, the 
draft bill was with Cabinet for consideration. The process over the years resulting in changes 
in approach and continual self-reflection on the debate within Namibia on ABS, as well as the 
within the international debate, was aimed at the development of a responsive piece of 
legislation. Numerous workshops and meetings took place to allow for this continual reflection 
at a national level. 
 
The key objectives of the legislation could be summarized as follows (Draft of the ABS bill, 
2010): 
 Promote building of national and grassroots scientific and technological capacity 
 Promote entrepreneurial spirit 
 Promote appropriate mechanisms for fair and equitable sharing of benefits 
 Provide appropriate system of access to genetic resources and associated TK and 
technologies subject to PIC 
 Recognise and protect farmers’ Rights and plant breeder’s Rights.  
The ABS Working Group took a conscious decision in 2007 not to finalise the Namibian ABS 
legal framework until the International Regime had been concluded. An Interim Bioprospecting 
Committee (IBPC) was, therefore, established to serve as Namibia’s ABS interim measure. 
This proposal was first put forward in August 2002 and had nothing to do with the international 
regime, but rather with the slowness of the national process (du Plessis, 2013 pers. comm). 
The idea was then further concretised in October 2003 at a national ABS stakeholder 
conference (Krugman and Katjirua, 2007 p. 18). The rationale for putting in place the IBPC 
was derived from the perceived urgent need for an interim mechanism to ensure greater 
coordination, consolidation and transparency of bio-prospecting and bio-trade activities in 
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Namibia, thereby preventing missed opportunities to develop genetic resources into potential 
sources of income for Namibia, while at the same time guarding against unlawful exploitation 
and bio-piracy.  
In support of the establishment of the IBPC, the Cabinet Memorandum provided a summary 
list of recent examples of bio-trade and bio-prospecting activities in Namibia, which 
demonstrated that bio-prospecting was a reality with important implications and significant 
potential benefits for Namibia (Krugman and Katjirua, 2007). The IBPC was established by a 
Cabinet Decision in August 2006 (Krugman and Katjirua, 2007 p. 103).  
 
The terms of reference of this multi-disciplinary and cross-sector stakeholder committee was 
to (RoN, 2006 and UNEP, 2012): 
 coordinate bio-trade issues and coordinate the development of bio-trade and bio-
prospecting policies for Namibia; 
 facilitate and promote bio-prospecting activities in Namibia that would ensure optimal 
value addition to natural products before export from Namibia; 
 collaborate closely with all relevant institutions to ensure sustainable resource use of 
wild-gathered products and build Namibia’s reputation for the sustainable supply of 
quality natural products; 
 use relevant international guidelines and protocols for access to genetic resources and 
benefit-sharing, such as the Bonn Guidelines of the CBD, and the International Treaty 
on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture; 
 inform and train local communities on the value of their traditional knowledge; 
 negotiate and conclude appropriate agreements with potential bio-prospecting 
partners; 
 issue, and revoke in event of non-compliance, bio-prospecting and bio-trade licences 
and permits; and,  
 promote the development of consensus positions concerning cross-border resources.  
The underlying assumption and objective for the facilitation and promotion of bio-prospecting 
in Namibia was twofold. The first was to enhance national income by facilitating and promoting 
the commercial sale of products produced from Namibia’s natural/indigenous biological 
resources. Secondly, it was aimed at enhancing the empowerment of Namibian natural 
resource producers through income creation, benefit sharing, value addition and technology 
transfer - through making use of the law of contract and existing laws and regulations as 
appropriate (du Plessis and Becherer, 2008 p.8). 
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Since the IBPC essentially had to operate in an environment where much of the activities were 
new, a modus operandi for the IBPC was developed based on the established best practice of 
that time (du Plessis and Becherer, 2008 p.9). The mode of operation included the following 
broad terms of reference:  
 grant and issue a bio-prospecting permit, which can be an academic research permit, 
a commercial research permit or a commercial exploitation permit; 
 facilitate the expediting of appropriate permits (e.g. research collection permits); 
 monitor compliance with agreements and permit conditions;  
 seek out and facilitate bio-prospecting-related capacity-building and training 
opportunities for Namibian stakeholders; 
 provide a focus for donor-funded activities aimed at boosting national bio-prospecting 
capacity; 
 raise public and community awareness about the need to regulate access to genetic 
resources in the national interest. 
In drafting the resource legal framework those involved were confronted by a multitude of 
challenges that they had to consider. They can be summarised as follows (Shikongo, 2008 p. 
3 in Du Plessis and Becherer, 2008): 
 Demands side /market issues 
 Harmonization with national, regional and international agreements 
 Education and awareness building 
 Determining who constitutes a community 
 Determining who should profit from a benefit-sharing mechanism 
 The land issue: Who has access to the land? Who has access to the resource? 
 Protection of knowledge innovations and practices of indigenous community, IPR and 
community rights 
 Who is helping the communities to maximally capitalize on their resources once access 
and benefit-sharing has been secured? 
These issues were deliberated upon in many forums and workshops amongst players in the 
ABS policy arena within Namibia. It was a challenge, but attempts were made to arrive at ways 
forward that could lead to the establishment of a national approach towards ABS in Namibia. 
8.3.5 Emergence of a National Approach towards ABS 
Namibia is widely recognised, along with a few other countries such as Peru and Nepal, as 
having developed a relatively sophisticated biotrade programme, and having done a lot to pro-
actively develop income opportunities based on indigenous resources (Du Plessis and 
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Becherer, 2008 p. 1 and UNEP, 2012 p. 1). This recognition is due to the concerted effort of 
dedicated Namibians30 who had worked on ABS over the years. Their work led to what became 
Namibia’s national approach to ABS.  
 
The work by a multitude of stakeholders in Namibia from across sectors since the debate on 
the ABS policy arena started in the 90’s, and eventually led to a concrete approach towards 
biotrade implementation - known as the pipeline approach (UNEP, 2012 p. 15). It was 
essentially done by adopting a coordinated national process, steered by multi-stakeholder 
Indigenous Plant Task Team (IPTT), with their own budget. The IPTT operated based on an 
agreed strategy and action plan, but implementation was guided by flexible, market-driven 
responses.  
 
It was also underpinned by the understanding that information sharing would maximize 
synergies and was, thus focused on addressing information asymmetry amongst the players. 
It operated under the principle that Namibian resources were needed to leverage further public 
and private investments through a focal point. It allowed for effort and resources to be applied 
where they would most urgently be needed, thus avoiding a complete standstill when 
development of one resource would temporarily be halted by external factors (Du Plessis and 
Becherer, 2008 p. 7). 
                                               
30 Pierre du Plessis, Toivo Uahengo, Steve Carr, Sem Shikongo, Dave Cole, Phoebe Barnard, Martha 
Kandawa-Schulz are amongst the individuals who have over the years been integrally involved in ABS. 
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The pipeline approach is depicted below: 
IPTT Pipeline concept
All potential 
plant products 
from Namibian 
species
Products 
with 
identified 
commercial 
potential
Products 
requiring 
public 
investment
Products under 
development
Products with 
self-sustaining 
supply chains 
and markets
Main zone for IPTT support
Main zone for commercial 
partnerships
 
Source: Namibian IPTT  
Figure 8.1 The Namibian Pipeline Approach 
The pipeline approach operated under the following principles that were agreed to by all 
stakeholders (du Plessis and Becherer, 2008 p. 7).  
 Community demand, aimed at maximizing primary producer benefits, is essential 
 Maintain a balanced approach to a variety of resources (“few eggs in many baskets”) 
 Focus on securing partnerships with well-resourced commercial partners 
 Work closely with markets 
 Be flexible and responsive to market signals 
The IPTT experience pointed to the fact that the pipeline approach had a number of strengths 
(du Plessis and Becherer, 2008 p. 7): 
 Allows efforts and resources to be applied where they are most urgently needed 
 Avoids total hang-up when product development is delayed by circumstances 
 Facilitates synergies among “generic” inputs, e.g. project coordination, market liaison, 
public-private partnerships 
 More likely to result in diversified (i.e. resilient) production systems 
 Open to innovative partnerships. 
Due to Namibia’s biogeography a number of interesting bio-prospecting cases emerged over 
the years with some yielding results, whilst others were not pursued (Du Plessis and Becherer, 
2008 p. 7 and RoN, 2006).  
 
Within the regional context of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), Namibia 
realised the importance of transboundary cooperation (as was pointed out in the section on 
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the NBSAP), since many genetic resources and the knowledge of local communities 
transcended borders.  
 
Namibia’s approach to biotrade and bioprospecting could be summarised as being 
underpinned by the following characteristics: it encouraged and facilitated bio-prospecting so 
that benefits could be created and shared amongst the respective stakeholders; it recognised 
as essential the pro-active promotion of opportunities to suitable and reputable research 
partners; and, it also generated the understanding that a clear way to “do the right thing” 
created disincentives for bio-piracy while at the same time creating an environment in which 
compliance had less transaction costs compared to biopiracy. Having a national approach in 
place served as a signal that provided “legal certainty” to users. Finally, the approached 
cemented the principle amongst the players that there should be “No publication without 
consultation” (Du Plessis and Becherer, 2008 p. 7). 
 
The aims of Namibia’s approach over the years could then be summarized as: 
 Pro-actively assert national sovereign ownership and control 
 Enforce respect for traditional knowledge when it is accessed 
 Lower transaction costs for users 
 Use law of contract to provide certainty 
 Encourage partners who have resources 
 Show that Namibia understands and respects intellectual property rights 
 Work towards putting in place the administrative, policy and legal framework 
 Provide the necessary political will and support to the Namibian ABS negotiators 
 Provide institutional support to the IBPC Secretariat 
The above all contributed towards a concerted integrated approach to ABS in Namibia by 
involving all stakeholders and facilitating Namibia's cutting edge approach and status in the 
ABS arena regionally and internationally. 
8.3.6 Assessing the Effectiveness of Namibia’s ABS Legal Framework 
As the aim of this study was to assess the effectiveness of Namibia’s approach in terms of 
implementation, the literature was reviewed for any work that could serve to assess or provide 
an objective view in terms of how Namibia dealt with the critical factors. The findings from the 
literature were further supplemented by face-to-face interviews. 
 
Krugman and Katjirua (2007 p. 8) assessed the legal, policy, institutional, and commercial 
dimensions of ABS issues and options of relevance for Namibia by examining how international 
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ABS commitments and arrangements were implemented at the national level. This was done 
by reviewing relevant (ABS-focused or ABS-related) national policies and legislation and 
considering their implementation in Namibia, and by analyzing illustrative cases of agreements 
between local, national and international partners (users and providers of particular biological 
resources) governing the collection, research and/or commercial utilization of these biological 
resources.  
 
The case study by Krugmann and Katjirua (2007 p. 8) also identified and examined the 
challenges and opportunities in Namibia (associated with ABS policies and legislation and with 
ABS agreements underpinning bio-trade and bio-prospecting) for the generation of economic 
benefits, equitable benefit-sharing, biodiversity conservation, sustainable development from 
the use of biological resources, and other relevant objectives. Based on the available 
accumulated experience at the time of assessment, the case study drew conclusions and best 
practices for Namibia in terms of enhancing the effectiveness of ABS policies, legislation and 
agreements in Namibia. 
 
In their assessment, Krugman and Katjirua (2007 p. 16) found that Namibia had in place, or 
under development, various other policies and laws containing ABS-related provisions or 
otherwise influencing ABS issues and options. These included: overarching environmental 
framework legislation, policies and laws for key natural resource sectors (forestry, wildlife, 
agriculture and fisheries), policies and legislation governing land access, tenure and use, 
legislation protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) as well as policies and laws 
governing the decentralization of political and administrative decision-making processes and 
the devolution of management authority over natural resources.  
 
In recent years and (in some cases) decades Namibian rural producers, middlemen and 
exporters were engaged in international bio-trade. As participants in this trade, they supplied 
international markets with biological raw materials or semi-processed natural products. These 
were used by global industries as inputs into different commercial products in sectors such as 
herbal medicines, personal care and cosmetics products, and food and beverage products or 
supplements (nutraceuticals). In so doing, they shared (divided up) benefits from trade with 
international actors (processors, manufacturers, wholesale and retail outlets) out of the total 
value margin available in the supply chain for any particular biological raw material or semi-
processed natural product (Krugman and Katjirua, 2007 p. 20). 
The review found some institutional and administrative inefficiency in terms of how the ABS 
policy and legislation process moved from drafting to implementation. The process took time 
and it appeared that not all actors were contributing fully towards successful implementation. 
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This was especially observed amongst the government or public sector stakeholders. The 
private sector also seemed to not have been featuring very well in the ABS policy arena. 
 
Cole and Nakamhela (2008) carried out an extensive review of the efficiency of the Namibian 
permitting system in order to find ways of strengthening it and to facilitate lower transaction 
costs for permit procedures of basic and commercial research. Their assessment found that 
some institutional inefficiencies still existed as well as a general lack of coordination and 
communication amongst the different public sector stakeholders with a mandate for issuing 
research permits, which significantly increased transaction costs in the sector. 
 
Namibia participated in a three country Capacity Building for Biotrade Project (CBBT) - an 
initiative spearheaded by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and supported 
by the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GIZ). The other two participating countries 
were Nepal and Peru. The project aimed to build national capacities in order to promote the 
sustainable use and trade of biodiversity-based products, otherwise known as bioTrade 
(UNEP, 2012 p. 1). A sectoral study positively assessed how Namibia addressed its biotrade 
issues within this project. According to UNEP (2012 p. 26), those key areas in which Namibia 
required further efforts in respect to ABS implementation and to facilitate the move towards a 
green economy were: 
 Harmonization of policies, particularly in terms of on-the-ground implementation 
 Investment in engaging the private sector (engagement of the private sector would be 
essential for further development of ABS implementation infrastructure as this would 
require sustained investment over the coming years.) 
  Infrastructure investments and reforms 
 Awareness raising and information dissemination  
 Research and development. 
In conclusion, the UNEP (2012 p. 27) report suggested that a dedicated programme of 
research and development that examined markets, new product development, possible 
innovative ownership and financingwould be essential and had to be embedded in a true 
understanding of the value of biodiversity and the ecosystem services on which it relied. 
 
The literature review generally described a positive trend in the evolution of the ABS dialogue 
in Namibia. It illustrated that Namibia, over the past years, had a strategy in place, that actively 
engaged the ABS policy arena both regionally and internationally, and took well thought-
through decisions based on internal reflection as to the way forward with regard to ABS 
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implementation. It also highlighted the challenges facing a young31 developing country in 
dealing with a complex issue such as ABS. 
The literature review did not reveal any prior analysis of the ABS policy arena from the 
perspective of the critical factors under investigation in this study. 
8.4 METHODOLOGY 
8.4.1 Introduction 
This country case study was based largely on face-to-face interviews and a review of the 
available literature. Description and analysis of ABS (related) legislation, policies, strategies 
and contractual arrangements and associated administrative and institutional mechanisms, 
arrangements and frameworks, were based on data and information gathered from the 
available literature and interviews with national stakeholders and key informants. 
8.4.2 Literature review 
Both primary literature (legal acts, official policies, regulations, guidelines, workshop 
proceedings amongst others) and secondary literature (analytical, synthetic and/or interpretive 
technical reports, articles, opinion pieces amongst others) were accessed and reviewed. 
8.4.3 Interviews 
Face-to-face interviews were carried out with expert and non-expert persons on ABS in 
Namibia. The interview consisted of open-ended and structured questions given to the 
interviewees. All interviews were held in a semi-structured open-ended manner, based on a 
list of major questions and issues to be covered. This was done in order to keep the discussion 
informal and flexible and to allow for the interviewees to feel at ease to respond, and to 
volunteer relevant incidental information, raise new questions, issues and challenges, and help 
explore selected issues in greater depth. These consultations with stakeholders served not 
only to gather information but also to cross-check, confirm and pre-validate relevant 
information, preliminary findings and still tentative conclusions. 
 
Overall a significant effort was made to identify, contact, mobilize and interview a reasonably 
large and representative cross-section of national stakeholders. 
 
Table 8.2 below highlights the different categories of stakeholders that were consulted during 
this study. 
                                               
31 Namibia gained her independence in 1990 and thus could be considered a relatively young 
democracy. 
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Table 8.2: Categorization and description of stakeholders that took part in the study 
CATEGORY OF 
STAKEHOLDERS 
DESCRIPTION OF STAKEHOLDERS NUMBER OF 
STAKEHOLDERS 
Academia and 
Research 
This category consisted of stakeholders active in 
research and academia such as from the university 
and other research institutions in Namibia 
4 
Government This group represented the interest of government 
and comprised of respondents from various 
government agencies, offices and ministries.  
7 
Local 
communities 
These groups consist of local community members 
from Namibia actively involved in the ABS policy 
arena 
3 
Civil Society This category represented the Non-Governmental 
Organizations stakeholders involved in the ABS 
policy arena 
8 
Private Sector This category represented respondents from the 
private sector actively involved in the ABS policy 
arena. It also included consultants active in the ABS 
policy arena 
3 
8.4.4 Structure and Approach Used For the Exploration of the Critical 
Factors 
As a young democracy which gained its independence in 1990, the relatively new systems in 
Namibia were amenable to the development of a structure, within the critical factors, from the 
beginnings of ABS until 2012, a time span of 22 years. Here an overview of how Namibia has 
dealtwith the complex issue of ABS policy and legislation and concrete actions taken to 
implement these during that that time. To facilitate ease of reference and assessment, four 
timeframes were developed. The critical factors were considered and gathered into two 
groups. The groups were developed based on which two were most related and relevant to 
each other and which time frame was the most relevant to the assessment, based on these 
two grouped critical factors.  
 
Table 8.3 below provides a summary of the time frames, groupings and the rationale for using 
the particular grouping for that specific time frame. Together, the various phases were used to 
assess Namibia’s effectiveness in dealing with ABS through the lens of the critical factors. 
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Table 8.3 Summary of Time Frames, Groupings of Critical Factors per Time Frame and Rationale 
for Approach 
TIME FRAME 
EXPLORED 
CRITICAL FACTOR 
(CF) 
DESCRIPTION OF CF AND RATIONALE FOR 
ASSESSMENT FOR THAT PARTICULAR PHASE 
PHASE 1: 1990 -1995 
The beginnings of the 
ABS policy dialogue in 
Namibia 
Good governance 
structure in both 
provider and user 
countries 
Good Governance within the context of this study means 
that Namibia as a provider country (provider of genetic 
resources) has put in place legislative and policy 
measures to ensure that stakeholders have incentives to 
participate in the ABS market place thus leading to the 
generation of benefits (Monetary and otherwise) for both 
Namibia and the user country. 
Assigning property 
rights and intellectual 
property rights 
This refers to how property rights are assigned in 
Namibia‘s domestic legislation in terms of who owns the 
genetic resources and how this ownership right enables 
that person/s to use, sell, transfer or exchange genetic 
resources and/or exclude others from doing these things. 
The assignment of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 
refers to how IPR is assigned in Namibias‘ domestic 
legislation in the context of ABS. The questions is what 
are the rights given to persons in the R&D process as well 
as to their traditional knowledge. Is it clear who owns 
knowledge e.g. traditional knowledge?  
It was decided to assign the assessment of these two 
critical factors to the period at the onset of independence. 
Since this is the phase were Namibia under its own 
independent government started the process of policy 
and law making which set the scene and frame for all 
activities further on.  
PHASE 2: 1995 – 2000 
Experience on ABS five 
years after 
independence and the 
beginning of the ABD 
dialogue 
Effective, functional and 
non-complex 
administrative 
structure/framework is 
in place 
The central focus of this part is to assess how the legal 
framework that was put in place at independence is 
applied in practice. How easy is it for a 
researcher/investor/user to understand and apply for an 
access agreement for Research & Development in bio-
prospecting in Namibia? This also includes the 
transaction costs that the researcher/investor/ user have 
to incure. In other words, are the procedures too 
bureaucratic, cumbersome and complicated or not and 
does one have to incur significant costs just to get a 
research permit? Do you get your research permit within 
the time that it is stipulated? 
In other words, how complex and bureaucratic are the 
laws and policies in Namibia in terms of practical 
implementation and what are the lessons learned? 
Addressing or 
accounting for time lags 
to the generation and 
sharing of benefits 
In this context, time lags refer to the fact that in the ABS 
sector generation of benefits may take a long time to 
realize.The assumption here is that if the time lag 
between the collection and provision of samples and the 
development of a marketable product is accounted for by 
adequate and appropriate benefits flowing to Namibia as 
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a provider country this will indicate the effectiveness of 
Namibia’s ability to regulate or deal with ABS.  
In other words, how long does it take from the collection 
of materials to the generation of the first benefits and how 
do we deal with this to manage expectations and to 
ensure that maximum benefits (Monetary and non-
monetary) accrue to Namibia? 
These two critical factors were assigned to assess 
Namibia five years after independence on the rationale 
that in the first phase laws and policies were put in place 
and in this phase Namibians have started to gain 
experience in navigating through the practical application 
and implementations of these laws and will also have 
realized that for ABS the generation of benefits take time.  
PHASE 3: 2000 - 2005 
 Informed decisions on 
ABS and its market 15 
(i.e. collectively from 
1990 – 2005) years 
after independence  
Efficient understanding 
of the ABS market 
structure within which 
the transaction must 
take place 
In this context, efficient understanding of the market 
structure means that all relevant stakeholders especially 
the regulators, private sector, researchers, and local 
communities understand the characteristics and 
dynamics of the ABS market. This includes the demand 
and supply forces in the bio-prospecting and bio-trade 
market that prevail in Namibia. It also assumes that if 
there is a good understanding of the market then there 
will be a well-functioning market for genetic resources 
within Namibia as a provider country or at least a vibrant 
ABS market. 
In other words, do Namibians in the ABS sector really 
understand how the ABS market works? What is the 
Namibian experience with the ABS market and what are 
the lessons learned? 
Presence of an effective 
and functional 
biodiversity valorization 
strategy at national level 
In this context, the valorization of biodiversity refers to the 
development of valorization strategies at the national 
level especially in provider countries that can help add 
value to their biodiversity as it goes up the value chain 
within the country and to the market. 
In other words, do Namibians know the value of their 
genetic resources? If not, what do we need to have in 
place that can help us add more value to our resources 
so that we do not only provide raw materials, but that we 
add value and thus enabling Namibia to negotiate more 
benefits - benefits that can serve as an incentive for 
conservation as well as turn Namibia into a user country 
of its own genetic resources and that of others. 
The rationale for assigning these two critical factors to 
this timeframe is that it takes time to create a market and 
to understand that market also needs time. This period 
covers fifteen (15) years after independence and, 
therefore, assumes that Namibians now have sufficient 
experience regarding ABS and the ABS market. It further 
assumes that Namibia would have understood the need 
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for a national value addition strategy as part of using its 
own biodiversity for economic development. 
PHASE 4: 2005 – 2012 
Current state of Affair 
with ABS 
Effective measures to 
address information 
asymmetry in the ABS 
implementation 
framework are in place 
Information assymetry in this context refers to the 
imbalance of power in negotiations and transactions of 
ABS agreements because one party has more, or better 
information, than the other. This imbalance can result in 
the transaction being influenced negatively and can result 
in the contract or agreement not being entered into or that 
a non-optimal agreement is reached for one of the parties 
especially the one with less information.  
 
The problem of uncertain product quality in the market for 
traditional knowledge-related information and tangible 
genetic resources where the quality of genetic resources 
samples or the reliability of the traditional knowledge-
based information or both can only be verified after the 
good has been traded, leads to problems of information 
asymmetries and in extreme cases, to a breakdown of 
market exchange. 
 
Therefore - what needs to be in place in Namibia to deal 
with these imbalances of power and how has the country 
dealt with this issue over the years to ensure that 
agreements are reached and benefits flow within the ABS 
market? 
Presence of effective 
and efficient measures 
to build trust (social 
capital) amongst 
stakeholders. 
In this context, social capital refers to the presence of 
networks and connections within the ABS market. It also 
includes the presence of relations of trust and mutual 
support, formal and informal groups, common rules and 
sanctions, collective representation, mechanisms for 
participation in decision-making and the presence of 
effective leadership within the ABS sector in Namibia. 
Heavy focus was placed on the need to build trust (social 
capital) between and amongst the players in the ABS 
sector within Namibia and internationally. ABS 
transactions are long-term contractual relations between 
academia, government, and private sector both within 
and outside Namibia and for these relationships to last 
trust building is necessary. How did Namibia deal with the 
issue of building trust through its various processes over 
the years in order to have a vibrant ABS market? 
These two indicators were chosen to complete the 
assessment of Namibia from the perspective of the 
critical factors. These critical factors have bearings on all 
the phases since independence and, therefore, provides 
a useful way to engender a reflection of Namibia from 
independence till twenty-two years after independence in 
terms of dealing with ABS at the national level. 
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8.5 RESULTS 
8.5.1 Introduction 
The questions from the questionnaires were analyzed to identify the common line or 
components relevant to the critical factor that pertained to them. The results of this analysis 
were presented in the results and discussions section reflecting the key responses from the 
interviews. Respondents were grouped into the following categories: Research and Academia 
representatives, Local Communities representatives, Government or Public Sector 
representatives, Civil Society representatives and Private Sector Representatives. 
 
The results are structured according to the various phases and stakeholders. Interviewees 
were asked what they thought the lessons learnt were for specific aspects of the critical factors. 
These are also presented at the relevant sections in the results. There are no interpretative 
sections within the results section as they represent simply the results as they came from the 
interviews. 
  
Since anonymity was a key feature of the interviews to allow for open, frank and critical 
presentations of the issues, this is also maintained in the presentation of the results. 
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8.5.2 Results for Phase 1 
The results for phase 1 are reflected below in Table 8.4 
Table 8.4: Results for Phase 1 (1990 – 1995) 
STAKEHOLDER 
CATEGORY 
CRITICAL FACTORS CONSIDERED FOR THIS PHASE (1990-1995) 
Good governance Assigning property and IPR Lessons learned 
ACADEMIA AND 
RESEARCH 
Necessary legal framework has 
been set. 
 
Structures and institutions put in 
place assures good governance 
and create a conducive 
environment that attracts investors 
and reduces bio-piracy and can 
facilitate ABS. 
All genetic resources owned by 
the State. 
 
Traditional Knowledge owned 
by the community or holders of 
TK. 
 
Internal migration may pose a 
challenge to the transfer and 
transmission of TK inter-
generationally this has 
implications for ABS. 
Good governance structures and clear assignment of property rights and IPR 
create a friendly environment that attracts investors and assures that benefits 
are managed properly for beneficiaries not to be jilted in the process. 
 
Good governance helps reduce bio-piracy. 
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GOVERNMENT Emergence of Rio Conventions 
gave impetus to legal framework in 
Namibia. 
 
Period dedicated to putting in 
place legislation to address 
colonial inequalities and access to 
economic resources and not per 
se to ABS. 
 
Natural resources given a focused 
economic value through policy 
and legislation which set the stage 
for ABS. 
 
Good governance structures are 
in place complemented by strong 
independent judiciary and 
relatively unambiguous laws. 
 
Legal certainty and security is 
assured which is viewed important 
for ABS. 
No appropriate IPR legal 
instrument that provides for 
Indigenous Knowledge 
Systems. 
 
All genetic resources vested in 
the State, communities own 
their own TK. 
Application of Good governance systems are as good as the quality of human 
capital. 
 
Good Governance assures accountability, transparency and better delivery 
of services and goods to public. 
 
Poor application of cross-sector collaboration which has implications on ABS 
implementation. 
Good governance has allowed for communities to benefit and utilize natural 
resources in Namibia. 
 
Needs systems that assigns clear responsibilities, are held accountable and 
responsive to the majority of the people if ABS implementation is to be 
effective and functional. 
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LOCAL 
COMMUNITIES 
Period dedicated to lawmaking 
and putting in place the necessary 
legal and policy framework to pave 
the way for implementation of 
national development goals. 
 
It sets the stage for work on ABS. 
 
Main focus is on protecting 
biodiversity, this triggers excellent 
research on biodiversity 
conservation and use which has 
implications for ABS. 
 
The establishment for the NBP in 
1994 set the stage for concrete 
ABS work. 
Biotrade work led by civil society 
becomes the precursor for ABS 
work. 
 
The first large scale sale of Marula 
kernels for ABS work takes place 
in 1995. 
Devils claw sustainable harvesting 
programme begins in 1995. 
 
Respondents state that 
ownership of resources is 
vague, due to uncertainty 
created by the previous colonial 
government; however many feel 
that the new government has 
brought in advocacy for 
ownership of resources through 
the legislation developed.  
 
According to this category the 
issue of traditional knowledge is 
still not resolved. 
Openness by all stakeholders to engage and work towards a common goal 
is important. 
 
Importance of capacity building at all levels. 
Working together, acceptance of other stakeholders and minimizing mistrust 
is good for building good governance. 
 
For good governance of ABS, management must be at the local level as 
much as possible, authority and responsibility translate into accountability 
which then will translate into good governance. 
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CIVIL SOCIETY The necessary legal and policy 
framework is put in place during 
this phase which is an important 
prerequisite for ABS good 
governance. 
 
Legislation confers rights to local 
communities to own or use forests 
and wildlife.  
 
This is a recognition of their right 
to use and trade in plant and 
animal genetic resources which is 
important for ABS. 
 
Ratification of the CBD laid down 
the principles for benefit-sharing 
and for ABS work. 
 
Good governance in general is 
prevalent in Namibia and fosters 
engagement by the private sector 
to engage in transactions and 
investments in the country. 
All rights to genetic resources 
are vested in the State. 
 
Traditional knowledge is a 
challenge in terms of defining 
ownership. 
Many of companies and firms 
have not focussed on ABS. 
There is good governance to a large extent but more is needed to facilitate 
for building local capacity to add value to products and to develop external 
trade policies and legislation that create incentives for foreign investors to 
add more value to local products which creates a better platform for benefit-
sharing. 
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PRIVATE 
SECTOR 
The necessary legal and policy 
framework is put in place during 
this phase which is an important 
prerequisite for ABS good 
governance. 
 
Legislation confers rights to local 
communities to own or use forests 
and wildlife  
 
This is in recognition of their right 
to use and trade in plant and 
animal genetic resources which is 
important for ABS. 
 
Ratification of the CBD laid down 
the principles for benefit-sharing 
and for ABS work. 
 
Good governance in general is 
prevalent in Namibia and fosters 
engagement by the private sector 
to engage in transactions and 
investments in the country. 
All rights to genetic resources 
are vested in the State. 
 
Traditional knowledge is a 
challenge in terms of defining 
ownership. 
 
Many of companies and firms 
do not focus on ABS. 
There is good governance to a large extent but more is needed to facilitate 
the building of local capacity to add value to products and to develop external 
trade policies and legislation that create incentives for foreign investors to 
add more value. This can create a better platform for benefit-sharing. 
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8.5.3 Results for Phase 2 (1995 – 2000) 
The results for this phase are reflected in Table 8.5 below 
Table 8.5: Results for Phase 2 
STAKEHOLDER 
CATEGORY 
CRITICAL FACTOR CONSIDERED IN THIS PHASE (1995 -2000) 
 ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES 
AND BUREAUCRATIC PROCEDURES 
TIME LAGS TO BENEFIT SHARING 
 Administrative Efficiency Institutional 
Efficiency 
Insights on benefit-
sharing and time it 
takes to generate 
benefits 
Insights on management of expectation of benefits 
RESEARCH 
AND 
ACADEMIA 
Respondents consider administrative 
efficiency for ABS in Namibia as overall 
satisfactory. 
Respondents 
maintain that 
overlapping 
mandates and 
responsibilities 
of institutions 
hinder 
efficiency. 
Respondents seem 
to not have much 
experience with the 
issue of benefit-
sharing and the time 
required to generate 
benefits. 
Some respondents argue that there is a need for a thorough 
understanding of the range of benefits and their implications for 
stakeholders. 
GOVERNMENT Divergence of views amongst 
respondents on administrative efficiency 
in Namibia, a view  
linked to the complexity of issues, 
necessary lack of knowledge and 
baselines, human capital and 
experience. 
 
Institutions tried 
their best in 
terms of 
efficiency. 
 
A significant 
brain drain from 
the public 
sector to the 
Need to manage 
expectations.  
 
Need to unpack the 
benefits. 
 
Need to have 
patience and a long 
Need to build capacity on negotiation skills and capacity of 
stakeholders to ensure benefits accruing from  
 
ABS are generated and shared. 
 
Innovative partnerships among sectors and institutions are 
necessary for ABS benefits to flow. 
 221 
 
Need to remove needless bureaucracy 
and identify loopholes and gray areas in 
legislation. Identify gaps and deal with 
them. 
 
Private sector will not improve and 
monitor itself regarding ABS. 
Government is needed for that. 
 
Lack of clarity on how ABS applications 
are analyzed which monitoring systems 
are in place and implementation is not 
coordinated and harmonized.  
civil and private 
sector creates a 
challenge for 
institutional 
memory. 
 
Administrative 
rules are faced 
by inefficiencies 
posing a 
challenge to 
institutional 
efficiencies. 
 
ABS competent 
authority may 
not have 
necessary 
inertia to move 
the issue. Lack 
of coordination 
and 
harmonization 
thus impacting 
on institutional 
efficiency for 
ABS. 
term outlook 
regarding benefits. 
 
Need for 
recognizing, 
reflecting and 
meeting obligations. 
 
Benefits accrue from 
investment, hard 
work, responsibility, 
adaptive 
management, 
responsiveness to 
early conflict 
resolution and 
understanding of the 
resource market. 
LOCAL 
COMMUNITY 
General view is that there is a lack of 
administrative efficiency. 
 
Lack of human capacity to enforce policy 
and legislative framework hampers 
effective ABS implementation. 
Lack of 
institutional 
structures at 
grassroots and 
capacity 
constraints. 
No good lessons 
learned. 
 
People waited for 
benefits and if 
benefits don’t come 
Care should be taken not to raise expectations. 
 
Need to be frank, honest about the barriers and challenges that 
will be faced in generating benefits from ABS. 
 
Donor funding is essential to help manage expectations. 
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Mandates and 
responsibilities 
are not clear. 
people go back to 
their ways. 
 
The issue of time 
lags to benefits and 
its implications on 
benefit sharing was 
not made clear to 
communities. 
CIVIL SOCIETY Lack of administrative efficiency. 
 
Hampered by conflict between 
politicians, bureaucrats and other 
stakeholders viz a viz implementation 
and perceptions of the realities on the 
ground. 
 
Scientist respond to politics and not to 
science which complicates ABS 
implementation. 
Institutions for 
ABS are not 
having the 
necessary, 
budget, human 
capital and 
technical 
resources. 
 
There was a 
general good 
will to learn and 
understand the 
rules. 
 
Political will and 
commitment for 
ABS was there. 
A working 
group was 
established in 
1995, the 
efficiency of this 
group was 
Benefits should not 
become the end in 
themselves. 
 
There is a need to 
unpack and 
understand the 
range of benefits and 
responds 
appropriately. 
 
Good governance 
promotes ownership 
which facilitate for 
effective deals and 
transactions that 
eventually leads to 
benefits. 
 
It is important to 
recognize that 
benefits take time. 
Expectations must be managed. 
 
Recognized the role of donors in assisting to manage 
expectations whilst ventures are maturing and benefits to be 
shared are generated. 
 
Assets generated are capacity training, social networks taking 
into account socio-cultural aspects which was a necessary 
foundation for larger investments to be absorbed in later 
phases. 
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hampered by 
institutional 
challenges. 
PRIVATE 
SECTOR 
Legislation on its own does not 
necessarily lead to administrative 
efficiency. It needs to create incentives 
for participation and the enabling 
framework for transactions to occur as 
well as provide disincentives for illegal 
actions. 
 
General administrative efficiency is 
maintained 
Lack of 
institutional 
efficiency. This 
hampers ABS 
implementation.  
 
Despite these 
efficiency the 
private sector 
knew who to 
approach even 
if all the 
legislation and 
regulations 
were not in 
place and still 
get what they 
needed without 
corruption 
Divergence of views 
on whether any 
lessons have been 
learned, generally 
there is agreement 
that it takes time to 
generate benefits, if 
communities are 
provided with rights 
and responsibilities 
benefits can flow. 
 
Support programs for 
ABS benefit 
generation must be 
long term and 
sustained before 
sustainability can be 
achieved. 
The most important lesson is not to “over-sell” benefits as this 
creates expectations amongst stakeholders. 
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8.5.4 Results For Phase 3 (2000 – 2005) 
Table 8.6 below provides the results obtained for this phase. 
Table 8.6: Results for Phase 3 
STAKEHOLDER 
CATEGORY 
CRITICAL FACTOR CONSIDERED IN THIS PHASE (2000 -2005) 
MARKET STRUCTURE OF ABS VALORISATION OF ABS 
Understanding 
the Market 
Structure oOf Abs 
in Namibia 
The Role of Technology Transfer 
in ABS Implementation 
The Role of Value Addition to 
Biodiversity in Namibia and 
ABS 
Role of the Private Sector 
RESEARCH AND 
ACADEMIA 
Lack of capacities 
hampers full 
understanding. 
 
Only a few 
Namibians have the 
necessary 
understanding of 
the ABS market. 
Technology Transfer is crucial for 
value addition, continued capacity 
development and for monitoring for 
compliance using modern tools. 
 
Ongoing new discoveries and new 
challenges are emerging in the field 
of ABS and technology transfer 
make it important to stay abreast. 
Greater need to develop capacity 
to engage in valorization of 
biodiversity in Namibia in the 
interest of ABS.  
 
Namibia trading only in raw 
resources or partially processed 
material and is therefore not yet 
a significant user of its own 
biodiversity. 
 
Need for focused investment in 
valorization of natural resources. 
 
No significant human capital 
investment has been made. 
There is need to engage the private sector more. 
 
Private sector can take the lead but cannot do it 
alone without other players in a win-win 
engagement. 
 
The role of the private sector in ABS is the 
development of industrial scale products, quality 
assurance and market development.  
 
Other stakeholders can do research and 
development as well as production of prototype 
products. 
GOVERNMENT  Divergent views. 
Most believe that 
the ABS market and 
Technology transfer without the 
human capital investment is 
doomed to failure. 
General view is that this issue 
has not been dealt with 
effectively. 
Divergence of views on the role of the private 
sector from no role to a significant role. 
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Namibia’s potential 
place in that market 
is not clear at all. 
 
Some believe that 
the markets are 
generally 
dominated by 
outsiders leaving 
locals feeling left 
out of the loop.  
 
Experts such as 
economist, and 
trade specialist and 
finance specialist 
have not been 
involved in the ABS 
debate. 
 
Namibia does not 
have the institutions 
and the 
administrative 
experience to 
effectively regulate 
the sector.  
 
The ABS sector should keep this in 
mind as it is crucial for success in 
ABS till now tech transfer and its 
potential has not been adequately 
exploited.  
 
Technology transfer will reduce the 
cost of research and development 
for ABS and will facilitate for 
capacity building. 
The approach is labelled as 
haphazard and fragmented 
without proper coordination and 
harmonization. 
 
A national strategy is required. 
 
There is need for a human 
resource especially a reliable 
supply of trained specialists and 
technicians. 
Private sector is often over looked or their role is 
underplayed by the authorities in Namibia. 
 
Mindset seem to have been to keep control even 
over research, within public sector institutions and 
not to allow the private sector in. 
 
Risk takers in the private sector must be 
rewarded. 
LOCAL 
COMMUNITIES 
The general view is 
that there is no clear 
understanding of 
the ABS market. 
 
Technology transfer is viewed as 
essential by this group of 
stakeholders. 
 
Capacity building must accompany 
technology transfer. 
Very little value addition has 
been done resulting in significant 
opportunities being lost by the 
country 
Namibia remained a provider of 
raw materials  
The role of the private sector in ABS is critical, 
however the government is not fully 
acknowledging the role of the private sector.  
 
There is a need to involve the private sector 
strategically, administrative measures, policies 
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This can be a result 
of having no critical 
mass of enough 
hands on 
experience  
 
Effective ABS implementation 
requires that a strategy be put in 
place. 
and laws that prohibits meaningful interactions 
between the two sectors needs to be revised to 
remove the blockages and facilitate for 
meaningful interaction. 
CIVIL SOCIETY Most respondents 
doubt whether 
Namibia 
understands the 
ABS market. 
There is an 
emergence of some 
understanding 
however 
perceptions and 
expectations still 
exist and are not 
addressed in a 
coordinated 
manner. 
Respondents view technology 
transfer as crucial if ABS 
implementation is to be effective. 
Capacity building is important and 
needs to be considered together 
with technology transfer. 
Not much has been done in 
terms of biodiversity valuation.  
 
There is no national strategy for 
value addition.  
Most respondents are of the view that there is a 
general suspicion towards the private sector. 
There is a perception that they are ripping off 
everyone. 
 
Private sector is viewed as important and integral 
to the success of effective ABS implementation 
Need for smart partnerships.  
PRIVATE 
SECTOR 
Lack of 
understanding of 
the ABS market.  
 
Respondents feel 
that government’s 
understanding of 
the needs of the 
private sector is 
inadequate. 
Technology transfer is a crucial 
aspect of value added processing of 
genetic and any other resource.  
 
Government should call for it in its 
investment policies, legislation and 
during international negotiations. 
 
Government must invest in local 
capacity in analysis and processing 
of products 
Namibia has not done well, this is 
an important issue for ABS. 
 
Value addition is hampered by 
the low capacity in Namibian 
institutions. 
The role of the private sector is obvious i.e. 
bringing in private capital for commercial 
processing and international marketing. 
 
Currently civil society is leading research in ABS 
and not the private sector. 
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8.5.5 Results for Phase 4 (2005 -2012) 
The results for this phase are provided in Table 8.7 below. 
Table 8.7: Results for Phase 4 
STAKEHOLDER 
CATEGORY 
CRITICAL FACTOR CONSIDERED IN THIS PHASE (2005-2012) 
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Misrepresentation of The 
Value of TK And Usage of TK 
by Firms 
Measures to Address 
Information Asymmetry 
and Insights Gained 
Does Namibia Have Trust 
from Stakeholders 
Internationally and 
Nationally? 
Is Social Capital Important in ABS 
Implementation? 
RESEARCH AND 
ACADEMIA 
Respondents view this as a 
complex issue. 
Some firms operate fairly and 
others not. 
 
Communities need to be 
capacitated on the value of their 
TK and the resources as well 
 
The true economic value of TK 
and GR is however difficult to 
assess. 
 
Generally respondants are of the 
view that information asymmetry 
is prevalent in the ABS sector. 
Awareness creation on the 
value of biodiversity is the 
first step. 
 
Followed by capacity 
development at various 
levels and on various aspects 
of ABS. 
 
There is a lack of young 
Namibian professionals who 
have in-depth knowledge and 
understanding of Namibian 
biodiversity.  
Developing trust ensures that 
partners do not exploit each 
other. It also facilitates for the 
ease in transactions. 
 
Respondents maintain that 
Namibia has gained trust from 
other stakeholders both within 
and outside Namibia 
 
Trust building can still be 
strengthened. 
 
Trust is crucial for ABS implementation all levels. 
It is a spin-off of benefit sharing and sustainable 
use of resources. 
 
There is a need for a broad based approach to 
take stock of all resources that are available and 
then consider proper valorization and monitoring 
strategies for compliance under a legal 
framework. 
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GOVERNMENT From critical self-inquiry and 
rising above the background 
rhetoric respondents maintain 
misrepresentation from NGO’s, 
environmental activists, 
uninformed officials and public 
media who have increased 
misinformation and raised 
unrealistic expectations 
regarding ABS and its potential 
benefits. 
 
Those implementing ABS 
themselves do not have full 
understanding for its value and 
misrepresent the potential value 
to communities, thus creating 
unrealistic expectations of the 
value. 
 
Communities have overrated 
perceptions regarding the value, 
uniqueness, and rarity of their TK 
and proclaim the injustices done 
to them. 
Measures are in place but 
implementation is lacking due 
to capacity constraints (legal 
and technical expertise), 
inexperience, but also due to 
lack of resources, especially 
adequate financial 
resources. 
 
There is a lack of intra and 
cross-sectoral consultation 
and coordination. 
It is proposed that a national 
database of information be 
established. 
 
The in-country attempts to 
address asymmetry have 
been weak. There is a lack of 
information flow, updating, 
explaining and review of it, 
even between national level 
stakeholders involved in the 
process of developing ABS, 
not to mention between these 
stakeholders and 
communities, traditional 
leaders, private sector etc. 
Civil society in Namibia is 
viewed as an honest broker 
and is facilitated to address 
information asymmetries. 
 
A divergence of views is 
demonstrated on whether trust 
is important for ABS 
implementation. Some consider 
it critical and crucial whereas 
others believe that what is 
needed is simply political will 
and commitment, good national 
legislation supported by clear 
procedures and close 
monitoring (compliance with) of 
any agreements. 
Trust is at the heart of full 
disclosure and fair negotiations. 
So is transparency and 
administrative efficiency. 
Namibia enjoys trust both within 
and outside of her borders. 
Some respondants argue that trust can 
contribute to but ASB implementation cannot 
rely solely on trust. Irrespective of trust there 
must be clear, logical procedures for access as 
well as benefits. 
There is need for intra-sector and cross-sectoral 
coordination, consultation and harmonization. 
ABS must be viewed as an issue that needs to 
be mainstreamed, where relevant, in policy 
development and national development 
planning in Namibia and not only confined to 
those initiatives in the Ministry of Environment 
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ABS is much more complex 
than was apparent at the 
beginning 
 
LOCAL 
COMMUNITIES 
Respondents all believe that 
there is misrepresentation of the 
value of the end product and the 
usage of TK by firms. 
The “culprits” are the middleman 
and the intermediaries. 
Information sharing and 
communication is viewed as 
an important measure to 
address information 
asymmetry 
Trust is generally viewed as 
important by these 
stakeholders. 
They maintain that there is a 
huge gap in trust in the ABS 
sector. The owners of TK don’t 
trust the users of TK. 
There is trust from outside, 
however, within Namibia there 
are serious trust issues due to a 
multiplicity of issues ranging 
from politics, capacities and 
information asymmetries. 
Trust is viewed as important for ABS 
implementation. There is, however, a need to 
critically review the social role of ABS for 
communities. 
Government has the main responsibility of 
fostering trust among the different stakeholders, 
this may be hampered by political affiliation 
imperatives especially at the local level. 
It is, therefore, important to put in place 
measures to address lack of understanding of 
the important issues in the ABS sector and lack 
of trust amongst the key players and at the same 
time increase transparency. 
CIVIL SOCIETY Respondents are of the opinion 
that it is possible to have 
misrepresentation of the value of 
TK and resources since firms are 
seeking to minimize costs and 
maximize profits. 
In the absence of proper 
guidelines, procedures etc. and 
lack of information and skills as 
well as a fragmented approach to 
ABS policy this issue will remain 
a challenge. 
Respondents generally 
believe that measures were 
put in place though 
recognizing that it has been a 
difficult issue. 
The measures have been 
poorly implemented in a non-
focused, non-harmonized 
and non-coordinated 
manner. 
Information is needed to 
makes ABS work. H however 
the most strategic information 
is not readily available and 
accessible from the industry. 
Internationally Namibia 
generally enjoys trust however 
the delay in enacting and 
getting proper ABS structures in 
place has not contributed to 
trust building. There is a general 
good will towards trust building 
amongst Namibians, there is 
room for improvement and this 
will be critical for ABS 
implementation. 
Respondents agree that trust is important for 
ABS implementation. 
Some respondents however express concern on 
how politics many influence ABS implementation 
and that this has potential for affecting trust 
building significantly. 
There is need to build the necessary capacity at 
all levels as this will engender trust as people 
become competent due to capacity. 
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It is a small number of people 
who know and a large 
number of people who don’t 
know much about ABS for 
effectiveness of ABS. This 
must be changed. 
PRIVATE 
SECTOR 
Respondents argue that it may 
be the case that this happens, 
however there are also cases 
when industry simply does not 
know the real value until many 
years later when the product is in 
the market 
Respondents maintained that 
experiences made by civil 
society such as CRIAA SA-
DC, the IPTT and 
PhytoTrade Africa has to 
some extends been 
measures to address 
information asymmetry. 
All respondents argued that 
trust is very important. This 
sector maintain that Namibia 
enjoys trust nationally and 
internationally which provides a 
good basis from which to move 
forward. 
What is needed is forward-
looking legislation and 
regulation, and a coordinated 
national process to capitalize on 
goodwill. Namibia’s policies and 
legislation has earned respect 
abroad but Namibia needs to do 
more on capacity and policy 
incentives. 
Trust is important and crucial for ABS 
implementation. Respondents feel that building 
social capital also requires reducing information 
asymmetry between partners and the need for 
working together for the same objectives- local 
empowerment, conservation and sustainable 
utilization, inward investment, value adding, 
technology access, markets and growth as all 
these creates capital to be used for national 
development. 
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The interviews generated a substantial amount of data and results, Attempts were, therefore, 
made to extract the most useful results relevant to the research questions and objectives of 
the study.  
 
8.6 DISCUSSION 
To set the stage for this part of the study the following section describes the structure of the 
discussion framework. The discussion of the results is presented in three sections. The first 
section explains the findings and interpretation of the results from the interviews, stakeholder 
by stakeholders. This is then followed by a discussion of the key issues that arose for each 
of the critical factors in terms of the effectiveness of ABS implementation in Namibia.  
 
This section concludes with an analysis of the results based on the indicators derived from 
the global survey on ABS. References are brought in for both sections to situate the findings 
in the existing body of knowledge surrounding ABS implementation in Namibia. 
 
The next section deals with the internal and external factors that may impact the assessment 
of Namibia by the critical factors. This is then followed by the last section which consists of a 
discussion aimed at putting it all into perspective. The final part contains the conclusions of 
this study. 
8.6.1 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS ON THE OVERALL RESPONSES BY 
THE VARIOUS STAKEHOLDER CATEGORIES 
8.6.1.1 Research and Academia Stakeholders 
As was pointed out, especially by government sector representatives, a wide variety of 
biophysical research on Namibia is available. Namibia has a well maintained historic wealth 
of environmental information. Funding for maintaining and expanding this wealth is limited, 
however, e.g. the State Museum is not keeping up with environmental information needs. 
Key gaps in this sector include limited interactions among scientists and institutions (e.g. 
government ministries and research agencies amongst others) and narrow disciplinary 
research and training efforts.  
 
The same was also found by Seeley and Montgomery (2009). The results seem to indicate 
a lack of adequate communication from this sector about their activities. In addition, no major 
strategic alliances are being built that could lead to the development of appropriate and 
relevant capacities for the needs of industry or specifically the ABS sector. Moreover, there 
seems to be a suspicion towards this sector, particularly from the government sector 
regarding misrepresentation of research results and the value of genetic resources. Indeed, 
this sector, it is hinted, are viewed as the main “culprits” of biopiracy in Namibia. Seely and 
Montgomery (2009 p. 9) also found that inadequate communication of research results with 
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communities and with policy makers, has led to poor understanding of the value of research 
results amongst both communities and policy makers and of its application potential in 
Namibia. 
 
In this regard, the research and academia sectors seems to behave exactly like the 
government sector in terms of inefficient cross-sectoral communication. This has serious 
implications for ABS implementation. For instance, civil society seems to be expected to then 
fill this gap, so that research for ABS then becomes fueled and driven by civil society with 
limited assistance from the research and academia sector.  
 
There is also generally a lack of investment towards the necessary infrastructure and as was 
pointed out by some government respondents, sometimes even when government facilitates 
the acquiring of new research equipment for the research and academia institutions, such 
equipment is then not maintained and there is a lack of capacity to use it adequately and 
effectively.  
 
This has serious implications for effective implementation of ABS in Namibia as well as for 
the issue of technology transfer as a mechanism for benefit-sharing. Most of the surveys 
carried out in Namibia have not given due reflection to this issue nor explored it extensively 
– especially with regard to its role in overall economic development and value addition as 
opposed to simple training for imparting scientific knowledge. Some of the constraints faced 
by this sector in Namibia include the heavy teaching load, leaving no time for real basic 
research. This is coupled with perceived and sometimes lengthy bureaucratic procedures 
required for research permits and funding.  
 
It is important to note that the concern expressed by some within the government sector in 
relation to accusations of biopiracy may result from misinformation about the necessary 
protocols, especially those among the research and academia sector who engage in 
collection, ethno-botanical research and collaboration with other external research partners.  
8.6.1.2 Government Stakeholders 
There are undertones in the results indicating that many of the obstacles towards effective 
ABS implementation originate from inefficiencies amongst key government personnel and 
institutions. At the same time, the results seem to indicate that the Namibian government 
plays an active role in promoting biotrade as a means to advance national goals and 
initiatives within the larger framework of national development plans, strategies and action 
plans. This indicates a political will and commitment, especially from the political decision-
makers. For example, the Office of the President was involved in advocating for biotrade and 
the Ministry of Environment and Tourism has been spearheading work on Biotrade and ABS 
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in Namibia. Government has promoted the creation of multi-sectoral platforms such as the 
Namibian National Biodiversity Programme, and notably the Indigenous Plants Task Team 
(IPTT) in 2000, as well as the interim Bioprospecting Committee in 2007, both of which have 
been central to ABS implementation in Namibia. 
 
The results seem to indicate that on-the-ground implementation of some aspects of ABS and 
biotrade has been occurring, whereas barriers seem to be found especially at the national 
level. Seely and Montgomery (2009 p. 38) point out that cooperation, networking and the 
sharing of resources amongst stakeholders, is most pronounced at regional/local level with 
a focus on community involvement. Little cooperation among ministries at the national level 
was reported in the study. Therefore enhanced capacity for environmental management that 
could be gained by networking and cooperation was not realized. The results of this study 
reinforces this finding. 
8.6.1.3 Local Communities Stakeholders 
The results indicated that the local communities in Namibia had, to some extent, gained some 
insights about ABS. Many had been involved as primary producers especially for Devil’s 
Claw, Hoodia, Marula and Kalahari Melon seeds. 
 
Expectations for benefits to be created and shared were raised, especially amongst this 
sector and to some extent it seemed to have been managed. The results also showed that 
there has been significant interaction between this sector and civil society organizations. 
Generally, the government has done well in dealing with issues such as natural resource 
management on a community level. Innovative approaches have been developed, the most 
important being the Community Based Natural Resource Management Programme, which 
influenced and impacted many rural Namibians. As the results suggested, elements of this 
programme were amenable to the issue of ABS implementation. What was also coming to 
the fore was a need to work closely with these stakeholders, through participatory 
mechanisms that could ensure ownership and control of their own affairs.  
8.6.1.4 Civil Society Stakeholders 
The results showed that the civil society sectors, especially the NGOs, were significant 
players in ensuring that communities benefit from sustainable management of natural 
resources, biotrade and bioprospecting initiatives in Namibia. The NGO sector played a 
significant role in the creation of conservancies, which contributed to the development of 
Namibia’s exemplary natural resource management strategy and they naturally extended 
some of the lessons learned from their experiences in these sectors. Civil society in Namibia 
however, contributed significantly towards building the capacity of rural communities and 
providing assistance with regard to sustainable natural resource management (UNEP, 2012 
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p.13). This sector has also played a central role in promoting and strengthening partnerships 
between the government and local communities. This was an interesting situation as in many 
contexts the norm has rather been that governments are generally suspicious of activities 
from this sector.  
 
An example of this mistrust or suspicion between government and private sector is elucidated 
by Kirsten and Andrew (2006) in which they point out that participants of a workshop, 
representing governments, marketing boards, the private sector, aid agencies and 
international organizations, emphasised the need for improved communication between 
government and private sector in order to overcome this mutual suspicion and develop an 
understanding of the different points of view. The focus of this workshop was on partnerships 
between government and the private sector to overcome food shortages in Eastern and 
Southern Africa. 
 
A recently established policy contributed indirectly to environmental sustainability, namely 
the Government of the Republic of Namibia and Civic Organizations (COs) Partnership 
Policy, 2005 (DRFN, 2008 p. 7). This policy supported partnership opportunities that benefit 
the Government, COs and civil society. The policy was also expected to establish a greater 
sense of local identity, community and ownership, possibly leading to more inclusive, 
equitable and socially sustainable development - all necessary elements in biodiversity 
conservation, combating desertification, adaption to climate change and sustainable 
development generally (DRFN, 2012 p.7). This attested to the fact that the relationship 
between civil societies in Namibia had evolved positively and the results in this study indicate 
that, especially in the ABS policy arena, government owed a lot to the civil society in terms 
of on the ground activities of biotrade and bioprospecting. 
 
This could be explained by the dichotomy in Namibia’s governance framework which 
described a dual focus on both sectoral and participatory elements within Namibian policy 
processes (Seeley et al, 2007 p. 110). One stream of policy elements addressed enhanced 
use of the environment and natural resources through a variety of stated intentions and 
recommendations. The other, less obviously, directed at sustainable development, was 
considered equally if not more important, and addressed broad participation, devolution of 
responsibilities and community empowerment. In many instances, the focus on participation 
and community involvement resulted in a high level of involvement by civil society in policy 
implementation while government institutions remained focused on the sectoral content of 
the policy framework (DRFN, 2008 p. 7). This focus on community participation and 
empowerment to address improved management of natural resources was extended to 
encompass adaptations to desertification, conservation of biodiversity and withstand climate 
change - including ongoing natural climate variability with its intermittent droughts (DRFN, 
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2008 p. 8). This explained the heavy involvement and participation of the civil society in ABS 
implementation. Effective ABS implementation had a strong potential for facilitating poverty 
reduction and was also situated within the biodiversity policy arena.  
8.6.1.5 Private Sector Stakeholders 
The results of the interviews indicated that the private sector had not been very much 
involved in the ABS issue within Namibia. UNEP (2012 p. 13) found that a typical value chain 
for biotrade began with the harvesters or resource stewards (wildlife). Moving higher up in 
the value chain the majority of buyers, processors, manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors 
and retailers were found outside of Namibia. The majority of value addition would be captured 
outside the country, much like diamonds. This had implications for ABS implementation in 
Namibia in two ways. On the one hand it was a signal that Namibia had been able to 
understand and develop mechanisms to work with the private sector externally and was 
therefore able to effectively engage in ABS contracts. However, on the other hand, the 
necessary technological and human resource capacity inside Namibia was not being 
strengthened to the necessary levels and the private sector inside Namibia was not being 
fully engaged. 
 
The civil society respondents pointed out that access to finance for ABS-related activities 
from both public and private sector financing institutions was challenging. UNEP (2012 p. 13) 
confirms this observation. UNEP (2012 p. 13) further maintains that financing by commercial 
and state banks played a very limited role in supporting biodiversity-based enterprises. This 
might have been because financial institutions had inadequate knowledge of ABS and 
bioprospecting, and thus perceived it as a new and risky industry in which to invest. The 
business of ABS would be cost-intensive and thus successful implementation strategies 
would need to be found, especially in terms of engaging both the public and private sector 
financing institutions to invest more in the ABS sector. Over the last 10 years, the IPTT has 
coordinated investments in the INP sector with an annual budget of approximately NAD 42 
000 (USD 5 700) provided by the Ministry of Agriculture (UNEP, 2012 p. 15). This amount 
was simply not adequate for all the work required for full and effective ABS implementation. 
This figure may not be correct since substantially more funds may have been put in by 
government through a number of initiatives not reflected or considered when this amount 
was calculated by those who worked on the project. 
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8.7 KEY ISSUES THAT AROSE FOR EACH OF THE CRITICAL FACTORS 
IN TERMS OF ABS IMPLEMENTATION IN NAMIBIA DURING THE 
DIFFERENT PHASES 
8.7.1 Phase 1:The Beginning Of The Abs Policy Dialogue In Namibia 
(1990 -1995) 
8.7.1.1 Good Governance Structure in both Provider and User Countries 
Since independence, Namibia was hailed for its modern policy frameworks and innovative 
approaches (UNEP 2012 p. 4). Establishment of a legal framework for environmental 
management in Namibia bridged the gap between drafting and implementing legislation. 
 
In the decade after independence, the drafting of policy received a vast amount of attention 
in many sectors. Yet, the process for developing environmental legislation for Namibia was 
very slow and incomplete (DRFN, 2008 p 4). This might have been due to the fact that 
significant developmental, economic, social priorities and political interests had to be 
assessed. The various respondents in the interviews confirmed the slow and incomplete 
nature of this phase. Consequently, relatively little environmental legislation was passed 
during these years. There had however, been a slow increase in the number of policies being 
passed, especially from 1996 onwards. The most significant piece of legislation was the 
Nature Conservation Ordinance, 1975 as amended through the Nature Conservation 
Amendment Act, 1996. This Act set the stage for Community Based Natural Resource 
Management (CBNRM) on communally owned lands, a major contributor to alternative 
livelihoods and sustainable development in Namibia (DRFN, 2008 p. 4). CBNRM was 
implemented primarily by NGOs or civil society (DRFN, 2008 p. 5 and UNEP, 2012 p. 13). 
As the results showed, all the different categories more or less agreed that this programme 
did set the stage for ABS work in Namibia and had significant implications for an ABS 
implementation framework. 
 
The perception by some individuals that the environmental sector had no teeth - was probably 
due more a lack of monitoring and enforcement capacity, as was pointed out by the 
government and NGO sector respondents. There was also a shortage of environmental 
lawyers in Namibia, with an emergence of a few in the mid-2000s. The governance structure 
of any country is influenced by its political environment and framework and Namibia was no 
exception in this regard. As pointed out by some government respondents, after 
independence, the Namibian government had the burden of legislating to redress the 
inequalities and injustices left by the apartheid regime. The challenge, as was evident from 
the majority of categories of respondents, was in moving from policy and legislation to 
implementation and action on the ground. This challenge of bridging the gap had had a 
significant influence on Namibia’s approach towards ABS. In general it could be argued that 
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Namibia’s environmental legal framework had assured the emergence of good governance 
structures that had paved the way for Namibia’s innovative approach towards ABS. 
 
Since independence, Namibia had enjoyed peace and democracy - which included basic 
human rights and freedom of speech. This emphasised, proved and promotedgeneral good 
governance structures in Namibia. 
 
DRFN (2008 p. 5) pointed out that in Namibia some aspects of the environment were 
regularly mainstreamed into policy and legislation, although contradictions and lack of 
realisation of implications of the words themselves were often evident. UNEP (2013 p. 22) 
maintains that the government has been supportive as evidenced by the numerous 
institutions and initiatives put in place to support and promote the development of this sector. 
They further point out that more strategic engagement of government institutions is needed, 
such as by the Ministry of Trade and the financial sector in Namibia.  
 
This study points to the fact that this has not been enough and that the research and 
academia sector would also need to be engaged more comprehensively. Other stakeholders 
to be included would be the National Planning Commission, the ministry responsible for 
coordination of research and technology and the Ministry of Finance.  
 
The above is important to further increase and cement Namibia’s leading role in ABS 
implementation. In the negotiations of the Protocol Namibia has demonstrated her capacity 
to take advantage of the growing international demand for biodiversity-related products 
(UNEP, 2013 p. 23) and this translated into informed decision making at the negotiating table. 
8.7.1.2 Discussion on the Indicators Derived for this Critical Factor: 
Table 8.8 below shows that in terms of ABS good governance measures Namibia has been 
scoring relatively well. It could, therefore, be argued from the above that Namibia has good 
ABS governance measures in place at the national level. 
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Table 8.8: Assessment of Good Governance Structure in both Provider and User Countries 
Based On Derived Indicators 
GOOD GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE IN BOTH PROVIDER AND USER COUNTRIES 
Indicator derived Namibian status based on results of assessment 
Functional and effective user country 
measures in place 
Since Namibia has focused primarily on putting the 
necessary provider measures in place there has not 
been much focus on good governance. The results 
indicate though that Namibia has potential to become 
a user of its own genetic resources and the necessary 
frame is in place to ensure that user measures are 
effective 
Domestic ABS instrument in place (provider 
measures) 
The results indicate that Namibia has developed a 
system that can be regarded as innovative for dealing 
with ABS. The IBPC is in place although it is not very 
efficient. The legislation is being discussed in 
Parliament and is expected to be finalized in 2014. 
A reliable legal system is prevalent The policy framework is there and can be considered 
reliable. Its effectiveness however depends on the 
human dimensions for effective implementation. There 
are challenges in this regard. The challenge seems to 
be the capacity to implement and enforce the legal and 
policy framework in Namibia. This is further hampered 
by the lack of harmonization of policies and legislation 
and lack of cooperation across sectors and agencies. 
olitical will and commitment towards ABS 
implementation prevails in the country 
The results indicate that this has been present 
throughout the evolution of ABS in Namibia. The ABS 
policy arena has enjoyed significant support from the 
highest level of the policy makers. This is exemplified 
by the number of workshops held including top level 
officials such as the President and the Minister of 
Environment and Tourism has officiated. 
Signing and ratification of the ABS Protocol Namibia has signed and ratified the Protocol. This is a 
significant step especially given that it took time for 
Namibia to do so as focus was being given on 
consultation and advocacy on the Protocol within the 
country after it was adopted in Nagoya. This is a clear 
sign of the political will and commitment of Namibia to 
engage with the ABS issue. 
Upholding the rule of law is guaranteed The Judiciary in Namibia is independent and the rule of 
law is guaranteed. No cases so far have been brought 
to the judiciary. However if one takes into account of 
experiences in other development sectors where cases 
reached the courts, the rule of law has been 
maintained. There is no reason why the same will not 
apply to ABS cases. 
Guaranteed equity and equality in terms of 
transactional assistance for traditional and 
rural providers of genetic resources 
The results have shown that Namibia has done 
extremely well on this indicator. The policy framework 
of Namibia has a dichotomy that has allowed for work 
to occur at the grassroots level and a significant effort 
on ABS advocacy has taken place across the country 
aimed at empowering communities. 
 
8.7.1.3 Assigning Property Rights and Intellectual Property Rights 
Workshop participants at an ABS workshop on the Interim Bio-Prospecting Committee 
launch and inception deliberated the issue of the legal position of private land owners in 
Namibia with regards to the right to bioprospect for indigenous botanical resources on their 
own land. The outcome of this debate - which had implications for the critical factor assigning 
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property rights and intellectual property rights - was that in terms of Namibia’s Nature 
Conservation Ordinance, private landowners are only allowed to use such resources on-farm 
for own private consumption. For commercial use, free permits were to be issued to them for 
law enforcement purposes and for bio-prospecting they would need to apply for a bio-
prospecting permit (du Plessis and Becherer p. 12).  
 
Traditional knowledge ownership - as it relates to Bioprospecting still needed to be clarified 
in Namibia. The IBPC and the Biotrade Working Group however, took a conscious decision 
to include Traditional Knowledge only when it was clear that it had been used in the process 
of bioprospecting. A traditional knowledge fund was being proposed at one stage in the draft 
ABS bill. 
 
The results indicated that there is generally a clear understanding of ownership of genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge in Namibia with a bit of confusion with regard to 
traditional knowledge in terms of ownership. 
8.7.1.4 Discussion on the Indicators Derived for this Critical Factor 
Table 8.9 below provides a summary of how Namibia has fared against the indicators derived 
based on the critical factor. Generally it seems the frame conditions for success are there 
what is challenging is the implementation of the legal framework to allow for more hands on 
experience to allow for revision and adaptation through learning by doing. 
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Table 8.9 Assessment of Assigning Property Rights and Intellectual Property Rights Based on 
Derived Indicators 
ASSIGNING PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Indicators derived Namibian status based on results of 
assessment 
Clear rules on who can issue Prior Informed 
Consent and Mutually Agreed Terms 
Based on the discussion and the proposed 
legislation it is clear who can issue PIC and 
MAT. The fact that a number of products 
involving communities and their knowledge are 
already in international markets attest to that. 
Ownership of traditional knowledge seems still 
to provide challenges however generally 
regarding ownership of genetic resources the 
role of the state is clearly understood by all. 
Clear rules on how the genetic resources and 
knowledge will be transferred to third parties 
Namibia has practical experience of how to 
handle the transfer of genetic resources and 
knowledge since collaboration in ABS research 
and the transfer of GR has occurred. There are 
two types of Material Transfer Agreements 
models that have been developed and one has 
been used regularly. 
 
Clear rules as to which resources and rights 
require permission before accessing 
As has come out in the discussion this is clear 
from the results. What is perhaps challenging is 
the issue of TK however since there has been 
cases where TK is involved and work on ABS 
has continued. The implications are that these 
rules are clear. 
Commercial rules and administrative rights are 
clearly defined 
The results and the literature indicate that in the 
Namibian ABS scene there has been more 
private sector participation from outside Namibia 
based on contract law. This implies that this 
indicator is met. 
Clear rules on the roles and responsibilities of 
both user and providers with regard to the above 
rights 
The material transfer agreements and 
experience made in Namibia attest to the fact 
that Namibia is clear to some extend on the roles 
and responsibility of both the user and the 
provider. The challenge seems to be the 
capacity in terms of human resources and 
institutions to enforce these rights and to ensure 
compliance. This therefore may results in not 
having had the system tested regularly. 
 
8.7.1.5 Summarizing Remarks for Phase 1 
All the different stakeholders more or less agree that the environmental policy and legislative 
framework in Namibia did set the frame for ABS work in Namibia. Good governance prevailed 
and ownership of genetic resources is known. There is however a need to look further into 
the issue of traditional knowledge. 
It seems that the category that is most engaged with this issue and is able to articulate the 
challenges and problems around it, is the civil society. Real ABS initiatives have also 
emerged led by this sector in partnership with the government sector. The private sector at 
this stage is minimally involved. Research and academia saw a flurry of activities when the 
call for more information on Namibia’s biodiversity was made and significant body of 
knowledge was generated by both Namibian and international scientists. It must be noted 
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that Namibia has well maintained history of research into biodiversity especially desert 
ecology through work led by the Namibia Desert Research Foundation (DRFN).  
 
This phase (1990-1995) also saw the emergence of environmental NGO’s which kept the 
environmental debate, advocacy and awareness creation open and which recognized the 
need for capacity building. Government seems to have been critically involved within the 
sector as can be seen with the establishment of the NNBP, which became the flagship 
programme for biodiversity work and ABS.  
8.7.2 Phase 2: Experience On ABS Five Years After Independence And 
The Beginning Of The ABS Dialogue Proper (1995 -2000) 
8.7.2.1 Effective, Functional and Non-Complex Administrative 
Structure/Framework is in Place  
The results indicate that lack of coordination and communication seem to have been the 
main challenge for effective implementation of ABS in Namibia. This is confirmed by 
Krugman and Katjirua (2007 p. 27) who argue that while national ABS legislation was under 
development in Namibia, there was no coordinated national approach or consistent (interim) 
national institutional framework for handling incoming requests for access to genetic 
resources (for academic research or commercial purposes) within Namibia’s borders. Access 
requests were received through different government ministries, departments, inter-
institutional groups, or NGOs. These initial points of contact had little, if any, guidance or 
capacity to respond to these requests in a logical, consistent and speedy fashion. As a result, 
access requests were either not processed due to the absence of a framework (approaching 
parties may have been told to wait until the ABS legislation was passed) or denied/ rejected 
and (in cases where this happened by default more than by design) promising bio-
prospecting partnership opportunities may have been lost, or approved (following ad hoc 
judgement, in the absence of collectively agreed and accepted criteria and guidelines). This 
was particularly the case in the early years of the ABS debate. This has been confirmed 
through the interviews by all stakeholders. The administrative structures at the beginning of 
the ABS debate can therefore be seen to have been inefficient and,to some extent, overly 
bureaucratic - often due to the lack of coordination. 
 
A review of Namibia’s permitting system and its efficiency in terms of bioprospecting and 
regulating access was done by Cole and Nakamale (2008 p.4). Their findings also point to 
the fact that while almost 1000 research and collection permits were issued since 1999, many 
of them to foreign researchers, only 22 MTAs were signed, all of them since 2005. They also 
point out a number of constraints with the Namibian permit system, among them the lack of 
coordination, bureaucratic and complex administrative procedures. This resulted in high 
transaction costs, lack of control at points of exit from Namibia, and difficulty in distinguishing 
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between pure academic research, research with bioprospecting potential or pure 
bioprospecting (du Plessis and Becherer, 2008 p. 1). A “one-stop-shop” for streamlining the 
permit system was proposed. 
 
The results also indicate that research was not coordinated, resulting in this general state of 
non-cooperation. Cole and Nakhamela (2008 p. 31) also found that Namibia did not have a 
state-wide coordinated approach to the issue of research on and export of biological 
resources.  
 
They recommended that Namibia develop a standard MTA covering all biological resources. 
The importance of setting and sticking to firm time targets for providing service to applicants 
was also emphasised in workshop discussion of what steps were required to streamline the 
permit system and to reduce transaction costs for researchers and potential prospectors (du 
Plessis and Becherer, 2008 p. 2). The concerns raised by the various categories of 
stakeholders with regard to coordination and harmonisation of procedures to allow for 
efficiency were also considered by others active in the Namibian ABS policy arena. The 
challenge however, still remained on how to effectively implement these recommendations. 
 
The need to liaise with tertiary education institutions about the proper permit application 
procedures was also proposed. The Research and Academia sector also needed to be 
recognized as important, overcoming the perception by some in the government sector that 
Namibians themselves could be the biopiracy culprits. In this regard, it was proposed that a 
handbook or guide specifying and spelling out the procedures should be developed (du 
Plessis and Becherer, 2008 p.4). This aspect had implications for the critical factor 
addressing information asymmetries. Such a hand book would greatly contribute to reducing 
information asymmetry in a very critical arena of ABS i.e. the research permit and its 
requirements. 
 
Furthermore, Cole and Nakamela (2008 p. 31) recommended that a template for persons 
having to review research permit applications for ABS should be developed. Moreover, 
research and collection permit applications should all be in a similar format, which would 
require agreement as to what criteria were being reviewed, with a signed MTA would have 
to be concluded before a research permit was issued (Cole and Nakamela, 2008 p. 32). 
 
In a workshop on ABS, it was pointed out that the purpose of reviewing permit applications 
was not to challenge or improve the academic merits of proposals, but to ensure that national 
interests and biodiversity were adequately protected (du Plessis and Becherer, 2008 p. 12). 
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8.7.2.2 Institutional Efficiency and Administrative Efficiency 
The interesting finding however, as pointed out by Krugman and Katjirua (2007 p. 27), was 
that despite these perceived inefficiencies in the institutions and administration, some 
procedural patterns for dealing with incoming access requests continued emerging. For 
instance, access requests involving the collection of plant materials for academic research 
have tended to be passed to NBRI for review and response, while access requests entailing 
biological resource collection to engage in research and development for commercial 
application have tended to end up with CRIAA for vetting and further handling. These 
requests have then ended up with the permit office housed in the Directorate of Scientific 
Services in the Ministry of Environment and Tourism.  
 
Consultation between the DSS and the NBRI on what action to take has increased over the 
years. Some of the requests have also come directly to the CBD national focal point and 
were then forwarded to the other stakeholders for consultation. At this point, due to the 
awareness generated over the years, the National Focal Point has been increasingly 
informed about requests and other bio-prospecting and bio-trade activities occurring or 
planned to occur in Namibia. Cole and Nakamale (2008 p. 31) also found that cooperation 
existed between MET and the various institutions from which it required inputs for the issuing 
of research permits and that there was general support for the idea of a one-stop-shop.  
 
They did however, highlight the seeming lack of awareness about the existence of the Interim 
Bio-prospecting Committee, especially outside of MET (Cole and Nakamale, 2008 p. 6). The 
interviews confirmed this, since the results from the government stakeholders pointed to the 
confusion about coordination of ABS in Namibia, to some extent. This could be ascribed to 
the sectoral nature of Namibia’s development agenda which emerged from around the third 
national development plan design process (DRFN, 2008 p. 11). The process of developing 
the national ABS legislation and the various national workshops and consultations 
contributed greatly to increased national awareness.  
 
The results also indicated an emergence of several multi-stakeholder institutions and 
initiatives since Namibian independence that contributed to the development of Namibia’s 
innovative biotrade approach and encouraged the participation of local communities. 
 
The most important of these were: 
 The Namibia National Biodiversity Programme (NNBP) 
 The Biotrade working Group (BWG) 
 The Indigenous Plant Task Team (IPTT) 
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8.7.2.3 Discussion of Indicators Derived for this Critical Factor  
The assessment for this critical factor based on the derived indicator is reflected in 
Table 8.10 below. 
Table 8.10: Assessment of Administrative Structure/Framework Based on Derived Indicators 
EFFECTIVE, FUNCTIONAL AND NON COMPLEX ADMINISTRATIVE 
STRUCTURE/FRAMEWORK IS IN PLACE 
Indicators derived Namibian status based on results of assessment 
Availability of information about the 
national system for access and use of 
genetic resources 
The discussion showed that there is a significant body 
of knowledge about ABS and the national system. This 
is contained in the national reports, various workshop 
reports and with individuals within the country. The 
discussion highlighted the need for  a one-stop-shop for 
ABS related information. 
Effective and functional institutional 
framework in place 
The institutional framework is in place and is not 
complex. The challenge is that players within the 
system are often operating in isolation leading to 
uncoordinated, unharmonized implementation of ABS. 
The discussion however points to the fact that despite 
these challenges the system does have a certain 
measure of efficiency and functionality.  
Decision-making on ABS application is 
clear and decentralised 
Some more work can be done to ensure that decision-
making is clear and efficient. Generally it seems to be 
clear but not decentralized.  
A rights to appeal is provided for in case 
access is denied for reasons that the 
firm/users did not intend or cannot 
change 
It is provided for. In the past access has been refused 
due to information asymmetry. As time has gone by a 
different, more amenable approach was developed  
that relies on contract law to facilitate access whilst the 
Namibian ABS legislation was being finalised. 
Stakeholders are identified and the 
competent authority is known 
There is a clear understanding of the various players in 
the ABS policy arena and the competent authority is 
known. 
One Permit system is being used This has been considered and is proposed but has not 
yet been implemented. To date there are different 
permits being used. 
Model contractual clauses are in use Namibia has managed to get products on the 
international market through the use of contract law. 
This implies that this practice is in use.  
Clear rules are being used for PIC, MAT 
and MTAs for applicants seeking access 
to GR and TK 
It seems from the results that there has been an 
emergence of rules based on experience with the cases 
that Namibia has been dealing with. There is however 
a need for these rules to be codified and 
institutionalized. 
Effective, simple and functional 
compliance measures are in place 
Monitoring and enforcement seem to be a challenging 
issue based on the discussion, althoughthere have not 
been serious cases where this has become apparent. 
Namibia has long-standing monitoring and 
enforcement experience within the wildlife sector which 
can be extended to the ABS sector. There may also be 
a need to implement the provisions of the Nagoya 
Protocol regarding compliance measures. 
There are clear rules and/or processes 
for the involvement of ILC’s for access to 
genetic resources and associated TK 
The discussion has clearly pointed out that Namibia has 
extensive policy and hands-on experience of dealing 
with the local communities within the ABS policy arena 
as well as within the CBNRM sector which has 
significant learning and best practice implications for 
ABS implementation. 
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8.7.2.4 Addressing or Accounting for Time Lags to the Generation and 
Sharing of Benefits  
The results indicate that Namibians are aware of the need to manage expectations and thus 
to ensure that measures are in place to address time lags to the generation and sharing of 
benefits. Namibia has demonstrated this through the Community Based Natural Resource 
Management Programme (CBNRM). UNEP (2013 p. 8) maintains that an innovative 
biodiversity conservation paradigm, placing communities at the center of conservation has 
been implemented effectively in Namibia. Its overall impact over the years in Namibia has 
been positive, poverty neutral, and pro-poor. The sustainable management of wildlife has 
been well established through the CBNRM programme and Namibia boasts with a 42 % (and 
growing)of its surface under some form of conservation management (MET, 2008). 
 
As was pointed out, in terms of managing time lags to benefits, assistance from donors has 
helped Namibia to overcome this challenge, especially in terms of benefits generated under 
the community-based natural resources management program. The GEF has funded 
numerous projects related to biotrade in Namibia.  
 
These were included in the Integrated Community –Based Ecosystem Management (ICEMA) 
project (2004-2011), the Country Pilot Partnership for Integrated Sustainable Land 
management Programme (CPP) (2008 -2012 phase 1). As well as the Innovative Grant 
Mechanism (IGM) specifically supporting Biotrade initiatives. Of note was also the UNDP–
GEF Small Grants Programme (2003 ongoing). Namibia has now also established the 
national Environmental Investment Fund (EIF), which was launched in 2011. 
 
For work on developing the ABS legal framework bilateral initiatives were significant. The 
German Government supported Namibia’s National Biodiversity Programme (1994 – 2004) 
through the then German Technical Agency for international cooperation (GTZ32). The 
programme was later known as the Biodiversity and Sustainable Land Management Project 
(2004 – 2012) (implemented through the GIZ). This programme has a specific focus on 
biotrade and bioprospecting and has supported numerous activities at the national level. The 
European Commission Rural Poverty Reduction Programme (2005 -2011) also provided 
support. The United States has committed itself through the Millennium Challenge Account 
(2009 – 14), to strengthening the functionality of Namibia’s IPTT program which has carried 
out excellent work related to biotrade on a very limited budget. 
 
                                               
32 GTZ is the German Agency for Technical Cooperation which is now known as GIZ. The German 
Bilateral Cooperation to the environment sector in Namibia was facilitated through GTZ. 
 246 
 
As can be seen from the time frames, the initial ground work was done by investment from 
within Namibia itself, especially in the beginning stages of the CBNRM programme. The 
funding that came in later served as an anchor to manage expectations whilst assets, 
capacity building, ownership and empowerment was being built and the investment was 
maturing. This approach helped many communities to overcome the challenge of time lags 
to benefits, especially in the CBNRM sector and the lessons learned have significant 
implications for ABS implementation. Care must be taken that the initiatives funded through 
development aid are mainstreamed into the larger national development agenda to ensure 
continuity and sustainability of the initiatives as government funding can then take over. Over 
the last 10 years, the IPTT has coordinated investments in the INP sector with an annual 
budget of approximately NAD 42 000 (USD 5 700) provided by the Ministry of Agriculture 
(UNEP, 2012). 
8.7.2.5 Discussion of the Indicators Derived for this Critical Factor 
Table 8.11 below provides the discussion for the derived indicators for the critical 
factor. 
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Table 8.11: Assessment of Accounting for Time Lags to the Generation and Sharing of Benefits 
Based on Derived Indicators 
Addressing or accounting for time lags to the generation and sharing of benefits 
Indicators derived Namibian status based on results of 
assessment 
Contribution of ABS to the national economic 
and human development through monetary and 
non-monetary benefits 
There is clear evidence that Namibia has 
understanding of the contribution of ABS to 
human development and national economic 
development. Namibia has a history of natural 
resource accounting in the wildlife sector and 
this should be extended to the ABS sector. The 
CBNRM sector keeps detailed record of the 
contribution of its programme to livelihood 
security, poverty alleviation, assets built, 
capacities developed and the general 
empowerment of the participating communities. 
This has been a powerful drive for political 
commitment and securing of finances both from 
within and outside Namibia. It can be argued that 
the same has occurred for ABS in Namibia. 
There is however room for improvement. 
National strategies for the application of 
technology, skills transfer, biodiversity valuation 
and negotiating capacities are in place 
There are no such strategies in place especially 
for application of technology, skills transfer and 
biodiversity valuation.  It is important to note that 
already in 2002 the ABS component in the 
NBSAP pointed to the development of such 
strategies. Energy however, went into 
developing the legal framework and approach to 
ABS in this process. However, as is evident from 
the results, Namibia has excellent negotiating 
capacities in all the sectors related to ABS. 
Clear rules for scientific and research co-
operation 
There seem to be clear rules for research and 
scientific cooperation. Coordination and 
cooperation amongst the players seems to be 
the challenge. 
Clear rules and guidelines for benefit sharing are 
in place 
The Namibian experience points to the excellent 
understanding and insights on practicalities 
around benefit sharing within the ABS policy 
arena. Products are in international markets and 
benefit sharing mechanisms are in place. 
Checkpoints are established to ensure the 
transparency of the value chain  through which 
the genetic resource is going to ensure 
appropriate benefit-sharing 
Check points have not been established. The 
Nagoya Protocol is now in place and this can 
facilitate for the development of checkpoints at 
the national level and complimentary 
checkpoints at the international level. 
 
8.7.2.6 Summarizing Remarks for Phase 2 
This phase points to the fact that even if the institutions are not efficient and administration 
is complex and not efficient, work can still continue. However, this does require significant 
political will and commitment together with a cross-sectoral approach. As was the case with 
the first phase, most practical expertise on ABS in Namibia seems to reside with the civil 
society and the local community sector. The private sector seems not to be visibly involved 
and were drawn in at a later stage. Thus, the ground work for ABS and basic research on 
ABS was being done by a combination of civil society, research and academia, and local 
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communities facilitated by government through good governance and the political will for 
empowerment.  
 
An interesting finding from the respondents was the reference to scientists in government 
responding to politics and not to science in terms of policy setting and administration. This 
may have serious implications on the efficacy of initiatives and outcome of initiatives. 
Through reflecting on this study it seems that civil society sector are almost acting within the 
private sector domain but with the primary aim of generating benefits for the local 
communities. It has emeged that government may have recognized a significant tolerance of 
civil society in Namibia to the point that civil society members participate in national 
delegations alongside local community members and government officials as fully accredited 
delegates of the Namibian government. 
 
Significant lessons were learned about time lags to benefits and the sharing of benefits. This 
points to the fact that strategies are required at the national level to manage benefit-sharing 
and time lags to benefits and that workers in the field should be cognizant of avoiding raising 
unrealistic expectations. 
 
The example provided by the CBNRM programme in Namibia was seen as a potential model 
for ABS implementation work in terms of governance, institutions and on-the-ground 
implementation. Despite ABS emerging as a challenging issue then, there would be no need 
to re-invent the wheel since initiatives were already in place at the national level and could 
serve as guidance on what not do to and what to do in terms of national ABS implementation. 
Still, such implementation would need to be done carefully recognizing the unique nature of 
ABS. 
 
Interestingly, given the fact that the issue of trust was not generally discussed in this context, 
the critical factor – building social capital and its importance to ABS implementation - has 
foregrounded the issue of the importance of trust or social capital. This started to emerge 
strongly during this phase as pointed out by respondents. 
8.7.3 Phase 3: Informed Decisions On ABS And Its Marked 15 Years After 
Independence  
8.7.3.1 Efficient Understanding of The ABS Market Structure within which 
the Transaction Must Take Place  
The results were mixed on this critical factor. It appeared that from all the stakeholders the 
sector that had gained the most understanding of the ABS market was the civil society sector 
and their counterparts within government and the local communities sectors. 
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The literature shed significant light on this fact. It pointed out that due to the experience 
gained over the years in dealing with ABS implementation, a conscious decision was made 
by the Biotrade Focal Group, towards the end of the second phase, to handle bio-
prospecting/bio-trade activities in Namibia on a case-by-case basis and to involve regional 
parties. To this effect, the biotrade/bioprospecting officer at the Council for Scientific and 
Industrial Research (CSIR) was invited to Namibia on a face-to-face brief at the Biotrade 
Working Group about developments in South-Africa. During these visits the bio-prospecting 
programme at the CSIR was also elucidated to the Working Group (Krugmann and Katjirua, 
2007 p. 27). Collaboration for bioprospecting was agreed upon which then paved the way for 
work on the Hoodia case - a successful case for the region, as in what not to do and on ABS 
implementation (du Plesiss, 2013 pers. comm). During the Hoodia case, several delegations 
from stakeholders as far as the UK-Phytopharm came to Namibia to discuss strategies to 
pave the way forward. Other delegations interested in other potential resources also came 
to Namibia and were received by the Biotrade Working Group. The NBRI has further 
appointed an officer to deal with biotrade and bioprospecting issues in Namibia and to serve 
as the Secretariat for the Indigenous Fruit Tree Task Team.  
 
A workshop on IBPC recommended that applications from serious research and/or 
commercial partners for bioprospecting permits should be fast-tracked as much as possible, 
by actively helping applicants to provide all the required information as quickly as possible 
(du Plessis and Becherer, 2008 p. 4). 
 
According to UNEP (2012 p. 5), Namibia has demonstrated leadership in BioTrade, 
particularly with its active engagement in the international Access and Benefit-Sharing (ABS) 
negotiations. The trade of indigenous plants and wildlife could be expected to gain premium 
prices from export markets such as the EU, while indigenous crops and livestock products 
would be more suited for domestic and/or sub-regional markets. 
 
The Eudafano Women’s Cooperative has been pointed out by some of the civil society and 
government stakeholders as an example of best practice in terms of dealing with ABS in 
Namibia and understanding the market structure. UNEP (2012 p. 5) supports this view by 
stating that the Eudafano Women’s Cooperative partnership with the Body Shop is an often 
cited example of best practice linking local communities to global markets. The Eudafano 
Women’s Cooperative brings together approximately 4800 rural Namibian women who 
harvest Marula fruits. Marula oil today is seen as a high quality and sought after oil and is 
produced from the kernel of the fruit. Marula trees are common in northern Namibia and fruits 
are easy to harvest (Krugman and Katjirua, 2007 and UNEP 2012). Women in particular 
benefit from harvesting and utilising Marula fruits (CBD 2010 cited by UNEP 2012 p. 5). This 
work has led to now a well-established Community Trade Marula Oil from Eudafano 
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Women’s Cooperative which negotiates the benefits derived from the selling of the oil which 
forms the basis of various cosmetics and lotions. 
 
On the supply side, Namibia’s private sector and other sectors with potential relevance to 
ABS implementation, has demonstrated its entrepreneurial and management expertise in 
dealing with the challenges of developing supply side capacities in order to access 
international markets, including those related to products. The interaction of PhytoTrade 
Africa, a regional natural products trade association with several Namibian members that 
work in close partnership with Aldivia S.A., a specialist lipids company based in France, has 
also contributed to the capacity for understanding the ABS market issues. 
8.7.3.2 Discussion of the Indicators Derived for this Critical Factor 
The assessment of this critical factor was based on the derived indicators as reflected in 
Table 8.12 below. 
Table 8.12: Assessment of Efficient Understanding of the ABS Market Structure within which 
the Transactions Occur Based on the Indicators Derived 
EFFICIENT UNDERSTANDING OF THE ABS MARKET STRUCTURE WITHIN WHICH THE 
TRANSACTION MUST TAKE PLACE 
Indicators derived Namibian status based on results of assessment 
Low transaction costs in the 
ABS market 
It appears from the results that given the presence of 
knowledgeable partners in the ABS policy arena at the national 
level, especially through civil society with the necessary networks 
and contacts the transaction costs in the ABS market in Namibia 
are fairly low. 
Measures are in place to allow 
investors to assess the 
commercial risks and 
opportunities in a country 
There is a significant body of basic knowledge on the genetic 
resource of potential interest to commercial partners but this is 
not extensive and does not extend to most genetic resources 
outside the spheres of the obvious genetic resources for which 
there is a known use. Namibia’s experience with other markets 
such as the diamonds, fisheries, agricultural and wildlife sector 
gives an indication of the relative risks and opportunities of doing 
business in the country. It can be argued therefore that measures 
are in place but a concerted effort for ABS is still required. 
There is a national ABS value 
addition strategy in the provider 
country 
The discussion pointed out that there is no coherent and 
systematic value addition strategy in place. This does not entirely 
reflect the situation on the ground since the Indigenous Plant 
Task Team can be considered as a partial move towards a value 
addition strategy at the national level. 
Potential challenging issues in 
the market for ABS such as TK 
and socio-cultural concerns are 
being addressed 
The results and discussion point to the fact that in Namibia 
internal reflection on the challenging issues surrounding ABS 
implementation in the socio-cultural arena have been considered 
and addressed. The necessary policy framework seems to be in 
place and lessons from that has significantly influenced the ABS 
approach in Namibia 
The biodiversity resource base 
is being monitored, evaluated, 
managed and used sustainably 
and necessary conservation 
laws are in place 
The results and discussion points to the fact that this indicator 
has been met it is clear though that there is need for investment 
in the requisite human resource for the scientific aspects of 
biodiversity research. There has been a focus on developing 
managers while at the same time the scientific capacity for basic 
research in core areas in biodiversity such as taxonomy has 
been declining. 
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It can thus be argued that there is a relative good understanding of how the ABS market 
operates within Namibia. The Namibian private sector however, has not been forthcoming 
and the financial institutions have also not been investing in the sector. There is need for 
greater engagement of these partners as well as the Ministries of Trade and Industry and 
Finance. 
8.7.3.3 Presence of an Effective and Functional Biodiversity Valorization 
Strategy at National Level 
The results overall seems to suggest that Namibia has no coordinated national strategy in 
place for valorizing biodiversity. The results further suggest that Namibia has a significant 
body of knowledge over some aspects of its biodiversity but that this body of knowledge has 
not been maintained nor significantly improved. There are also strong views demonstrated 
within the results that the human capital necessary for implementation of such a strategy has 
been dwindling and that it is under threat of not being replaced with new human capital. The 
literature also confirms the view that Namibia has a history of excellent biodiversity research 
(Barnard et al, 2009). 
 
Moreover, the results point out that the matter of issuing permits seems to be one of the 
barriers to the effective implementation of ABS research and, therefore, indirectly also to the 
establishment of an effective biodiversity valorisation strategy. The transaction costs in 
obtaining a research permit and the time required seem to have been increasing over the 
years. In a workshop report, du Plessis and Becherer (2008 p.12) pointed out that the 
workshop participants agreed that when the National Research Council became operational 
it would need to work closely with MET and other authorities around issuing research permits, 
especially for research on protected species and for permits issued to non-Namibian 
researchers. It was further pointed out that Namibia would need to encourage basic research 
and that the MET should perhaps consider not charging for research and collection permits 
and issue them gratis. In the end however they have not yet consulted any of the 
stakeholders about the regulations, and efforts are now underway to rectify the situation. 
It was also recommended that permits for ‘pure” research should be issued quite quickly 
(although the MET permit office already requires that applications are submitted at least three 
months in advance). It was recognised that bioprospecting permits would necessarily take 
longer; all timeframes apply to complete application forms and delays caused by incomplete 
information in applications is not the IBPC’s problem. 
 
The IPPT seeks to encourage domestic value addition along the production chain specific 
opportunities for value addition differing, depending on the product (UNEP 2012 p. 15). 
Namibia’s approach has so far brought four new Namibian natural products (Marula oil, 
Kalahari Melon seed oil, Ximenia oil and Manketti oil) to the international cosmetics markets 
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(UNEP, 2012 p. 15). Several others (Baobab oil and pulp, Nara oil, Mopane essential oil, 
marula juice and fruit pulp, Commiphora resin, Devil’s Claw, Hoodia, Terminalia root bark, 
Manketti Fruit) are at various stages within the ABS pipeline, and many other indigenous 
resources have been identified as possibly having commercial potential (Drews et al., 2008). 
8.7.3.4 Discussion of the Indicators Derived for this Critical Factor 
Table 8.13 below presents the assessment of this critical factor against the derived 
indicators. 
Table 8.13: Assessment of an Effective and Functional Biodiversity Valorization Strategy at the 
National Level Based On the Indicators Derived  
PRESENCE OF AN EFFECTIVE AND FUNCTIONAL BIODIVERSITY VALORIZATION 
STRATEGY ATNATIONAL LEVEL 
 
Indicators derived Namibian status based on results of 
assessment 
A national strategy for the promotion of the use 
of biodiversity and ethno-botanical knowledge 
for value creation, human and economic 
development is in place at the national level 
This indicator has not been satisfactorily met. 
The necessary building blocks for this indicator 
in Namibia are contained in the NBSAP strategic 
aim. What will be required is the mainstreaming 
of these elements into the national development 
process and demonstrating the value to 
economic and social development. 
 
Clear rules and guidelines how the economic 
valuation will contribute to deciding on ABS 
permits 
 
There is already good understanding of the 
contribution of ABS to economic and human 
development in Namibia and the expertise are 
there for economic valuation. This indicator can 
be met fairly easily. However a lot more work 
needs to be done on this indicator. 
A biodiversity inventory and investment centre is 
in use at the national level 
 
There is no investment center for ABS related 
work. The results indicated that biodiversity 
inventory work has been on the decline. Namibia 
however has the potential to resuscitate these 
skills by providing the necessary incentives. 
 
Domestic public and private institutions are 
involved in the identification of the commercial 
value of biodiversity 
 
The results indicate that Namibia has over the 
years done significant investment in the ABS 
sector. It seems that investment was more from 
the public sector as opposed to the private 
sector and implementation was driven by the 
civil society. 
 
Existence of potential research partners in the 
provider country are made public 
 
Potential research partners exist within Namibia, 
however it is not clear from the results whether 
there is a concerted effort to make these 
partners known public. 
 
 
Generally it seems the most important underlying challenge facing Namibia in this regard is 
the development and maintenance of capacity to engage in value-addition activities in 
relation to biodiversity. This will require significant interaction amongst the key stakeholders, 
especially between the public, private and research and academia sector. 
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8.7.3.5 Summarizing Remarks for Phase 3 
This section highlighted the need for experience gained to inform policy and decisions on the 
way forward for ABS implementation. It revealed a general lack of understanding about the 
ABS market in Namibia and that the private sector was not significantly involved in ABS in 
Namibia. Interestingly, this gap was being filled by civil society operating so as to fill the gap 
left by the lack of private sector involvement. 
 
Technology transfer and biodiversity value-adding strategies at the national level was 
confirmed as essential for effective ABS implementation but this would require significant 
investment in the building of human capital and capacity. 
 
The private sector was shown to be integral to the successful implementation of ABS 
frameworks at the national level, and that government would need to facilitate and set 
incentives for private sector involvement. The urgent need was also shown to address the 
disconnect between government and the private sector with some measures put in place to 
reassure the private sector that they are indeed a critically important partner in ABS 
implementation at the national level. 
 
The results were mixed on whether there had been adaptive learning over the years in 
Namibia. The progress made however, seems to indicate that learning has taken place and 
informed decisions were taken, albeit slowly. 
 
8.7.4 Phase 4: Current State Of Affairs With ABS (2005 – 2012) 
8.7.4.1 Effective Measures to Address Information Asymmetry in the ABS 
Implementation Framework  
The results seemed to indicate mixed views on this issue. This in itself indicated that many 
of the stakeholders had not as yet fully understood the core issues surrounding ABS, and, 
therefore, information asymmetries still remained, especially in some key governmental 
departments. There had been numerous workshops held on ABS in Namibia. Yet, 
significantly, one of the lessons under this section was that workshops were not necessarily 
the best mode or medium for imparting ABS knowledge to stakeholders, but that there was 
a need for innovative information-sharing mechanisms. The results did confirm that 
information asymmetries were critical for ABS and need to be addressed. 
 
Cole and Nakamela (2008 p. 32) recommended the establishment of a national awareness 
creation campaign to inform people, particularly rural communities, about research, and their 
rights, etc. The capacity of customs and police at points of exit from Namibia would also need 
to be strengthened, again demonstrating the need for awareness and coordination of efforts 
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towards effective ABS implementation. This also brings in the need for sharing information 
and knowledge. An important point was made that over the years there would need to be a 
differentiation between information asymmetries and knowledge asymmetries as both 
seemed to affect implementation in different ways. 
8.7.4.2 Discussion on the Indicators Derived for this Critical Factor 
The assessment for this critical factor against the derived indicators are presented in Table 
8.14 below. 
Table 8.14: Assessment of effective measures to address information asymmetry in the ABS 
implementation framework based on the indicators derived for this critical factor 
EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO ADDRESS INFORMATION ASYMMETRY IN THE ABS 
IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK 
Indicators derived Namibian status based on results of assessment 
The definitions in the Nagoya 
Protocol are being used especially 
for GR and utilisation 
This is a requirement that must be looked at within the 
context of the time that it took to develop the ABS Protocol. 
The Namibian draft legislation has made provision for that.  
 
A clear policy on science, research 
and technology including tech 
transfer is being used 
 
There seems to be   a policy on science and technology at 
the national level. A policy for research and technology 
transfer seems not to have been developed.  It seems 
though that there is enough basic ground work to assure that 
such policies can be developed and implemented with 
relative ease -  taking into account the results from this study 
in terms of coordination, communication and institutional 
efficiency 
 
A functional CEPA initiative on ABS 
is in place at national level with a 
special focus on traditional 
knowledge 
 
There is no such strategy in place, however extensive 
consultations have been carried out in the regions of 
Namibia to create awareness on ABS and the draft bill 
including its implications. A concerted effort should remain 
a priority. 
 
Effective, efficient and functional 
institutional and administrative 
measures are in place 
 
This has been discussed under the critical factor non-
complex administrative structures. 
 
Measures are in place to reduce 
potential negotiating and other 
inequalities between stakeholders 
 
It can be argued that these measures are in place but have 
not been institutionalized for ABS. In the CBNRM arena this 
has been done and the step towards doing so for ABS 
should not be challenging.  In general however Namibia has 
done well in this regard for ABS. 
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Rules and guidelines to ensure that 
functional and effective 
communication process at the 
national level are clear 
 
This is an important one for Namibia.  The results indicate 
that few people have access to the right information to effect 
the right actions. Rules and guidelines to ensure that 
functional and effective communication process therefore 
needs to be agreed by all and all need to stick to the agreed 
rules and process in terms of communication, this is 
especially true for the government stakeholders. 
Information asymmetry seems to be amongst the easiest of 
the critical factors to deal with, however since this depends 
on efficient unbiased communication amongst the key 
actors it is made difficult by the human dimension. As the 
issue of ABS plays of in the socio-political arena this further 
complicates the issue of information asymmetry since 
information is related to power and the ability to make 
informed decisions. 
8.7.4.3 Presence of Effective and Efficient Measures to Build Trust (Social 
Capital) Amongst Stakeholders  
The results points to the fact that social capital is regarded as very important, i.e the presence 
of networks and connections within the ABS market and policy arena, includingrelations of 
trust and mutual support, formal and informal groups, common rules and sanctions, collective 
representation, mechanisms for participation in decision-making and the presence of 
effective leadership within the ABS sector in Namibia,. 
 
Namibian producers played a leading role in the development of the “Ubuntu Natural” hybrid 
standard developed by PhytoTrade Africa. Information asymmetries and social capital 
amongst the players, especially within the private sector was developed. While certification 
and quality standards remain a challenging barrier for Biotrade business, Namibian 
producers have gone a long way to obtain recognition domestically and internationally 
(UNEP, 2012 p. 22). However, much still remains to be done particularly with regards to 
certification and quality standards. The sector could benefit from further public and 
international support, especially in terms of market incentives and capacity building. 
Nonetheless, successful experiences suggest that the supply side capacity could be a 
positive impact on Namibia’s implementation of ABS measures (UNEP, 2013 p. 22). 
 
Namibia has done well with regard to implementation of the (Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements (MEAs) particularly related to biodiversity, climate change and land degradation 
as well as CITES (DRFN, 2008 p. 14). These agreements have relevance to ABS 
implementation.
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8.7.4.4 Discussion on the Indicators Derived for this Critical Factor 
Table 8.15 below provides the discussion or assessment of the indicators derived for this 
critical factor. 
Table 8.15: Assessment of effective and efficient measures to build trust (social capital) 
amongst stakeholders 
PRESENCE OF EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT MEASURES TO BUILD TRUST (SOCIAL 
CAPITAL) AMONGST STAKEHOLDERS 
 
Indicators derived Namibian status based on results of 
assessment 
An effective, transparent legal, policy and 
administrative ABS domestic framework is in 
place 
The Namibian framework is in place but more 
could be done in terms of effective 
implementation. The challenge that seems to 
hinder trust lies more in the human capital and 
human dimensions area. The results also points 
to the critical need to build trust between and 
amongst the players in the ABS sector within 
Namibia and internationally as over the years the 
various sectors has to some extend realized that 
there are serious mistrust issues that hinders 
effective cooperation, harmonization of policy 
and joint effort. This results in serious time 
delays, duplication of efforts, wastage of scarce 
resources, and general lack of concerted 
effective action on the ground in terms of 
implementation by some critical actors in the 
ABS policy arena in Namibia. 
Despite these challenges however, there 
somehow seems to have been some 
cooperation taking place over the years among 
some actors in the ABS policy arena. According 
to UNEP (2012) there is a good level of 
cooperation among stakeholders from civil 
society and the public and private sector. 
 
Effective and functional administrative 
procedures are in place 
The results points to fact that the procedures are 
there however the challenge lies in the human 
capacity and will to enforce and effectively 
implement these procedures. This results in 
mistrust developing within the ABS policy arena. 
A good governance structure is in place at the 
national level 
The discussion on good governance pointed out 
that Namibia from enjoys relative good 
governance overall for its ABS framework 
The internationally recognised certificate is 
being used 
At the international level this certificate is not yet 
in place 
 
8.7.4.5 Summarizing Remarks for Phase 4 
This phase has brought to the fore critical issues resulting from sincere self-reflection and 
review ofthe various phases from Namibian independence till now. One of the most 
significant insights came from the government sector respondents who argued that perhaps 
the real ‘culprits’ regarding misrepresentation in the area of ABS were not the private sector 
companies, but rather NGO’s, environmental activists, uninformed officials, and public media 
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that spread misinformation and raised unrealistic expectations in Namibia regarding ABS and 
its potential benefits. From this perspective then, the problem was rather with those 
implementing ABS themselves misrepresenting the potential value to communities and thus 
creating unrealistic expectations of the value. This was further worsened by lack of 
regulations, controls, monitoring, enforcement and knowledge. All though some may find this 
insight a bit unsettling and interpret it as criticism by the government sector of all other 
sectors, a second reading would make it clear that it also speaks about uninformed officials.  
 
In addressing information asymmetry it would be important to know how to digest and 
internalize information gathered. There has been a big learning curve in the Namibia ABS 
sector over the years. What has become clear is that information is the oil that makes the 
ABS machinery work. However, the most strategic information is often not readily available 
and accessible from the industry. There must, therefore, be a strategy to allow Namibia to 
draw the right information from the right actors and distribute it to the right stakeholders. 
 
It is also important to recognize this insight that Namibia has come to learn over the years. 
ABS is deeply concerned with the flow of information and benefits and in this regard 
information must be viewed as a national asset. The necessary policy, legal and 
administrative framework should be put in place but beyond these measures there should 
also be those actors who can interpret the law and make the information accessible and 
understandable to the stakeholders to ensure that the required and appropriate informed 
decisions are taken. 
The role of the Namibian Research and Academia sector has been confirmed as critical in 
addressing information asymmetry through engaging in focused and targeted research 
aimed at addressing or filling information gaps. There is a perceived call for an embracing 
targeted training strategy, taking into account the required skills and knowledge necessary 
to implement ABS effectively in Namibia. This means a focus on the vocational training 
sector, scientist proper and related fields such as environmental lawyers, economics, 
biotechnology and so forth. An integral part of such a national training strategy tailored to 
meet identified needs and skills would be necessary. 
 
Another critical concern that was highlighted in the reflection over the years was that 
scientists had been responding to politics and not that politics was responding to scientists - 
which had serious implications for trust building and addressing information asymmetry. This 
was discussed before and could lead to a situation where policy decisions were taken based 
on political imperatives that could have nothing to do with the realities on the ground and, 
therefore the right policy framework and action required for effective and sustainable ABS 
implementation. 
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There was a general sense of goodwill towards the view that trust was essential for effective 
implementation of the ABS legal, policy and administrative framework. Moreover, there was 
also a shared recognition in Namibia that trust was at the heart of full disclosure and fair 
negotiation in relation to ABS implementation and that it was important that trust was coupled 
with transparency and administrative efficiency. 
 
The internal critical reflection pointed to the fact that Namibia had done well in terms of trust 
building between the private sector and the local communities, and the private sector and 
civil society. Yet, to some extent, they fared less well in relation to building partnerships 
between the private sector and government, and NGO and government. It was important to 
consider the point that the ABS sector had suffered from distrust as there are high suspicions 
towards some of the main actors - especially towards the private sector. Still, it seems that 
over the years suspicions have been dissipating and trust building was continuing - there 
have been fewer mistrustful statements being made. Trust issues must be looked upon within 
the context of Namibia’s historic legacy of apartheid and colonialism – as this legacy left a 
culture of mistrust between different groups of people and towards authority structures. As 
trust is built on understanding, it would be the role of government to be a facilitator and to 
bring together the players to foster understanding and, through that, allow all players to do 
their job in terms of implementation. 
 
An important final reflection was that Namibia has learned that ABS is much more complex 
than originally thought, and that there would be little immediate prospects of appreciable 
financial gain if the challenges were not addressed effectively in a targeted and coordinated 
manner. 
8.7.5 The Internal and External Factors That Impact On The Critical 
Factors As Derived From The Global Survey On ABS. 
8.7.5.1 Criticism from Different Interest and Advocacy Groups and 
Change in Legal Framework 
Change in legal frameworks is especially important for investors from outside Namibia. This 
however, seemed not to have been a significant factor for Namibia, given that there was no 
ABS legislation in place till now. The change in approach within Namibia seems to have had 
a positive effect for ABS implementation since the number of ABS cases started to increase 
soon after. The change simply meant that Namibia became pro-active on a case-by-case 
basis, as was explained in the literature review. This opened the ABS sector for those 
investors willing and able to engage in an adaptive manner within the Namibian framework 
and conditions at that particular time. 
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Criticism from the different interest and advocacy groups seemed not to have had a 
significant impact with regards to ABS implementation. The core issue appeared to have 
been mistrust amongst the players. Despite this an apparent genuine effort towards finding 
common grounds for ABS implementation was made. 
8.7.5.2 Advancement in Science and Technology As Well As Special 
Circumstances at the National Level 
New scientific findings definitely had an impact on Namibia’s ABS approach and the 
implementation of the ABS framework. Technology innovations also came to the fore since 
some technologies had to be adapted to suit the needs of the Namibian primary producers. 
Since Namibia has not become a significant user of its own genetic resources, the impact of 
this was difficult to assess. Special circumstances at the national level did influence 
Namibia’s implementation approach, especially the dichotomy in its policy framework, as was 
discussed in the preceding sections. 
Political pressure in Namibia could be seen as having had a significant positive influence on 
ABS implementation, especially from the political decision-makers. On the other hand, 
perceived political pressure or perhaps political favor or power by some actors in the 
technocrat’s level seems to have hampered effective ABS implementation in Namibia. This 
was discussed extensively in the preceding sections. 
 
Changing demand levels may not have had such a significant impact on Namibia since the 
pipeline approach assured many eggs in different baskets. What emerged though, was the 
negative impact of the inability to supply products, which may have led to the termination of 
some interesting bioprospecting initiatives within Namibia. 
8.7.6 Overall Discussion for The Discussion Session 
This study has shown that the ongoing challenge in Namibia, in terms of effective 
implementation, lies in the policy application arena at national level. It includes conflict 
between policies and legislation of different sectors, lacking an overall policy and 
implementation framework, and integrating sectoral policies with respect to addressing 
natural resources, the environment and its natural variability and change (DRFN, 2008 p. 8).  
 
Policies in Namibia today are much better informed, but the legislation and regulations arising 
from these policies are languishing and implementation is slow, selective or negligible in 
many instances (Seeley and Montgemory, 2009 p. 164).  
The political will and commitment however, has remained throughout and this has most 
probably forced the technical decision-making level to allow for progress in the ABS policy 
arena.  
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No overall policy has been formulated on participation, devolution of responsibilities or 
community empowerment, although this is included in most sectoral policies and has been 
addressed in the recent government – civil society partnership policy (DRFN, 2008 p. 8). The 
implication for ABS implementation has been significant. The civil society has risen to meet 
a great challenge and the findings of this study show that their role and contribution to ABS 
and community empowerment is well recognized. Challenges do still remain and the lessons 
learned as elaborated by the different categories of stakeholders point to the fact that these 
challenges need to be addressed for effective ABS implementation. The implementation of 
the ABS policy arena will require a multi-sectoral, multi-disciplinary and cross-sectoral 
approach involving communities and research and academia.  
 
The findings also show that since independence inter-sectoral cooperation and coordination 
has been frequently spoken about and attempts to implement an integrated approach are 
undertaken at different levels for different purposes. This perhaps can be traced back to the 
design set-up of the national development frameworks after independence. An integrated, 
cross-sectoral approach was taken for formulation of the National Development Plans I and 
II (1995-2000, 2000 -2005), while a sectoral but cross-ministry approach was taken for NDP 
III (2005- 2010). Interestingly, NDP 4 was undertaken again without a sectoral focus. 
Implementation of these five year plans continues to be primarily sectoral, within individual 
ministries, rather than integrated. While integrated planning is frequently called for, it does 
not necessarily ensure integrated implementation. This issue came out clearly in the results 
from the various categories of stakeholders.  
 
Another challenge that emerged from this survey was the lack of understanding amongst the 
actors of the others’ primary interests and needs, as well as their understanding of one 
another’s roles and activities in terms of ABS implementation, especially in the government 
sector. Poor communications and limited opportunities for communication, lack of 
coordination and integration amongst different segments of governments, and between 
governments and the people, hamper the possibility of overcoming of this challenge. This is, 
however, also true amongst the other groups, such as research and academia, the private 
sector and local communities. 
 
By and large, the capacity to deal with ABS has been developed within Namibia with local 
communities, with their service providers (civil society), with young, up-and-coming middle-
level decision makers and with a few impartial committed high-level decision makers.  
 
The question that remains then is whether Namibia has been effective and successful in 
terms of dealing with ABS? The results suggest that the answer is yes. 
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The findings by Cole and Nakhamela (2008 p. 4) point to the fact that while almost 1000 
research and collection permits have been issued since 1999, many of them to foreign 
researchers, only 22 MTAs have been signed, all of them since 2005. This indicates that 
there is interest in Namibian genetic material and transactions have occurred. Table 8.16 
below summarises the number of permits issued between 1999 and 2007. The Ministry of 
Environment and Tourism estimates that 90% of the researchers have complied with the 
conditions of the permits issued. 
 
Table 8.16 Summary of Research and Collection Permits issued in Namibia between 1999 and 
2007 
YEAR No OF PERMITS ISSUED 
1999 105 
2000 91 
2001 121 
2002 112 
2003 106 
2004 124 
2005 114 
2006 110 
2007 115 
TOTAL 998 
Source: Cole and Nakhamela (2008 p. 4) 
 
Their analysis also pointed out that permits have been issued to researchers from almost 20 
different countries. The main countries to which permits have been issued are presented in 
the table below. 
 
Table 8.17 Main countries to which permits have been issued by Namibia 
COUNTRY No OF PERMITS ISSUED 
Namibia 283 
Germany 156 
South-Africa 130 
United States of America 83 
United Kingdom 57 
Source: Cole and Nakhamela (2008 p. 4) 
 
The above warrants further investigation to further elucidate that Namibia was indeed 
successful in dealing with ABS the next session explores this issue further. 
8.7.7 Has Namibia’s Approach to ABS Implementation Been Successful? 
To answer this question one would need to see whether there has been activities in terms of 
accessing of Namibia’s genetic resources and whether transactions have taken place. 
8.7.7.1 Cases of ABS and Biotrade in Namibia over the Years 
As was said before, the issues of biotrade and ABS are interwoven and this has also been 
the case for Namibia. Success has sometimes been measured by the number of contracts, 
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patents and cases that a country has been able to negotiate and implement over years. The 
challenge with this view is that it negates all the other gains a country may have made such 
as technology transfer, capacity building and advocacy resulting from the investments of a 
country in engaging the ABS debate.  
 
Also the income, business and development opportunities created through investment in 
biotrade should be taken into account. The indicators for successful ABS implementation, as 
determined by this study, attest to the importance of these other measures of success. The 
example of Costa Rica also exemplifies that.  
 
Many Namibian biotrade cases (e.g. marula oil, devil’s claw, ximenia) were initiated by the 
Traditional Knowledge holders and executed with their involvement as required by the CBD, 
and as an alternative to PIC. Additionally, it is worth considering that a proactive valorisation 
approach to indigenous resources changes “standard” ABS relationships completely: rather 
than responding to request for access from users, the providers choose which resources to 
prioritize and then seek appropriate research/user partners who are willing and able to work 
on the target resources. While some of the more formal ABS modalities might still be used in 
such arrangements (e.g. Material Transfer Agreements) others, like benefit-sharing 
agreements, might not be needed (since the terms of collaboration are dictated by the 
providers).  
 
Most of the ABS work in Namibia became apparent in the mid-90s onward before that work 
focused on biotrade and the generation of markets, quality and standards of material, as well 
as general awareness of the issue. It must be pointed out though that this is an arbitrary 
division since it would be difficult to refer to any significant work on biotrade before the mid-
90s in Namibia. It is indeed true that there may be some examples – devil’s claw especially, 
and maybe the German colonial efforts with e.g. manketti – but most of these were simply 
exploitative trade in indigenous natural resources. As such, they could provide an interesting 
and illuminating contrast to later work aimed at increasing benefits to harvesters and 
Traditional Knowledge holders (Du Plessis, pers. comm, 2014). 
 
An attempt was made to present ABS cases of genetic resources that have been of interest 
and that have been processed in Namibia. What became evident in the process, was how 
complex this issue was, so that it couldnot be easily reduced into a table due tothe need for 
extensive and detailed explanation. 
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Table 8.18 Cases of genetic resources that have been of interest and that have been processed 
in Namibia 
ABS CASE 
GENETIC 
RESOURCE 
Purpose Success (Benefits) 
 
Scientific 
Research 
Commercial 
Research 
Local 
value 
adding 
Consistent 
demand 
Improved 
resource 
practices 
Capacity 
building 
Sustainability 
Marula oil N Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ximenia oil N  Yes 
Agreements 
signed 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kalahari Wild 
melon seed oil 
N Heads of 
agreement, 
(MTA in 
place  
Yes N Y Y Y 
Grass species Y 
MTA in 
place, work 
not 
completed 
Research 
permit, MTA 
(work not 
completed) 
N N N N N 
Scorpion Venom N None (permit 
not granted) 
N N N N N 
Snake Venom N None (Permit 
not granted) 
N N N N N 
All Namibian 
endophytes 
N None (Permit 
to carry out 
research not 
granted) 
N N N N N 
Moringa 
Ovalifolia all parts 
N None Permit 
not granted  
N N N N N 
!nara seeds N Failed verbal 
arrangement
s with TK 
holders 
Y  Y Y Y Y 
Welwitschia resin N None N N N N  
Mopane essential 
oil 
N MTA, heads 
of agreement 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Comiphora resin N MTA(s), 
heads of 
agreement,  
Y Y Y Y Y 
 
The above table highlights the difficulties quantifying success in the ABS market by only 
looking at contracts. The difference between contracts and patents is significant, for example, 
and there are other IP rights beyond patents to consider (Du Plessis, 2014). There are, 
therefore, additional measures/indicators of success (e.g. local value adding, better prices, 
more consistent demand, improved resource management practices/sustainability etc. that 
must be taken into account. The case of comiphora resin, for instance, has had many benefits 
e.g. a factory is in place, products (local and international) are in the market, a visitor centre 
has been put up, several community forest registrations, amongst others. The same applies 
for Marula oil. 
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The challenge has been that some applications were turned down as there was not sufficient 
information, or no consensus could be reached to sign a transfer agreement, especially if the 
application had commercial intent. However, even in those cases the outcome of these 
applications indicates that genetic resources of interests can be followed up later. 
8.7.7.2 Analysis of Material Transfer Agreements signed in Namibia 
Between 2008 - 2012 
The material transfer agreements that are held by the Namibian National Botanical Research 
Institute shows that there is a healthy interest in Namibian genetic material. This is 
emphasized by the number of material transfer agreements signed for scientific and 
commercial research. These material transfer agreements cover plants, lichen, fungi and 
micro-organisms. It is important to keep the issue of time lags to the generation of benefits 
in mind when considering success in ABS cases. 
 
These MTAs deal only with plant material. There are probably many other cases involving 
e.g. animals and insects that are not captured (Carr, pers. comm, 2014; and Du Plessis pers 
comm 2014). The information referred to here could maybe be gleaned from a review of the 
Ministry of Environment and Tourism’s (MET) Research Permits. This was not done under 
the current study since the MTA’s from the NBRI were sufficient to show that Namibia has 
indeed been handling cases and that there is an interest in Namibian genetic resource. 
 
It is further important to point out that overlaps between biotrade and ABS blur significantly 
when Traditional Knowledge is involved – and the question is how to account for this aspect. 
In Namibia some of the work initiated under biotrade through the IPTT in 2000 still goes on, 
without any clear success yet, because of constrained budgets, human resources, technical 
capacity, organizational capital Du Plessis pers. Comm. 2014) 
 
Given the sensitive nature of the research and the confidentiality of the agreements, the term 
‘plant material’ includes various parts of plants such as essential oils, resins, leaves, roots, 
tubers amongst others. To protect the identity of the various research institutions, this study 
has only considered the origin of the institution. The type of institutions varied from 
universities, botanical gardens, private companies, multi-national companies amongst 
others. 
 
This table intended to demonstrate that Namibia has engaged fully in the ABS arena at the 
national level in terms of actual agreements. The information is derived from an analysis of 
Material Transfer Agreements at the Namibian National Botanical Research Institute. The 
timeframe 2012 to 2008 was selected to see whether, in those specific five years, many 
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materials have been accessed. The table shows that most of the agreements for commercial 
research were signed between 2010 and 2008.  
 
The table further shows that five (5) German, two (2) Belgian, five (5) USA, one (1) 
Zimbabwean, three (3) South-African, 3 United Kingdom and 4 Namibian research 
institutions have accessed and signed material transfer agreements in Namibia for both 
commercial and research purposes under this timeframe. It further shows that Namibian 
institutes were also involved in the ABS research both for commercial and research purpose. 
Namibian institutes have also gone into joint ventures with other institutions. Some 
institutions from outside have been coming back to Namibia over the years to acquire 
materials, while some started off with scientific research and then ended up with commercial 
research. 
 
Table 8.19 Analysis of Material Transfer Agreements in Namibia over a period of five years 
(2012 -2008)  
INSTITUTION TYPE OF  
MATERIAL 
MATERIAL 
TRANSFER 
AGREEMENT 
PURPOSE YEAR 
Scientific 
Research 
Commercial 
Research 
German 
research 
institute (1) 
Plant material signed Y N 2012 
Namibian 
Research 
Institutes (1) 
Plant material Signed (2) Y N 2012 
South African 
Research 
Institute (1) 
Plant material Signed  Y N 2012 
USA 
Research 
Institute (1) 
Various desert plants signed Y N 2012 
German 
research 
Institute (2) 
Mixed plants signed Y N 2012 
Namibian 
Research 
Institute (2) 
Various plant 
samples 
signed Y N 2012 
Belgium 
Research 
Institute (1) 
Plant sample signed Y N 2012 
Belgium 
Research 
Institute (2) 
Plant sample signed N Y 2012 
Namibian 
Research 
Institute (3) 
and USA 
Based 
Research 
Institute (2) 
Various plant species 
samples 
signed Y N 2012 
German 
Research 
Institute (3) 
Soil samples 3 agreements 
signed 
Y N 2012 
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USA 
Research 
Institute (3) 
Plant sample signed Y N 2012 
USA 
Research 
Institute (4) 
Fungus samples signed Y N 2012 
German 
Research 
Institute (4) 
Plant Material signed Y N 2012 
UK Research 
Institute 
Plant Material signed Y N 2012 
South African 
Research 
Institute (2) 
Plant Material 3 agreements 
signed (on 
various 
occasions) 
Y N 2011 
USA 
Research 
Institute (5) 
Plant Material signed Y N 2011 
South African 
Research 
Institute (3) 
Plant Material signed Y N 2011 
Zimbabwean 
Research 
Institute 
Plant Material signed N Y 2011 
German 
Research 
Institute (5) 
Plant Material signed N Y 2011 
German 
Research 
Institute (3) 
Soil Samples 2 agreements 
signed on 
various 
occasions 
Y N 2011 
Namibian 
Research 
Institute (2) 
Plant Material signed N Y 2011 
UK Based 
Research 
Institute (2) 
Plant Material 2 agreements 
signed at 
separate times 
Y N 2011 
German 
Research 
Institute (4) 
Plant material signed Y N 2010 
German 
Research 
Institute (3) 
Soil Samples signed Y N 2010 
German 
Research 
Institute (1) 
Plant Material signed Y N 2010 
Namibia 
Research 
Institute (3) 
Plant Material signed N Y 2010 
German 
Research 
Institute (5) 
Plant Material  4 agreements 
signed at 
various 
occasions 
N Y 2010 
Namibian 
Research 
Institute (4) 
and German 
Research 
Institute (5) 
Plant Material signed N Y 2010 
USA 
Research 
Institute (6) 
Plant Material signed Y N 2009 
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UK Based 
Research 
Institution (2) 
Plant Material signed N Y 2009 
UK Based 
Research 
Institute (3) 
Plant Material signed N Y 2009 
UK Research 
Institution (2) 
Plant Material signed N Y 2008 
Namibian (4) 
and 
Zimbabwean 
Research 
Institute  
Plant Material signed N Y 2008 
Namibian (4) 
and 
Zimbabwean 
Research 
Institute 
Plant material signed N Y 2008 
() indicate the different research institute 
 
From the above it is clear that the process of studying a country from the perspective of the 
critical factors for ABS effective implementation has allowed for an in-depth and self-critical 
analysis of the ABS policy arena in Namibia. The insights gained are far reaching and when 
heeded will have a meaningful contribution to the policy design, development and 
implementation in Namibia towards the goal of effective ABS implementation. 
 
8.8 CONCLUSIONS 
The results indicate that the critical factors can indeed be used as a comparison within a 
country to track changes in terms of dealing with ABS over time. The various phases that 
have been assessed based on the critical factors and their indicators, clearly shows a 
progression over time in terms of how the Namibian government has been dealing with the 
issue of ABS.  
 
The indicators that were derived from the global survey, based on the critical factors and the 
assessment in terms of the effectiveness of Namibia’s approach towards ABS 
implementation over time, has provided useful insights and lessons learned that can lead to 
improvements in the approach that Namibia has taken both in terms of policy and 
implementation. 
 
In general, the greatest gap with respect to ABS implementation appears to be on the level 
of individual knowledge, understanding and attitudes. Employees of relevant ministries, 
NGOs and private sector appear to have mediocre to excellent skills to undertake their 
specific responsibilities within the ABS policy arena. Despite mastering skills, many do not 
seem to have the understanding of the role of ABS in sustainable development and 
attainment of the higher development goals and thus do not have the appropriate attitudes 
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to address relevant issues. Even with skills, many are unable to broadly apply them to broad-
based and cross-cutting problem solving, such as ABS implementation. As a consequence, 
this lack of understanding tends to affect the institutional attitudes towards the environment 
but permeate through to the ABS policy and implementation arena and hence the 
organizational and networking capacities so necessary for effective implementation. 
Unfortunately, this lack of overall understanding extends to many high level decision-makers 
who also tend to view suggestions from others as criticism or a challenge to competence.  
 
Moreover, the results in this study suggest that this may be traced back to scientists who 
have become principal policy-makers and decision-makers. By implication and thus 
influencing the political decision-making processes to perpetuate this lack of understanding 
or unwillingness to understand, based on the realities on the ground from feedback from 
research and academia, civil society and the private sector. Therefore, the governance 
structure and the assignment of property rights seems not to be the main challenge but rather 
the challenge to move from drafting to implementation to the policy making and interpretation 
intermediaries through to the political decision-makers who can affect the necessary political 
will and commitment to affect enforcement and monitoring of implementation by all 
stakeholders. 
 
Political will and commitment, especially amongst political decision-makers, as indicated by 
civil society through the patronage they received from the Office of the President, as well as 
by the various ministers of environment, seem to have been amongst the main driving forces 
for ABS implementation when the intermediaries have failed. 
 
The results also confirm that the dynamism of the evolution of ABS, due to internal and 
external factors in the country, has an impact on the critical factors in terms of implementation 
at the national level. Political pressure (perceived or real) seems to be a significant factor, 
more so at the implementation level than at the policy level, since political will and 
commitment towards ABS has been assured. However, at the bureaucratic or technocratic 
level this has been blocked in terms of commitment to speed up implementation. The other 
external factor also has all but been confirmed as having an impact on implementation. 
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CHAPTER 9 
OVERALL CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
This is not the end  
– it is simply the pointer to the road less travelled and beyond –  
the road towards full and effective implementation of the Nagoya Protocol 
 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
The present study investigated the critical factors necessary for ensuring the effectiveness 
of ABS instruments at national and international levels. The theoretical framework for the 
study was based upon New Institutional Economics (NIE) theory.  
 
The study further developed indicators for the critical factors, and determined whether the 
critical factors and their indicators could be used to monitor progress in a country with regard 
to the development and implementation of national policy and legal framework in this area.  
 
In order to do so, a number of expert interviews were completed, which provided the primary 
information on potential indicators of the critical factors, as well as additional critical factors. 
This information eventually became the basis of the questionnaire that was used in the 
international online survey on ABS. The last steps of the study consisted of the interviews for 
the Namibia case studies, as well as the desk study for the institutional learning under the 
CBD, during the negotiations of the Nagoya Protocol on ABS.  
 
This Protocol provides the central point for this thesis since, after a long process of 
international negotiations, the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair 
and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity was adopted in October 2010. The Protocol seeks to increase legal certainty on 
ABS issues by providing more detailed guidance on access (which must be with Prior 
Informed Consent, or PIC), utilization of GR, benefit-sharing (on Mutually Agreed Terms, or 
MAT) and compliance (including user measures to prevent illegal utilization). Member states 
are now faced with the implementation of this Protocol. 
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It is important to point out that the focus of the study was not to do a review of the Nagoya 
Protocol or domestic instruments in terms of their legal or non-legal aspects, but rather on 
the characteristics necessary to make implementation effective.  
9.2 SYNTHESIS OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND ANSWERS TO 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The main empirical findings were made chapter specific and were summarized within the 
respective empirical chapters i.e. Chapter 3 – Deriving the indicators for the critical factors, 
Chapter 6 - the results and discussion of the online global ABS survey, Chapter 7 - 
institutional or organizational learning in the CBD from the perspective of the ABS 
Negotiations and, finally Chapter 8- The Namibian Case study using the critical factors and 
indicators derived.  
 
This section will synthesize the empirical findings to answer the study’s main research 
questions. 
 
The overall objective of this study was threefold. First, it was to confirm the critical factors in 
terms of their effectiveness to ABS implementation as well as the underlying assumptions in 
terms of ABS implementation at the national and international levels. It then sought to carry 
out an in-depth re-consideration and analysis of the critical factors, and lastly, to develop 
indicators for the critical factors themselves. The study thus provided another way of verifying 
the critical factors by means of a broad international survey.  
 
In Chapter 3 – the literature review showed that: 
1. The empirical framework provided by Richerzhagen (2007) was not used by workers to 
carry out and advance the assumptions contained in or underlying her work, as no 
literature based upon her work was evident. The search, however, also provides ample 
indications that the work of Richerzhagen (2007) up to now provides the most 
comprehensive and systematically structured framework to analyse the effectiveness of 
ABS regimes at the national and international levels.  
2. The literature review further revealed that over the years there was a significant effort 
towards building a body of knowledge on ABS implementation globally. It also elucidates 
the fact that there has been no development of indicators for ABS implementation in a 
systematic and empirical manner based on an analytical framework, as provided for by 
the critical factors. 
 
Chapter 6 – which speaks about the results of the global survey on ABS, has shown that the 
objectives of the study were met in that the indicators for the critical factors were confirmed, 
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as well as the importance of the critical factors themselves, both at national and international 
levels. The empirical results further confirmed that the assumptions made were valid at both 
national and international levels. 
 
As seen in Chapter 6 - the factor analysis based on the indicators for the critical factors, 
allowed for all original indicators derived to be retained for use as indicators for the critical 
factors. Actors in the ABS policy arena now have a tool with which to measure their own 
progress and effectiveness in terms of ABS implementation. This tool has also been 
designed to ensure that in the development and design of their domestic ABS policy and 
legal frameworks such actors would have access to the indicators to continually gauge their 
effectiveness. 
 
The indicators developed provide a check list to governments as to what elements they 
should consider within their ABS domestic frameworks that would assure them of a measure 
of success in this area. It is, therefore, recommended that those involved in the ABS policy 
arena use these indicators so that they can be further tested and refined in the interest of 
effective ABS implementation.  
 
The indicators will need to be used taking into account the developmental stage, status and 
reality of the specific country, and also taking into account the external and internal factors 
that influence the ABS policy arena as discussed in chapter 7. The study has shown that 
indeed, these internal and external factors i.e. key political pressure, changing demand 
levels, new competitors, new scientific findings, technology innovations, criticism from NGO, 
criticism from industry, criticism from media, criticism from governments, and change in legal 
frameworks, do influence the ABS policy arena. 
 
The main recommendations from the global survey on ABS, points to the need for more 
dialogue between the players in the ABS policy arena, particularly around implementation 
which is geared towards agreements or transactions that would be able to unlock the 
generation of benefits, as well as the equitable sharing of such benefits. If the ABS private 
sector would not be allowed to engage meaningfully in the ABS implementation process, this 
will be difficult.  
 
The survey further revealed a critical need for actively building social capital amongst the 
various actors in the ABS policy arena, as well as building real political will and commitment. 
This would need to come, not only from the high level decision makers, but also from the 
technocrats and bureaucrats. 
Chapter 7 on institutional learning within the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) has 
shown that there has indeed been significant learning within the CBD during the negotiation 
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of the Nagoya Protocol. The study points out that the challenge will be whether this can be 
institutionalized and maintained in order to inform the ABS policy arena in terms of 
implementation. The study showed that the participation of indigenous and local communities 
was significantly mainstreamed into the work of the CBD through the ABS Working Group. 
The study further showed that adaptive management occurred within the operational 
modalities of the ABS working group in order to advance their work. 
 
A polycentric approach is being proposed for future ABS implementation, based on the 
lessons from the institutional learning. This approach further stresses that the private sector 
must be allowed to be integrally involved in the implementation of the Protocol, as well as the 
indigenous and local communities, if implementation is to be effective. The polycentric 
approach requires the inclusion of all relevant stakeholders to be involved. 
 
It is also further recommended that some of the strategies outlined in this chapter be 
institutionalized within the CBD and especially in the work of the implementation of the 
Nagoya Protocol. 
 
Chapter 8 - The Namibian case study addressed the strategic objective of whether the critical 
factors could be used to track changes within a country. It tested the critical factors, their 
indicators and the assumptions on the critical factors. It also elucidated how the critical factors 
themselves could be used to track changes within a country. 
 
The results of the Namibian case study indicates that the critical factors can indeed be used 
as a comparison within a country to track changes in terms of dealing with ABS over time. 
The various phases that were assessed based on the critical factors and their indicators, 
clearly demonstrated a progression over time, as to how the Namibian government has dealt 
with the issue of ABS.  
 
The indicators derived from the global survey and based on the critical factors, together with 
the assessment of the effectiveness of Namibia’s approach towards ABS implementation 
over time, provided useful insights and lessons learned that could lead to improvements in 
the approach that Namibia has taken, both in terms of policy and implementation. 
 
The results of the Namibian case study further confirmed that the evolutionary dynamism of 
ABS due to internal and external factors in the country, has an impact on the critical factors 
with regard to implementation at the national level. Political pressure (perceived or real) 
seems to be a significant factor. More so at the implementation level than at the policy level, 
since political will and commitment towards ABS has been assured, but has been blocked at 
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the bureaucratic or technocratic level so that implementation is slowed down. The other 
external factor also have all been confirmed as having an impact on implementation. 
 
The Namibian case study showed that the internal and external factors indeed had an impact 
on the critical factors. The study showed that political pressure, commitment and will for 
instance, can influence administrative efficiency, value addition and information asymmetry, 
amongst others. 
 
The study also confirmed that the understanding of the definition of the effectiveness of an 
ABS system is most certainly the same for all parties involved, i.e. both provider and users. 
Very small variations were observed in terms of differences in understanding regarding the 
success or definition of effectiveness of an instrument. The empirical results showed that 
stakeholders view effective implementation of ABS instruments as the ability of that 
instrument to set incentives to allow for the flow of benefits to both user and provider. This is 
followed by its ability to set incentives for the sustainable use and conservation of biodiversity.  
Slight modifications were made to the definition by Richerzhagen (2007). Her definition did 
not include the fourth bullet - incentives – which would allow for the flow of benefits to both 
user and providers of genetic resources. Her definition was essentially aimed at considering 
the effectiveness of the three objectives set by the CBD, or what would be successful, or 
effective, from the point of view of a provider country versus a user country. The Namibian 
case study further confirmed this understanding. It was shown to be necessary to manage 
expectations and eventually to provide benefits as this would become the incentive for 
conservation. 
9.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This section first looks at the general limitation facing research work on ABS and then 
proceeds to consider the concrete and specific limitations that faced this study. 
 
There is the limitation, as pointed out by Rosenthal (2009 p. 7), that we still need to grapple 
with, namely the question of who is ultimately responsible for evaluating whether the goal 
achievement/implementation of ABS legislation in a specific bio-prospecting deal, is a 
success or a failure. Ideally, we would need to follow the results and impacts of such a deal 
over a prolonged period of time and conduct broad-based interviews and surveys with all 
possible and potential stakeholders in order to answer this. Most implementation studies stop 
at outcomes (i.e. enforcement of policies leading to behaviour change in target groups, e.g. 
through institutions and budgets established to reach policy goals) rather than studying the 
effects of the full scope of socioeconomic and ecological impacts of policy decisions (see 
e.g. Hansenclever et al., 1996; Keohane & Levy, 1996). 
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There is furthermore the challenge of defining success. Some may view success simply as 
transactions that lead to real monetary income, whereas it may also be seen as other factors 
that result from such transactions such as capacity building, technology transfer and 
incentives for conservation. 
 
It is however important to point out that it is not possible to fully determine outcomes i.e. 
success in terms of number of contracts (which at this stage seems to be the only measure 
possible), in terms of benefits or number of access transactions made, in terms of 
developments or in terms of species saved due to new incentives. The outcomes here simply 
point to basic, mostly income oriented indicators, such as number of contracts and number 
of permits. 
 
There is of course the other challenge - that not many deals have been concluded 
successfully so as to generate a concept of best practice norms for the ABS market. 
Rosenthal (2009 p. 7) therefore, posits that lack of goal achievement for bio-prospecting 
deals is likely to result largely from the lack of compatible ABS legislation and measures in 
user countries. She argues that there is a failure by current international and user-country 
legal frameworks to ensure full compliance and which must be perceived as a given in any 
analysis, and which emphasizes the division between international and domestic 
distributional effects. The benefit sharing part of ABS as a concept has connotations at both 
levels (Rosenthal, 2009 p. 6). 
 
The next delimitation with regard to general work on ABS, takes cognizance of the fact that 
there are not many ABS cases. This is because many provider countries have been battling 
(Kamau and Winter, 2009) with developing, implementing and reviewing their ABS legal and 
administrative frameworks. The onset of negotiations of an international regime on ABS may 
further have delated this process for some . The outcome of this limitation is that today we 
mostly have a significant body of theoretical insight, whilst the same is not true for real, 
hands-on experience with ABS implementation or regulation of bio-prospecting, informed by 
time and through time in an adaptive manner. The implication of this situation for this study 
was that it limited the work in that the number of contracts were so few and they could, 
therefore, not be used as an indicator for (intermediate) success. It was for this reason that 
critical factors were derived from literature, as others in the ABS research arena had done 
previously.  
Looking at the concrete and specific limitations that emanated from this study, one has to 
point out that a significant limitation may rest in the sampling for the international survey on 
the effectiveness of ABS instruments with a view to develop indicators for the critical factors. 
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The sampling methodology of taking only participants from ABS working group 6 to Nagoyo 
has the limitation in that many of the major groups who should have been at the negotiating 
table - especially industry - may not have been adequately reflected, and that this bias would 
be reflected towards provider and user countries through their negotiators. It may, therefore, 
not be possible to obtain a good enough representative sample of research and academia, 
private sector/industry, civil society and indigenous and local communities. This challenge 
also reflects on the researcher, since the researcher was also part of that group and the 
respondents knew the researcher which may have resulted in a non-respondent bias, 
depending upon their relationship with the researcher. This however, could not be avoided 
as, on the other hand, it was only with this personal knowledge that it was possible to obtain 
so many responses for the study.  
 
There was also a serious lack of dialogues between industry and the negotiators, especially 
for negotiators from provider countries. This, by implication, may mean that such dialogue 
and meaningful engagement may also not have taken place at the national level. It may 
further have limitations on the results from the global survey in terms of their ability to fully 
reflect on the perspective from industry. 
 
Another limitation is that since the principal survey tool was based on electronic media, it 
may have significantly reduced participation especially by the indigenous and local 
community (ILC) sector. This limitation could partly have been due to internet connectivity 
concerns (during the time the survey ran) as well as changes of email addresses during the 
period from 2006 – 2010, since some participants may have changed sectors, positions and 
careers. This was however. not such a serious flaw. since the ABS population remained 
relatively stable throughout the negotiations. For ILC’s however. since a small group 
participated. it was difficult to obtain access to a wider range of ILC representatives through 
the internet. 
 
The Namibian technical community that was involved in the ABS debate was relatively small 
if one considers that Namibia’s total population is only 2.2 million. This has the effect that the 
pool from which stakeholders were drawn was and the dynamism of that pool, in terms of 
change and turnover, was high. The same players moved from government, to private sector, 
to civil society, to academia, during the course of their active professional lives. This placed 
a limitation on a study of the perceptions and views of these players, especially if they had 
to be categorized, as in the case of the Namibian case study. This was a serious limitation 
since the researcher then had to grapple with the challenge of being an ABS expert himself 
and trying to report what other experts have put forward.  
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One of the greatest limitations of the study was the author himself. The author had been a 
critical player in the ABS policy arena for many years both at the international, regional and 
national level. This had implications on the objectivity of the study. The limitation was that in 
an empirical study the ideas and views must come from those interviewed and not the 
researcher’s own ideas. The literature review for the Namibian case study as well as the 
results from the global survey, helped provide objectivity as a way to address this challenge. 
9.4 THEORETICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This study used empirical findings to demonstrate a critical need to involve the private sector 
more in the ABS policy arena, especially so in the implementation of the Nagoya Protocol. It 
further showed that governments may have to consider the eventuality of working towards 
the negotiation of a Convention on Technology Transfer.  
9.5 OUTLOOK FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study took the work of Richerzhagen (2007) further. In her thesis she pointed out that a 
new focus had been brought into the debate on ABS in terms of addressing effective 
implementation of the ABS instruments at the domestic and international level. This would 
foster the move towards achieving the three objectives of the CBD. At the time of her work 
the negotiations for an international regime were on in all earnest. At the time of writing, the 
Nagoya Protocol had been in place since 2010 and world governments have been working 
towards its signing, ratification, accession and eventual full and effective implementation.  
 
Having taken the work of Richerzhagen further and having used the critical factors developed 
by her as a basis, two new critical factors i.e. Social capital and valorization of biodiversity 
were added to those of Richerzhagen. In addition indicators were developed for all the critical 
factors.  
 
The players in the ABS field were not changed since the time that she has completed her 
work. At the time of writing, a significant amount of literature had been generated on the 
Nagoya Protocol. What is needed in future is action - guided by a careful design of regulation 
of and around the Nagoya Protocol. Action is now required in order to see whether the 
architecture of the Protocol, as designed by the ABS negotiators, will stand the test of time 
or whether it will render the Protocol useless, impractical and un-implementable. 
 
This current study does not claim to have the all the answers. It simply points the way and 
much more work needs to be undertaken by those willing and able to continue running with 
the flame of hope that one day world governments, industry, civil society, research and 
academia and the local and indigenous communities around the world will effectively 
implement the provisions of the Nagoya Protocol and domestic ABS instruments leading to 
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the sustainable use of biodiversity and the generation of benefits, that will be allowed to flow 
through ABS transactions and off-set conservation. 
 
In section 8.9 of Chapter 8, the material transfer agreements from Namibia were assessed 
and provided significant insights on actual cases of research for commercial and non-
commercial research. This was not an in-depth analysis but simply considered the trends in 
order to demonstrate that a country can consider itself as being successful in dealing with 
ABS implementation on the basis that ABS transactions are occurring.  
 
Furthermore, work is now needed to critically revise these contracts and agreements, 
especially from the perspective of provider countries, to interpret whether real money has 
been generated. Such a revision would also need to consider other non-monetary benefits 
and how they are related to successful ABS implementation and the critical factor time lapses 
up until the generation of benefits, amongst others aspects. 
 
Further work on institutional learning within the multilateral environmental governance 
systems is warranted. The study on institutional learning merits a full empirical research since 
the insight of such a study could have significant implications on reforms in the UN in terms 
of effective implementation of multilateral environmental agreements and conventions. 
 
Further work needs to be undertaken on how countries are implementing ABS and the 
Nagoya Protocol based on the indicators derived under this study and further refine them if 
need be. 
 
The issue of private sector involvement requires a more concerted effort as highlighted in 
this study. Here it has been demonstrated that a polycentric approach towards ABS 
implementation is critical for the Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol. 
 
The issue of technology transfer also makes itself amenable to further inquiry, in order to 
better appreciate how it influences the ABS policy arena, especially in terms of success. 
Finally, there is a need for further work on organizational learning and adaptive management 
within the CBD, not only with regard to work on ABS, but also in the other cross-cutting and 
related areas such as biosafety and Traditional Knowledge, as it relates to article 8(j) of the 
Nagoya Protocol and its interface with ABS. 
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Appendix 1 Questionnaire For The Global Survey On ABS 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of this section is to gather information about the organisation involved in Access and Benefit Sharing 
(ABS). 
 
For questions 1-5 in this section, you are only required to answer the question relevant to the category of organisation that you belong. 
1. Only answer this question if you are a non-governmental organisation. 
National International 
Non-governmental 
organisation 
 
gfedc gfedc 
 
Other (please specify) 
 
 
 
2. Only answer this question if you are an inter-governmental organisation. 
Specialised agency 
Inter-governmental 
organisation 
 
gfedc 
 
Other (please specify) 
 
 
 
3. Only answer this question if your organisation is involved with research and 
academia. 
 University Botanical garden Museum 
Research and Academia gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
Other (please specify)    
4. Only answer this question if you are with an indigenous and local community 
organisation. 
 
 
Indigenous and local 
community 
Developed country Developing country 
 
gfedc gfed
 
5. Only answer this question if you are in the private sector. 
 
 Pharmaceutical Intermediary Biotechnological Neutraceutical Cosmetic 
Private sector gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
Other (please specify)      
 
6. Name of your country 
 
5 
 
6 
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7. Please select the category that best describes your country with regard to 
biodiversity resources 
 
fec 
 
Provider 
 
fec User 
 
fec Both User and Provider 
 
 
8. Were you an ABS negotiator for the Nagoya Protocol? 
 
mlj Yes 
 
mlj  No 
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2. Effectiveness of ABS Measures 
 
 
The purpose of this section is to gather information about your understanding of what ABS measures are supposed to 
do. 
 
9. To be effective the domestic ABS legal instruments should do the following: (Please 
tick the appropriate response, note that multiple entries are possible.) 
 
 
fec Set incentives for the sustainable use and conservation of biodiversity 
 
fec Set incentives to facilitate access to genetic resources 
 
fec Set incentives to allow for the flow of benefits to both user and providers of genetic resources 
 
fec Set incentives for the assertion and recognition of rights related to genetic resources and associated Traditional Knowledge 
 
fec None of the above 
 
fec Do not know 
 
Other (please specify) 
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3. Questions on Good Governance as a Critical Factor for ABS 
 
 
The purpose of this section is to gather information about the best indicators for good governance structure of a 
country in terms of its ABS legislation. 
 
Good governance in this context means that both provider countries and user countries have put in place legislative, 
administrative or policy measures that ensures the academia, private sector and other stakeholders as well as rights 
holders such as Indigenous and Local Communities have incentives to participate in the ABS market place. This will 
lead to the generation of benefits for both provider and user country. 
 
10. In your opinion, how important are the following indicators for a good governance structure 
within a country that seeks to implement an ABS legal instrument? 
 
 
Indicators 
(Good governance structure) 
 5=Very Important 4=Important 3=Not important 2=Not important at all 1=Do not know 
Political stability prevail in gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
the country      
Political consistency fec fec fec fec fec 
prevail in the country      
A reliable legal system gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c A clear policy statement fec fec fec fec fec 
that indicates political will      
and ability to engage on      
ABS issues      
A clear statement gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
regarding the      
ratification/implementation      
of the ABS Protocol      
Signing and ratification of fec fec fec fec fec 
the Nagoya Protocol by the      
Government      
A clear policy statement on gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
putting in place a domestic      
ABS legal, administrative      
or policy framework      
The process of developing fec fec fec fec fec 
its ABS legislation,      
administrative or policy      
measure has been initiated      
by the country      
Self-interest of the gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
government of the provider      
for accomplishing ABS      
agreements      
Clear policies and strategy fec fec fec fec fec 
on ABS at the national      
level is in place      
Assurance that the user will gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
perform his obligations      
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User countries guarantee fec fec fec fec fec 
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support for measures in 
provider countries to 
ensure functionality and 
effectiveness 
 
Access to courts for plaintiff 
from another country is 
assured 
Upholding the rule of law 
is guaranteed 
For each transaction the 
relevant legal 
requirements and costs are 
clear at the national level 
An assurance provided by 
the ABS framework that the 
user will comply with the 
terms of the countries 
chosen legal vehicle for 
ABS are clear 
Functional and effective 
user country measures in 
place 
Guaranteed equity and 
equality in terms of 
transactional assistance for 
traditional and rural 
providers of Genetic 
Resources 
 
gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc 
 
 
 
fec fec fec fec
 fec gfedc gfedc gfedc
 gfedc gfedc 
 
 
fec fec fec fec fec 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc 
 
 
 
fec fec fec fec fec 
 
11. Can you think of any other indicators for a good governance structure? 
 
Indicator 1 
 
Indicator 2 
 
Indicator 3 
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4. Assigning Property Rights and Intellectual Property 
 
 
The purpose of this section is to gather information about the best indicators for how a ABS instrument is assigning 
Property Rights and Intellectual Property. 
 
This refers to how property rights are assigned in a provider/user countries domestic legislation in terms of who owns 
the genetic resources and how this ownership right enables that person/s to use, sell, transfer or exchange genetic 
resources and/or exclude others from doing these things. 
 
The assignment of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) refers to how IPR is assigned in a provider/user countries 
domestic legislation in the context of ABS. 
 
12. In your opinion how important are the following indicators for indicating how a country is 
assigning property and intellectual property rights necessary for the effective implementation 
of an ABS legal instrument. (Please tick the appropriate box below) 
 
 
Indicators 
(Assignment of property and IPR) 
 5=Very Important 4=Important 3=Not important 2=Not very Important 1=Do not know 
Clear rules as to which gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
resources and rights      
require permission or      
payment      
Clear rules as to how fec fec fec fec fec 
shared genetic resources      
will be treated      
Clear rules to ensure that gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
private property rights are      
respected      
Clear rules on how the fec fec fec fec fec 
transfer of genetic      
resources to third parties      
will be handled      
Clear rules on the roles gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
and responsibility of both      
users and providers with      
regard to the above rights      
Clear rules for disclosure fec fec fec fec fec 
requirements      
Clear rules to ensure that gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
confidentiality issues are      
taken into account by      
users and providers      
Basic commercial and fec fec fec fec fec 
administrative rights are      
clearly defined      
Clear rules on who has the gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
right to give access      
Clear rules on who can fec fec fec fec fec 
issue Prior Informed      
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Consent 
 
13. Can you think of any other indicators for assigning property rights? 
 
Indicator 1 
 
Indicator 2 
 
Indicator 3 
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5. Administrative Procedures/Complexity 
 
 
The purpose of this section is to gather information about the best indicators for the administrative complexity or 
procedures of an ABS system. 
 
In this context administrative procedures and complexity refers to how easy it is for a researcher/investor/user to 
understand and apply for an access agreement for Research and Development (R&D) in bio-prospecting in any given 
provider country. This also includes the transaction costs that the researcher/investor/ user have to incure. In other 
words are the procedures to bureaucratic or not in terms of practical implementation of the ABS legal instrument. 
 
14. In your opinion how important are the following indicators below for an effective and non 
complex administrative structure necessary to implement an ABS legal instrument (Please 
tick the appropriate box below) 
 
 
Indicators 
(Administrative Complexity) 
 5=Very Important 4=Important 3=Not important 2=Not very Important 1=Do not know 
A clear, simple and gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
functional institutional      
framework is in place      
The National Competent fec fec fec fec fec 
Authority for granting      
access is established      
A national ABS multi- gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
sectoral      
Committee/Council is in      
place      
It is clear what processes fec fec fec fec fec 
one must go through at      
the national level in order      
to acquire the resources      
and rights one desires      
A one stop shop for all gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
permits, and other      
requirements has been      
established      
Only one permit is fec fec fec fec fec 
required      
Clear competencies of gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
actors for access      
negotiators      
The National ABS Focal fec fec fec fec fec 
Point is established      
There is a clear framework gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
for stakeholder      
identification to facilitate      
effective implementation      
Availability of information fec fec fec fec fec 
about the national system      
for access and use of      
genetic resources      
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 Centrally managed access gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc 
procedures for genetic 
resources 
 
Competent contact partner fec fec fec fec fec 
in provider country is 
established and is 
reachable 
There are clear rules, gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc 
guidelines and 
information on procedures 
for Prior Informed Consent 
(PIC), Mutually Agreed 
Terms (MAT) and Material 
Transfer Agreements 
(MTAs) for applicants 
seeking access to genetic 
resources 
There is a manual of the fec fec fec fec fec 
ABS process at the 
national level 
There is a guidance gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc 
manual for the national 
ABS law, administrative or 
policy measure 
There are clear rules, fec fec fec fec fec 
guidelines and 
information on procedures 
for PIC, MAT and MTAs 
for applicants seeking 
access to traditional 
knowledge associated with 
genetic resources 
There are clear rules, gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc 
guidelines and 
information on procedures 
for benefit-sharing 
There are clear rules fec fec fec fec fec 
and/or processes for the 
involvement of the 
Indigenous and Local 
Communities for access to 
genetic resources and 
associated traditional 
knowledge 
Decision-making on ABS gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc 
application is 
decentralized and clear 
authority for decision 
making is given to lower 
levels. 
Model sectoral and cross- fec fec fec fec fec 
sectoral contractual 
clauses are being used 
 Model contractual clauses gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc 
to ensure voluntary codes of 
conduct, guidelines and 
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 best practices and/or 
standards for access and 
benefit-sharing are being 
used 
 
The international fec fec fec fec fec 
recognized certificate is 
being used 
Tools to monitor gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc 
compliance are there and 
not complex 
Check points are fec fec fec fec fec 
established 
 
The fee structure is clear gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc 
and transparent 
 
Grounds on which access fec fec fec fec fec 
can be denied or revoked 
should be mentioned and 
enforced in a transparent 
manner 
Access authorities should gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc 
make available 
information that is used as 
a basis for decision 
making and price setting 
to the public 
A rights to appeal is fec fec fec fec fec 
provided for in cases 
access is denied for 
reasons that the firm/users 
did not intend or cannot 
change 
There is no confusion and gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc 
uncertainty regarding the 
administrative rules and 
their implementation 
A clear time frame is fec fec fec fec fec 
provided of the time 
needed to reach the 
decision whether to grant 
access for non-commercial 
research 
A clear time frame is gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc 
provided of the time 
needed to reach the 
decision whether to grant 
access for commercial 
research 
A clear time frame is fec fec fec fec fec 
provided of the time 
needed to reach a 
decision on PIC, MAT and 
benefit-sharing agreement 
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15.Can you think of any other indicators for administrative procedures/complexity? 
 
Indicator 1 
 
Indicator 2 
 
Indicator 3 
 307 
 
Effectiveness of ABS policy and legislative instruments 
 
6. Time Lags/ Timeline to Benefit-Sharing 
 
 
The purpose of this section is to gather information about the best indicators for the time lags between the collection of 
samples and generation of benefits. 
 
In this context time lags refer to the fact that if the time lag between the collection and provision of samples and the 
development of a marketable product is accounted for by adequate and appropriate benefits. In other words how long 
does it take from the collection of materials to the generation of the first product and thus the first benefits 
 
16. In your opinion how important are the following indicators below for showing how a country 
is effectively addressing the issue of time lags to benefit-sharing to ensure effective 
implementation of its ABS legal instrument (Please tick the appropriate box below) 
 
 
Indicators 
(Time lags) 
 
 
 
 
5=Very Important 4=Important 
 
 
 
3=Not very 
important 
 
 
 
2=Not at all 
important 
 
 
 
 
1=Do not know 
 
Mechanisms are in place to ensure that 
benefits are allocated for biodiversity 
conservation measures 
Mechanisms in place at national level to 
ensure that short term benefits do not 
overrule long term benefits 
A national bioprospecting fund or similar 
mechanisms into which a share of the 
benefits is deposited at the national 
level 
 
A national strategy in place for the 
application of technology, skills and 
expertise transferred as benefits under 
ABS deals 
A strategy in place for building capacity 
for negotiating ABS contracts (PIC, MAT 
and appropriate benefit-sharing) 
National and regional strategies in place 
to promote use of biodiversity for value 
creation and economic development 
Clear understanding at the national level 
of the value chain of genetic resource in 
the ABS pipeline and the implications 
for benefit-sharing 
 
A strategy for building capacities of 
negotiating skills for communities 
Checkpoints are established to ensure 
the transparency of the value chain 
through which the genetic resources is 
going to ensure appropriate benefit- 
sharing 
Number of contracts negotiated under 
the ABS regime 
 
gfedc  gfedc  gfedc  gfedc  gfedc fec  fec  fec  fec  fec gfedc  gfedc  gfedc  gfedc  gfedc 
 
fec  fec  fec  fec  fec 
 
 
 
 
gfedc  gfedc  gfedc  gfedc  gfedc fec  fec  fec  fec  fec gfedc  gfedc  gfedc  gfedc  gfedc 
 
fec  fec  fec  fec  fec gfedc  gfedc  gfedc  gfedc  g 
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Amount of benefits registered as a result gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc 
of the ABS regime 
 
Total contribution of bio-prospecting fec fec fec fec fec 
activities to the national budget 
 
Total contribution of bio-prospecting gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc 
activities to biodiversity conservation and 
education 
Clear rules and guidelines for how fec fec fec fec fec 
monetary and non-monetary benefits will 
be shared 
Number of nationals trained under ABS gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc 
agreements 
 
Clear rules for scientific, technical and fec fec fec fec fec 
research co-operation 
 
Assistance for the development of gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc 
appropriate adaptation of relevant 
foreign technologies 
 
17. Can you think of any other indicators for time lags? 
 
Indicator 1 
 
Indicator 2 
 
Indicator 3 
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7. Information Asymmetries 
 
 
The purpose of this section is to gather information about the best indicators as to how an ABS instrument deals with 
information asymmetry amongst partners in ABS transactions. 
 
Information asymmetry refers to the imbalance of information in negotiations and transactions of ABS agreements 
because one party has more or better information than the other. This imbalance can result in the transaction being 
influenced negatively and can result in the contract or agreement not being entered into. 
 
The problem of uncertain product quality in the market for traditional knowledge-related information and tangible genetic 
resources where the quality of genetic resources samples or the reliability of the traditional knowledge-based information 
or both can only be verified after the good has been traded, leads to problems of information asymmetries and in extreme 
cases, to a breakdown of market exchange. 
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18. In your opinion how important are the following indicators below for showing how a country 
is effectively addressing information asymmetry in order to ensure effective implementation of 
its ABS legal instrument (Please tick the appropriate box below) 
 
 
Indicators 
(Information Asymmetry) 
 5=Very Important 4=Important 3=Not important 2=Not very important 1=Do not know 
A national ABS Clearing gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
House Mechanism is in      
place      
An ABS National Advisory fec fec fec fec fec 
Council/Committee with      
multi-disciplinary and      
multi-stakeholder      
representation in place      
A functional and effective gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
Communication      
Education and Public      
Awareness Initiative on      
ABS in place at national      
level      
Rules and guidelines to fec fec fec fec fec 
ensure that functional and      
effective communication      
process at the national      
level are clear      
Clear rules, guidelines gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
and process for dealing      
with traditional knowledge      
(TK) are in place      
Measures are in place to fec fec fec fec fec 
reduce potential      
negotiating and other      
inequalities between      
stakeholders      
A clear policy and gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
understanding of      
technology transfer at      
national level      
There is a clear policy on fec fec fec fec fec 
science, research and      
technology and its role in      
national and economic      
development      
A national strategy for gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
awareness raising on the      
value of Traditional      
Knowledge associated      
with genetic resources in      
place      
Definition of the concept fec fec fec fec fec 
of Genetic Resource as      
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Protocol is understood by 
all players 
 
The definition of the 
concept of the utilization 
of genetic resources as 
provided for in the Nagoya 
Protocol is understood by 
all players 
 
gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc 
 
19. Can you think of any other indicators for information asymmetry? 
 
Indicator 1 
 
Indicator 2 
 
Indicator 3 
 313 
 
Effectiveness of ABS policy and legislative instruments 
 
8. Market Structure 
 
 
The purpose of this section is to gather information about the ABS market and the best indicators for the ABS market 
and market structure as it relates to ABS legal instruments. 
 
In this context market structure means that all relevant stakeholders especially the private sector and the regulators 
understand the characteristics of the market and the demand and supply forces in the bio-prospecting market that 
prevails in a provider/user country. It also assumes that there is a well functioning market for biodiversity uses within 
the provider country. 
 
20. Can you please indicate below according to your view the kind of companies that are 
approaching countries for ABS related transactions? (Multiple entries are possible). 
 
fec 
 
Intermediary 
 
fec Biotechnological 
 
fec Nutraceutical 
 
fec Pharmaceutical 
 
fec Cosmetic and Personal Care 
 
fec Plant breeding and seed industry 
 
fec Phytomedicine 
 
fec All the above 
 
fec Do not know 
 
fec Other 
 
Other (please specify) 
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21. In your opinion how important are the following indicators below for understanding 
the ABS market structure inside a country that seeks to implement and effective ABS 
legal instrument (Please tick the appropriate box below) 
 
 
Indicators 
(Market Structure) 
5=Very Important 4=Important 3=Not important 2=Not very important 1=Do not know 
 
Measures are in place to gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc 
resolve the issues relating 
to the nature of market 
demand for traditional 
knowledge 
Measures are in place to fec fec fec fec fec 
resolve the cultural and 
social complexities and 
equity issues relevant to 
the ABS market at 
national level 
Domestic public and gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc 
private institutions are 
adding value to Genetic 
Resources 
Measures are in place to fec fec fec fec fec 
allow investors to assess 
the commercial risks and 
opportunities in a country 
Market opportunities in gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc 
relevant sectors are 
identified and fed into the 
national ABS strategy of 
the provider or user 
country 
 
Provider has a concept for fec fec fec fec fec 
resource evaluation 
 
Pro-active policy and gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc 
approach towards the 
private sector and 
investors interested to 
invest in the bio- 
prospecting market at the 
local level 
The search and fec fec fec fec fec 
information costs in the 
market for bio-prospecting 
is low 
Bargaining occurs under gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc 
competitive conditions 
 
Measures in place to fec fec fec fec fec 
provide an idea to 
investors about the 
potential value of ABS 
 There are public and gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc  
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 private sector incentives 
for undertaking Bio- 
prospecting 
 
The bargaining and fec fec fec fec fec 
decision- making costs in 
the market for bio- 
prospecting are low 
The monitoring and gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc 
enforcement costs in the 
market for bio-prospecting 
are low 
 
22. Can you think of any other indicators for market structure? 
 
Indicator 1 
 
Indicator 2 
 
Indicator 3 
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9. Valorization of Biodiversity 
 
 
The purpose of this section is to gather information about the best indicators for valorization strategy as part of a 
country's efforts to effectively deal with ABS legal instruments. 
 
In this context the valorization of biodiversity refers to the development of valorization strategies at the national level 
especially in provider countries that can help add value to their biodiversity as it goes up the value chain in country 
and to the market. 
 
23. In your opinion how important are the following indicators below for showing how a country 
is doing in terms of a valorization strategy as part of implementing an effective ABS legal 
instrument (Please tick the appropriate box below) 
 
 
Indicators 
(Valorization of biodiversity) 
 5=Very Important 4=Important 3=Not important 2=Not very important 1=Do not know 
A national strategy for the gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
promotion of the use of      
biodiversity for value      
creation and economic      
development is in place      
Existence of potential fec fec fec fec fec 
research partners in the      
provider country are made      
public      
Domestic public and gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
private institutions are      
involved in the      
identification of the      
commercial value of      
biodiversity      
An investment centre at fec fec fec fec fec 
national level which has      
information or database      
on the species of interest      
and with potential for      
value addition      
A list of species with gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
potential interest for      
investor and the stages of      
research at which they are      
in terms of R&D      
Efficient biodiversity fec fec fec fec fec 
infrastructure at domestic      
levels for inventories of      
genetic resources and      
traditional knowledge are      
in place      
A clear national process gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
for identification market      
opportunities in relevant      
sectors of importance to      
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 ABS is in place  
A data base covering the fec fec fec fec fec 
economic valuation 
information is in place 
A national strategy for the gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc 
promotion of the use of 
biodiversity for value 
creation and economic 
development 
A strategy in place to fec fec fec fec fec 
ensure that the stages of 
collection of plant material, 
screening, and advanced 
screening, advanced 
research and development 
are all conducted with 
reputably and quality of 
cooperation 
A national programme to gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc 
validate the importance of 
ethno-botanical 
knowledge for modern 
medicinal research in 
order to capitalise on the 
economic value is in 
place 
Economic valuation fec fec fec fec fec 
methods for valuing 
biodiversity with potential 
for ABS are being used 
Clear rules and guidelines gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc 
how the economic 
valuation will contribute to 
deciding on ABS permits 
 
24. Can you think of any other indicators for valorisation of biodiversity? 
 
Indicator 1 
 
Indicator 2 
 
Indicator 3 
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10. Social Capital 
 
 
The purpose of this section is to gather information about the best indicators for showing how a country is working 
towards building trust between ABS stakeholders. 
 
In this context social capital will refer to ‘trust building’ between the players in the ABS sector. The Nagoya 
Protocol provide an international framework that is meant to provide the rules of the game for both user and providers 
and through that contributes to legal certainty, clarity and transparency. Domestic ABS legal instruments are supposed 
to do the same at the national level. This is essentially asking for trust between the players in the ABS game. 
 
25. In your opinion how important are the following indicators below for showing that a country 
is working towards building trust between stakeholders to ensure that ABS transactions 
contributes to effective implementation of its ABS legal instrument (Please tick the appropriate 
box below) 
 
 
Indicators 
(Social Capital) 
5=Very Important 4=Important 3=Not important 2=Not very important 1=Do not know 
 
Mechanisms to signal the gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc 
quality of genetic 
resources to potential bio- 
prospectors are in place 
A valorization strategy is fec fec fec fec fec 
in place 
 
An effective, transparent gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc 
legal, policy and 
administrative ABS 
domestic framework is in 
place 
Effective administrative fec fec fec fec fec 
procedures in place 
 
Measures are in place that gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc 
deal with addressing 
information asymmetry 
A good governance fec fec fec fec fec 
structure in place at the 
national level 
A ‘Black List’ of those firms gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc 
and organizations that 
contribute to bio-piracy is 
in place (including the 
end pharmaceutical 
companies who buy such 
genetic resources from 
intermediaries) 
The development of fec fec fec fec fec 
ethical bio-trade 
guidelines and codes of 
conduct 
 The internationally gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc  
 
 319 
 
Effectiveness of ABS policy and legislative instruments 
 recognized certificate is 
being used 
 
Creation of reputable fec fec fec fec fec 
networks of research 
collaborators with best 
practice codes 
Measures to ensure that gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc gfedc 
the stages of collection of 
plant material, screening, 
and advanced screening, 
advanced research and 
development are all 
conducted with reputation 
and quality of cooperation 
 
26. Can you think of any other indicators for social capital? 
 
Indicator 1 
 
Indicator 2 
 
Indicator 3 
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11. Impact of External and Internal Factors on Critical Factors 
 
 
The purpose of this section is to gather information about whether external and internal factors in a country has an impact 
on the critical factors used in this study. Please note that Question 27 is focussing on factors at the National level 
whereas Question 28 is focussing on factors at the International level. 
 
27. Please indicate which critical factors are important for the effective implementation of the 
Nagoya Protocol at the National levels. 
 5=Very Important 4=Important 3=Not Important 2=Not Very Important 1=Do Not Know 
Good governance 
structure 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
Assignment of property 
rights and intellectual 
property 
fec fec fec fec fec 
Administrative 
procedures/complexity 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
Time lags/timeline to 
benefits 
fec fec fec fec fec 
Information asymmetry gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c Market structure fec fec fec fec fec 
Valorization of biodiversity gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c Social capital fec fec fec fec fec 
 
28. Please indicate which critical factors are important for the effective implementation of the 
Nagoya Protocol at the International levels. 
 5=Very Important 4=Important 3=Not Important 2=Not Very Important 1=Do Not Know 
Good governance 
structure 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
Assignment of property 
rights and intellectual 
property 
fec fec fec fec fec 
Administrative 
procedures/complexity 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
Time lags/timeline to 
benefits 
fec fec fec fec fec 
Information asymmetry gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c Market structure fec fec fec fec fec 
Valorization of biodiversity gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c Social capital fec fec fec fec fec 
 321 
 
 5=Significant impact 4=Moderate impact 3=Very low impact 2=No Impact 1=Do not know 
Political Pressures gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c Changing demand levels fec fec fec fec fec 
New scientific findings gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c Technology innovations fec fec fec fec fec 
Change in legal 
frameworks 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
Criticism from NGOs fec fec fec fec fec 
Criticism from media gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c Criticism from government fec fec fec fec fec 
Criticism from private 
sector/industry 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
gfed
c 
Special circumstance at 
national level 
fec fec fec fec fec 
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29. In your opinion to what extent do the following factors impact on the critical 
factors (Good governance, Assigning Property Rights and Intellectual Property, 
Administrative Procedures/Complexity, Time Lags/ Timeline to Benefit-Sharing, 
Information Asymmetries, Market Structure, Valorization of Biodiversity, Social 
Capital)? Please tick the appropriate box Internal and External factors that may impact 
on critical factors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30. Can you think of any other critical factors? 
 
Factor 1 
 
Factor 2 
 
Factor 3 
 
31. Any other comments or observations on ABS? 
 
5 
 
6 
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Structure In Both Provider And User Countries 
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Appendix 3 Factor Analysis Results Assigning Propoerty 
Rights And Intellectual Property Rights 
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Appendix 4 Factor Analysis Results Effective, Functional 
And Non-Complex Administrative Structure/Framework Is In 
Place 
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 330 
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 Initial 
Mechanisms are in place to ensure that benefits are 
allocated for biodiversity conservation measures 
 
Mechanism in place at national level to ensure that 
short term benefits do not overrule long term benefits 
 
A national bio-prospecting fund or similar 
mechanisms into which a share of the benefits is 
deposited at the national level 
A national strategy in place for the application of 
technology, skills and expertise transferred as 
benefits under ABS deals 
A strategy is in place for building capacity for 
negotiating ABS contracts (PIC, MAT and appropriate 
benefit-sharing) 
National and regional strategies in place to promote 
use of biodiversity for value creation and economic 
development 
Clear understanding at the national level of the value 
chain of genetic resources in the ABS pipeline and 
the implications for benefit-sharing 
A strategy for building capacities of negotiating skills 
for communities 
Checkpoints are established to ensure the 
transparency of the value chain through which the 
genetic resources is going to ensure appropriate 
benefit-sharing 
Number of contracts negotiated under the ABS 
regime 
Amount of benefits registered as a result of the ABS 
regime 
Total contribution of bio-prospecting activities to the 
national budget 
Total contribution of bio-prospecting activities to 
biodiversity conservation and education 
Clear rules and guidelines for how monetary and non- 
monetary benefits will be shared 
Number of nationals trained under ABS agreements 
 
Clear rules for scientific, technical and research co- 
operation 
Assistance for the development of appropriate 
adaptation of relevant foreign technologies 
1.000 
 
 
1.000 
 
 
1.000 
 
 
1.000 
 
 
1.000 
 
 
1.000 
 
 
1.000 
 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
Appendix 5 Factor Analysis Results Addressing Or 
Accounting For Time Lags To The Generation And Sharing 
Of Benefits 
 
Table 1: Communalities 
 
Communalities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component An lysis. 
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Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
 
Total 
 
% of Variance 
 
Cumulative % 
 
Total 
 
% of Variance 
 
Cumulative % 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
6.664 
1.720 
1.492 
1.308 
1.162 
.754 
.740 
.593 
.518 
.449 
.437 
.335 
.272 
.204 
.157 
.101 
.096 
39.201 
10.116 
8.775 
7.692 
6.834 
4.438 
4.351 
3.488 
3.047 
2.642 
2.569 
1.972 
1.598 
1.198 
.921 
.596 
.563 
39.201 
49.318 
58.093 
65.785 
72.618 
77.056 
81.408 
84.895 
87.942 
90.584 
93.153 
95.125 
96.723 
97.921 
98.842 
99.437 
100.000 
3.475 
2.620 
2.498 
2.119 
1.633 
20.441 
15.412 
14.696 
12.464 
9.605 
20.441 
35.853 
50.549 
63.014 
72.618 
 
Table 2: Total Variance Explained 
 
Total Variance Explained 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
Table 3:  
 
 
 
Component Matrix
a
 
 
a. 5 components extracted. 
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 Component 
1 2 3 4 5 
Mechanisms are in place to ensure that 
benefits are allocated for biodiversity 
conservation measures 
Mechanism in place at national level to ensure 
that short term benefits do not overrule long 
term benefits 
A national bio-prospecting fund or similar 
mechanisms into which a share of the benefits 
is deposited at the national level 
A national strategy in place for the application 
of technology, skills and expertise transferred 
as benefits under ABS deals 
 
A strategy is in place for building capacity for 
negotiating ABS contracts (PIC, MAT and 
appropriate benefit-sharing) 
National and regional strategies in place to 
promote use of biodiversity for value creation 
and economic development 
Clear understanding at the national level of the 
value chain of genetic resources in the ABS 
pipeline and the implications for benefit-sharing 
 
A strategy for building capacities of negotiating 
skills for communities 
Checkpoints are established to ensure the 
transparency of the value chain through which 
the genetic resources is going to ensure 
appropriate benefit-sharing 
 
Number of contracts negotiated under the ABS 
regime 
Amount of benefits registered as a result of the 
ABS regime 
Total contribution of bio-prospecting activities to 
the national budget 
Total contribution of bio-prospecting activities to 
biodiversity conservation and education 
 
Clear rules and guidelines for how monetary 
and non-monetary benefits will be shared 
 
Number of nationals trained under ABS 
agreements 
Clear rules for scientific, technical and research 
co-operation 
Assistance for the development of appropriate 
adaptation of relevant foreign technologies 
.228 
 
 
.291 
 
 
.185 
 
 
.153 
 
 
 
.088 
 
 
.476 
 
 
.211 
 
 
 
-.082 
 
.192 
 
 
 
 
.767 
 
.820 
 
.876 
 
.772 
 
 
.048 
 
 
.501 
 
.176 
 
.226 
.324 
 
 
.709 
 
 
.103 
 
 
.690 
 
 
 
.783 
 
 
.614 
 
 
-.036 
 
 
 
.424 
 
.170 
 
 
 
 
.164 
 
.279 
 
.223 
 
.023 
 
 
.266 
 
 
.012 
 
.273 
 
-.164 
.163 
 
 
.071 
 
 
.492 
 
 
.448 
 
 
 
.201 
 
 
-.053 
 
 
.103 
 
 
 
.067 
 
.088 
 
 
 
 
.113 
 
.263 
 
.169 
 
.129 
 
 
.749 
 
 
.490 
 
.752 
 
.681 
.677 
 
 
.110 
 
 
.486 
 
 
.316 
 
 
 
-.118 
 
 
.372 
 
 
.827 
 
 
 
.486 
 
.021 
 
 
 
 
.216 
 
.050 
 
.052 
 
.354 
 
 
.146 
 
 
.176 
 
.028 
 
.088 
.037 
 
 
.147 
 
 
.088 
 
 
-.045 
 
 
 
.422 
 
 
-.024 
 
 
.050 
 
 
 
.544 
 
.881 
 
 
 
 
.275 
 
.034 
 
.053 
 
-.003 
 
 
.111 
 
 
.421 
 
-.150 
 
.234 
 
Component 1 2 3 4 5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
.604 
-.686 
-.303 
-.265 
-.041 
.466 
.617 
-.398 
-.003 
-.495 
.444 
.099 
.856 
-.200 
-.146 
.392 
-.032 
.052 
.874 
.280 
.260 
.372 
-.123 
-.355 
.809  
Table 4: Rotated Component Matrix 
 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 8 iterations. 
 
 
 
Table 5: Component Transformational Matrix 
 
Component Transformation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
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 Initial 
Measures are in place to resolve the issues relating to the 
nature of market demand for traditional knowledge 
 
Measures are in place to resolve the cultural and social 
complexities and equity issues relevant to the ABS market at 
national level 
Domestic public and private institutions are adding value to 
Genetic Resources 
Measures are in place to allow investors to assess the 
commercial risks and opportunities in a country 
Market opportunities in relevant sectors are identified and 
fed into the national ABS strategy of the provider or user 
country 
Provider has a concept for resource evaluation 
Pro-active policy approach towards the private sector and 
investors interested to invest in the bio-prospecting market 
at the local level 
The search and information costs in the market for bio- 
prospecting is low 
Bargaining occurs under competitive conditions 
Measures in place to provide an idea to investors about the 
potential value of ABS transactions in the market 
 
There are public and private sector incentives for 
undertaking bio-prospecting 
The bargaining and decision-making costs in the market for 
bio-prospecting are low 
The monitoring and enforcement costs in the market for bio- 
prospecting are low 
1.000 
 
 
1.000 
 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
 
1.000 
1.000 
 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
1.000 
 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
 
 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
 
Total 
 
% of Variance 
 
Cumulative % 
 
Total 
 
% of Variance 
 
Cumulative % 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
6.381 
1.416 
1.253 
.753 
.658 
.611 
.494 
.350 
.348 
.300 
.186 
.141 
.110 
49.081 
10.894 
9.641 
5.789 
5.058 
4.703 
3.799 
2.689 
2.677 
2.307 
1.430 
1.086 
.844 
49.081 
59.975 
69.615 
75.404 
80.463 
85.166 
88.965 
91.655 
94.332 
96.639 
98.069 
99.156 
100.000 
3.254 
2.188 
2.002 
1.872 
1.143 
25.034 
16.834 
15.399 
14.400 
8.795 
25.034 
41.868 
57.267 
71.667 
80.463 
 
 
Appendix 6 Factor Analysis Results Efficient Understanding Of 
The ABS Market Structure Within Which The Transaction Must 
Take Place 
 
Table 1: Communalities 
 
Communalities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Table 2: Total Variance Explained 
 
Total Variance Explained 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Table 3: Screen Plot 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Component Matrix
a
 
 
a. 5 components extracted. 
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Component 
    
 1 2 3 4 5 Measures are in place to resolve the issues relating to the 
nature of market demand for traditional knowledge 
.185 .193 .114 .898 -.006 
Measures are in place to resolve the cultural and social 
complexities and equity issues relevant to the ABS market at 
national level 
.175 .065 .099 .894 .249 
Domestic public and private institutions are adding value to 
Genetic Resources 
.172 .839 .208 .174 .136 
Measures are in place to allow investors to assess the 
commercial risks and opportunities in a country 
.412 .513 .570 .089 -.193 
Market opportunities in relevant sectors are identified and fed 
into the national ABS strategy of the provider or user country 
.137 .167 .800 .148 .288 
Provider has a concept for resource evaluation .161 .200 .235 .193 .868 
Pro-active policy approach towards the private sector and 
investors interested to invest in the bio-prospecting market at 
the local level 
.508 .482 .396 .137 .086 
The search and information costs in the market for bio- 
prospecting is low 
.760 .361 .213 .017 .150 
Bargaining occurs under competitive conditions .537 .532 -.009 .208 .328 
Measures in place to provide an idea to investors about the 
potential value of ABS transactions in the market 
.100 .624 .516 .069 .197 
There are public and private sector incentives for undertaking 
bio-prospecting 
.510 .241 .619 .091 .068 
The bargaining and decision-making costs in the market for 
bio-prospecting are low 
.868 .135 .121 .213 .060 
The monitoring and enforcement costs in the market for bio- 
prospecting are low 
.893 .026 .224 .220 .068 
 
Component 1 2 3 4 5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
.627 
-.080 
-.758 
.162 
-.013 
.490 
-.275 
.403 
-.201 
-.694 
.455 
-.330 
.353 
-.211 
.718 
.328 
.876 
.106 
-.336 
.043 
.231 
.207 
.356 
.881 
.033 
 
 
 
Table 4: Component Matrix 
 
Rotated Component Matrix
a
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: 
Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
 
 
Table 5: Component Transformation Matrix 
 
Component Transformation 
Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: 
Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
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 Initial 
A national strategy for the promotion of the use of biodiversity for value creation 
and economic development is in place 
Existence of potential research partners in the provider country are made public 
 
Domestic public and private institutions are involved in the identification of the 
commercial value of biodiversity 
An investment centre at national level which has information or database on the 
species of interest and with potential for value addition 
A list of species with potential interest do investor and the stages of research at 
which they are in terms of R&D 
Efficient biodiversity infrastructure at domestic levels for inventories of genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge are in place 
A clear national process for identification of market opportunities in relevant 
sectors of importance to ABS is in place 
A data base covering the economic valuation information is in place 
A national strategy for the promotion of the use of biodiversity for value creation 
and economic development 
A strategy in place to ensure that the stage of collection of plant material, 
screening, and advanced screening, advanced research and development are all 
conducted reputably and with quality of cooperation 
A national programme to validate the importance of ethno-botanical knowledge for 
modern medicinal research in order to capitalize on the economic value is in place 
 
Economic valuation methods for valuing biodiversity with potential for ABS are 
being used 
Clear rules and guidelines how the economic valuation will contribute to deciding 
on ABS permits 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
 
1.000 
 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
 
 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
 
Total 
 
% of Variance 
 
Cumulative % 
 
Total 
 
% of Variance 
 
Cumulative % 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
6.587 
1.225 
1.042 
.830 
.729 
.659 
.503 
.394 
.349 
.308 
.185 
.114 
.074 
50.671 
9.423 
8.012 
6.386 
5.609 
5.072 
3.871 
3.028 
2.685 
2.370 
1.425 
.880 
.567 
50.671 
60.094 
68.107 
74.493 
80.102 
85.174 
89.045 
92.074 
94.758 
97.128 
98.553 
99.433 
100.000 
2.754 
2.304 
1.917 
1.815 
1.623 
21.188 
17.721 
14.746 
13.963 
12.484 
21.188 
38.909 
53.655 
67.618 
80.102 
 
Appendix 7 Factor Analysis Results Presence Of An Effective And 
Functional Biodiveristy Valorization Strategy At National Level 
Table 1: Communalities 
 
Communalities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Table 2: Total Variance Explained 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Table 3: 
 
 
 
 
 
Component Matrixa 
 
a. 5 components extracted. 
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 Component 
1 2 3 4 5 
A national strategy for the promotion of the 
use of biodiversity for value creation and 
economic development is in place 
.169 
 
 
.153 
 
 
.507 
 
 
 
.192 
 
 
 
.371 
 
 
.047 
 
 
 
.793 
 
 
 
.150 
 
.256 
 
 
.712 
 
 
 
 
 
.514 
 
 
 
 
.750 
 
 
.466 
.337 
 
 
.220 
 
 
.018 
 
 
 
.434 
 
 
 
.167 
 
 
.093 
 
 
 
.357 
 
 
 
.740 
 
.744 
 
 
.202 
 
 
 
 
 
.269 
 
 
 
 
.230 
 
 
.722 
.118 
 
 
.115 
 
 
.067 
 
 
 
.558 
 
 
 
.523 
 
 
.901 
 
 
 
-.081 
 
 
 
.177 
 
.200 
 
 
.264 
 
 
 
 
 
.539 
 
 
 
 
.207 
 
 
.085 
.132 
 
 
.841 
 
 
.684 
 
 
 
.188 
 
 
 
.257 
 
 
.027 
 
 
 
.171 
 
 
 
.482 
 
.198 
 
 
.209 
 
 
 
 
 
.334 
 
 
 
 
.236 
 
 
-.090 
.795 
 
 
.088 
 
 
.234 
 
 
 
.439 
 
 
 
.585 
 
 
.157 
 
 
 
.194 
 
 
 
.213 
 
.192 
 
 
.054 
 
 
 
 
 
-.239 
 
 
 
 
.370 
 
 
.225 
Existence of potential research partners in 
the provider country are made public 
Domestic public and private institutions are 
involved in the identification of the 
commercial value of biodiversity 
An investment centre at national level which 
has information or database on the species 
of interest and with potential for value 
addition 
A list of species with potential interest do 
investor and the stages of research at which 
they are in terms of R&D 
Efficient biodiversity infrastructure at 
domestic levels for inventories of genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge are in 
place 
A clear national process for identification of 
market opportunities in relevant sectors of 
importance to ABS is in place 
A data base covering the economic 
valuation information is in place 
A national strategy for the promotion of the 
use of biodiversity for value creation and 
economic development 
A strategy in place to ensure that the stage 
of collection of plant material, screening, 
and advanced screening, advanced 
research and development are all 
conducted reputably and with quality of 
cooperation 
A national programme to validate the 
importance of ethno-botanical knowledge 
for modern medicinal research in order to 
capitalize on the economic value is in place 
Economic valuation methods for valuing 
biodiversity with potential for ABS are being 
used 
Clear rules and guidelines how the 
economic valuation will contribute to 
deciding on ABS permits 
 
Component 1 2 3 4 5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
.564 
-.501 
.070 
-.609 
-.235 
.501 
.041 
-.566 
.118 
.643 
.378 
.744 
.473 
-.255 
.122 
.391 
-.326 
.541 
.666 
.069 
.367 
.296 
-.398 
.326 
-.716  
Table 4: Rotated Component Matrix 
 
Rotated Component 
Matrixa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. Rotation converged in 8 iterations. 
 
 
Table 5: Component Transformational Matrix 
 
Component Transformation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. 
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Initial 
A national ABS Clearing House Mechanism is in place 1.000 
An ABS National Advisory Council/Committee with multi-disciplinary 
and multi-stakeholder representation in place 
1.000 
A functional and effective Communication Education and Public 
Awareness Initiative on ABS in place at the national level 
1.000 
Rules and guidelines to ensure that functional and effective 
communication process at the national level are clear 
1.000 
Clear rules, guidelines and process for dealing with traditional 
knowledge (TK) are in place 
1.000 
Measures are in place to reduce potential negotiating and other 
inequalities between stakeholders 
1.000 
A clear policy and understanding of technology transfer at national 
level 
1.000 
There is a clear policy on science, research and technology and its 
role in national and economic development 
1.000 
A national strategy for awareness raising on the value of Traditional 
Knowledge associated with genetic resources in place 
1.000 
Definition of the concept of Genetic Resources as provided for in 
the Nagoya Protocol is understood by all players 
1.000 
The definition of the concept of the utilization of genetic resources 
as provided for in the Nagoya Protocol is understood by all players 
1.000 
 
 
 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
 
Total 
 
% of Variance 
 
Cumulative % 
 
Total 
 
% of Variance 
 
Cumulative % 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
4.563 
1.577 
1.183 
1.071 
.746 
.574 
.369 
.317 
.279 
.186 
.135 
41.478 
14.339 
10.758 
9.734 
6.779 
5.222 
3.350 
2.877 
2.540 
1.695 
1.227 
41.478 
55.817 
66.575 
76.309 
83.088 
88.310 
91.660 
94.538 
97.078 
98.773 
100.000 
2.218 
1.951 
1.763 
1.712 
1.496 
20.165 
17.736 
16.024 
15.566 
13.597 
20.165 
37.901 
53.925 
69.491 
83.088 
 
Appendix 8 Factor Analyais Results Effective Measures To 
Address Information Asymmetry In The ABS Implementation 
Framework Are In Place 
Table 1: Communalities 
 
Communalities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Table 2: Total Variance Explained 
 
Total Variance Explained 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Table 3: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Component 
Matrixa 
 
a. 5 components extracted. 
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 Component 
1 2 3 4 5 
A national ABS 
An ABS Nation 
A functional an 
Rules and guid 
Clear rules, gui 
Measures are i 
A clear policy a 
There is a clear 
A national strat 
Definition of the 
The definition o 
.199 
.229 
.037 
-.069 
.641 
.219 
.136 
.134 
.294 
.893 
.861 
.044 
.177 
.200 
.394 
.030 
-.058 
.904 
.914 
.142 
.184 
.107 
.256 
.133 
.782 
.021 
.525 
.313 
.109 
.146 
.762 
-.035 
.278 
.864 
.811 
.386 
.169 
.198 
.018 
.105 
.082 
.086 
.147 
.212 
-.052 
.278 
.050 
.755 
.194 
.808 
.103 
.105 
.333 
.137 
-.051 
 
Component 1 2 3 4 5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
.539 
-.476 
-.473 
.487 
.147 
.394 
.797 
-.436 
-.041 
-.134 
.492 
-.163 
.390 
-.097 
-.755 
.444 
-.169 
.029 
-.762 
.439 
.338 
.289 
.658 
.414 
.444  
 
 
Table 4: Totated Component Matrix 
 
Rotated Component Matrix
a
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation 
Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
 
 
Table 5: Component Transformation Matrix 
 
Component Transformation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation 
Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
  
 343 
 
 Initial 
Mechanisms to signal the quality of genetic resources 
to potential bio-prospectors are in place 
 
A valorization strategy is in place 
An effective, transparent legal, policy and 
administrative ABS domestic framework is in place 
 
Effective and functional administrative procedures are 
in place 
Measures are in place that deal with addressing 
information asymmetry 
A good governance structure is in place at the national 
level 
A “Black List” of those firms and organizations that 
contribute to bio-piracy is in place (including the end 
pharmaceutical companies who buy from such genetic 
resource intermediaries) 
The development of ethical bio-trade guidelines and 
codes of conduct in country 
The internationally recognized certificate is being used 
 
Creation of reputable networks of research 
collaborators with best practice codes 
Measures to ensure that the stages of collection of 
plant material, screening, and advanced screening, 
advanced research and development are all 
conducted with reputation and quality of cooperation 
1.000 
 
 
1.000 
1.000 
 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
 
 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
 
Total 
 
% of Variance 
 
Cumulative % 
 
Total 
 
% of Variance 
 
Cumulative % 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
4.359 
1.619 
1.100 
.806 
.720 
.616 
.521 
.395 
.366 
.268 
.231 
39.632 
14.716 
10.000 
7.323 
6.545 
5.599 
4.739 
3.591 
3.327 
2.432 
2.097 
39.632 
54.348 
64.348 
71.671 
78.216 
83.814 
88.554 
92.144 
95.472 
97.903 
100.000 
2.134 
1.887 
1.702 
1.549 
1.332 
19.399 
17.157 
15.475 
14.079 
12.106 
19.399 
36.556 
52.031 
66.110 
78.216 
 
Component 1 2 3 4 5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
.462 
.814 
-.326 
-.132 
.010 
.533 
-.304 
-.251 
.570 
-.486 
.439 
-.480 
-.394 
-.413 
.501 
.426 
-.081 
.602 
-.528 
-.413 
.359 
.087 
.559 
.456 
.585  
Appendix 9 Factor Analysis Results Presence Of Effective And 
Efficient Measures To Build Trust (Social Capital) Amongst 
Stakeholders 
Table 1: Communalities 
 
Communalities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Table 2: Total Variance Explained 
 
Total Variance Explained 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Table 3: Component Transformation Matrix 
 
Component Transformation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
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 Component 
1 2 3 4 5 
Mechanisms to signal the quality of genetic 
resources to potential bio-prospectors are in 
place 
.009 
 
 
.155 
.895 
 
 
.655 
 
.298 
 
.825 
 
.002 
 
 
 
 
.294 
 
.063 
 
.137 
 
.040 
.767 
 
 
.823 
.071 
 
 
.363 
 
.398 
 
.013 
 
.090 
 
 
 
 
.279 
 
.081 
 
.201 
 
.440 
.309 
 
 
.196 
.066 
 
 
-.217 
 
.338 
 
.260 
 
.147 
 
 
 
 
.059 
 
.128 
 
.870 
 
.732 
.189 
 
 
.135 
.067 
 
 
-.048 
 
.227 
 
.254 
 
.795 
 
 
 
 
.779 
 
.253 
 
.017 
 
.262 
.184 
 
 
.038 
-.045 
 
 
.458 
 
.421 
 
.133 
 
.335 
 
 
 
 
.040 
 
.863 
 
.174 
 
-.023 
A valorization strategy is in place 
An effective, transparent legal, policy and 
administrative ABS domestic framework is in 
place 
Effective and functional administrative 
procedures are in place 
Measures are in place that deal with 
addressing information asymmetry 
A good governance structure is in place at the 
national level 
A “Black List” of those firms and organizations 
that contribute to bio-piracy is in place 
(including the end pharmaceutical companies 
who buy from such genetic resource 
intermediaries) 
The development of ethical bio-trade guidelines 
and codes of conduct in country 
The internationally recognized certificate is 
being used 
Creation of reputable networks of research 
collaborators with best practice codes 
Measures to ensure that the stages of 
collection of plant material, screening, and 
advanced screening, advanced research and 
development are all conducted with reputation 
and quality of cooperation 
 
Table 4:  
 
 
 
Component Matrix
a
 
 
a. 5 components extracted. 
Table 5: Rotated Component Matrix  
Rotated Component Matrix
a
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 8 iterations. 
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 Initial 
A national strategy for the promotion of the use of biodiversity for value creation 
and economic development is in place 
Existence of potential research partners in the provider country are made public 
 
Domestic public and private institutions are involved in the identification of the 
commercial value of biodiversity 
An investment centre at national level which has information or database on the 
species of interest and with potential for value addition 
A list of species with potential interest do investor and the stages of research at 
which they are in terms of R&D 
Efficient biodiversity infrastructure at domestic levels for inventories of genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge are in place 
A clear national process for identification of market opportunities in relevant 
sectors of importance to ABS is in place 
A data base covering the economic valuation information is in place 
A national strategy for the promotion of the use of biodiversity for value creation 
and economic development 
A strategy in place to ensure that the stage of collection of plant material, 
screening, and advanced screening, advanced research and development are all 
conducted reputably and with quality of cooperation 
A national programme to validate the importance of ethno-botanical knowledge for 
modern medicinal research in order to capitalize on the economic value is in place 
 
Economic valuation methods for valuing biodiversity with potential for ABS are 
being used 
Clear rules and guidelines how the economic valuation will contribute to deciding 
on ABS permits 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
 
1.000 
 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
 
 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
 
Total 
 
% of Variance 
 
Cumulative % 
 
Total 
 
% of Variance 
 
Cumulative % 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
6.587 
1.225 
1.042 
.830 
.729 
.659 
.503 
.394 
.349 
.308 
.185 
.114 
.074 
50.671 
9.423 
8.012 
6.386 
5.609 
5.072 
3.871 
3.028 
2.685 
2.370 
1.425 
.880 
.567 
50.671 
60.094 
68.107 
74.493 
80.102 
85.174 
89.045 
92.074 
94.758 
97.128 
98.553 
99.433 
100.000 
2.754 
2.304 
1.917 
1.815 
1.623 
21.188 
17.721 
14.746 
13.963 
12.484 
21.188 
38.909 
53.655 
67.618 
80.102 
 
 
 
Appendix 10 Factor Analysis Results For An Effective And 
Functional Biodiveristy Valorization Strategy At National Level 
Table 1: Communalities 
 
Communalities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Table 2: Total Variance Explained 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Table 3: 
 
 
 
 
 
Component Matrixa 
 
a. 5 components extracted. 
 348 
 
 Component 
1 2 3 4 5 
A national strategy for the promotion of the 
use of biodiversity for value creation and 
economic development is in place 
.169 
 
 
.153 
 
 
.507 
 
 
 
.192 
 
 
 
.371 
 
 
.047 
 
 
 
.793 
 
 
 
.150 
 
.256 
 
 
.712 
 
 
 
 
 
.514 
 
 
 
 
.750 
 
 
.466 
.337 
 
 
.220 
 
 
.018 
 
 
 
.434 
 
 
 
.167 
 
 
.093 
 
 
 
.357 
 
 
 
.740 
 
.744 
 
 
.202 
 
 
 
 
 
.269 
 
 
 
 
.230 
 
 
.722 
.118 
 
 
.115 
 
 
.067 
 
 
 
.558 
 
 
 
.523 
 
 
.901 
 
 
 
-.081 
 
 
 
.177 
 
.200 
 
 
.264 
 
 
 
 
 
.539 
 
 
 
 
.207 
 
 
.085 
.132 
 
 
.841 
 
 
.684 
 
 
 
.188 
 
 
 
.257 
 
 
.027 
 
 
 
.171 
 
 
 
.482 
 
.198 
 
 
.209 
 
 
 
 
 
.334 
 
 
 
 
.236 
 
 
-.090 
.795 
 
 
.088 
 
 
.234 
 
 
 
.439 
 
 
 
.585 
 
 
.157 
 
 
 
.194 
 
 
 
.213 
 
.192 
 
 
.054 
 
 
 
 
 
-.239 
 
 
 
 
.370 
 
 
.225 
Existence of potential research partners in 
the provider country are made public 
Domestic public and private institutions are 
involved in the identification of the 
commercial value of biodiversity 
An investment centre at national level which 
has information or database on the species 
of interest and with potential for value 
addition 
A list of species with potential interest do 
investor and the stages of research at which 
they are in terms of R&D 
Efficient biodiversity infrastructure at 
domestic levels for inventories of genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge are in 
place 
A clear national process for identification of 
market opportunities in relevant sectors of 
importance to ABS is in place 
A data base covering the economic 
valuation information is in place 
A national strategy for the promotion of the 
use of biodiversity for value creation and 
economic development 
A strategy in place to ensure that the stage 
of collection of plant material, screening, 
and advanced screening, advanced 
research and development are all 
conducted reputably and with quality of 
cooperation 
A national programme to validate the 
importance of ethno-botanical knowledge 
for modern medicinal research in order to 
capitalize on the economic value is in place 
Economic valuation methods for valuing 
biodiversity with potential for ABS are being 
used 
Clear rules and guidelines how the 
economic valuation will contribute to 
deciding on ABS permits 
 
Component 1 2 3 4 5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
.564 
-.501 
.070 
-.609 
-.235 
.501 
.041 
-.566 
.118 
.643 
.378 
.744 
.473 
-.255 
.122 
.391 
-.326 
.541 
.666 
.069 
.367 
.296 
-.398 
.326 
-.716  
Table 4: Rotated Component Matrix 
 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. Rotation converged in 8 iterations. 
 
 
Table 5: Component Transformational Matrix 
 
Component Transformation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation 
Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
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 Initial Extraction 
Good governance structure 1.000 .584 
Assignment of property rights and intellectual property 1.000 .402 
Administrative procedures/ complexity 1.000 .672 
Time lags/timeline to benefits 1.000 .494 
Information asymmetry 1.000 .650 
Market structure 1.000 .732 
Valorisation of biodiversity 1.000 .647 
Social capital 1.000 .663 
 
 
 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Loadings Loadings 
 
Total 
 
% of Variance 
 
Cumulative % 
 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 3.584 44.806 44.806 3.584 44.806 44.806 2.683 33.535 33.535 
2 1.258 15.730 60.536 1.258 15.730 60.536 2.160 27.001 60.536 
3 .797 9.962 70.498       
4 .691 8.632 79.130       
5 .587 7.340 86.471       
6 .421 5.262 91.732       
7 .382 4.780 96.512       
8 .279 3.488 100.000       
 
 Component 
1 2 
Good governance structure .621 .445 
Assignment of property rights and intellectual property .461 .435 
Administrative procedures/ complexity .574 .585 
Time lags/timeline to benefits .690 .133 
Information asymmetry .782 -.195 
Market structure .732 -.443 
Valorisation of biodiversity .625 -.507 
Social capital .802 -.140 
 
Appendix 11 Factor Analysis Results For The National And 
International Levels Indicating Whether Crticial Factors Are 
Valid 
Table 1: Communalities 
 
Communalities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Total Variance Explained 
 
Total Variance Explained 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
Table 3: Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component Matrix
a
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 2 components extracted. 
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 Component 
1 2 
Good governance structure 
Assignment of property rights and intellectual property 
Administrative procedures/ complexity 
Time lags/timeline to benefits 
Information asymmetry 
Market structure 
Valorisation of biodiversity 
Social capital 
.209 
.090 
.085 
.457 
.733 
.848 
.804 
.715 
.735 
.628 
.815 
.534 
.334 
.109 
-.008 
.390 
 
Component 1 2 
1 .783 .623 
2 -.623 .783 
 
 Initial 
Good governance structure 1.000 
Assignment of property rights and intellectual property 1.000 
Administrative procedures/ complexity 1.000 
Time lags/timeline to benefits 1.000 
Information asymmetry 1.000 
Market structure 1.000 
Valorisation of biodiversity 1.000 
Social capital 1.000 
 
Table 4: Rotated Component Matrix 
 
Rotated Component Matrix
a
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations. 
 
 
 
Table 5 :Componet Transformation Matrix 
 
 
Component Transformation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Factor Analysis   
Communalities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Component 
 
 
Initial 
Eigenvalues 
 
Rotation Sums 
of Squared 
Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
3.584 
1.258 
.797 
.691 
.587 
.421 
.382 
.279 
44.806 
15.730 
9.962 
8.632 
7.340 
5.262 
4.780 
3.488 
44.806 
60.536 
70.498 
79.130 
86.471 
91.732 
96.512 
100.000 
2.683 
1.787 
1.170 
33.538 
22.339 
14.622 
33.538 
55.877 
70.498 
 
Table 7: Total Variance Explained 
 
Total Variance Explained 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Table 8:  
 
 
 
 
Component 
Matrix
a
 
 
a. 3 components extracted. 
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 Component   
1 2 3 
Good governance structure .210 .796 .107 
Assignment of property rights and intellectual 
property 
.087 .154 .953 
Administrative procedures/ complexity .087 .887 .110 
Time lags/timeline to benefits .457 .423 .332 
Information asymmetry .733 .254 .225 
Market structure .849 .112 .025 
Valorisation of biodiversity .804 .028 -.061 
Social capital .714 .293 .269 
 
Component 1 2 3 
1 .783 .530 .326 
2 -.623 .670 .405 
3 -.004 -.520 .854 
 
Table 9: Rotated Component Matrix 
 
Rotated Component Matrix
a
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 4 iterations. 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Component Transformation Matrix 
 
 
Component Transformation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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 Initial 
Good governance structure 
Assignment of property rights and intellectual property 
Administrative procedures/ complexity 
Time lags/timeline to benefits 
Information asymmetry 
Market structure 
Valorisation of biodiversity 
Social capital 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000  
 
 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
 
Total 
 
% of Variance 
 
Cumulative % 
 
Total 
 
% of Variance 
 
Cumulative % 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
3.499 
1.733 
.898 
.538 
.454 
.362 
.319 
.197 
43.741 
21.663 
11.231 
6.722 
5.678 
4.522 
3.984 
2.461 
43.741 
65.403 
76.634 
83.356 
89.034 
93.555 
97.539 
100.000 
3.029 
2.204 
37.859 
27.545 
37.859 
65.403 
 
Appendix 12 Factor Analsys Results Of Internal And External 
Factors That May Impact On ABS Implementation 
Table 1: Communalities 
 
Communalities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Total Variance Explained 
 
Total Variance Explained 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Table 3:  
 
 
 
 
Component Matrix
a
 
 
a. 2 components extracted. 
 354 
 
 Component 
1 2 
Good governance structure 
Assignment of property rights and intellectual property 
Administrative procedures/ complexity 
Time lags/timeline to benefits 
Information asymmetry 
Market structure 
Valorisation of biodiversity 
Social capital 
.036 
.238 
.094 
.661 
.699 
.817 
.825 
.830 
.884 
.696 
.870 
.280 
.303 
.045 
-.013 
.097 
 
Component 1 2 
1 
2 
.856 
-.516 
.516 
.856 
 
 Initial 
Good governance structure 
Assignment of property rights and intellectual property 
Administrative procedures/ complexity 
Time lags/timeline to benefits 
Information asymmetry 
Market structure 
Valorisation of biodiversity 
Social capital 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
 
Sem T Shikongo: Survey of Namibian experience with the critical factors necessary for effective 
implementation of the ABS policy and legal framework 
 
 
 
Table 4: Rotated Component Matrix 
 
Rotated Component Matrix
a
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations. 
 
 
Table 5: Component Transformation Matrix 
 
 
Component Transformation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
 
 
Table 6: Communalities 
 
 
Communalities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 355 
 
 
 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
 
Total 
 
% of Variance 
 
Cumulative % 
 
Total 
 
% of Variance 
 
Cumulative % 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
3.499 
1.733 
.898 
.538 
.454 
.362 
.319 
.197 
43.741 
21.663 
11.231 
6.722 
5.678 
4.522 
3.984 
2.461 
43.741 
65.403 
76.634 
83.356 
89.034 
93.555 
97.539 
100.000 
2.277 
2.089 
1.162 
1.141 
28.462 
26.106 
14.529 
14.258 
28.462 
54.568 
69.098 
83.356 
 
Table 7: Total Variance Explained 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Table 8  
 
 
 
 
Component 
Matrix
a
 
 
a. 4 components extracted. 
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 Component 
1 2 3 4 
Good governan 
Assignment of 
Administrative 
Time lags/timeli 
Information asy 
Market structur 
Valorisation of 
Social capital 
-.091 
.447 
p -.031 
.299 
.303 
.689 
.899 
.777 
.846 
.785 
.831 
.157 
.176 
.015 
.031 
.100 
.317 
-.126 
.059 
.243 
.825 
.287 
-.003 
.469 
.043 
-.138 
.348 
.860 
.312 
.341 
.213 
-.015 
 
Component 1 2 3 4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
.672 
-.499 
.542 
.079 
.470 
.858 
.204 
.020 
.421 
-.094 
-.498 
-.752 
.388 
-.075 
-.645 
.654 
 
Table 9: Rotated Component Matrix 
 
Rotated Component Matrix
a
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
 
 
 
Table 10: Component Transformation Matrix 
 
 
Component Transformation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
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Appendix 13 Questionnaire for the Namibian Case Study on 
ABS 
 
Interviews on implementation of Access to Genetic Resources, the associated 
traditional knowledge and the Sharing of the resultant benefits (ABS) 
 
 
Short introduction on critical factors necessary for success in implementing the ABS 
legislation: Critical Factors: 
 
1. Good governance structure 
 
in this context means that both Namibia as a provider country (provider of genetic resources) have 
put in place legislative and policy measures to ensure that stakeholders have incentives to 
participate in the ABS market place thus leading to the generation of benefits (Monetary and 
otherwise) for both Namibia and the user country. 
 
 
2. Assigning property rights and intellectual property rights 
 
This referes to how property rights are assigned in Namibia‘s domestic legislation in terms of who 
owns the genetic resources and how this ownership right enables that person/s to use, sell, 
transfer or exchange genetic resources and/or exclude others from doing these things. 
 
The assignment of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) refers to how IPR is assigned in Namibias 
domestic legislation in the context of ABS. The questions is what are the rights given to persons 
over the creations of their minds in the R&D process as well as to their traditional knowledge. Is it 
clear who owns knowledge e.g. traditional knowledge? 
 
 
3. Administrative Structures and bureaucratic procedures 
 
How are Namibia’s laws applied in practice? How easy is it for a researcher/investor/user to 
understand and apply for an access agreement for Research & Development in bio-prospecting 
in Namibia. This also includes the transaction costs that the researcher/investor/ user have to 
incure. In other words are the procedures too bureaucratic or not and do you have to incur 
significant costs just to get a research permit? Do you get your research permit in the within the 
time that it is stipulated? 
In other words how complex and bureaucratic is the law in terms of practical implementation and 
therefore what can we do to avoid that it is too complex in terms of implementation. 
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4. Time lags to benefit sharing 
 
In this context time lags refer to the fact that if the time lag between the collection and provision 
of samples and the development of a marketable product is accounted for by adequate and 
appropriate benefits flowing to provider countries this will indicate the effectiveness of the ABS 
instrument. 
 
In other words how long does it take from the collection of materials to the generation of the 
first benefits and how do we deal with this to manage expectations and to ensure that maximum 
benefits (Monetary and non-monetary) accrue to Namibia 
 
 
5. Market Structure of ABS 
 
In this context market structure means that all relevant stakeholders especially the regulators, 
private sector and researchers understand the characteristics of the market and the demand and 
supply forces in the bio-prospecting and bio-trade market that prevails in a provider/user country. 
 
It also assumes that there is a well functioning market for biodiversity uses within the provider 
country. In other words do we really understand how the ABS market work? What are the 
indicators that shows that we understand how this market works? 
 
6. Valorization (Value adding to) of Biodiversity 
 
In this context the valorization of biodiversity refers to the development of valorization strategies 
at the national level especially in provider countries that can help add value to their biodiversity as 
it goes up the value chain within the country and to the market. 
 
In other words do we know the value of our genetic resources? If not what do we need to have in 
place that can help us add more value to our resources so that we do not only provide raw 
materials, but that we add value and thus can negotiate more benefits that further serve as 
incentive for conservation? 
 
 
7. Social Capital 
 
This refers to the need to build trust between and amongst the players in the ABS sector. ABS 
transactions are long-term contractual relations between academia, government, and private 
sector both within and outside Namibia and for these relationships to last trust building is 
necessary. 
 359 
 
8. Information Asymmetry 
 
Information assymetry refers to the imbalance of power in negotiations and transactions of ABS 
agreements because one party has more or better information than the other. This imbalance can 
result in the transaction being influenced negatively and can result in the contract or agreement 
not being entered into. 
The problem of uncertain product quality in the market for traditional knowledge-related 
information and tangible genetic resources where the quality of genetic resources samples or the 
reliability of the traditional knowledge-based information or both can only be verified after the good 
has been traded, leads to problems of information asymmetries and  in extreme cases, to a 
breakdown of market exchange. 
 
Therefore what needs to be in place at the national level to deal with these imbalance of 
power to ensure that agreements are reached and benefits flow? 
 
Please answer the following questions below and explain your answer as appropriate. 
 
1.The beginnings of the ABS Dialogue (1990- 1995) 
 
 Good governance structure 
 Assigning property rights and intellectual property rights 
 
1.What legislative measures were put in place that set the framework for the ABS dialogue to be 
set in Namibia? 
 
2.Does our governance structure increase legal certainty i.e. investor feel secure to invest as the 
relevant laws are there to govern ABS transactions? 
 
3.Who legally owns genetic resources? 
 
4.Who owns Traditional Knowledge in Namibia? 
 
5. What lessons have we learned with regard to good governance structures in Namibia? 
 
 
2. Experience on ABS five years after independence and the beginning of the dialogue (1995-
2000) 
 
 Administrative Structures and bureaucratic procedures 
 Time lags to benefit sharing 
 
1.Would you say that the way Namibia has been implementing legislation contributes to 
administrative efficiency in the environmental and ABS sector? 
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2. Are the institutions that governs the environmental sector efficient and effective? 
 
3.Would you say that the CBNRM programme in Namibia set the frame for ABS related work? 
 
4.What lessons have been generated by CBNRM and other programs in Namibia with regard 
to the sharing of benefits and the time it takes to generate benefits? 
 
5.In terms of managing expectations with regard to benefit sharing what lessons have been 
learned? 
 
 
3.  Informed decisions 15 years after independence (2000-2005) 
 Market Structure of ABS 
 Valorization of Biodiversity 
 
1. Do you think that the frameworks and experience of the first two time frames helped us to 
make informed decisions with regard to ABS in Namibia? Have we involved industry to its full 
potential? 
 
2. Have we in the process of implementing legislation in Namibia come to understand the market 
structure of the sectors that we are attempting to regulate e.g. CBNRM, water sector, mining 
sector, agricultural sector? Are there lessons that are important for ABS and its market structure? 
 
3. What role can technology transfer and capacity building play in ABS 
implementation? 
 
4.What has been our experience with the valorisation of Namibia’s biodiversity since 
independence? Are there lessons learned? 
 
5. What is the role of the private sector and other stakeholders in valorisation of biodiversity within 
the context of ABS? 
 
 
4. Current state of affairs with ABS (2005 – 
2012) 
 Social Capital 
 Information Asymmetry 
 
 
 
1. Do you agree that firms really have misrepresented the value of the end product or the extent 
of usage of traditional knowledge to communities and access authorities and sometimes also 
purposefully failed to disclose the true value of such inputs to the research process? 
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Communities may have no market related knowledge of the value of their TK and resources? 
 
 
2.  How has Namibia dealt with the issue of information asymmetry over the years? 
 
 
3.  What lessons have we learned? 
 
 
4.  Do you agree that it is essential to build trust between all players in the ABS field not 
only in Namibia but also internationally? Are there lessons learned from the other sectors 
such as CBNRM, biosafety, and fisheries over the years in Namibia? 
 
 
5.  Has Namibia gained the trust of stakeholders both within and outside the country? 
 
 
6. Do you believe that social capital can contribute to ABS implementation nationally and 
internationally? 
 
 
7.  What lessons have we learned over the years in terms of building social capital? 
 
Thank you for the taking the time to complete this 
questionnaire 
 
Sem T 
Shikongo 
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Appendix 13 ABS Excerpts From The Namibian National 
Biodiversity Strategy And Action Plan (NBSAP) 
 
APPENDIX 8.1 
Excerpt from the Biodiversity and Development in Namibia – Namibia’s ten year 
strategic plan for sustainable development through biodiversity conservation 2001-
2010 
 
The appendix reflects only the strategic actions relevant to biotrade and bioprospecting 
 
Strategic Aim 2.5 
Promote and control bioprospecting and biotrade to generate sustainable benefits for Namibia 
 
a) Improve national and local capacity to benefit from and control biotrade 
 
Key activities are the development of national scientific facilities and private enterprises 
to add value to genetic resources; the identification of additional biological resources 
for potential trade and product development; a baseline study of the current and 
potential genetic resources industry; the development of local negotiations skills in 
order to facilitate fair, informed and mutually beneficial agreements; and the promotion 
of mechanisms for the sustainable economic use of natural resources 
 
Targets: All Namibian stakeholders in the development of new biotrade agreements 
are equipped with relevant negotiations and monitoring skills by 2003, three new value 
addition enterprises are established. 
 
b) Raise public and political awareness of issues, costs and benefits of biotrade 
and bioprospecting 
 
This will require information and training on the new policy and legislation at grassroots, 
NGO, regulatory agency and political levels, using prepared materials; a national 
workshop to educate stakeholders on intellectual property issues; the assessment of 
training needs, institutions and candidates for focused training in regulatory, research 
and community aspects; and the integration of issues into tertiary curricula. 
 
Targets: Awareness materials are compiled and distributed to target audiences, with 
the training and information policy and legislation, by December 2003 
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c) Promote effective cooperation at relevant levels 
 
There has recently been vastly improved networking on these issues between key 
stakeholders at national and international levels. This promotes research and 
development, the harmonization of national frameworks within the SADC region, and 
regulatory efficiency. Local level networking needs further emphasis. 
 
Targets: Namibian legislation on access to genetic resources harmonized with existing 
SADC frameworks by December 2005; contact established with key research and 
development institutions by mid - 2002 
 
Strategic Aim 6.6 
Build awareness and strengthen capacity to regulate and promote marine bioprospecting in 
line with national policy and legislation 
 
Marine organisms, especially invertebrates of the sea floor, are increasingly under the spotlight 
of the pharmaceutical and agrochemical industries. Namibia needs to control and, where 
desirable, promote this largely unseen bioprospecting activity, and ensure that revenues are 
locally shared. 
 
Targets: A focused study of marine bioprospecting in Namibia is completed by September 
2003; a consultative strategy for the promotion, collaboration and regulation of bioprospecting 
activities is ready by December 2003. 
 
Strategic Aim 9.4 
Strengthen communities to participate as equal partners, e.g. in biotrade and bioprospecting 
 
a) Develop an equitable benefit-sharing framework 
Communities are the main custodians and users of biodiversity and should be seen as 
equal partners in biodiversity management. Communities need to share equitably in 
the benefits arising from the use of their knowledge, innovations and practices relevant 
to the conservation of biodiversity. 
 
Targets: The Access to Genetic Resources and Related Traditional Knowledge Bill is 
enacted, and awareness workshops on its provisions are held in all regions, by June 
2003  
 
b) Promote mechanisms for communities to share their knowledge with other 
partners 
 
Communities have a wide range of knowledge innovations and practices that are 
relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. Such knowledge 
systems should be promoted for wider application with the prior informed consent (PIC) 
of such communities. 
 
Targets: Existing customary codes of ethical conduct are identified and appropriate models of 
conduct for research, access to knowledge, and information management on indigenous 
knowledge systems are developed by 2005 
